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Abstract
This thesis argues that Hobson’s approach to international relations coheres around his use of 
the biological analogy of society to an organism. An aspect of this ‘organic analogy’ - the 
theory of surplus value - is central to Hobson’s m odification o f liberal thinking on 
international relations and his reform ulated ‘new liberal internationalism ’.
The first part outlines a theoretical fram ework for Hobson’s discussion o f international 
relations. His theory of surplus value posits cooperation as a factor in the production of value 
understood as human welfare. The organic analogy links this theory of surplus value to 
Hobson’s holistic ‘sociology’. Hobson’s new liberal internationalism  is an extension o f his 
organic theory of surplus value. This approach is contrasted to the domestic analogy and 
economism as bases of liberal internationalist thought.
The second part examines Hobson’s ‘sociology’ of international relations. Hobson’s 
theory of imperialism is placed in the context of his theory of surplus value. Imperialism is 
sectionalism in the international system. For Hobson, internationalism  advances from  the 
isolation of the pre-industrial era, through the noninterventionism  of Cobden, to positive 
internationalism , including some international economic management. Hobson’s proposals for 
international government rely on the domestic analogy. A broader vision of world society, 
however, emerges from the extension of the organic analogy to international relations.
The third part locates Hobson in international relations scholarship. Hobson’s work is 
not straightforw ardly idealist. His new liberal internationalism  modifies liberal thought 
towards institutional solutions to international problems. It is concluded that some aspects of 
his analysis remain of interest to the contemporary international relations theorist.
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PART ONE
Chapter One 
Introduction
This thesis critically examines the approach to international relations in the writings of J.A. 
Hobson. Hobson was a w riter, a journalist, a lecturer, a political activist, and propagandist for 
a group o f left liberals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He is famous in 
international relations for originating the theory o f imperialism subsequently adopted by 
Lenin. Focusing on Hobson’s writings on international relations, the thesis explores the 
theoretical structure and tensions in Hobson’s international theory; his analysis of, and 
concrete proposals for, contemporary international relations; and the social, political and 
economic theory that underlies his approach to international relations.
Hobson’s fram ew ork for analysing international relations is a new liberal m odification 
of liberal internationalism , Hobson’s new liberal internationalism  entails the application o f his 
theory o f cooperative surplus beyond the boundaries of national societies and of his idea of 
an organic unity to international relations and the world economy. Hobson’s new liberal 
internationalism  suggests that international relations and the world society as a whole is, like 
the several national societies, shifting away from laissez fa ire  and individualism , towards 
increased social organisation and collectivism. The thesis draws on recent work in political 
theory and the history of political ideas on Hobson to develop his fram ew ork for international 
relations.
The thesis demonstrates that Hobson’s international relations are an integral part and 
an extension of his analysis of social, political and economic life. The coherence (and the 
problems) of his international thought follow from the consonance of his international theories 
with his writings on domestic matters. For instance, the all-encom passing dichotomy of 
internationalism  and imperialism in Hobson’s writings on international affairs is the dual 
aspect of his theory of the social surplus. While internationalism  is associated with peace and 
democracy, through rational conscious collective control of social (international) life by the 
people (nations), imperialism connotes militarism and dictatorship, through the imposition of 
rule by a powerful sectional interest w ithin the national (international) social organism.
The thesis assesses the im portant contributions Hobson made to international theory, 
in the theory of imperialism but also beyond, that have been overlooked. This includes, first, 
a reassessment of Hobson’s theory of imperialism in international relations scholarship.
especially recent work on hegemonic stability theory. The prevalent opinion of Hobson’s 
imperialism  theory as ‘second image reductionism ’ and ‘economic determ inism ’ is also refuted. 
Hobson was an im portant figure in the transform ation of liberal internationalism , as he was 
with liberalism in domestic society. He was a forerunner of the functionalist approach to 
international organization. He was a theoretical and historical link between classical and 
‘em bedded’ liberalisms and a m ajor mover in the shift away from  free trade and classical 
liberal international political economy. He can also be interpreted as an alternative to the 
curren t agenda fo r liberalism  in international relations.
Finally, the thesis examines the theoretical tensions that appear in Hobson’s writings 
on international relations and a num ber o f the criticisms of Hobson’s international theory. 
Hobson’s writings on international relations are particularly open to the charge of being too 
abstract, o f relying heavily on a problematic domestic analogy and of being imbued with an 
economic determ inism .
In addressing the theoretical issues in Hobson’s discussion of international relations, 
the thesis is none o f the following things: a chronology of Hobson’s thought on international 
relations; a study o f Hobson’s international relations in terms o f the great events of his 
lifetim e, e.g., the Boer War, the G reat War and the Great Depression; a consideration of the 
specifics or the policy implications of Hobson’s proposals on international economic issues, 
like tariffs; or a discussion of the theory of imperialism beyond Hobson’s contribution to it. 
The thesis also excludes an examination of issues that bear on Hobson’s discussion of 
international relations but are not intrinsic to it, such as the population question and the 
notion of the ‘dem ocratic control of foreign policy’. There is, furtherm ore, only a brief 
excursion into the genealogy of Hobson’s argum ents, e.g., his intellectual forebears, Cobden, 
M ill, R uskin, and the influence he had on later international theory, such as functionalism  
and im perialism , in the concluding chapter.
The thesis is divided into three parts containing eight chapters. The theoretical 
fram ew ork for Hobson’s approach to international relations is set out in part one. Hobson’s 
theoretical analysis of social, political and economic life, discussed in chapter two, is the basis 
fo r a fram ew ork o f four types of international system, examined in chapter three.
Part two critically examines the theoretical issues underlying Hobson’s writings on 
international relations. Chapter four challenges the orthodox interpretation of Hobson’s theory 
of imperialism  in international relations. Chapter five traces the tension in Hobson’s economic 
internationalism  between his defence o f free trade and his interventionist constructive 
internationalism . Chapter six examines the conflicting logics behind Hobson’s proposals for
international government.
Part three considers Hobson in the context of and his contribution to international 
relations scholarship. Chapter seven locates Hobson within the idealist approach to 
international relations. Hobson’s place in the liberal tradition o f international thought is 
considered in the concluding chapter.
I turn now, however, to a brief sketch of Hobson’s background and writings before 
surveying the scholarly literature on Hobson.
Biographical Sketch
John Atkinson Hobson was born in Derby on 6 July 1858, the second son of newspaper 
proprietor and local Liberal lum inary, William Hobson. The young Hobson was sent to the 
local grammar school before obtaining an open scholarship to Lincoln College, Oxford in 
1876. G raduating from Oxford in 1880, Hobson was a school teacher in Faversham , until 
1882, and in Exeter, from 1882 until he left for a life of journalism  in London in 1887. In 
Exeter, Hobson met his fu ture wife, Florence Edgar, an Am erican, and A.F. M ummery, a 
businessman and m ountaineer, with whom Hobson co-w rote his first book. The Physiology 
o f  Industry}
Hobson’s move to London brought him into contact with a variety of radical 
intellectuals and groups. He was a member of the London Ethical Society from  1890 to 1895, 
when he left to join the more radical South Place Ethical Society. In 1894, he was a founder- 
member of a meeting club of radical intellectuals and politicians called the Rainbow Circle. 
For most of the rest of his life, the Rainbow Circle and the South Place Ethical Society 
provided congenial fora in which Hobson could develop his ideas and have them  subjected
 ^ Accounts of Hobson’s life and work can be found in Hobson’s autobiography. Confessions o f  
an Economic Heretic; A.J.F. Lee, ‘The Social and Economic Thought of J.A. Hobson’, ch. 1, and 
‘Hobson, John Atkinson (1858-1940) Economist and Journalist’, pp. 176-81; J.A. Townshend, J.A. 
Hobson and the Crisis of Liberalism ’, pp. 7-13, and ‘Introduction’, Imperialism : A Study^ 1988 
reprin t of 1938 edn., pp. [11]-[14]; J. A llett, New Liberalism: The Political Economy o f  J.A. Hobson^ 
ch. 1; R.H. Tawney, ‘Hobson, John Atkinson’, pp. 435-6; Michael Freeden, ‘Introduction’, in J.A. 
Hobson: A Reader, pp. 2-4, ‘Introduction’, in Reappraising J.A. Hobson: Humanism and Welfare, pp. 
1-10, and ‘Introduction’, in Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic, 1974 reprint, pp. v-xiv; P.F. Clarke, 
‘Introduction’, in The Crisis o f  Liberalism , 1974 reprint, pp. ix-xxxviii; and H.N. Brailsford, ‘The 
Life-w ork of J.A. Hobson’. It is also worthy of mention that, in Exeter, Hobson taught at the author’s 
old school.
8to sympathetic criticism.^
Im perial and international affairs influenced the development of Hobson’s liberal 
thought. An early significant turning point in his career was an invitation in 1899 from  C.P. 
Scott, editor o f the Manchester Guardian^ for Hobson to go to South A frica to report for the 
paper on the turbulent political situation in that country.^ In South A frica, Hobson became 
convinced o f the m ine-ow ners’ conspiracy and the m anipulation of politics. He returned to 
England to, among other things, a ‘Welcome Home’ dinner at the National Liberal Club, co­
chaired by David Lloyd George. However, the an ti-w ar, anti-im perialist lecture tour of the 
country on which Hobson subsequently embarked had its meetings frequently disrupted or 
broken up by jingoistic mobs. In the next couple of years, as part o f his an ti-w ar 
campaigning, Hobson published a collection of his reports for the Manchester Guardian in 
book-form  as The War in South A frica  in 1900; spelled out his response to the unpleasant 
reception o f his an ti-w ar views in The Psychology o f  Jingoism  in 1901; and analysed the 
phenomenon o f imperialism  at greater length in Imperialism : A S tudy  in 1902.
Hobson’s main occupation, besides writing books, was journalism . Hobson propounded 
his views through the medium of the liberal periodicals. While the high point of his 
journalistic career was his contribution to the Nation from 1907 to 1923 under the editorship 
of H.W. M assingham, he also contributed to numerous journals - far too many list here - but 
notably to the Ethical World, the Progressive Review, the Contemporary Review, the 
Manchester Guardian, the Tribune, the New Leader, the New York Nation, and the New 
Republic.^
When he first arrived in London, Hobson was a University Extension Lecturer for 
Oxford and London Universities. Though he lectured two courses at the London School of 
Economics, his university lecturing was to play less of a role after his inheritance from  his 
father’s estate gave him sufficient income to allow him to concentrate on his books and 
journalism . The poor reception of the economic heresies of his first book had resulted in an 
exclusion from  academic life. Hobson was not invited to a university post until late in his life.
 ^Michael Freeden (ed.). The Minutes o f  the Rainbow Circle, 1894-1924, lists Hobson’s talks to this 
group from its inception to 1923.
® Confessions, p. 59-61.
 ^For the most comprehensive list of articles Hobson contributed to journals and newspapers, see 
A.J.F. Lee, ‘The Economic and Social Thought of J.A. Hobson’, pp. 676-713.
9when he turned down an offer from the University o f M anchester due to ill health.^ He 
continued to lecture at South Place, however, and was a frequent speaker to a wide variety 
of groups.® He also travelled abroad a num ber of times, for example, Denm ark, Switzerland, 
the U nited States and Canada, to research for books and on lecture tours.
Hobson was a political activist until the last decade o f his life in the 1930s. Many of 
the groups in which he was involved were concerned, at least indirectly, with international 
issues. Prior to the First World War, besides his political activity during the Boer War, Hobson 
was a member o f the Free Trade Union and the International A rbitration League. In the 
summer of 1914, Hobson and others set up the British N eutrality Committee to campaign 
against British intervention in a European war, just in time to hear G rey make the speech that 
comm itted Britain to defend Belgium militarily.^ During the War he campaigned for an early, 
negotiated peace settlem ent, and against a num ber of the restrictions of civil liberties imposed 
by the National Governm ent in the name of the war effort.® Hobson was a member of the 
Bryce Committee, set up to investigate possible arrangements for a post-w ar international 
order. His Towards International Government was Hobson’s dissenting opinion from that 
comm ittee’s deliberations. He was also a member of a num ber of peace groups, by far the 
most significant of which was the U.D.C. Hobson contributed the U.D.C.’s F ifth  Cardinal 
Point, wrote a num ber of U.D.C. pamphlets, such as A League o f  Nations, Labour and the 
Costs o f  War and A New Holy Alliance, and was on the executive committee for over a quarter 
of a century.®
The U.D.C. was to influence Hobson’s politics, though more his affiliations than his
® Reputedly, this was in part because of the unfortunate impact of Hobson’s first book. The 
Physiology o f  Industry. See Confessions, pp. 29-31. For an alternative interpretation of this episode, 
see Alon Kadish, ‘The non-canonical context of The Physiology o f  Industry' and ‘Rewriting the 
Confessions’.
® See the various incarnations of the journal of the South Place Ethical Society for reports of 
Hobson’s talks there, A couple of Hobson’s speeches appeared as pamphlets, for instance, ‘Poverty’, 
a speech given at the South Sectional Conference, and a speech given to the National Union of 
Gasworkers; Industrial Unrest, given at the National Liberal Club; and Rationalism and Humanism, 
a Conway Memorial Lecture.
 ^See Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, pp. 164-9
® See his four part series on ‘The War and British Liberties’, Nation (Vol. 19), pp. 68-9, 123-5, 
307-8, 524-5
® On the U.D.C., see M arvin Swartz, The Union o f  Democratic Control in British Politics During 
the First World War.
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ideas. Having become increasingly disillusioned with the Liberal Party, Hobson resigned from 
the party over the proposed abandonm ent of free trade by the Governm ent in the Paris allied 
negotiations in 1916. In the U.D.C., Hobson had made the acquaintance o f Labour politicians 
and intellectuals. Hobson him self joined the Labour Party in 1924, though, by Hobson’s own 
admission, he never really felt ’at home’ there.
A fter the War, Hobson’s wrote increasingly on international affairs. Like Keynes and 
other Liberals, he opposed the Versailles Treaty, especially the economic provisions such as 
reparations p a y m e n ts .H e  was a regular contributor to the U.D.C. journal. Foreign A ffa irs . 
He attended meetings at Chatham  House.^^ He continued to give lectures and talks at South 
Place, the Rainbow Circle and to be chairman of the U.D.C. after the war. He was an 
im portant figure in the 1917 Club. By this time, Hobson was a regular witness to and 
participant on expert comm ittees, both for government and for the Official and Independent 
Labour Party, dealing with practical economic matters such as industrial relations. He 
contributed to the I.L.P. policy statem ent. The Living Wage. He was also a member of the 
I.L.P. Advisory Com m ittee on International Relations.
By the 1930s Hobson was into his seventies. Though he was by now attracting disciples 
both in politics and academe, he had outlived many of his closest friends and associates. 
Nevertheless, his writing continued apace, though his political activism tapered off. Hobson 
opposed the rise of dictatorship in the thirties, and was a critic of appeasement.^^ He called 
for the greater involvem ent by the US in world affairs and his last paper pleaded for the early
10 Confessions., pp. 123-6.
Compare his The Economics o f  Reparation and The Obstacles to Economic Recovery in Europe 
with J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences o f  the Peace.
David M itrany is mistaken when he claims that Hobson was excluded from  the new 
international relations institute at Chatham House. Hobson did attend a num ber of meetings and there 
is a record o f his comments on one talk in International A ffa irs  (Vol. 10, No. 3, May 1931), p. 303. 
See M itrany’s ‘The M aking o f the Functional Theory: A M emoir’ in A Functional Theory o f  Politics, 
p. 39.
Hobson was a m em ber of the Advisory Committee of the Labour Party on International 
Questions, the Whitley Com m ittee, Reconstruction sub-com m ittee on Trusts. He was a witness to the 
Sankey Coal Commission.
14 See the prefaces to Democracy and A Changing Civilisation and Property and Improperty.
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intervention o f the U nited States in the Second World War.^^ Hobson died at his home on 
1 A pril 1940 at the age of 81.^®
Hobson’s wrote over thirty  books on a wide range of topics. Often they were compiled 
from  journal articles, lectures and talks, either at South Place or the Rainbow Circle, or as 
part o f his political campaigning. Even his autobiography was first aired at South Place. 
Sometimes these collections had a strong theme, as with The Social Problem^ Imperialism  and 
The Crisis o f  Liberalism . Others were selections of Hobson’s newspaper reports from  abroad, 
some on Hobson’s travels, like The War in South A frica  and Canada Today^ others on current 
issues, such as A Modern Outlook. Offers to write books occasionally came from  friends or 
through connections in the Ethical M ovement, the origins o f  both The Evolution o f  Modern 
Capitalism  and John Ruskin Social Reformer. Hobson wrote biographies of John Ruskin, 
R ichard Cobden and Thorstein Veblen, and the co-edited collections of work by L.T. 
Hobhouse and William Clarke. All of the subjects were m ajor influences on Hobson’s 
thinking.
Hobson’s writings on international relations are scattered through his writings. His 
concern with international affairs, beginning with the Boer War, continued, his writings 
becoming more concrete, explicit and sophisticated. During the period under discussion, 
1890-1940, many scholars began to consider international affairs and look at the international 
perspective or dimension of domestic issues. As with many others, the Boer and G reat Wars 
stim ulated Hobson’s interest, yet gave a traum atic jolt to his optimistic belief in hum anity’s 
rationality. As a liberal journalist, Hobson m odified his theories and his ideological 
orientation with the current of events, yet interpreted those events through the prism of his 
liberal ideological and theoretical fram ework. An im portant problematic for Hobson had been 
what he described as the social problem, the requirem ent for social solutions to the problems 
o f poverty and unemployment. International relations appears briefly in Hobson’s early 
writings on these issues. However, international relations were not seen so much as a problem 
in and o f themselves as a background to a specific domestic social problem. Especially after
‘Am erica in the War?’, South Place M onthly Record (December 1939), pp. 3-4.
See the obituaries by G.D.H. Cole, ‘J.A. Hobson, 1858-1940), pp. 351-60; C D. Burns, ‘J.A. 
Hobson: The Hum anist’, p. 3; C. Delisle Burns, ‘J.A. Hobson’.
Throughout the thesis, I shall refer to Hobson’s books without naming Hobson. In any case 
where I refer to other authors, I refer to those authors by name. Any reference to Im perialism  is to 
the th ird  edition, reprinted with a new introduction in 1988; and to The Evolution o f  Modern 
Capitalism  is to the fourth edition, unless indicated otherwise.
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the G reat War, the ‘Bad Peace’ and the disruption of in ter-w ar international relations, Hobson 
began concentrate more on international relations as a problem in itself. There was, in other 
words, an international problem , parallel to the social problem.
L iterature Survey
U ntil recently it was true to say that Hobson was both neglected and well-known.^® There 
was a great deal o f analysis, particularly by economic historians and M arxist scholars, of 
Hobson’s theory of imperialism. There was, though, little analysis of Hobson’s work as a 
whole; only a b rief account in a lecture given by Hobson’s friend , H.N. Brailsford.^® 
However, since the publication of Bernard Porter’s ground-breaking study. Critics o f  Empire 
in 1968 and A.J.F. Lee’s 1970 PhD thesis on Hobson, there has been a burgeoning literature 
on Hobson, as well as the turn  of the century new liberalism of which he was a key figure.^® 
M uch of this recent work has been conducted in the history of ideas, while studies of Hobson 
in international relations are largely derivative earlier work on the theory of imperialism. The 
in terpretation o f Hobson’s contribution to international theory is dom inated by K enneth 
Waltz’s evaluation o f Hobson’s ideas on the causes o f war and the theory of imperialism.^^ 
The focus in this thesis on Hobson’s international theory provides a counterweight to the 
neglect or marginalisation his discussion of international relations have received. The large 
num ber o f studies on the theory of imperialism, when they assess Hobson’s theory have rarely 
integrated this discussion with an analysis of Hobson’s other social, political and economic 
w ritings or attem pted to reconcile Hobson’s theory of imperialism with the rest of his writings 
on international relations. On the other hand, the scholarly studies o f Hobson have tended to 
relegate his writings on international matters, with the exception of the theory o f imperialism, 
to the status of an afterthought.
®^ P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism , 1898-1914’, p. 565; 
A.J.F. Lee comments in 1970 on the lack of significant work on Hobson’s writings as a whole in the 
Introduction to his A Study o f the Social and Economic Thought of J.A. Hobson’,
H.N. Brailsford, The L ife -w ork  o f  J.A. Hobson.
The most recent work includes Michael Freeden (ed.), J.A. Hobson: A Reader and Reappraising 
J.A. Hobson: Humanism and Welfare^ and a collection o f papers from a conference on Hobson held 
in M alvern in May 1990 to be edited by John Pheby.
K.N. Waltz, Man, the State and War and Theory o f  International Politics.
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Intellectual History
Among those who have studied Hobson’s life and work, there is agreement on two 
matters. First, Hobson’s corpus of work can be understood through a couple of central 
concepts: organic and surplus. Second, Hobson’s theory of imperialism is better understood 
as a facet of his general social philosophy than a separate from it as a contribution to the 
theories o f imperialism.^^ A.J.F Lee’s PhD thesis, ‘The Social and Economic Thought o f J.A. 
Hobson’, is the most detailed historical account o f Hobson’s life and work. Lee claims that 
Hobson’s work coheres around the concept of surplus and organises his study around that 
theme. Though more theoretically oriented and them atically organised, John Allett’s New  
Liberalism: The Political Economy o f  J.A. Hobson also concentrates on what Allett calls 
Hobson’s ‘theory of the organic generation of surplus value’.^  ^ Julian Townshend disagrees 
with this assessment of the overall coherence of Hobson’s work. In his PhD thesis, ‘J.A. 
Hobson and the Crisis of Liberalism’ and in later work, Townshend emphasises the historical 
context to Hobson’s thought and accuses Hobson of eclecticism and inconsistency.
Much of Peter Clarke’s study of Hobson for his book Liberals and Social Democrats 
is summarised in his introduction to the 1974 edition of Hobson’s The Crisis o f  Liberalism. 
Clarke’s historical treatise is an enjoyable anecdotal study, mainly discussing Hobson, L.T. 
Hobhouse, J.L. Hammond and his wife Mary, and Graham  Wallas, with a powerful defence 
of Hobson as a flawed but im portant thinker in a group of radical liberals and social 
democrats that indirectly but significantly influenced liberal ideology and the social policy 
debate in B r i t a in .P e t e r  Weiler’s study stresses the change from laissez faire to state 
intervention in the new liberalism. As well as Hobson, he examines the work of L.T. 
Hobhouse, C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian and H.W. Massingham of the N ation}^  
Covering the same time frame as Clarke, Michael Freeden insists that Hobson is a m uch- 
neglected m ajor liberal thinker whose importance derives from  his m odification of liberalism 
by the use of the organic analogy. Freeden has written two m ajor studies o f the new liberalism 
in which Hobson features significantly, and has edited and introduced Hobson’s Confessions,
Bernard Porter’s Critics o f  Empire is a paradigm of the historical examination o f Hobson’s 
theory of imperialism as part of his social and economic thought.
J. A llett, New Liberalism: The Political Economy o f  J.A. Hobson.
P.F. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats.
Peter Weiler, New Liberalism: English Social Theory in Great Britain, 1889-1914.
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as well as a collection o f Hobson’s writings and a collection o f research papers on Hobson. 
Freeden has also edited the Rainbow Circle minutes in which Hobson appears frequently as 
a speaker.^®
All of the studies of Hobson’s work discuss Hobson’s theory of imperialism  and his 
writings on international affairs, such as free trade, the First World War and the League of 
Nations.^^ However, Hobson’s writings on imperialism and international relations generally 
are considered together. Further, it has been argued that Hobson’s theoretical development 
was all but complete by the turn  of the century.^® The implication of this is that Hobson’s 
ideas on international relations are simply a practical application of Hobson’s completed 
social, economic and political theories, as with issues such as unemployment and taxation. 
Hobson’s argum ents for internationalism , a predom inant concern towards the end of his life, 
is a marginal concern for most Hobson s c h o la r s .T h e s e  writers concentrate on Hobson’s 
gloomy prognosis of contem porary international relations, exemplified by his writings on 
imperialism , which looms larger in his earlier writings where his theoretical approach is 
considered to have been forged.
For Freeden, Hobson’s internationalism derived, as it did for other liberals at the time, 
from  liberal principles ‘writ large’ applied to international affairs.®® This, like Porter’s study 
of Hobson’s internationalism , demonstrates that Hobson’s constructive writings on 
international relations were less prescient than his critical analysis of imperialism.®^
Underconsumption and Economic Theory
Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism", Liberalism Divided", (ed.), J.A. Hobson: A Reader, (ed.). 
The Minutes o f  the Rainbow Circle", (ed.). Reappraising J.A Hobson.
With the exception o f Weiler who explicitly excludes imperialism from  his discussion.
See P.F. C larke, ‘In troduction’, The Crisis o f  Liberalism, 1974 reprint, p. xix.
Lee, Allett, and Freeden all collapse Hobson’s international relations into one chapter towards 
the end o f the study with imperialism  predom inating. See the Lee, ‘The Social and Economic Thought 
o f J.A. Hobson’, ch. 8; A llett, New Liberalism, ch. 5; Freeden (ed.), J.A. Hobson: A Reader, ch. 4. 
While Townshend devotes more space to imperialism and Hobson’s international relations, imperialism 
is even more to the fo refron t, see ‘The Crisis of Liberalism ’, chs. 8-9.
®® M. Freeden, Liberalism  Divided, pp. 365.
®^ Bernard Porter, ‘Hobson and Internationalism ’, in Freeden (ed.). Reappraising J.A. Hobson.
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While Hobson scholars emphasise the importance of a focus on Hobson’s work as a 
whole, there have been a num ber of studies of Hobson’s underconsum ption theory and his 
theory of imperialism that do not discuss the rest of his work.
U nfortunately, Hobson nowadays attracts little attention from  economists. The decline 
o f interest can be accounted for by Hobson’s opposition to the mathématisation of economics 
and the so-called marginal revolution, and the decline in the institutionalism  that Hobson 
might most closely be associated with. Hobson’s version of welfare economics has not taken 
root in the discipline and he is less likely to be considered an economist now than he was 
during his lifetime.®^ J.M. Keynes’s famed dscususion o f Hobson’s underconsum ption theory 
in his General Theory o f  Employment, Interest and Money was also something of a mixed 
blessing. While he applauded Mummery and Hobson’s underconsum ption theory as m arking 
‘an epoch in economic thought’, Keynes claimed that he had exposed the root of Hobson’s 
mistake. In short, for economists, Keynes definitively transcended Hobson’s analysis of 
unemployment, depression and trade cycles in economic theory.®^
Subsequent studies have complained of Hobson’s defective understandings of the role 
of the interest rate, of money and credit, his failure to distinguish between saving and 
investment, the vagueness of his concept of surplus, his neglect o f the distinction of positive 
and normative economics, the ‘theological terminology’ of his discussion of the ‘social 
organism’, the inadequacies of his theory of underconsum ption, and his lack of academic 
rigour and anti-academ ic bias. E.E. Nemmers and Michael Bleaney, following the Keynesian 
critique, have examined Hobson’s theory of underconsum ption. Proposing that it is possible 
to separate Hobson’s theories of underconsum ption, taxation and imperialism from his welfare 
economics, Nemmers outlines four phases in Hobson’s writings on economics according to his 
attitude to underconsum ption. Wesley Mitchell and William Liu analyse Hobson’s welfare 
economics and find it stimulating but wanting. Wesley C. M itchell, a sympathetic critic of 
Hobson, condemns him for his vagueness and failure to supply a working definition o f his 
central concept, welfare. Paul Homan gives a review of the context of Hobson’s work and 
Hobson’s own background, before exploring the developm ent o f his theory o f the 
unproductive surplus. Roy Harrod critically assesses Hobson’s theory of surplus and finds it
Though he is included in M ark Blaug’s Great Economists Before Keynes,, pp. 93-5. Similar 
revision has befallen Thorstein Veblen.
M ark Blaug denies the theoretical link of Hobson to Keynes, see Economic Theory in Retrospect, 
p. 665, and Great Economists Before Keynes, p. 94. See also John R. Commons review, ‘Hobson’s 
"Economics o f Unemployment"’, American Economic Review  (Vol. 13, No. 4, Dec. 1923), pp. 644-7.
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wanting because it is too vague.^^
These studies, while enlightening on the theoretical deficiencies of Hobson’s 
economics, have treated his economic theories in isolation from his other work and from his 
social philosophy that integrates economics, politics, and sociology under ethics.
The Theory o f  Imperialisn'i
There have been many books and articles on the theory of imperialism. This has been 
the largest area o f discussion o f Hobson. Both because of this, and because imperialism  theory 
is particularly relevant to Hobson’s approach to international relations, I shall devote some 
space to it. The studies of Hobson’s contribution to the origin and structure of the theory have 
come from  almost every conceivable methodological, theoretical and ideological standpoint. 
Most of this work has been done by the intellectual historians, economic historians and 
M arxist scholars. Specialists of international relations, with the exception of K enneth Waltz 
and Charles Reynolds, have been content to adopt the conclusions of the work from  other 
disciplines.
The main issues in the discussions of Hobson’s contribution to the theory of 
imperialism  have been the shape and m ajor components of the classical theory of imperialism 
originated by Hobson and refined by Lenin, the distinction or otherwise between Hobson and 
Lenin (or the extent of Hobson’s influence on Lenin), the facts of the imperial expansion, and 
the nature o f the explanation in the theory.
R ichard K oebner has claimed that Hobson systematised an anti-im perialist sentim ent 
o f the turn  o f the century, and took the Cobdenite critique o f foreign policy onto ‘another 
historical level’ by identifying capitalists as the guilty party.®® While some have doubts as
E.E. Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption^ pp. 32-3, 48, 66, 8 6 //; Paul T. Homan, 
Contemporary Economic Thought, p. 364-8; T.W. Hutchinson, Review o f  Economic Doctrines, p. 118- 
29; Michael Bleaney, Underconsumption Theories: A History and Critical Analysis, ch. 8; William Liu, 
The Welfare Economics o f  J.A . Hobson’, Wesley C. M itchell, Lecture Notes on Types o f  Economic 
Theory, chs. 37-39; Roy H arrod, ‘Epilogue’, The Science o f  Wealth, 4th Edn.; J.M. Keynes, review 
o f Hobson’s Gold, Prices and Wages in Economic Articles and Correspondence: Academic, p. 388-94. 
For other general considerations o f Hobson’s economics, see John M. Ferguson, Landm arks o f  
Economic Thought, 2nd Edn., pp. 197-203; Joseph A. Schumpeter, History o f  Economic Analysis, pp. 
832-3, 1130; Philip Charles Newman, ‘John A. Hobson and Heterodox Economics in Britain’, in The 
Development o f  Economic Thought, ch. 29.
®® Richard K oebner, ‘The Concept of Economic Imperialism’, in K enneth Boulding and Tapan 
M ukherjee (eds.). Economic Im perialism : A Book o f  Readings, p. 93-4.
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to the validity of identifying an ‘economic imperialism’ at all, there has been a large literature 
on the basic elements of that theory. Norman Etherington points to the connection between 
Hobson’s Imperialism  and American writings on the Spanish-Am erican War. His contention 
that the link of trusts to imperialism was taken from Gaylord Wilshire and that it was central 
to his theory has been challenged by Peter Cain. Cain has, over a num ber of articles, defended 
the view of Hobson’s original form ulation of the theory in Imperialism  as a contradictory but 
innovative approach that was subsequently dropped by Hobson in favour of a more 
straightforw ardly Cobdenite position. This is challenged by P.F. Clarke, who points out that 
Hobson’s theory of imperialism is a collection of diverse influences that does not necessarily 
hang together, as is true of much of his work. In essence, for Clarke, Hobson’s theory is 
contradictory and suffers from serious lacunae, but is more consistent over time than Cain 
pretends. Elsewhere Clarke argues Hobson’s theory was a political rather than an economic 
theory, and that underconsum ption, contrary to Cain’s opinion was the coping stone rather 
than the origin of Hobson’s theory. Bernard Porter’s study o f Hobson’s theory points to two 
d ifferen t forms of explanation, the economic structural theory and the conspiracy theory. 
These are distinct, the first deriving from Hobson’s economic studies and the second from  his 
confrontation with business leaders and politicians on his visit to South Africa. Porter also 
accuses Hobson of rationalising imperialism by looking for a guilty party. In short, for 
Hobson, he claims, imperialism was an irrational outcome, but was the product of a rational 
interest for one group. Julian Townshend attempts to summarise the various interpretations 
of Hobson’s theory, and criticises simplistic criticisms o f Hobson. He concludes that Hobson 
offers an ‘economic sociology’ of imperialism, but does not tell us by what criteria it might 
be evaluated. There are thus many different perspectives on the form that Hobson’s theory 
of imperialism takes.
In his Imperialism, The Highest Stage o f  Capitalism^ Lenin described Hobson 
appropriately as a ‘social-liberal’, pacifist and reformist. While clearly deriving his statistics 
from  Hobson, there is some dispute as to how much Lenin owes to Hobson’s theory. Most 
M arxist and neo-M arxist theorists have contended that there is a m arked difference. Lenin’s 
theory is more systematic than Hobson’s. Lenin believes that capitalism must be abolished to 
end imperialism because the latter is a necessity for the former; Hobson saw imperialism as 
a policy choice o f a perverted social system under capitalism and an issue o f distribution. 
Lenin develops the concept of finance capital and emphasises the importance o f monopoly to
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a greater degree than H o b s o n ,N o n -M a rx is t  economic historians, like Fieldhouse and 
Cairncross, have been content to consider Hobson’s and Lenin’s theories as one Hobson-Lenin 
economic or capitalist theory of (economic) imperialism. Both the M arxists and the non- 
M arxist economic historians suffer an analogous defect to that noted above with the 
economists, considering Hobson’s theory through the Leninist version, and also condemning 
Hobson for not accounting for developments after he was writing and of which he could have 
no knowledge. For those who have concentrated on Hobson’s work rather than on the theory 
o f imperialism , such as Peter Clarke, there is a clear distinction between Hobson and Lenin, 
sim ilar to that made by the M arxists, but with the approval reversed!
Hobson’s theory o f imperialism  enjoyed a brief vogue, through Lenin’s 
acknowledgem ent and his refinem ent of the theory and because other radicals in Britain and 
Am erica adopted the premises of the argument in their campaign against the European 
empires.^^ However, since the Second World War in particular, economic historians have 
rejected Hobson’s theory on empirical grounds. Among others, D.K. Fieldhouse and A.K. 
Cairncross have shown that there is no significant correlation between the expansion of 
empires at the end of the century and any of the variables that might be pointed to as 
economic causes, such as the existence of surplus capital, higher rates of return in the colonies 
and actual investment in the new colonies.®®
Others, notably the diplomatic historians Gallagher and Robinson, and Bernard 
Semmel, have criticised Hobson’s reading of past events through the ideological prism of
See V.I. Lenin, Imperialism , the Highest Stage o f  Capitalism,, p. 78, 87, 91-3, 98, 105, and his 
review of Hobson’s Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , reprinted in translation in Economica (Nov. 
1925), pp. 362-4. For those who make a strong distinction between Hobson and Lenin, see Eric 
Stokes, ‘Late N ineteenth Century Colonial Expansion and the Attack on the Theory of Economic 
Imperialism: A Case o f Mistaken Identity?’, The Historical Journal (Vol. 12, No. 2, 1969), pp. 285- 
301; Tom K em p, ‘Hobson and the Radical Democratic Critique of Imperialism ’, in his Theories o f  
Im perialism , ch. 3; Michael Bleaney, Underconsumption Theories, pp. 181-3. Those who see rather 
more o f a sim ilarity between Hobson and Lenin include Michael Barrat Brown, ‘A Critique o f M arxist 
Theories of Im perialism ’, pp. 52-4; Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry o f  Im perialism , pp. 23-26; and 
John Strachey, The End o f  Empire, ch. 6.
Norman Etherington, Theories o f  Imperialism , chs. 5-6, on the discussions o f imperialism  by 
Norman Angell, Henry Brailsford and Leonard Woolf.
D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire', The Colonial Empires', ‘Conclusions’, in Fieldhouse 
(ed.). The Theory o f  Capitalist Imperialism', ‘Imperialism: A Historiographical Revision’; A.K. 
Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1914', Davis and H uttenback, Mammon and the 
Pursuit o f  Empire', John R. Oneal and Frances H. Oneal, ‘Hegemony, Imperialism , and the 
Profitability of Foreign Investments’, especially p. 347, 368, 373.
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liberalism. The belief that there were halcyon days of Cobdenite free trade and pax Britannica 
is an error. These authors deny the categorical break in the history o f the empire that Hobson 
proposes, and thus problematise Hobson’s claims of a ‘new imperialism ’. They claim , instead, 
that while the form  of imperialism might have changed somewhat over the years, from the 
imperialism of free trade to formal governmental control, the fact o f imperial expansion was 
a constant over the nineteenth century. There was, then, nothing new about Hobson’s new 
imperialism.^®
In much of the literature there has been a revulsion from  the theory of imperialism 
because it is considered a mono-causal explanation of international events supposed to be 
universally applicable to all times and situations. In its origin, it is, clearly lim ited to a 
particular tim e-fram e and to specific countries. Closely linked to this point, the theory is 
criticised as being determ inist. Hobson’s theory is also interpreted as an economic theory, 
putatively explaining political outcomes from economic variables. However, as Clarke and 
Porter spell out, Hobson is often contradictory and rarely spells out a position with sufficient 
clarity to make it ‘falsifiable’. Furtherm ore, interpretations in economic history have distorted 
Hobson’s position so much that suggested refutations of his theory actually support it! 
Hobson’s key claims that the nation as a whole is being misled into the imperialist enterprise 
and that there is a misperception about the gains and who is gaining from  imperialism, are 
made redundant by the interpretations imposed by analysts.^®
The problem with this work as a whole is the tendency to ignore the importance of 
imperialism in Hobson’s work and the significance of other work and the context in which 
Hobson was writing for the theory of imperialism.^^
Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review\ A frica and 
the Victorians; see the controversy stirred up by this argum ent, collected in Wm. Roger Louis (ed.). 
Imperialism : the Robinson and Gallagher Controversy; Bernard Semmel, The Rise o f  Free Trade 
Imperialism .
For the interpretations of Hobson’s theory and their mistakes in terms of what Hobson was 
trying to do, see Clarke, ‘Hobson, Free Trade and Imperialism’, p. 312. For the incorrect premises 
adopted by the economic historians from Hobson, see Trevor Lloyd, ‘Africa and Hobson’s 
Imperialism ’, pp. 130-1. For a d ifferen t interpretation of what Hobson was in fact discussing, see 
Etherington, Theories o f  Imperialism^ ch 3.
Though this does not apply to E.M. Winslow’s account in ‘Hobson and the Theory of Economic 
Imperialism ’, The Pattern o f  Imperialism^ ch. 5.
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International Relations
The discipline of international relations has adopted imperialism theory, mainly the 
Leninist version, via the interpretations of the economic historians. Imperialism has even, 
lately, become the focus for a challenge to the realist orthodoxy in international relations, 
through the developm ent of dependency theory, world systems analysis and the so-called 
structuralist paradigm.^^ The impression generated by the attention to the theory of economic 
imperialism  is that this constitutes the totality o f Hobson’s contribution to international 
theory. Hobson’s theory of imperialism is briefly referred to, described, or caricatured, in 
many of the textbooks on international relations.^^
The m ajor contribution to the discussion of Hobson’s imperialism in international 
relations has come from  Kenneth Waltz. Following the simple descriptions of the theory given 
in previous studies. Waltz accuses Hobson’s theory of being a state-level explanation of war, 
that is, of ignoring the importance of the international system, and of being a simplistic 
m ono-causal explanation of imperialism. In his Man, the State and War, Waltz claims that 
Hobson’s theory o f imperialism differs from the M arxist explanation in the hope for the 
reform  of the capitalist system and benign wish that socialist states will not come into conflict. 
In Theory o f  International Politics, Waltz classes Hobson’s and Lenin’s theories together as a 
single ‘reductionist’ explanation of international political outcomes.^^ This interpretation of 
Hobson’s contribution to international theory and specifically his theory of imperialism has 
become the predom inant one in international relations. Two other im portant studies of 
Hobson’s imperialism  within international relations are Giovanni A rrighi’s The Geometry o f  
Im perialism : The L im its o f  Hobson's Paradigm  and the discussion of Hobson in Charles
See Michael Banks, ‘The Inter-paradigm  Debate’, in Light and Groom (eds.). International 
Relations: A Handbook o f  Current Theory, p. 18.
For example, Tony Thorndike, ‘The Revolutionary Approach: the M arxist perspective’, in 
Trevor Taylor (ed.). Approaches and Theory in International Relations, p. 71; M artin Shaw (ed.). War, 
State and Society, p. 53; G eoffrey Blainey, The Causes o f  War, pp. 146-7; K eith  L. Nelson and 
Spencer C. Ohlin, Jr., Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History, pp. 78-81; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 
Jr., Contending Theories o f  International Relations, pp. 176-8; Charles Reynolds, Theory and 
Explanation in International Politics, ch 7; Hans M orgenthau, Power Among Nations, 3rd Edn., p. 48; 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War, ch. 9; Ian Clark, The Hierarchy o f  Powers: Reform  and Resistance 
in the International Order, p. 136; J.D.B. M iller, The World o f  States: Connected Essays, p. 118, n. 
8 .
K enneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, pp. 145-56; Theory o f  International Politics, pp. 19-
27.
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Reynolds’ Modes o f  Imperialism. Arrighi examines Hobson’s theory o f imperialism in an 
innovative way concentrating on the distinctions between imperialism, colonialism, 
nationalism and internationalism  made by Hobson in the introduction to Imperialism. 
However, he reads Hobson’s theory as a scientific precursor to Lenin’s theory, and thus falls 
into anachronism; and this is exemplified by his misreading of Hobson’s internationalism as 
‘inform al em pire’, a concept that would have had no meaning for H obson/^ Reynolds 
analyses the types of theories used by Hobson and Lenin in their respective theories. While 
Lenin’s is a ‘dogm atic’ theory based on scientific laws, Hobson’s is described as ‘voluntarist’ 
founded in an historical explanation, Reynolds then accuses Hobson of failing to consult the 
evidence that this type of explanation requires, and claims that the evidence that does exist 
refutes Hobson’s theory,"*®
Hobson’s other writings on international relations are under-researched. His writings 
on internationalism  have earned scant acknowledgement in international relations. The history 
of ideas is relatively marginal to current international relations scholarship,^^ and even here 
Hobson’s writings on international economic relations and on the League of Nations and 
international organization have largely been overlooked. F,H. Hinsley quotes a secondary 
source in his reference to Hobson proposing a world state. M artin Ceadel includes Hobson as 
one of the in ter-w ar peace activists in his Thinking About Peace and ITflr,"*® Recently,
Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry o f  Imperialism: The L im its o f  Hobson’s Paradigm^ pp. 23, 27- 
30, and ‘A fterw ord’. Much of the later chapters is devoted not to Hobson’s theory but to A rrighi’s 
developm ent of the problem atic beyond that considered by Hobson. While the remark that Hobson’s 
theory is no longer applicable to current forms of imperialism may be justified , A rrighi’s commentary 
makes little contribution to an examination of Hobson’s theory.
Charles Reynolds, Modes o f  Imperialism., ch. 3; see also his Theory and Explanation in 
International Politics, ch. 3. Reynolds distinction is close to Porter’s, though Reynolds sees Hobson 
only as holding a conspiracy theory.
W hether this be blamed on positivistic behavioural closure to historical approaches or on an 
inherent problem of political philosophy as eloquently argued in M artin Wight, ‘Why is there no 
international theory?’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds,). Diplomatic Investigations.
M artin Ceadel, Thinking About Peace and War, p. 96, 118, Though Ceadel reflects something 
of the schizophrenic attitude to Hobson’s international writings noted above. He both notes Hobson’s 
social-dem ocratic interest in an extensive League of Nations that would deal with socio-economic 
problems of the world, and also Hobson’s updating of Cobden’s international relations, Hinsley’s 
source is a Foreign Office report by one of the authors o f the British proposals for the League of 
Nations - hardly a neutral observer. See F,H, Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f  Peace, p. 143; and 
Lord Phillimore, Schemes fo r  Maintaining General Peace, esp, pp, 10-11, Fred Parkinson in his The 
Philosophy o f  International Relations, pp, 114-6, notes Hobson’s contribution to the neo-M arxist 
theory of imperialism , but claims that Hobson was working for the Daily Telegraph in South Africa!
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however, a num ber o f articles have appeared focusing on in ter-w ar international theorists/^  
However, Hobson is not one o f the figures addressed. The theory of imperialism that has 
secured Hobson’s name for specialists of international relations turns out to be something of 
a mixed blessing for an understanding of his contribution to international theory. International 
relations analyses of Hobson’s work have tended to reduce Hobson’s contribution to 
international theory to an economic determ inist explanation of imperialism and have ignored 
his contribution to international theory elsewhere. This thesis seeks to remedy this misplaced 
view of Hobson’s discussions o f international relations and to demonstrate the theoretical 
sophistication and value of Hobson’s work in the discipline.
Hidemi Suganami’s recent study o f reform ist ideas in international relations, Domestic Analogy and 
World Order Proposals^ does not mention Hobson at all.
Cornelia Navari, The G reat Illusion Revisited: The International Theory of Norman Angell; Don 
M arkwell, ‘Sir A lfred Zim m ern Revisited: F ifty  Years On’; and Brian Porter ‘David Davies: A Hunter 
A fter Peace’. In international relations studies concentrate predom inantly on the G reat Men of 
political theory, e.g,^ Hobbes, K ant, Rousseau. However, even some great political thinkers have had 
to have their reputations restored in international relations, see R.J. V incent, ‘Edm und Burke and the 
Theory of International Relations’. See the challenge by James Der Derian to the scope o f intellectual 
history in international relations in his ‘Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International 
Relations’, p. 191. Though Der D erian’s record on Hobson is less than perfect - he refers to Hobson 
as J.B. Hobson throughout his On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f  Estrangement.
Chapter Two 
Hobson’s Theoretical System
This chapter examines the theoretical system through which Hobson discusses social, political 
and economic issues. The chapter concentrates on the central concepts o f Hobson’s analysis, 
organic and surplus, and discusses his ideas on cooperation, organisation and distribution 
through them. It discusses the theoretical system and m ajor concepts that form  the fram ework 
for Hobson’s approach to international relations considered in chapter 3.
The chapter opens with an examination of Hobson’s methodology and underlying 
assumptions. The second section examines Hobson’s conception of human welfare. The third 
section analyses Hobson’s theory of cooperative surplus, its relationship to his evolutionary 
theory o f human progress and the economy of organisation in human life. The fourth section 
discusses Hobson’s theory of distribution according to costs and surpluses. Hobson’s different 
form ulations of the theory of underconsumption and their relationship to his theoretical 
system are explained in the fifth  section. The sixth section considers Hobson’s use of the term 
organic. Hobson’s most significant use of the term is the ideological supersession of nineteenth 
century liberalism by the new liberalism through the turn to methodological holism. However, 
organic also conjures up other associations important to Hobson’s work. The seventh section 
advances a series of criticisms of Hobson’s analysis. The conclusion notes the importance of 
the concept surplus and of organic terminology in Hobson’s writings. It is concluded that 
Hobson’s theoretical system is not without m ajor flaws, but that his theoretical orientation and 
the organic and surplus concepts provide the basis for a novel approach to international 
relations.1
Hobson’s Methodology
This section examines the underlying assumptions that inform  Hobson’s work and his method 
of enquiry into political, social and economic questions. His work is underpinned by an 
instrum ental, evolutionary notion of human rationality. Hobson emphasises the unity o f the 
hum an personality, of society, and the need for a social science to reflect this unity and guide 
social improvement.
 ^Another account of Hobson’s theoretical system appears in John Allett, New Liberalism, chs. 2-4.
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Rationality, Science and Social Science
A central hypothesis in Hobson’s work is that man can be understood and judged as 
a rational or sem i-rational animal. While this view was shaken by the experience of war, 
Hobson clung to this presum ption as the hope for civilisation and progress.^ For Hobson, 
hum an reason was part of the urge towards a fuller, better life. This was pursued through an 
increasing control over the physical environment.^ Hobson, thus, conceived reason 
instrum entally as a ‘scientific in s tru m en t... applied to furnish means to the satisfaction of the 
particular instincts, interests, and desires of man.’  ^ A t the same time, rationality was the 
‘passion of Wholeness’.® The fuller life would therefore satisfy the whole of the hum an being, 
not only the conscious intelligence but also the instincts or passions. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that, for Hobson, it is reason that guides the passions and not vice-versa.
For Hobson, reason was part of human evolution. The development of rationality 
allows purposive action and the establishment of some ideal. Hobson posits the growth of 
consciousness in evolution, and the evolution of consciousness and rationality itself, 
perm itting the purposeful pursuit of an ideal of human progress in the growth of reason and 
civilisation.
In all organic life there is a limited amount of transm itted energy, or urge, capacity 
to strive, directed to secure the survival and growth of the individual and the species. 
It belongs to the economy of this struggle that some direction of the several instinctive 
urges and desires in the interest of the organic whole should be exercised. This 
directive control, so far as it is conscious, is some thin form  of ‘reason’, and it 
involves some conscious or intuitive valuation of the claims of the several instincts 
upon the organic resources.®
The developm ent in hum anity of conscious purpose, its reasoning nature, transform s 
the nature of human social evolution. The blind fum bling of nature is replaced by the 
conscious application of reason. This perm its man, as a higher organism, to in terfere with the 
processes o f reproduction and adaptation to the environm ent, and even to drastically change
 ^ For Hobson’s confidence see John Ruskin Social Reformer^ p. 208, Sociology, p. 22. For his 
shaken attitude see Confessions, p. 96; Problems o f  a New World, ch. 2; The Psychology o f  Jingoism , 
p. 20, 31 ,33 .
® Social Problem, p. 105, Sociology, p. 20-1, Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 176.
 ^Free Thought, p. 19.
® Social Problem, p. 3.
® Wealth and L ife ,  p. 17.
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the environm ent itself. It permits, in short, hum anity to interfere with the lower processes of 
evolution. The teleology of hum anity heading towards an ideal of civilisation apparently 
exogenous to the process of evolutionary selection appears because humans are reasoning 
animals.^
For Hobson, ‘the chief organising process of Reason’ is science.® However, he denied
the possibility of pure disinterestedness and value freedom in scientific investigations. Hobson
describes the origin and ultimate purpose of science in the ordering and control o f the human
and physical environment.® Science is thus set in the context of human developm ent and
social life. While shaped by practice, or social ‘art’ as Hobson calls it, science in its turn limits
social development by determ ining the methods and attainability of social improvements,^®
While he followed Comte and Spencer in his belief in the applicability of the term
science to studies of human action and society, the social context and instrum ental nature of
science led Hobson to make a distinction between the natural and social (or, as he occasionally
called them, mental) sciences. Hobson believed that ‘natural laws’ did not apply to individuals
and society because of the operation of human will. In Wealth and L ife  Hobson delimits four
realms of science: the inorganic, the organic, the psychic (sic, or psychological), and the self-
conscious.^^ The intractability of the subject matter of social science, its complexity and the
impossibility of constructing any historically generalisable ‘laws’ cast doubt on the idea that
it was possible to have a social science:^^
It is not merely that ethics, politics, economics, sociology, are backward in the 
discovery and form ulation of their laws: the laws are not ‘there’ to be discovered, in
 ^Though Hobson took this as an axiomatic part of evolution, see John Ruskin Social Reform er, 
p. 88; Wealth and L ife , p. 131. Hobson here parallels closely his friend Hobhouse. See L.T. Hobhouse, 
M ind in Evolution. This is the meeting point of Hobson’s use of biology and his adaptation o f the ideas 
of the Philosophical Idealists such as Green and Bosanquet. See Michael Freeden, ‘J.A. Hobson as a 
New Liberal Theorist’, pp. 422-6.
8 Free Thought, p. 61
® Free Thought, p. 11, 19; Social Problem, p. 66; Wealth and L ife , p. 19. For Hobson’s description 
of science conceived as ‘a solemn marshalling o f the several orders of concrete phenom ena’, see John 
Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 313-4.
®^ Free Thought, p. 19, 235; John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 59.
Wealth and L ife , p. 95-6.
Work and Wealth, p. viii; Free Thought, p. 5-6, 17; Sociology, p. 21; Wealth and L ife ,  p. 95, 109.
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the sense in which they are ‘there’ in physics and chemistry.
However, Hobson equivocated on this point, not wishing to jettison a scientific approach to 
society altogether. He claimed that ‘hum an nature is after all only a branch of nature, and is 
amenable to laws as regular in their normal operation over the human field of enquiry as is 
the case in other fields.’^^
Hobson identified a num ber of qualifications to the use of the methods of natural 
science in the study o f hum an activities and institutions. He distinguished the scientific 
exactitude o f the physical sciences from  the relative vagueness of the human s c ie n c e s .H e  
was especially concerned with two tendencies in the social sciences,the growth of 
specialisation and the move to quantification, both following successes in the natural sciences.
Specialisation o f the social sciences into economics, politics, sociology, psychology and 
so on broke the essential unity of human experience into separate parts. For Hobson, this 
m ethod was fallacious: ‘This is no doubt the way to simplify science. But it is also the way to 
falsify  it.’ ®^ Scientific specialisation resulted in what Hobson called ‘overwrought theory’, 
increased abstraction as a consequence of the scientist’s distance from the subject of his 
study.
According to Hobson, specialisation and quantification reflected the m entality of 
industrialism  and the success o f applied natural science. However, the implicit mechanistic 
m etaphor was contrary to the needs of society: ‘The net effect is to deny the existence and 
operation o f the creative power of the human will, by presenting human nature itself as a 
static being, responding to laws that are immutable in the same sense and degree as those 
which govern the operations of stars and plants.’ ®^ Q uantification also artificially separated 
elements o f complex objects o f study, such as an individual or society.^® Hobson claimed
Wealth and Life^  p. 95.
Wealth and Life^  p. 95.
John Ruskin Social Reformer^ p. 69; Free Thought, p. 281; Wealth and L ife , p. xxxi, 95. 
Social Problem, p. 62. See Hobson’s discussion on pp. 52-62.
John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 200; Social Problem, p. 235.
Free Thought, p. 30. See also p. 23, 25-6; Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 185. Social Problem, p. 59-61, 
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 265, Free Thought, p. 123-4. This also played into the hands o f conservatives 
who sought to rule out dram atic change of the social system. See Free Thought, p. 52.
Social Problem, pp. 59-60; Wealth and L ife ,  p. vii.
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that quantitative social science was useless as a guide for human conduct and was merely 
‘intellectual gymnastics’.^ ®
Social Science and Social Reform
Hobson claimed that all scientific studies relied on ideas to order the ‘facts’ being
studied.^^ Hobson denied the validity of inductively based empiricism: facts could not be
understood without some prior ordering.^^ But this made judgem ent and measurement in
social science especially problematic because the selection o f social facts was influenced by
the values of the observer and even the interpretation of the facts was plastic. Beneath these
methodological concerns, Hobson was making a significant ontological claim about social
science. This was that, in social science, values and beliefs were facts.^^ It followed that the
separation of ought and is was artificial:
The "ought" is not something separable or distinct from the "is;" on the contrary, an 
"ought" is everywhere the highest aspect and relation of an "is." If a "fact" has moral 
im p o rt..., that moral import is a part of the nature of the fact, and the fact cannot be 
fully known without taking it into consideration.^^
These facts included illusions and superstitions. Thus Hobson concluded that there was no
objective fact in the human sciences as there was in physical sciences.^®
Hobson’s attack on the objectivity of social science might seem to lean towards
relativism. This is not the case because this relativism is couched in terms of the evolutionary
development of human reason. There were no fixed facts because man was evolving. Hobson’s
ideas on social science follow from his assumptions on human nature, that man is distinct in
evolution for the development of conscious reason. Man was a purposive animal, set on
survival in the first instance, but also, more widely, for human im provem ent. For Hobson,
therefore, social science might not be able to establish any fixed facts or have any fully
objective standards for methods, but there remained an ultimate goal or purpose, the
John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 314.
Social Problem, p. 66, 281-2.
Social Problem, pp. 281-2.
John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 79, 314; Social Problem, pp. 66-8. 
Social Problem, pp. 66-7.
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 216, 273; Free Thought, p. 17-8, 222-3.
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normative injunction to guide human conduct. The ultimate goal of social as for natural
science was the improvement of human life through human practice as social reform.^®
Hobson combined these insights into a science of society, at once analysing and
prescribing appropriate social reforms and institutions. This was to be a
sociology [which], by the distinctively intellectual operation of enabling individuals 
to realise society as an elaborate organic interaction of social forms and forces, and 
so to understand the worth of social conduct, will alter the scale of human values and 
desires.
This sociology would analyse society as a whole:
The study o f social value of individual men no more constitutes sociology than the 
study o f cell life constitutes human physiology. A recognition o f the independent 
value of the good life of a society is essential to any science or art of Society.^®
This sociology was a unified conception of the social whole and included necessarily the
consideration of individual human and social good as a value and goal.^® As such it was the
most im portant of the social sciences, coordinating as it did the separate sciences of ethics,
politics and economics.®®
The basis for this science was the extension of the ‘reign of law’ to all spheres of
human conduct, premised on the notion that there was a fundam ental uniform ity in human
nature: that people are more alike than unlike each other. For Hobson this was ‘a valid
assumption for the possibility of any social science.’®^ Hobson’s method was therefore,
inevitably, holistic, ‘because by the order of its descent from the whole to the constituent
parts it brings out more definitely the slight consciousness and integration of industry ...’.®®
In summary, Hobson’s sociology was a holistic science correlating the separate studies
of human value (ethics), material value (economics) and governm ent (politics). This science
was unlike physical sciences because it dealt with the life of humans in society, where facts
Sociology y p. 23, 25; Work and W e a l t h y  p. 2.
Social Probletriy p. 264.
Work and Wealthy  pp. 15-6. Hobson derived his focus on society as a whole from  Herbert 
Spencer. See Free Thoughty  p. 5; Crisis o f  Liberalisniy pp. 184-5, 263.
John Ruskin Social Reform er y p. 87, 198; Social Probleniy pp. 60-1, 254.
®® Sociology y p. 28; Social Probleniy  p. 61.
Free Thoughty p. 5; Wealth and L //e , p. x.
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalismy 1st Edn., p. 10-11.
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were neither easily accessible nor forever fixed. As Hobson concluded, this made his sociology
a d ifficu lt and ambitious enterprise, but ‘[bjecause a "unified social science" is so much more
difficu lt, that is no reason for neglecting it, but is rather a reason for putting more intellectual
energy into its pursuit.’^^
This conception of a social science was integral to Hobson’s campaign for human
im provem ent through social reform. For Hobson, a unitary approach was integral to the future
success of social reform . A social science would provide the basis for a broad-based social
reform  examining the social structure as a whole, instead of piecemeal practical measures and
fragm entary analysis.®^ Reform ers would, Hobson thought,
pay the price which short-sighted empiricism always pays; with slow, hesitant, and 
staggering steps, with innumerable false starts and backslidings, they will move in the 
dark along an unseen track towards an unseen goal. Social development may be 
conscious or unconscious. It has been mostly unconscious in the past, and therefore 
slow, wasteful, and dangerous. If we desire to be sw ifter, safer, and more effective 
in the fu ture, it must become the conscious expression of the trained and organised 
will of a people not despising theory as unpractical, but using it to furnish economy 
in action.
According to Hobson, the ideals of social reform  would not be fixed but would shift 
with the evolving needs of individuals and society.^® Hobson believed that social reformers 
should not be looking for grand theories, but rather ‘middle principles’ that demonstrated the 
interconnectedness of d ifferen t arenas of human society and could be comprehended and 
acted upon by significant numbers of ordinary people.®^ Most im portantly, practical 
experience of the common people must fill out any ideals or principles. The principles could 
not be the vapid theorising of ivory-tow er professors. There was a need for ‘sound 
inform ation and sound modes of thinking ... [which must] percolate into the general mind. 
Thus alone can progress of a people become conscious and rational, and, therefore, take at 
once a faster and surer pace.’ ®^
Social Problem, p. 61.
John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 18, 87.
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 132. See also Social Problem, p. 284.
Social Problem, p. 4, 6, 31.
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 272, 274; Social Problem, p. 4. He disliked neo-Hegelian Idealist 
philosophy prevalent in Oxford at the turn of the century, because he felt that the Idealists’ abstract 
ideals were fixed and distant from present realities of society. See Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 187, 272.
Social Problem, p. 262; John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 258.
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Human Welfare
Hobson conceived a unitary social science guiding human progress through social reform . The 
end towards which hum anity was heading according to Hobson was im provement in 
individual and social well-being. Thus, Hobson’s ideal of human progress is first and foremost 
welfare rather than freedom  or liberty, order or justice, though these latter do come into his 
analysis of welfare.
Hobson conceived welfare as both the ideal for human progress and social reform , and 
the basis o f m easurem ent for social science.^® His study o f welfare is where his science of 
society joins economics and ethics as complementary studies of individual and social value. 
Hobson’s concept of welfare is broad in two respects: it incorporates social as well as 
individual welfare and it extends welfare beyond economic measures into human valuation. 
There are two aspects to Hobson’s discussion of welfare. First, there is the content or meaning 
o f welfare as an ideal o f human progress. Second, there is the m easurement o f welfare as a 
standard for contem porary society.
The Meaning o f  Welfare
Hobson understands welfare broadly as the w ell-being o f the entire human organism. 
Welfare derives from the satisfaction of individual and social needs. Welfare of individuals 
involves the developm ent of the human personality. A holistic view of individual welfare 
follows from  the developm ent of personality emphasising the interconnections of the physical, 
moral, and intellectual facets of human life. Hobson advised that we should ‘seek our standard 
[of welfare] in the conception of man as a psycho-physical organism with various related 
satisfactions o f its functions.’ ®^ That is, both the physical and psychological needs of human 
beings had to be taken into account in the conception of welfare.^^
A ccording to Hobson, human welfare results from  the satisfaction of the needs of each 
personality. This satisfaction is achieved through the production of human value. Hobson
See Free Thought^ p. 142, 168-9; Social Problem^ p. 39, 50, 69, 76, where it is called ‘social 
u tility’.
Wealth and Life^  p. 16.
Wealth and Life^  p. 21. Hobson acknowledged, however, that there may be a d ifferen t selection 
mechanism for cultural compared to biological needs.
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wrote a num ber of books on the relationship of work, wealth and life. Hobson was profoundly
influenced in his opinions by John Ruskin’s critique of political economy, and adopted a
num ber of Ruskin’s maxims, most notably ‘There is no Wealth But L ife’. Following Ruskin,
he defined ‘vital’ value as ‘the power to sustain life’. Hobson attem pted to found a science of
ethics, that is, a science of human values, on the humanisation of economics.
Human welfare also included the social aspects o f hum anity. Thus, for Hobson,
‘[h]uman welfare will be not merely the welfare of human beings taken as an aggregate, but
o f society regarded as an organic u n i t y . H o b s o n  claimed that an objective social standard
of welfare was possible because ‘[i]n so far as the members of a society own the same nature,
habits, education, institutions, and range of vision, they possess a common grasp of what is
good for the society ...’^  ^ This standard would shift with the change in level of civilisation
of a people, for sure. However, at any one time, in any one place, there would a standard
which would address the question:
Given a num ber of human beings, with a certain development of physical and mental 
faculties and of social institutions, in command of given natural resources, how can 
they best utilize these powers for the attainm ent of the most complete satisfaction?^^
The basis for this standard would be ‘objective social good’ over individual self-in terest, ‘our
standard must be conceived in terms of a life that is good or desirable.’^  ^ Hobson assumed
that people are in large part similar, the precondition for m eaningful social standard.^®
Hobson’s conception of welfare invoked Ruskin with a utilitarian twist. It was ‘[t]he
42 Work and Wealth, p. 17, 309.
Social Problem, p. 69; Free Thought, p. 142, 172. See also Hobson’s belief that this standard 
could be decided on by the most cultured members of society, in parallel to M ill’s claim on this 
subject. Wealth and L ife , pp. 60-1.
Social Problem, p. 7.
Work and Wealth, p. 12. There is a problem here. If each individual’s conscious satisfactions are 
the basis of welfare, how is it possible to get to the notion of social welfare from  such divergent 
estimations of the standard of welfare? Hobson states the problem baldly in reference to the 
population question: ‘Who shall say whether one Darwin or M ozart is worth as m uch as a hundred 
million happy negroes?’ Hobson’s introduction of distinctions of quality as opposed to quantity made 
this even more difficult. See Wealth and L ife , p. xxvi. Free Thought, p. 64, 135; Wealth and L ife ,  p. 
51.
Social Problem, pp. 39, 45-7. See the discussion on the translation o f economic into ethical 
values in Wealth and L ife , pt. 1.
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largest num ber o f happy and healthy human beings.’^  ^ Hobson’s conception of welfare as 
the ideal for hum an progress is clearly a utilitarian approach, though he eschewed the narrow 
hedonistic, quantified  calculus of utilitarians such as Bentham and James Mill. Hobson’s ethics 
were *a New U tilitarianism  in which physical, intellectual, and moral satisfactions will rank 
in their due places.’ ®^ This led Hobson to criticise and modify the utilitarian calculus that 
appeared in classical political economy, through examples from the developm ent of prim itive 
com m unities as well as more m odern industrial society.
At the prim itive stage o f developm ent (and in the isolated context of, for instance, 
Robinson Crusoe), Hobson claimed, each person or group produced what it needed for its 
consum ption, and consum ption provided the energy needed for subsequent production.^® 
There was a natural balance o f production and consumption. This balance was still a feature 
of industrial society despite its complexity. Hobson broadened his notion of welfare include 
psychological or spiritual needs as well as physiological in the economy of production and 
consum ption, as these form er became more im portant in the increasingly civilised peoples. 
Finally, he asserted that ‘[wjelfare consists o f ordered, organised values’, and thus ‘value and 
purpose [are], if  anywhere in v e total harmony of nature as a whole.’®® Both production and 
consumption had costs and satisfactions. Production involved costs in terms of the expenditure 
o f life, i.e., work or labour, to produce the necessaries of life, but it was also a fu lfilm ent of 
a natural hum an function. Consumption promoted of life and /or happiness, contributing to 
the potential productivity  of the individual, but could be bad for the individual if the wrong 
thing is consumed.®^
47 Free Thought^ pp. 167-73; Social Problem^ pp. v-vi, 5, 7.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 16. See also p. 47, and Free Thought, p. 170. Hobson advocated a standard 
to avoid the chaos o f subjectivism  where each person’s valuation is worth as much as another, a view 
he took to be incorrect.
If  this was not the case, then logically the individual or group would have perished. Social 
Problem, p. 221 -  ‘an intelligent individual ... may be conceived as working out a perfect organic 
economy of production and consumption designed to support him in full physical health and 
satisfaction.’ See also Free Thought, pp. 133-4.
®® Wealth and L ife ,  p. 11, 14.
®^ The d ifference between work and labour was that the form er was a wholesome activity, while 
the latter was toil or loss o f life. John Ruskin Social Reform er, pp. 76-7, 84, 98n; Social Problem, 
p. 47; Wealth and L ife ,  p. xxi.
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From Economic to Human Valuation
The economics of human welfare as a systématisation of ethical valuation was one of 
Hobson’s central concerns. He attempted to broaden economic valuation o f wealth to include 
non-m arket and other than monetary values, so that his was a human valuation of welfare. 
Hobson’s welfare economics can be construed as an attem pt to systematise Ruskin’s humanist 
critique of the commercial science into an alternative political economy.®^
The foundation of Hobson’s economics of human welfare involved several steps 
transform ing the m onetary valuation of welfare in orthodox economics to a human 
valuation.^^ First, money values of goods are translated into the concrete wealth that they 
engender, what they are in terms of goods or services. Second, concrete goods are translated 
into subjective satisfactions and dissatisfactions of the people who produce and consume 
them. T hird, the second step must bear in mind the fact that each person is both a producer 
and consumer, and that d ifferen t persons have differen t needs and capacities. The distribution 
of work and income affects the satisfaction of individual and social needs. Finally, these 
satisfactions must be translated from those currently desired to be measured according to the 
standard of the objectively desirable. In each person’s individual standard o f consumption and 
conditions relating to production, there will inevitably be "illth" as well as wealth, for the 
individual and for society as a whole.
Hobson intended his standard of welfare to guide social reform. It was broad enough 
to be a standard for all human actions and institutions. As a tool of analysis and as normative 
standard, it was broad enough to encompass the variety and d iffering qualities of satisfactions 
and dissatisfactions in human life. This human standard could not, however, have the perfect 
fit for an individual in society, because of d iffering valuations and the disruptive effect of 
the distribution of income and work on social welfare. Though not as precise as the money 
standard of economics, it would, though, be more accurate. Hobson accepted that there might 
be theoretical d ifficulties, perhaps, some of which might prove to be strictly insuperable. For 
instance, he adm itted that ‘[t]he general conception of human well-being is itself vague and
52 John Ruskin Social Reformer^ p. 74; Free Thought, p. 90.
These steps are outlined in Work and Wealth, ch. 3; Social Problem, bk. 1, ch. 5; and Wealth and 
L ife , pp. v ii-ix , pt. 2, ch. 3.
The idea that value is derived from the right use of a good by the right person comes from  John 
Ruskin, see John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 79. On the objective human standard, see pp. 84-5.
34
insubstantial, until it has acquired and assimilated the very sorts of knowledge the collection 
o f which it is here assumed to be able to direct.*^® But this was an issue that could, for 
practical purposes, be ignored in the setting up of the ideals or standards of human welfare. 
Hobson hoped that his human standard would be practically possible on the basis o f some 
reliable physical i n d i c e s . H i s  aim was a standard for welfare that included ‘[h]onest 
production, just d istribution, wise consumption.’^^
In sum m ary, Hobson attem pted to create a science of human welfare, bridging the gap 
betw een economics and ethics with a new, widened utilitarianism . The broad standard of 
hum an welfare was the measure of this new utilitarianism  and was also the ideal o f social 
im provem ent. Hobson founded the social aspects o f human welfare on the basis o f the 
common features of people. However, social welfare also arises from  the theory o f the 
cooperative surplus that Hobson advanced.
The Cooperative Surplus
This section considers Hobson’s theory of surplus value that demonstrates the productivity of 
cooperation. It shows that this is used by Hobson in his evolutionary view of the developm ent 
o f hum an society towards increasing rationality, m anifested in organisation. Hobson proposed 
that welfare is social because human value is produced through social cooperation. Hobson 
claimed that ‘[ojrganized cooperation is a productive power.’®® Cooperative surplus is the 
d ifference between the value of the individual contributions and the total sum of social value 
produced. The difference between aggregate production and separate contributions is surplus 
value which constitutes the benefit of cooperation. In short, individual welfare is enhanced 
by cooperation. Hobson’s analysis suggests that cooperation results in a surplus beyond the 
contributions o f individuals, and that human value is determ ined socially. It is the cooperative 
surplus that gives Hobson’s approach to society its evolutionary dynamism. For Hobson, the
®® Work and Wealth, p. 2. See also John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 239. On the insuperable nature 
of these problem s, see Wealth and L ife , p. viii. For a criticism of Hobson along these lines, see Wesley 
C. M itchell, Lecture Notes on Types o f  Economic Theory, chs. 37-9.
John Ruskin Social Reform er, pp. 84-5; Social Problem, p. 87; Work and Wealth, p. v, 309; Free 
Thought, p. 65, 141; Wealth and L ife ,  p. 58.
John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 310; Free Thought, p. 94.
®® Social Problem, p. 147.
developm ent of human personality depended on the ability to devote time and energy to 
diverse, ‘higher’ pursuits. This was only possible if  there was more than sufficient time and 
energy to satisfy immediate needs.
Hobson used a parable involving three men building a boat, in a way that closely 
resembles Adam Smith’s story of a pin factory demonstrating the importance o f the division 
o f labour.®® Hobson’s account of the production of cooperative surplus is orthodox classical 
political economy. His conclusions, however, are less orthodox. Hobson asks, if  three men 
build a boat, is it true to say that one of them could have built the same boat but taken three 
times as long, or that one man could have built a third of the boat in the same time? Hobson 
answers no. The advantages of cooperating together mean that the three men can produce 
something together that they could not have produced alone. Further, the developm ent o f each 
o f coopérants their skills and the provision of materials for their endeavour is the result of the 
cooperation of the wider society of which they are a part.
The men might also gain by selling the boat. According to Hobson, the social 
institution of the market also raises the boat’s value. If these men are selling the boat they 
produce, they depend on the m arket for boats to establish the value o f their product. Hobson 
suggested that cooperation modifies individual welfare and value, so that there is social 
determ ination of the total value of a good or service beyond any individual or group’s control. 
As soon as exchange in markets decides the value of an item, there is what Hobson calls social 
determ ination of value.®®
From his theory of surplus value, society or any cooperative activity is seen to be 
irreducible to its component parts. A social feeling is engendered which cannot be reduced 
to individual feelings without losing its essential character:®^ ‘organised cooperation, 
voluntary participation of individuals in some common activity, can produce a valuable effect, 
spiritual or even m aterial, d ifferen t both in quantity and in character from  that which the 
unorganised activities of the individual participants could compass.’ This is true even in 
businesses and in the apparently disorganised and com petitive markets. Classical economists 
of laissez faire had demonstrated the value of cooperation, yet had played down the
®® Social Problem^ pp. 146-7.
®® Social Problem, p. 144, 159; Free Thought, p. 245; Wealth and L ife , p. 43, 152, 168. While the 
m arket might be a form  of the social determ ination of value, it was criticised by Hobson as working 
inefficien tly  and inequitably as we shall see in the next section.
®^ Wealth and L ife ,  p. 24, 27, 29; Work and Wealth, p. 162, 281.
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im portance o f social as opposed to individual contributions.®^
This approach to surplus value is close to that of the classical economists. Indeed, 
Hobson’s economics are undoubtedly, from  a Marxist perspective, bourgeois.®® Hobson’s 
discussion may also seem somewhat economic and exclusive o f his concern for a broader 
standard of hum an welfare. However, Hobson asserts that in all interaction, of which 
economic is only one form , cooperation produces ‘social’ surplus.®'* Further, the production 
o f economic, m aterial value is seen by Hobson as the prerequisite for the developm ent of 
higher values o f hum an personality and society.
Evolution and Organisation
Influenced by Spencer, Hobson applied evolution and adaptability to change to explain 
social change.®® Not only did physical organisms evolve, but so did human culture and 
society. This view of society added a dynamism and a responsiveness to external change that 
was lacking in the static models and mechanical approaches of other sociologists and classical
®® John Ruskin Social Reformer^ pp. 134-5; Free Thought^ p. 157; Wealth and L ife , p. 162, 201; 
Work and Wealth, p. 6.
®® For M arx’s criticisms of argum ents like Hobson’s, see his Theories o f  Surplus Value, pp. 387-8. 
The difference between Marx and Hobson’s theories of surplus value lies in M arx’s stress on the 
labour theory o f value and Hobson’s cooperative approach. Hobson’s approach justifies the payment 
o f profits and interest as m aintenance costs, and suggests that even wages can include elements of 
unproductive surplus. See Robert Freem an (ed.), M arx on Economics, pp. 70-93. The bourgeois nature 
o f Hobson’s approach was quite apparent to Lenin. See his review of Hobson’s Evolution o f  Modern 
Capitalism  in Economica (Vol. , No. , Nov. 1925), pp. 362-4. For a conflation of the two positions, 
see James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f  Western Estrangement, p. 186.
Hobson adm ired M arx’s analysis but found it deficient. He criticised socialist economics’ 
reliance upon a crude labour theory of value, their failure to show how the capitalists expropriated 
the surplus from  labour, and their neglect o f the pressures o f com petition on capitalists. See The 
Economics o f  Distribution, p. 353; Free Thought, p. 147, 152-3, 163; Wealth and L ife , p. xvi, 192-3. 
For Hobson’s other criticisms o f Marx and M arxism, see Sociology, p. 22; Free Thought, p.29, 77-8; 
Crisis o f  L iberalism , p. 138, 237; Free Thought, p. 249; Physiology o f  Industry, pp. 76-7.
®^ According to Hobson, this is an organic law that applies to all organisms and organic systems 
o f which hum an society is one. For an example o f Hobson’s emphasis of the role o f surplus in organic 
systems, see Social Problem, p. 108: ‘Man is the owner of a recurrent fund o f superfluous energy...’ 
See the discussion of the organic analogy below.
®® Hobson referred  to Spencer’s ‘novel conception that social organisation could be m aterial for 
scientific study, and that laws of evolution could be discovered in the history of human institutions’. 
See Free Thought, p. 5. See also J.A. Hobson: A Reader, pp. 60-3.
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economists.®® It also provided the possibility of historical relativism in his analysis o f the
social system. Hobson suggested that evolution shows the importance of cooperation and
organisation as a route to higher forms of life and that if  there be com petition, that it is at the
level o f higher values.®^ Evolution joined his theory o f cooperative surplus in an optimistic
interpretation of the development of human personality and society.®®
Hobson tended to use the example of an isolated family or village or a version o f the
Crusoe story as his ‘original position’ for the development of hum anity, though he
acknowledged the importance of social interaction in the early stages o f the development of
the human species.®® Initially, value is mainly produced through human control of the
m aterial environm ent. However, cooperative surplus provides the basis for the development
of higher, spiritual values. Hobson’s view of this development deserves to be quoted at length:
Taking the life of an individual in society, and regarding that life as constituted as an 
organic complex of functions - physical, intellectual, moral, etc. - we find a 
continuous evolution of wants and satisfactions. In a general historical review of this 
development, there will arise first the want of foods, clothing, shelter, absolutely 
necessary to support the continuance of physical life. Certain improvements in quality, 
character, and variety of these prime satisfactions will follow. Complementary food 
appealing to taste, ornamental elements in clothing, commodiousness and dignity of 
dwelling, may come next. Gradually, higher or more delicate sensations are educated, 
craving satisfaction; crude arts grow, providing utilities which were "unnecessary" to 
primeval man. The beginnings of aesthetic, intellectual, and moral needs are 
manifested; a general widening of life, bringing a conscious and continuous process 
of developing new wants whose satisfaction gives increased value to life, ensues.
In tracing the historical process of development o f wants and satisfactions, each earlier 
element seems more im portant than each succeeding one, the need of food and 
physical protection being more pressing and essential than the needs o f "the higher 
nature." Logically, however - or in the order of nature, considered as a complete 
system, not as a process - each subsequent need or satisfaction is more im portant and 
more valuable than the preceding one in time, because it represents a higher type of 
life.?*
This evolutionary perspective on social interaction underlies all of Hobson’s work
66 John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 103; Wealth and L ife , p. 131.
®^ Hobson realised that the analogy could have conservative overtones, defending on the one hand 
the necessity or desirability of ruthless competition or social stability at the cost of justice. For an 
example o f Hobson’s attack on this view. Crisis o f  Liberalism , pp. 184-5.
®® John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 105.
®® See, for example. Social Problem, pp. 142-5; Free Thought, pp. 133-4.
Social Problem, p. 76, 81.
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though it is rarely stated as explicitly as this. Lower values are historically prior, but in terms 
of valuation at any one time higher values are prior to lower. The surplus raises life to a 
higher level of civilisation. At this higher level, further cooperation is possible and thus a 
fu rther progress in civilisation can be effected. This is the wider significance of Hobson’s 
discussion o f economic surplus. In practical terms, Hosbon’s evolutionary perspective imposed 
the tem poral priority  o f physical needs over spiritual; it put economic reform  before moral 
reform . People needed to be free from  physical restraints before they could have access to 
higher values, as in culture and so on.^^ But a comparison of the worth o f spiritual and 
m aterial values showed that the form er were of higher value than the latter.
Hobson also stressed the efficiency and economy of organisation; it is organized  
cooperation that is a productive factor. As we have seen, Hobson’s underlying methodology 
suggests that direction from  the centre is the most rational. Similarly, cooperation centrally 
organised is the most efficient. Consciousness and reason gives human beings the ability to 
organise and plan rationally, thus reducing w a s t e . C e n t r a l  direction maximises society- 
wide w elfare, by minimising loss through the growth of rationality and social feeling:^^ 
‘Civilisation has its chief meaning in the extension and growing realisation of this unity of 
Society, by utilising these secret threads of social feeling for the weaving of the fabric of 
social institutions.’ ®^
Thus, following Hobson’s evolutionary theory, an ‘expanding circle’ of cooperation 
and organisation is completed.^® Cooperation creates a social surplus, that can be maximised 
by organisation; the existence of surplus permits the pursuit higher activities; cooperation in 
these activities results in the creation of further surplus, again maximised through rational 
organisation of that cooperation. Surplus sets the basis for a system of cooperation that its own
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 191, 208; John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 102; Social Problem, p. 49.
Here, Hobson is following M ill’s distinction o f higher and lower values. The distinction of 
higher and lower values appears in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. For a fu rther discussion of 
utilitarianism , see J.C.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against.
Free Thought, p. 12, 228-9; Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , p. 402; Crisis o f  Liberalism , pp. 
265-6.
Wealth and L ife , p. 218; Social Problem, p. 255, 259-61; Free Thought, p. 31.
Work and Wealth, p. 307. See also Free Thought, p. 265; Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , p. 402.
This phrase is borrow ed from  the title of a book by Peter Singer. See his The Expanding Circle: 
Ethics and Sociobiology.
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surplus, and so on.
‘Organised cooperation’, then, is more productive than disorganised. In economic 
theory and in liberal ideology, Hobson rejected laissez faire, and claiming that while ‘[t]he 
idea that man is really a social being and that his reason can be applied so as to make his social 
cooperation effective for the common good is still regarded as the supreme economic 
heresy’,^^ in fact '‘laissez fa ire  ... is not only impracticable in view of the actual forces 
which move politics, but it is ethically indefensible in the last resort.’^ ® Hobson’s analysis 
o f the development of m odern industry verified his evolutionary theory. While industrial and 
financial combination were already established facts, social control of industry was also 
advancing apace. Hobson claimed that there was a trend for social control o f industries to 
increase. Following the model of individual progress through organisation, society would 
organise its resources to eliminate waste. With some qualifications this is what was in fact 
occurring.^® Small firms were combining into Joint-Stock companies, which themselves were 
transform ed into trusts and private monopolies. Subsequently these were being ‘nationalised’, 
so that some form of social control would give the benefits of combination to the whole of 
society. There was a consonance of the development of routine production techniques and 
economies of scale in firm s and trades, with the provision of routine wants in society and the 
need to provide social control of private monopolies in the public interest. This led to the 
conclusion that firms would pass through stages of combination to become nationalised: ‘The 
natural evolution of modern industry is bringing many large routine businesses into a position 
of dangerous power, to which State organization will be found to be the only effective 
rem edy.’ The State’s economic role would thus naturally grow to cope with the failing of the 
capitalist system: ‘There are certain wastes of economic power involved in all competition; 
there are certain dangers of monopoly attaching to all private conduct of industry. Collective 
control deals with these wastes and dangers, adjusting itself to their extent and character.’®®
Hobson’s position on combination in industry might seem at first blush somewhat 
ambivalent. He applauded the replacement of wasteful com petition, yet he condemned the
The Recording Angel: A Report from  Earth, p. 20.
®^ Im perialism , p. 225.
Work and Wealth, p. 172.
®® Social Problem, pp. 175-7; Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , p. 410; Wealth and L ife , p. 173, 
219. This control might be through nationalisation, the enforcem ent of arbitration or fair wage 
legislation.
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combinations themselves.®^ In fact, combinations are good for their eradication o f blind 
com petition, they are the ‘highest reach of capitalist evolution’, but bad for the creation of 
a strong sectional interest which might wield power over society.®^
As portrayed so far, Hobson’s theory might seem rather authoritarian: the process of 
organisation being inexorable, human life comes increasingly under the reign of centralised 
control. However, this is not the case, because the social surplus is not just applied to social 
activities and institutions such as the state, but also goes towards individual development. 
Socialism, as Hobson called it, was balanced by individualism. First, collectivist organisation 
finds its lim its at the point which individuals d iffer in tastes.®® Second, the ‘economy’ of 
organisation allows individuals to satisfy their lower needs easily and turn more time and 
energy to h igher-valued pursuits.®^ T hird, the authoritarianism  of centralisation is mitigated 
by the inform ation supplied by individuals to the centre.
According to Hobson, state organisation of industry would not eliminate private 
industry because o f the limits on collectivisation. Public industries would provide routine 
common wants, whiie private enterprise would devote itself to providing those higher 
d ifferen tiated  wants, which were in their nature less regular or standardised. Hobson’s 
fram ew ork is beautiful in its sim plicity and symmetry. Following the theory of surplus value, 
the involvement of the state in the economy and increased standardisation would release 
energy and time for the pursuit of higher ends. Thus, while the absolute level of standardised 
industry would continually rise, its proportion of society’s industrial energy would fall.®® 
Hobson called this shift to the higher private needs the qualitative conception of social 
progress.
®^ Though he entertained the idea of a general will, Hobson severely criticised the ‘mob m ind’ of 
jingoism  and war fever. See Psychology o f  Jingoism , ‘Introductory’, chs. 2 -3 , and Democracy A fter  
the War, pt. 2. The determ ining factors in Hobson’s d iffering opinions appear to be the limited and 
sectional nature o f the combination as well as the irrational, directionless and malleable state of mind 
of the masses.
®® Poverty, pp. 201-2, 207-11, 213; Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , p. 113-40; Work and Wealth, 
pp. 277-8; Wealth and L ife , p. 9; Social Problem, p. 177.
®® Crisis o f  Liberalism , pp. 120-2; also on the impossibility and undesirability o f complete central 
control, see Wealth and L ife , pp. 30-40, 43, 235, 238; John Ruskin Social Reform er, pp. 204-5.
®^ Wealth and L ife , p. 33, 68; Social Problem, pp. 245-6.
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , p. 418, 420; Social Problem, pp. 183-5.
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Costs, Surpluses and the Human Law o f  Distribution
Hobson’s theory of distribution was innovative. While the cooperative surplus appeared as a 
benefit to all, in classical political economy the rewards from  production are assumed to be 
distributed fairly among the various contributors to production, that is, the four factors, land, 
labour, capital and ability.®® Hobson eschewed these distinctions and instead outlined a 
theory of distribution according to costs and surpluses. His theory is first rigorously outlined 
in The Industrial System , but dates back to his extension of the concept of rent from  land to 
the other factors of production.®^
In Hobson’s scheme, there are three categories: costs o f maintenance (or subsistence); 
costs o f growth (productive surplus); and unproductive surplus (or waste). Costs of 
maintenance are subsistence wages and salaries for labour and ability and w ear-and-tear 
funds for capital and land. If these are denied, as in the case, say, of subsistence wages, 
production is halted because the w ork-force is starved.®® Costs of progress, or growth, 
‘consist of the minimum payments needed to call into industrial use the various sorts and 
quantities of labour, land, capital and ability needed for effective co-operation in the 
enlarged structure of industry.’®®
Costs are ‘payments necessary for the maintenance and efficient functioning of the 
factors of production.’®® Because they are necessary, they are rationally distributed and there 
is a harmony of individual and social interests in regard to their apportionment.®^ However, 
as we have seen, surplus is initially produced through social cooperation and, belonging to no 
single coopérant, would not necessarily be rationally distributed.
Contrasted with the ‘costs’ it may be regarded as an irrational element in the system.
®® This last is commonly labelled entrepreneurship in economics today. Ability and 
entrepreneurship are not exactly the same, however. For Hobson, ability meant particularly the ability 
to organise the other factors, the reward for which was a salary; for economic theorists today, 
entrepreneurship means risk taking as well as organisation, the reward for which is profit.
®^ ‘Law of Three Rents’. Hobson’s discussion of costs and surpluses in The Industrial System  is 
presented in an abbreviated form in The Science o f  Wealth.
®® Science o f  Wealth, p. 68.
®® Science o f  Wealth, p. 69.
®® Wealth and L ife , p. xviii; Work and Wealth, p. 177, 276.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 213; Work and Wealth, p. 276.
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It [the surplus] belongs nowhere by necessary law... There is a sense in which the 
economic surplus is entirely rational... [it] is the sole source and substance of economic 
progress. Its irrationality lies in the defective provision for its serviceable 
distribution.®^
According to Hobson, under capitalism, there is no rational mechanism to distribute
this social surplus. The ideology of laissez fa ire  permits the appropriation o f the surplus by
sectional interests to the detrim ent of others and of society as a whole. This unproductive
surplus, as Hobson calls it, is a result o f the flawed system of distribution that exists under
capitalism.®® U nproductive surplus is appropriated through scarcity, whether natural,
artificial (e.g., monopoly power) or purely fortuitous. Because the cooperative surplus has no
necessary place, it is d istributed under capitalism according to bargaining power or force. The
owner o f a scarce factor, be that land, labour, capital or ability, makes forced gains.®^ The
main gainers from  such a system are, then, the economically or physically strong. U nder
capitalism , it is the capitalists.
The unproductive surplus is a harmful element in industry and society in a num ber
of respects. It results in no stimulus to production, as is the case with the costs of maintenance
and growth; it takes from a possible application to the growth of production; and finally, it
acts as ‘a demand for idleness’ and so depresses production.®® Further, because it is an
appropriation of the cooperative surplus, a main claimant on this surplus, the State, is
deprived o f funds. U nproductive surplus is the source of discord in industry and society,
because its appropriation becomes a m atter o f struggle, not rational distribution.®®
How should the surplus be distributed? Hobson’s answer is that it should go to benefit
all, according to needs. This involved the concerted action of the whole society through the
instrum ent o f the state:
an enlightened com m unity, recognizing the growing social needs, will continually use 
its enlarging income from State monopolies and taxation to raise the standard of 
public consum ption, but providing a fuller, richer, and more complex social life, as
®® Wealth and Life^  p. xviii, 190.
®® He elsewhere calls this elem ent in the system of distribution unearned income or im property. 
See The Industrial System : An Inquiry into Earned and Unearned Income and Property and 
Improperty.
®^ Work and Wealthy p. 276; Wealth and L ife , p. 190, 195-6; Science o f  Wealth, pp. 105-6, 111. For 
the vagueness o f the distinction between costs and surplus see Wealth and L ife , p. 211.
®® Science o f  Wealth, pp. 80-1.
®® Science o f  Wealth, p. 82.
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well as by furnishing such support and aid to the weaker members of society as is held 
to be consistent with a true interpretation of social utility.
Taxation of the unproductive surplus is Hobson’s basis for an extended state finance and for
the morality of state intervention in the economy and society.®®
The solution to this problem of strife resulting from the struggle over the surplus was
to apply the human law of distribution: a m odified rendering of the Saint-Simonian doctrine
’from  each according to his powers [or capabilities], to each according to his needs’.®®
According to Hobson, this human law of distribution allocated work and wealth according to
needs and capacities and so maximised social welfare also. Refuting the claims o f those who
emphasised effort or productivity, Hobson suggested that it was best to allocate according to
needs. Hobson interpreted needs as the costs involved in producing for society and the need
for personal growth. The cooperative surplus if rationally distributed would be absorbed into
the costs of growth, both individual and social.
From the economic point of view, just as ‘[ejvery failure to put the right man or
woman in the right place, with the best faculty of filling that place, involves social waste’, so
does any system of distribution that deprives some and produces ‘illth’ for others. Only by the
balanced application of income to individual needs as incurred costs and revealed values could
the maximum level of production be obtained in the future. In economic theory and industrial
society, individuals were considered as specialised producers or isolated consumers. The
hum an law of distribution acknowledged individuals as whole persons whose consumption
affected  their production and vice versa. D istributing work and wealth according to each
individual’s needs and capacity to use the wealth would ‘secure the minimum of Hum an Costs
and the maximum of Human U tility’. It would thus be the ‘true principle o f ‘economy” ®^®
inasmuch as it obtained the most welfare out of current production possible, and led to the
developm ent of production and consumption in the fu ture so as to maximise w elfare, even if
this were to mean the reduction of current material well-being. The law would economise
industrial resources and ‘liberate more and more time, energy and conscious interest o f its
m em bers for occupations, both individual and social, that lie outside the distinctively
®^ Social Problem, p. 254.
®® Wealth and L ife , p. 198.
®® John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 104; Work and Wealth, p. vii, 163, Free Thought, p. 131; Wealth 
and L ife ,  p. xxx; Social Problem, p. 162; Crisis o f  Liberalism , pp. 80-1.
1®® pfQg Thought, p. 131.
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economic field,
To sum up the last two sections, for Hobson, the origin of social surplus was 
cooperative activity. The surplus is the fount of human progress, through improvements in 
welfare. Hobson believed that there was an evolutionary process towards increased 
organisation, and that welfare would be enhanced by social organisation and his human law 
of distribution. His theory o f distribution accounts for the strife in capitalist society through 
the appropriation o f the surplus by powerful sectional, usually business, interests.
The Theory of Underconsumption
The theory o f underconsum ption is one of the more famous aspects o f Hobson’s work. Three 
elements of Hobson’s theory of underconsum ption are outlined here: overproduction resulting 
from  technological progress; oversaving caused by the ‘any/every’ paradox; and 
m aldistribution and subsequent integration of the theory of underconsum ption into Hobson’s 
theory o f distribution according to costs and surpluses. The section deals purely with Hobson’s 
account of the origins and possibility of underconsum ption in a modern economy.
What is underconsum ption? It is a situation in which there is an excess of production 
over consum ption, a condition of general over-supply. The result is a surplus o f consumption 
goods, but particularly o f capital. Orthodox political economy and modern neo-classical 
economics has denied the possibility of underconsum ption on the grounds that a capacity to 
purchase is created with each good produced, the notion that all markets must clear and the 
idea that the interest rate will create the correct level of saving relative to spending.
Overproduction
The first way in which Hobson explained underconsum ption was as the ‘flip -side’ of 
overproduction. As we have seen, Hobson argued that organisation, concentration and 
planning increased productivity. Overproduction resulted from  the application of science to 
industry. The technology of machine production, improved transportation facilities and
Wealth and L ife , p. xxx.
I will not be discussing the various stages through which trade depression passes and the 
relationship o f underconsum ption, oversaving and overproduction to depression. For accounts of 
Hobson’s discussion of these m atters, see John Allett, New Liberalism , ch. 4; E.E. Nemmers, Hobson 
and Underconsumption", Michael Bleaney, Underconsumption Theories, ch. 8.
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increasing returns to scale immensely enhanced production possibilities. Hobson believed that 
industrial capitalism had developed the technology to produce huge quantities o f goods, but 
that there was no proportionate increase in c o n s u m p t i o n . H a b i t s  of consumption were 
conservative by comparison, Hobson argued. This meant that production was outrunning 
consumption:
[T]he improved technique of every branch of industry, in m anufacture, m ining, 
agriculture, commerce, transport and finance, in every part o f the civilised world, has 
developed a power of production which is wildly excessive in the sense that goods it 
could put on the market cannot be sold at a price that would cover costs and yield a 
profit.
This explanation tends to accompany the next two elem ents, but is relegated by
Hobson to background s t a t u s . T h i s  is because Hobson realised that it ignored the fact
that each production is rewarded by an income which, theoretically at least, is sufficient to
purchase the good. That is, Hobson accepted this version of Say’s Law, that what is produced
will be consumed, and that therefore markets will clear:
Whatever is, or can be, produced, can be consumed, for a claim upon it, as rent, 
profit, or wages, forms part of the real income of some m em ber o f the comm unity, 
and he can consume it, or else exchange it for some other consumable with someone 
else who will consume it. With everything that is produced a consuming power is born. 
If then there are goods which cannot get consumed, and if  there is a quantity  of 
capital and labour which cannot get full employment because its products cannot get 
consumed, the only possible explanation of this paradox is the refusal o f owners of 
consuming power to apply that power in effective demand for commodities.
Thus, despite the advance of production and the conservative habits o f consum ption, the extra
goods produced would be consumed.
Recording Angela p. 33. He thought that modern productive techniques could provide enough 
to feed hum anity. For the production processes increasing disproportionately to consum ption, see, 
among many others. Imperialism^ p. [45].
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation^ p. 36. See also p. 123, and Imperialism^ p. 80.
Or is dismissed entirely. See the Preface to Poverty in Plenty.
Imperialism., p. 81; see also p. [45]; Property and Improperty., p. 38; Recording Angel, p. 48. 
For brief and accessible explanations of Say’s Law, see William J. Barber, A History o f  Economic 
Thought, pp. 68-70, and Robert Heilbroner, The W orldly Philosophers, p. 77 (see also pp. 148-9 on 
Hobson’s underconsum ption). On Hobson and Say’s Law see P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and 
the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1898-1914’, pp. 571-2, and ‘International Trade and 
Economic Development in the Work of J.A. Hobson Before 1914’, p. 410.
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Oversaving
If Say’s Law were true, then, there would be no fixed limit to demand and no
overproduction or underconsum ption. Hobson’s acceptance o f Say’s Law was qualified,
however. In the co-w ritten  The Physiology o f  Industry^ Hobson and his co-author M ummery
attem pted to dem onstrate, against the classical political economy orthodoxy, that general
oversaving was both theoretically possible and that it was the cause of industrial depression.
M ummery and Hobson argued that any individual in society can save as much of their income
as they wish. This is possible because others to consume now rather than later, so that the
saving individual may consume later. However, there is a limit to social saving, the provision
for a level of consumption presently and in the future. There is, they argued, a social saving-
spending ratio. The problem was, wrote M ummery and Hobson, that
the th rift of the comm unity is composed of the th rift o f individuals. It is clear, then, 
that if the united th rift of individuals passes the limit imposed by the interests of the 
comm unity, th rift ceases to be as effectual as before, even from the individual’s point 
of view; that is to say, though any individual may anticipate all future labour, every 
individual cannot.
This is Hobson’s any/every paradox a variant of his critique of the separatist fallacy of laissez
faire. In contrast to the orthodox classical economic view, according M ummery and Hobson,
individual interests do not harmonise with or add up to the social interest:
If the interests of each individual in the community were always identical with the 
interests of the comm unity there could be no such thing as over-supply. It is 
impossible to suppose that a company of men, producing in common for the common 
good, would at any time produce more than required for consumption in the present 
or near future. It is, in fact, the clash of interests between the comm unity as a whole 
and the individual members in respect to Saving, that is the cause of O ver- 
supply.^°®
M ummery and Hobson exposed the fallacy of the Victorian virtue of th rift. Individual 
th rift, they claimed, can lead to socially detrim ental e f f e c t s . T h o u g h  they blamed the 
wealthier sections of society in particular, the logic of their argum ent merely suggested that 
because individually rational saving did not accord with socially rational decisions, that 
oversaving was theoretically possible and had in fact been the source o f trade depression. 
According to this analysis. Say’s Law does not operate because there is no rational mechanism
Physiology o f  Industry, p. 111.
Physiology o f  Industry, p. 105.
Physiology o f  Industry, p. iv, 205.
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to equate social saving and spending.
Rebutting the classical political economists. M ummery and Hobson claimed that a cut 
in wages to reduce costs or fall in the rate of interest were parts o f the problem of 
underconsum ption and d e p r e s s i o n . T h e  interest rate did not provide a rational 
mechanism for balancing saving and spending. M ummery and Hobson’s alternative was to 
propose that the state should intervene to create this rational mechanism by expanding 
consumption relative to saving in periods o f over-saving. They cited fighting a war as one 
way of alleviating the problem, but this was not the only alternative:
[I]f the comm unity, instead of expending its surplus accumulations in the endeavour 
to cut its members’ throats, consented to increase its consumption of luxuries, or applied the 
surplus funds to the improvement of the condition of the working classes or the sanitation of 
its great towns, all the contingent economic advantage of a war would be reaped, and the 
d irect advantage of increased consumption o f luxuries, of an improved condition o f labourers, 
or of sanitary towns would be obtained.
This explanation is most closely associated with Hobson’s work with Mummery. 
However, the ‘any/every’ paradox reappears in Hobson’s later work. Though it is overtaken 
by the last element of the explanation, m aldistribution, in regard to national economies, it is 
revived in Hobson’s explanation of the international aspects of the G reat Depression.
Maldistribution and Underconsumption
Hobson’s most famous explanation of underconsum ption is that it is a result of the 
m aldistribution of income. Underconsum ption was, for Hobson, a social malady causing 
economic depression. Hobson wrote that ‘our main economic troubles are of a distinctively 
moral o r i g i n . T h e  ‘fundam ental logic’ of his argum ent was ‘that rents, excessive interest 
and profits constitute an irrational surplus income, the irrationality of which must be 
represented in an attem pt to save and invest a larger proportion of the total income than can
Physiology, pp. 130-2. 
Physiology o f  Industry, p. 162.
There are a num ber o f anomalies to the Physiology as part o f Hobson’s work. For instance, on 
page 37, there is a distinction of the concerns of economics from  the ethical concerns. This, along 
with other textual indications and the violation of the alphabetical convention on the listing of the 
authors’ names, has led some scholars to wonder whether it was M ummery who had the larger 
influence on this book. For an example o f a recurrence o f the any/every  paradox, see 
‘Underconsum ption: An Exposition and a Reply’, pp. 407-8.
Poverty in Plenty, p. 85.
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be utilised as capital.
In an early version of the argum ent, without a discussion o f the influence of
unproductive surplus, Hobson argued:
In a w ell-ordered society, where distribution of wealth as consuming power was 
proportioned either to the efforts or the needs of the producers, every increase in the 
powers of production of the community would automatically be attended by a 
corresponding rise in the general standard of consumption, effective demand rising 
to correspond with every increased power of supply.
If, on the other hand, inequality of economic opportunities is such as to impose a 
grave inequality in the distribution of wealth, some classes getting a power of 
purchase greater than is required to supply legitimate and pressing needs, we have an 
economic condition which explains the paradox of over-production, under­
consumption, and unemployment.^^®
Hobson had argued, as we have seen, that the system of distribution under capitalism
was flawed. Underconsum ption was a consequence of m aldistribution because some sections
o f the comm unity got more than they deserved and some less, according to Hobson’s needs
criterion. This disrupted the ‘economically sound ratio between saving and spending’.
Where property is acquired by labour, involving personal cost, it is naturally and 
proportionately related to some personal utility of consumption. If all property and all 
purchasing power were apportioned in accordance with this natural law, no 
disequilibrium  could arise between the rate of production and the rate of 
consumption.
But if  in any society you get considerable groups of men whose incomes come to them 
by others’ toil instead of their own, and if these incomes are so large as to afford  them 
little or no additional satisfaction by any considerable increase of their expenditure, 
[the] natural balancing o f present against future enjoym ent is upset.
For the wealthy, the unproductive surplus that they had appropriated stim ulated little or no
desire to consume. Therefore, ‘a large part of the surplus unearned income of the rich is
found to be excessive, even for purposes of luxurious and wasteful consumption, and
accumulates to form an investment fund of capital which is larger than is required.
‘R ejoinder’ to ‘U nderconsum ption: An Exposition and a Reply’, p. 427.
International Trade^ p. 149, 150. See also Imperialism^ p. 29.
Economics o f  Unemployment^ p. 8.
Property and Improperty, p. 39.
Economics o f  Unemployment^ p. 41.
Economics o f  Unemployment, p. 8. For further discussion of the ‘autom atic’ nature of the 
saving of the wealthy, see pp. 35-7.
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They saved too much and consumed too little. Furtherm ore, too little purchasing power was
allocated to the working classes who would have used the extra income consuming to improve
their standard of living, thus reducing underconsumption.
Thus, the workers had the desire but not the ability to consume, and the capitalists the
ability but not the desire. The result was a failure of aggregate effective demand. Kowevei,
the wealthy would attem pt to invest their surplus income anyway. M aldistribution caused a
disjunction of production and consumption, thus undoing Say’s Law, because productive
capacity increases despite insufficiency of demand. The ultimate outcome was trade
depression with declines in prices, in profits, and in production. U nfortunately, these falls do
not themselves solve the problem, as economists had claimed. Calling on his
underconsum ption explanation for the depression, Hobson noted that a reduction in
production reduced wages, but a reduction in wages in turn their reduced effective demand.
For Hobson, the conclusion was that society was not generating the maximum possible
welfare from the available resources. Having been merged into is theory of the unproductive
surplus after The Industrial System  in 1909, his discussion of underconsum ption is resurrected
after the First World War as an alternative explanation, first, for the economic dislocations
in Europe immediately following the war, but later as an alternative to m onetary explanations
of and radical solutions to the Great Depression of the t h i r t i e s . H o w e v e r ,
underconsum ption has other implications in Hobson’s work. In trying to avoid the losses
attendant in a depression in trade, those with surplus income were prompted to look for
investment opportunities abroad. Another tactic was the dumping o f consumption goods on
foreign markets in order to maintain the prices at home.^^^ However, it is the pressure to
export capital because of underconsum ption-induced trade depression that is more famous,
as it became, for Hobson, one of the central causes of modern imperialism.
Hobson’s solution, however, was straightforward: tax the surplus from  the wealthy and
apply it either to public works by the State or in redistribution to the workers. This was not
only a just solution but was economically defensible.
The application of this surplus ... to enlarge the spending power and consumption of 
the workers and the community, will remedy [the] chronic m aladjustments [of saving
See Rationalisation and Unemployment^ p. 55; Economics o f  Unemployment^ pp. 47-8.
See, in the first case. Economics o f  Unemployment and Problems o f  a New World, and in the 
second. Rationalisation and Unemployment, Poverty in Plenty, From Capitalism to Socialism, 
Recording Angel, Democracy and a Changing Civilisation and Property and Improperty
See ‘The M ystery of Dum ping’, in International Trade.
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and spending] by raising the aggregate power of consumption to keep pace with every 
increase of productive power.
The Organic Analogy and Hobson’s Transformation of Liberalism
Hobson’s discussions o f welfare, surplus, cooperation, organisation, distribution and 
underconsum ption have a unity and rhetorical power because they are couched in ‘organic’ 
terms. The organic analogy appears throughout Hobson’s work. This section considers the part 
that organic term inology plays in Hobson’s thought. It discusses whether Hobson’s ‘almost 
mystical attachm ent’ to the ‘alarm ing’ organic analogy is anything more than rationalising 
rhetoric.
Today, Hobson’s references to society as a ‘social organism’ might seem dated, quaint 
or a little alarming. The terminology is often associated with the ruthless theories of social 
Darwinism or with Parsonian structural functionalism in sociology. Darwin’s evolutionary 
doctrine had an immense impact on social, political and economic thought in the nineteenth 
c e n t u r y . A s  Freeden has shown, however, the use of a biological analogy was by no 
means lim ited to social Darwinists. Hobson lifted the conception of the social organism from 
H erbert Spencer, but turned it to the cause of social reform.
My discussion o f Hobson’s use of organic terminology is in three parts. First, organic 
refers to the nature of human beings as organisms. This not only emphasises the physiological 
aspect of hum anity but is also used by Hobson as a means of attacking the Cartesian dualism 
of mind and body. Second, Hobson transformed liberalism through his use of the analogy of 
society to an organism. He justified the increased role of the state and the supersession of
Poverty in Plenty, pp. 63-4. See also Economics o f  Unemployment, pp. 47-8.
Peter C larke, ‘Introduction’, Crisis o f  Liberalism, 1974 reprint, p. xvii; Bernard Porter, Critics 
o f  Empire, p. 174; William Liu, A Study o f  Hobson's Welfare Economics, pp. 82-6, 92. Hobson’s use 
o f organic term inology ia also examined in Michael Freeden, ‘Introduction’, Confessions, 1974 
reprin t, pp. v ii-v iii; and ‘Introduction’, J.A. Hobson: A Reader, pp. 6-8. For a comm entary on 
Freeden’s discussion o f new liberalism including Hobson, see Stephan Collini, ‘Political Theory and 
the ‘Science o f Society’ in Victorian England’, pp. 226-31.
G reta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought. Economists had also adopted the 
language o f natural selection through free competition in a market economy. See the Preface to A lfred 
M arshall, Principles o f  Economics Hobson commented on the use and abuse o f the terms organic and 
evolution in Free Thought, pp. 24-30. Talcott Parsons, The Structure o f  Social Action, pt. 1.
Michael Freeden, New Liberalism , pp. 102-5.
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laissez fa ire  through the analogy. This ideological purpose is accomplished through an 
substantive emphasis on the interdependence of modern society and the methodological holism 
o f the organic analogy. In sum, Hobson claimed that society must be studied as the organic 
whole that is. T hird, ‘organic’ is used by Hobson as a device to organise and give unity to his 
own work, and as a way of indicating his approval.
The Human Organism
Organic terminology highlights the physical nature o f hum anity. Together with his 
evolutionary approach to social life, this led to Hobson to emphasise the physiological basis 
of issues in social r e f o r m . H o w e v e r ,  organic also brought attention to the fact that each 
individual, human personality was an integrated whole, that could not simply be analysed into 
its separate parts, physical and emotional, intellectual without some loss of scientific 
exactitude. In this emphasis on the integrated nature of human existence, Hobson rejected the 
Cartesian dualism of mind and body.^^®
Hobson also sought to evaluate human society in terms of the evolution of a spiritual, 
and even occasionally physical, organism. For Hobson, society was a collectivity of human 
organisms, or even an organism itself, rather like M andeville’s bees. The social aspects of 
industry, production and consumption could thus be construed in terms of biological nutrition 
and f u n c t i o n . D e s p i t e  doubts as to whether organism was an over-stretched term in 
discussing the spiritual dimension of human life, Hobson maintained his use of the organic 
terminology because he believed that a spiritualised interpretation of organism was more 
appropriate than any other description of humanity.
The Transform ation o f  Liberalism
The most significant use of organic by Hobson is the analogy of society to an organism. 
Hobson’s use of the organic analogy transform ed liberalism from nineteenth century laissez
John Ruskin Social Reformer^ p. 155; Crisis o f  Liberalism^ pp. 80-3.
Social Problem^ p. 156, 236; Work and Wealthy p. 16.
Work and Wealth, pp. 19-20. Hobson also referred to race and hum anity as collectivities.
Work and Wealth, pp. 17-8.
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fa ire  into what was called new l i b e r a l i s m , b y  shifting the methodology that underpinned 
liberalism away from  individualism  and atomism (monadism) towards a methodological 
holism. Yet liberalism was m aintained through an affirm ation of the importance of the 
individual in the interdependence of organic cooperation, and denying the authoritarianism  
o f bureaucratic socialism and Oxford Idealism. Hobson’s new liberalism, inspired by the 
organic analogy, brought the State into liberal conception of the common good and placed 
social reform  on a firm  theoretical footing.
For Hobson, the organic view of society demonstrated the methodological fallacy of 
the individualism  or monadism in laissez fa ire  liberalism. For Hobson, it was not possible to 
construct a theory o f individual, let alone social, value on an individualistic basis because of 
the changes wrought by social interaction and c o o p e r a t i o n . S u c h  monadism ‘looks upon 
society as embodied in the separate action of individual wills, without allowance for any 
organic relation among those wills, constituting spiritual solidarity.’^^^  Thus, ‘such 
separatism and atomism is the repudiation of creative action and the organic unity which it 
expresses.’^^^
Following his theory of the cooperative surplus and the social determ ination of value,
society was more than the mere aggregation of individual personalities. Society was an entity
in its own right. It had an existence beyond the aggregation of individuals and welfare could
be said to attach to it as well as individuals separately:
We are told indeed that "Society only exists in individuals." This, however, is only true 
in the same restricted sense in which it is true that an animal organism only exists in 
the life of its cells. There is nothing but the cells plus their organic cooperation. But 
I should rather say that the organism exists in the cooperation of the cells. So I should
See the aims o f the Rainbow Circle in Samuel Papers, A. 10, quoted in Bernard Porter, Critics 
o f  Empire^ p. 164.
See, among others, Freeden, New Liberalism, ch. 3; Allett, New Liberalism , chs. 6-7; Clarke, 
‘Introduction’, Crisis o f  Liberalism , 1974 reprin t, pp.xiii-xv.
Social Problem, p. 67; Work and Wealth, p. 307; Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 77. On individual 
rights, see Social Problem, p. 88, 95, 101; Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 77, 79-80. Hobson does concede 
the prim acy of individual on welfare. Social Problem, p. 172. On this issue see Freeden, ‘J.A. Hobson 
as a Political Theorist’, pp. 10-18.
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 207. Parallel repudiation of economic calculus in Free Thought, pp.
122-3.
Free Thought, p. 130.
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say that Society exists in the cooperation of individuals.^®®
Only from  an individualistic perspective would cooperation seem to involve the
sacrifice of individual development:
Not only industrial but social life in general requires a certain sacrifice of free 
individual development, represented by a specialisation of certain powers and a 
comparative neglect o f others. This, of course, is only a sacrifice, so long as we regard 
individuals as self-sufficien t units, which they are not: the so-called sacrifice becomes 
a gain as soon as we recognise the social character of man, which requires that he be 
form ed not merely with regard to his individual perfection, but with regard to the 
perfection of the social organism of which he is part.^®^
According to Hobson, developments in society and the economy had underm ined the 
viability of laissez faire and set the ground for the new liberalism with which he was so 
closely associated. There was need for a change of policy, ‘a coherence of purpose, an organic 
plan of social progress, which implies a new consciousness of Liberal statecraft.’ ®^® 
Hobson’s new liberalism entailed a changed beneficent view of the state. There were 
philosophical and practical rationales for this extended role for the state. Hobson’s conception 
of the development of conscious control as a superior form of human rationality suggested 
that markets were seen as anarchic, or at best diffuse systems, and that the economy would 
perform  better with a measure of central social control. Hobson’s evolutionary theory, 
buttressed by the theory of surplus value, supported this conclusion. Extrapolating from  m an’s 
developing consciousness and applying the possibilities of control and planning to the state 
in society, Hobson believed that state control would reap the economies o f organisation.
His theory of cooperative surplus legitimised state finance through taxation o f the 
surplus.^®® Through the organic analogy, the state could, fu rther, be seen as the central 
social direction needed to control the powerful sectional interests of industrial com bination, 
both of business and labour, that had emerged in modern society. This vision o f the role of 
the state in the economy and in social policy contrasts sharply with the nightw atchm an state 
of laissez faire. Hobson proposed the state as a bulwark against separate interests. He claimed 
that laissez fa ire  individualism and the autonomy of politics and economics envisaged in 
classical political economy no longer existed due to the growth of combination and monopoly
®^® Work and Wealth, p. 308. See also Social Problem, p. 146; Wealth and L ife , p. 167. 
®^^  John Ruskin Social Reform er, pp. 247-8.
®^® Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. xi.
®^® For example. Taxation in the New State.
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in industry. The ideology of laissez fa ire  remained nonetheless as a support to the interests 
of the ruling class. Sanctioning the right of each individual to take what they could for 
themselves, it blessed the predominance of stronger groups or classes. This challenge to the 
priority o f  social interests constituted for Hobson a challenge to civilisation itself.
Hobson’s new liberalism was an attempt to reinvigorate liberalism with reforming zeal, 
and to move it away from the influence of the wealthy classes, particularly the powerful 
industrial magnates and financiers. It aimed for more intervention by the state in socio­
economic matters and for a reformation of d e m o c r a c y .H o w e v e r ,  Hobson did not only 
use organic against the individualism and separatism of laissez faire. He also used it to 
distance his new liberalism from the authoritarian view of society held by the socialists and 
the Idealists. Here, Hobson contrasts organism with mechanism and holism.
Hobson claimed that a mechanistic conception of society underlaid arguments for a 
‘rational’ control of society by an elite of experts, be they the captains of industry of political 
economy or the administrators of Fabian or Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism. Hobson 
pointed out that the mechanistic analogy is drawn from the natural sciences, and so stressed 
a version of cause, process and system, which divorce them from human will and intervention. 
It conceived of society as a giant manipulable mechanism: ‘Great national issues really turn, 
according to this judgement, upon the arts of political management, the play of the adroit 
tactician and the complete c a n v a s s e r , I n  attempting to reduce individual and social life 
to quantifiable categories, however, mechanism ‘can neither handle an organism as structure, 
nor as the system of activities in which the organism expresses itself.’^^^  For Hobson, the 
failure to acknowledge that society is an organic system resulted in an anti-democratic 
distortion, an authoritarian view of society, that usually favoured political conservatives and 
the bureaucratic establishment.
Hobson attacked neo-Hegelianism of Oxford idealism for its abstractness, its failure
Crisis o f  Liberalism^ p. 116.
See ‘The Re-statement of Democracy’ and ‘The Tasks of Reconstruction’ in Crisis o f  
Liberalism .
Crisis o f  Liberalism., p. 115; Wealth and L ife , p. 84.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 134.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 117.
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to address the concrete practical issues of society, and for its authoritarianism,^^® The
Idealists, according to Hobson, stressed the importance of society over individuals; social ends
reigned supreme. Hobson criticised the Idealists prescriptions to ameliorate the conditions of
the poor, because they stressed individual spiritual salvation rather than social causes of the
maladies of unemployment and poverty. Fundamentally, he objected to the authoritarian tone
of the Idealist prognosis on social problems. Hobson’s organic conception o f society retained
the value of the individual: ‘The organic conception of society ... demands a self-government
in which the whole of the self, the organic experience and judgment of the whole rational
system, shall find direct conscious expression,’^^ ® Organic terminology acknowledged that
the individuals were essential for the existence of the social whole, that is, that there was no
society beyond the people that made it up. Hobson opposed both Idealist and socialist
conceptions of society, and instead claimed that:
Society exists, not, as is sometimes maintained, in order consciously to secure the 
separate welfare of its individual members, but to secure the health and progress of 
society always realised as a social organism; but this end, interpreted at any given time 
in terms of "social utility," has been seen to involve the care and promotion of 
individual health and progress. It can never be the interest of society to attempt to 
dominate or enslave the individual, sucking his energies for the supposed nutriment 
of a State; any such endeavour would be futile, for ... an attempt to exploit those 
energies, or to take away that "property" which nature has set aside for individual 
support and progress, would defeat its end by drying up the sources of such energy 
and "property.
Hobson’s new liberalism, inspired by organic terminology, was, then, an attempt at 
a democratic compromise between the laissez fa ire  of nineteenth century liberalism and the 
authoritarian tones of contemporary socialistic doctrines of both the Idealists and the radical 
working class groups.
Early in his career Hobson was quite close to this position himself. For his critique, see ‘The 
Social Philosophy of Charity Organisation’, in Crisis o f  Liberalism. He remained unimpressed by 
Hegelian dialectics, but the attack on Hegel’s philosophy and its influence was conducted with more 
fervour by Hobson’s friend L.T. Hobhouse. See the latter’s The M etaphysical Theory o f  the State, a 
critique of Bernard Bosanquet’s The Philosophical Theory o f  the State.
146 John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 207.
Social Problem, p. 224. See also Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 76, 82-3. For Hobson’s rather less 
liberal views, see for instance, John Ruskin Social Reform er, p. 16 on marriage, Crisis o f  Liberalism, 
p. 85 on democracy, and Social Problem, p. 88 on the impossibility of self-regarding actions.
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Organisational and Rhetorical Uses o f  Organic
Organic is put to two further uses by Hobson: as an organisational device for his work 
and as rhetoric. The various aspects and different concerns in Hobson’s work are coordinated 
by the overarching concept, organic. It gave a unity to his diverse writings, from poor relief 
to internationalism, from taxation to eugenics, creating a coherent campaign for social reform. 
Though his use of organic terminology waned, the emphasis on the unity of politics, 
economics and ethics in a single social science r e m a i n e d .H o b s o n ’s use of organic linked 
together and brought a common theme to his political and economic principles, the 
differentiation of functions (division of labour), the theory of surplus value, the human law 
of distribution, and the principle of federalism.
Hobson used the terms organic and organism rhetorically as gestures of approval, using 
the term to apportion praise and blame. This point is not trivial because Hobson’s arguments 
might be made without recourse to organic terminology and yet remain substantively 
unchanged. The phrases ‘organic interconnection’ and ‘organic unity’ are good examples. For 
instance, ‘[t]he organic unity of man as producer and consumer renders invalid the statistical 
separatism which our neo-classical economics seeks to i m p o s e . T h e  use of organic here 
tells us little more than that Hobson approved of connection and unity, and disapproved of 
separatism. Beyond this there is little substantive distinction, for instance between mechanical 
and organic systems, other than that Hobson approved of the latter over the f o r m e r . T o  
read Im perialism , for instance, to is to read Hobson complaining about the parasitical nature 
of capitalism. ‘Parasitical’ conveys some meaning but is also highly effective as a derogatory 
slight against capitalists.
Hobson substituted federalism for organism in Wealth and L ife .
Confessions, p. 209. See also Work and Wealth, p. 308, and Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 116. Hobson 
referred on occasion to his preferred system of distribution according to needs as the ‘organic law of 
distribution’.
However, see the contrast in terminology used to excoriate the forces of reaction, from the 
mechanistic tones of Im perialism , to the organic tones of Democracy A fter the War, p. 146.
And is part of the particularly dire warning issued to Western civilisation at the end of 
Imperialism , pp. 365-8.
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Critical Assessment
Hobson’s ideas have not gone unchallenged. This section considers some of the critiques of 
Hobson’s work and explores further objections not raised in the critical literature. It closes 
with a defence against these criticisms.
The Organic Analogy
Criticism of Hobson’s organic analogy begins with the weaknesses of analogy as a 
description or explanation of human actions or institutions. Language, even science, relies on 
analogies and m e t a p h o r s .H o b s o n ’s overt use of the organic analogy is a useful antidote 
to the use of mechanical metaphors in international relations, where we consistently hear talk 
of the balance of power, the use of force, trade flow s  and so on. These physical and 
mechanical analogies and metaphors are so prevalent that we hardly realise that they are there. 
While biological analogies are also common in the social sciences, it is only recently that 
scientists and social scientists have become interested in the biases and the rhetorical power 
of these linguistic f o r m s . H o b s o n  was aware of the effects of metaphor and was 
particularly critical of the use of mechanical m e ta p h o r s .N o n e th e le s s ,  the organic 
analogy suffers from the same problems as other analogies, that it does not have the validity 
of logical reasoning and that there are disanalogies as well as analogies.
Another criticism is that Hobson’s use of organic contributes little to our 
understanding of society. This is partly because of the inappropriateness of the analogy, 
perhaps, but also because such a broad generalisation explains little. Indeed, all the organic 
analogy tells us is that society can be understood as a whole made up of related parts, but both 
system and mechanism convey this meaning. This is a significant turn to methodological 
holism, but is not aided greatly by the biological terminology. Hobson’s use of organic
Cristina Bicchieri, ‘Should a Scientist Abstain from Metaphor?’, pp. 100-14, esp. 104.
See particularly, Donald McCloskey, The Rhetoric o f  Economics. In international relations, see 
the intriguing analysis by Isabelle Grunberg, ‘Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability’.
See Free Thought, pt. 1, ch. 2.
See Hidemi Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, ch. 2; Irving M. Copi, 
Introduction to Logic, 5th Edn., ch. 11; Duncan Snidal, ‘The Game Theory o f International Politics’, 
pp. 29-32.
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terminology may, indeed, be the reverse of an organic analogy; rather, the lessons he sought 
to draw derive from political and economic analogies to organisms. Hobson’s notions of the 
cooperative surplus, the division of labour and so on are liberal presumptions about the nature 
of society given a biological g l o s s . A s  Peter Clarke has pointed out, the organic analogy 
has conservative implications. The emphasis on the importance of social welfare and order in 
an organic harmony as the basis for individual well-being verges on being a conservative 
tautology and ultimately a defence of the status quo.^®^
The analogy was, as Hobson admitted, an ‘unphilosophic compromise’.^ ®® The 
resolution of the competing claims of the social and the individual or the whole versus the 
parts is problematic. Hobson, for instance, assumed that this antagonism cannot take place in 
an organic system, except as a result of the influence of sectional interests. Here, Hobson has 
assumed a version of the harmony of interests between individuals or groups in society that 
he claimed to have refuted elsewhere. This was not, of course, the natural harmony of the 
laissez faire liberals to be sure, but rather a harmony emergent in conscious collective human 
control of the physical and social environment.^®® Despite the importance of human 
consciousness and active intervention in social life, the difficulty with the harmony of 
interests remains. Indeed, a consciously willed harmony of interests might seem more difficult 
to conceive of and realise in practice than a natural harmony, if the diverse wills of men are 
to be reconciled rather than the resort to an appeal to a natural order.
Hobson’s discussion of separate interests is problematical. Inasmuch as each individual 
or group should realise its fullest potential within the whole, this is can be dealt with through 
education as to true interests. Hobson, however, admits the possibility that separate interests 
might gain, at least in the short run.^®° But this puts any harmony, natural or ‘conscious’, 
into question. How long is the short run? On what grounds should an individual prefer these
®^® See Anatol Rapoport, Conflict in M an-M ade Environment, pp. 17-24, for a persuasive 
argument concerning the transfer of human concepts onto the natural world. Rapoport’s central 
examples are also relevant here: cooperation and conflict do not make sense in the animal world, for 
instance, because it is not clear what animals are conflicting about. See also Stephan Collini, ‘Political 
Theory and the ‘Science of Society’ in Victorian England’.
®^^  Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, p. 50. See also John Allett ‘The Conservative 
Aspect of Hobson’s New Liberalism’.
®^® Social Problem, p. 155.
®^® See L.T. Hobhouse, Liberalism , pp. 127-30.
See Im perialism , pt. 1, ch. 4.
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short run gains to long term common interests? Hobson did not resolve the issue of the 
possible conflict of individual and social rationality, though he acknowledged as much in his 
discussion of the continued requirement for individual incentives to work,^®^
Finally, Hobson’s organic analogy emphasised the similarity between societies and 
between the various levels of social cooperation. Yet it is far from clear whether it is helpful 
to call a family a society. Furthermore, the differences between a local community based on 
affective ties and a multinational society under a single state are huge. In short, the use of 
organic terminology commits Hobson to an isomorphism of social forms that is illegitimate.
Hobson is not without a defence against these charges. The organic analogy remains 
a useful start for a holistic analysis of society. Hobson’s use of the organic analogy was 
progressive at the time. In terms of contemporary sociological analysis, it is also worthwhile 
remembering that Emile Durkheim used the comparison between mechanical and organic 
solidarity to compare the differences in social organisation between feudalism and modern 
industrialism.^®^ As we saw, science consists, initially at least, of metaphor and analogy. 
It might be valuable, as Manning points out, to multiply analogies, if only to avoid being 
under the commanding influence of one, probably misleading analogy.^®®
The isomorphism charge falls because it is important to draw attention to the 
similarity between forms of cooperation and community as much as the contrasts. The 
assumption of an implicit harmony of interests is an unresolvable issue. Whether social 
relations are essentially harmonious or conflictual is perhaps not the right way of looking at 
it. The most that can be said is that Hobson’s assumption of a harmony is no less justified than 
the assumption that there must be a conflict of interest. It is as illegitimate to assume the latter 
as the former.
Thus, as long as the organic analogy is not pushed too far, or used too specifically, i.e., 
in the search for a social sensorium equivalent to the brain, the use of organic may be helpful. 
We should not expect too much from the analogy, but rather look for the broad vision of 
society implied by it. Finally, the conservative aspect of the analogy is avoided through the 
superimposition of an evolutionary socialism. Hobson believed in the social good, to be sure, 
but this would do away with the status quo because society was evolving towards greater 
democracy.
®^^ For example, see Incentives in the Industrial Order.
®^® Talcott Parsons, On Institutions and Human Evolution, p. 191. 
®^® C.A.W Manning, The Nature o f  International Society, p. 151.
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Theory o f  Surplus Value
Surplus has been described as a concept that is impossible to operationalise. A number 
of critics have pointed out that Hobson’s analysis lacks the precision of neo-classical studies. 
His concept of surplus is too vague, for instance, to inform taxing policy, unless with the aid 
of some ad hoc assumption, for example, that the unearned element in income rises 
proportionately with increases in income.
According to Hobson, an income is cooperation’s due. The question then becomes how 
to pay this income and to whom. Hobson seems to prefer the state, through taxation, but there 
is no clear justification for this, except that the state is said to be the representative of society, 
itself a tendentious statement. Hobson’s argument is a better defence of guild socialism and 
syndicalism than the variant of state socialism he hoped for. A further problem is that the 
state has a dual role. It is both an active participant, as an organiser and ultimate provider of 
skills and experience of society as a whole, in the creation of social value. It is therefore due 
its reward. However, the state is also the representative of all society and the body which is 
expected to arrange and enforce an equitable distribution of social value. The state’s neutrality 
must be in question.
Hobson suggested distribution according to needs to remove the unproductive surplus. 
But he defined needs as costs of production and the need for personal growth, mediated by 
the value of that individual to society. This idea is circular, because individual needs are 
determined by their social value. Allett has defended Hobson against the charge that he held 
a ‘bourgeois’ conception of n e e d s . I n  Wealth and L ife , however, Hobson collapses needs 
into ‘the capacity to use’, thus rendering the human law of distribution redundant; it becomes 
‘from each according to his capacities, to each according to his capacities’, not far from neo­
classical economics. Furthermore, the measurement of needs or human costs is going to be a 
huge task. Empirical estimation of capacities would involve a fantastic amount of work to 
complete, collate and compile. The theoretical and practical difficulties meet in the problems 
of assigning what needs to whom, that is of determining the social utility of one course of
Roy Harrod, ‘Epilogue’, in Science o f  Wealth, 4th Edn.; Peter Clarke, ‘Introduction’, to Crisis 
o f  Liberalism , 1974 reprint, p. xxviii; T.W. Hutchinson, A Review o f  Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929, 
p. 126.
John Allett, New Liberalism, p. 69.
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action as against another, appear insurmountable.^®®
The concept of surplus in his theory of distribution contradicted neo-classical 
marginal analysis. According to marginalism, Hobson noted, value was determined, not by a 
rational decision from the centre, but by the peripheral expenditures. Hobson understood 
marginalism well enough to realise that it was a methodological substitute for the dogma of 
laissez fa ire, that there was no unproductive surplus because wealth was distributed according 
to worth under a perfectly competitive economy.^®^ Unfortunately, Hobson misconstrued 
the mathematical analysis of marginal economics and the idea of opportunity cost, thus 
weakening his criticisms.^®®
Despite his attempt to humanise the standard of welfare, Hobson’s human welfare 
remains a utilitarian calculus. Indeed, Hobson recognised as much and defended a ‘modified 
utilitarianism’. This leaves Hobson’s analysis open to the criticisms levelled at utilitarianism 
generally, such as the problems of consequentialism, the difficulties of measurement and the 
contradiction with human integrity.^®^ Furthermore, just as far as Hobson mixed humanism 
with utilitarianism, he is led into the contradiction of the ultimate sanctity of human life as 
against the overall welfare of individuals and society.
Finally, the evolutionary dynamism of the theory of the cooperative surplus allows 
Hobson a certain relativism with regard to individual and social development. However, in 
thus resolving all current problems, oppositions and conflicts in the abstract ideal of a distant 
utopia, Hobson’s teleological explanation is simply an evasion that (like the organic analogy) 
restores an ultimate harmony of interest.
166 As argued famously by Friedrich Hayek, Road to Serfdom .
®^^  For some of Hobson’s more sustained treatments of marginalism as well as classical economic 
theory, see Social Problem, chs. 3-4; Free Thought, pt. 2; Industrial System , Appendix to ch. 5.
®^® See Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption, p. 95 //. ;  J.M. Keynes, review of Hobson’s Cold, 
Prices and Wages in the Economic Journal (1913), reprinted in Collected Works, Vol. 11, pp. 388-94; 
T.W. Hutchinson, A Review o f  Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929, p. 123. The Oxford English Dictionary 
lists Hobson as the originator of the word ‘marginalism’.
®^® J.C.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, pp. 108-18; A.K. Sen, On 
Ethics and Economics, p. 40-6, 74-6; A.K. Sen and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond, pp. 
1 - 2 1 .
For instance, see H.B. Acton, ‘Introduction’, to J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. xiv, xvii, xx.
For a criticism  of utilitarianism  and evolutionary positivism, see Talcott Parsons, On 
Institutions and Human Evolution, pp. 103-5, and J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society, pp. 263-4.
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Again, these criticisms can be rebuffed. Cooperative surplus underlies almost all 
economics. If  there were no benefits to cooperation, people would be unlikely to cooperate. 
Hobson claims that the social surplus is beyond the ‘rational’ distribution of the market. 
Hobson acknowledged the political aspect of distribution. This is not insignificant in the face 
of the depoliticising discourse of rational (or social) choice theorists in economics and 
philosophy alike. However, Hobson’s pronouncements on the social surplus do not accept the 
possibility of justifiable conflict of interest between individuals. His thus analysis stops where 
social philosophers, such as Rawls, Nozick and Barry, now begin.
Furthermore, the criticism that the surplus concept is difficult, if not impossible, to 
operationalise does not mean that surplus does not e x i s t . H o b s o n ’s discussion of human 
needs is incomplete, but it does contribute to a persuasive defence of the economy of high 
wages for the workers.
Subsequent developments in modern societies have made Hobson’s surplus analysis and 
its focus on imperfect competition and monopoly even more plausible. Hobson’s concern with 
the relationship of political and economic issues, and his demonstration that economic 
problems have ethical roots, remain significant contributions. The social emphasis within the 
theory of cooperative surplus and unproductive surplus restores a notion of the common good 
to a liberal economics that has all but banished it.^^^
U nd erconsum ption
The first criticisms of Hobson’s theory of underconsumption came from those 
economists who succeeded in excluding him from the economics profession. For these 
economists, the theory was the economic equivalent of claiming the earth was flat. A fall in 
the interest rate or in costs would restore equilibrium and prosperity, according to this
See generally John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia\ 
Brian Barry, Theories o f  Justice,
For Hobson’s defence of the surplus as the basis for taxation policy, see Poverty in Plenty,, p.
55.
For criticisms of liberals and liberalism along these lines, see William Connolly, Appearance 
and Reality in Politics, ch. 4; John Dunn, Rethinking Modern Political Theory, ch. 9; and Bernard 
Crick, In Defence o f  Politics, pp. 127-34.
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a r g u m e n t . Hobson’s maldistribution argument countered the interest rate solution by 
suggesting that saving is more closely related to income than to the interest rate.
As Nemmers has suggested, Hobson’s account of underconsumption was ‘realist’, that 
is, it discounted the role of money as an active factor in the determination of economic 
activity. Hobson downplayed the influence of monetary factors and the role of credit in the 
trade cycle in his depreciation of other explanations of cyclical depressions and 
unemployment, from the classical arguments to the ‘social credit’ proposal of Major 
Douglas.
Nemmers also points out that Hobson understood investment as the extension of 
current productive potential, /.e., ‘capital widening’. As Nemmers suggests, investment can 
also go towards ‘capital deepening’, the improvement of productive technique and the change 
of processes of production. Such use of capital might be much larger than Hobson anticipated, 
using up the surplus he identified.
However, the ‘root of Hobson’s mistake’ is his equation of saving and investment. This 
means that Hobson shares the classical economists ideas that savings and investment are in 
equilibrium. The possibility of disequilibrium between saving and investment is one of the 
central tenets of the so-called Keynesian revolution in economics. Where Hobson believed that 
saving and investment were basically the same process, Keynes distinguished saving of funds 
from investment in plant and showed that these were carried out by different sections of the 
community. This distinction leads to the difference between Hobson and Keynes on the cause 
of deficient aggregate demand that both identified as the root of trade depression: for Hobson, 
oversaving was over-investment and meant underconsumption; for Keynes, oversaving meant 
under-investment. For Hobson, there was too much capital investment; for Keynes, there was 
too little. Michael Bleaney’s criticism that Hobson failed to identify the dual aspects of 
investment as both saving and consumption follows from this Keynesian distinction.^^®
In most of his writing on underconsumption, Hobson claimed that maldistribution of
F.Y. Edgeworth’s review of Physiology is cited in T.W. Hutchinson, A Review o f  Economic 
Doctrines, 1870-1929. pp. IIS -9 .
See Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption., p. 48. For Hobson’s account of alternative 
explanations of trade depressions, see Economics o f  Unemployment.
Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption., p. 40.
J.M. Keynes, The General Theory o f  Employment. Interest and Money., p. 367-70; Michael 
Bleaney, Underconsumption Theories, p. 180; Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, pp. 226-31, 
and ‘Hobson and Keynes as Economic Heretics’; Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption.
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wealth results in trade depression in the capitalist countries. This maldistribution and 
consequent disharmony was, for Hobson, a false antagonism inspired by sectional interests. 
In his first, co-written book however the source of underconsumption is a paradox of 
aggregating individual saving decisions. This argument, though Hobson did not acknowledge 
it, posits a more fundamental conflict than merely the interference of sectional interests, the 
conflict of social and individual interests. Furthermore, because it highlights individual 
saving, it does not fit well with Hobson’s social reform and equity arguments. The role of 
government in economic reform would also be different under the two types of explanation. 
Thus, Hobson’s maldistribution explanation of underconsumption does not so much subsume 
the M ummery-Hobson explanation, but is different from it.
Keynes discussed the Mummery-Hobson formulation of underconsumption rather than 
Hobson’s maldistribution argument. Keynes agreed with the problematic as posed by 
Mummery and Hobson but explained over-saving differently, both from this first explanation 
and Hobson’s subsequent discussion. In today’s terminology, Hobson’s maldistribution 
argument explains underconsumption as a result of a falling marginal propensity to consume 
with rising income. A distribution of income that benefitted the wealthy would result in 
higher saving and lower consumption. However, Hobson only hinted at this explanation, 
preferring instead to emphasise the surplus income of the wealthy as a cause of over-saving. 
This use of the surplus concept led Hobson astray, and could be the reason why Keynes felt 
the earlier Mummery-Hobson discussion to be more valuable.
However, Hobson’s theory of underconsumption still has some value. It is probably 
best understood as part of his theory of unproductive surplus. Maldistribution is an economic 
result of  a moral problem; that force and scarcity are used to distribute the rewards from 
production rather than some method just apportionment. Generally, Hobson’s explanation 
suggested that social equity would lead to efficiency, whereas, for Keynes, the requirement 
of efficiency could only be reached with some measure of equity. This might seem a fine 
distinction, but in terms of liberalism in the early part of this century it was significant.^^^
The criticism that Hobson failed to distinguish savings and investment is anachronistic. 
When Hobson was writing, economists had not distinguished the two functions, and it is only 
with Keynes that the distinction is drawn. Many of the other criticisms of Hobson’s 
underconsumption similarly are valid in terms of current economic theory but are o f  dubious
See Michael Freeden, Liberalism  Divided^ p. 12-14. Hobson’s emphasis on the moral aspect of 
economic problems will be discussed further in chapter four as a response to the charge of economic 
determinism in the theory of imperialism.
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validity for an examination of Hobson because they see Hobson through Keynesian glasses. 
Indeed, Hobson and Keynes’s theories may not be as irreconcilable as has been portrayed, and 
there have been attempts to systematise Hobson’s theory into modern economic terms.
Hobson’s underconsumption did, as Keynes pointed out, mark an epoch in economic 
thought. Hobson broadened the concerns of economics other than in his welfare economics 
by highlighting important economic issues relatively neglected or rationalised by classical and 
neo-classical economists. Hobson reintroduced the economic analysis of unemployment, 
poverty, depression, trade cycles, deficient demand, and the possibility of social and state 
remedies to economic problems.
Conclusion
Despite these criticisms, Hobson’s theoretical system provides an interesting and 
innovative basis for the study of international relations. A number of the criticisms reappear 
in later chapters.
The discussion of Hobson’s theoretical system leads to three major conclusions. First, 
Hobson ably demonstrated the failures of methodological individualism. He successfully 
undermined the atomistic presuppositions of the Manchester School of laissez-faire, the 
hedonistic utilitarianism of the Philosophic Radicals, and the individualistic prejudices of 
classical political economy. In sum, Hobson transformed liberalism through the surplus and 
organic concepts.
Second, Hobson advanced an evolutionary perspective of individuals and society, in 
which an economic division of labour and the political structure of federalism featured 
importantly. His perspective was also, through the organic analogy, holistic, seeing society as 
a whole, rather than merely an aggregation of the individuals that made it up.
Third, Hobson’s theory of the cooperative surplus value and the idea of the social 
determination of value took his economic analysis towards an argument for social control, i.e., 
state planning. This suggested the increasing organisation and socialisation of social life, 
especially as manifested in the growth of the functions of the state in the provision of the 
welfare of its citizens. The bias towards cooperation and particularly organisation is a 
significant feature of Hobson’s theoretical system.
For instance, Michael Schneider, ‘Modelling Hobson’s Underconsumption Theory’; D. 
Hamilton, ‘Hobson with a Keynesian Twist’; Roger E. Backhouse, Mummery and Hobson’s ‘The 
Physiology of Industry’: A Centennial Evaluation’.
65
These conclusions are of interest because we find the same concepts in Hobson’s 
writings on international relations. While the concepts surplus and organic, as well as the 
notion of the evolution of human society, will be a major part of the framework for the rest 
of the thesis, other matters will also reappear. Underconsumption and the notion of an 
unproductive surplus are important to the theory of imperialism. Hobson’s humanistic 
conception of welfare and the growth of organisation appear in his discussion of international 
economic relations. The justification of an expanded role for the state has parallels with 
Hobson’s arguments for an international government.
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Chapter Three 
Hobson’s Framework for International Relations
Chapter two has examined Hobson’s new liberal approach to politics, economics and society, 
especially the concepts organic and surplus. This chapter will show that Hobson’s discussion 
of international relations is moulded by his new liberalism. Guided by the organic and surplus 
concepts, his study of international relations is holistic and evolutionist. Hobson considered 
current international relations to be an emergent society being created through international 
cooperation and organisation. The chapter introduces the general framework within which 
Hobson discusses international relations. More specific analysis of some of the issues raised 
in this chapter is conducted in part two.
The first section delimits four types of international system that Hobson discussed. 
They are the balance of power system, where states relate to each other through formal 
channels of diplomacy or physical force culminating in war; Cobdenism, an international 
community of freely interacting national communities with minimal government interference; 
the system of the competing empires in imperialism; and constructive internationalism, an 
international society with a government and a network of specialised international and 
transnational organisations. The first three of these are parts of Hobson’s analysis of 
contemporary international relations; the last is both Hobson’s optimistic observation of 
developments in contemporary international affairs and his hope for the future organisation 
of international relations. They are also related one to another through the implicit 
evolutionary logic of Hobson’s writings on international relations, that is revealed through an 
application of the two concepts of organic and surplus to international relations.
In the second section Hobson’s holistic approach to international relations, based on 
the extension of the organic analogy to apply to all humanity, is investigated. Hobson’s 
organic view of international relations construed international relations, not as a world of 
interacting states, but as a network of individuals, groups and communities within a single 
world society. Again, the tendency of Hobson’s analysis is to suggest a preferred ordering of 
international relations in the shape of constructive internationalism.
The third section considers Hobson’s discussion of nations and nationalism, especially 
as part of his perspective of an organic world society. The fourth section adds to the criticisms 
advanced in chapter two the charges of domestic analogy and economism as well as 
considering the additional difficulties for Hobson’s theoretical system when applied to 
international relations.
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Hobson’s Framework of Four International Systems
This section and the next analyse the framework within which Hobson discusses international 
relations. Here I consider the influence of the two sides of his theory of surplus value, the 
idea o f  cooperative surplus and the evolution towards organisation, and the theory of 
unproductive surplus. In this section, the four types of international system are outlined. It 
also shows that Hobson’s opinions of each is determined by its position on an evolutionary 
scale of forms derived from the theory of surplus value applied to international relations.^ 
These appear in Hobson’s writings on international relations (and elsewhere) but they are not 
explicitly distinguished by Hobson himself.
The theory of cooperative surplus showed that cooperation and organisation of the 
rising industrialism has changed not only domestic politics and economics but also 
international relations. Hobson claimed that civilised nations were by their nature 
interdependent, and that the more civilised nations became, the more interdependent they had 
to become also.^ This was not only an interdependence spurred by developments of industrial 
capacity but by the growth of cultural links.
Hobson discussed four international systems, the balance of power, Cobdenism, 
imperialism, and constructive internationalism. Though largely implicit, Hobson suggested a 
progression from the balance of power, the least cooperative and organised international 
system, through Cobdenism to his constructive internationalism, the most organised and 
cooperative. There is not all plain sailing toward a rational organisation of humanity, however. 
Because of  the pervasive struggle over and appropriation of unproductive surplus, Hobson’s 
analysis of contemporary international relations is dominated by imperialism, a retrogressive 
stage of separatism, conflict and the use of force.
In addition to the motif of increasing interdependence, cooperation and organisation, 
the four system reflect a changing relationship of politics and economics. In the balance of 
power and Cobdenism, economics and politics are autonomous spheres. The theory of surplus 
value exploded this conception; combination in industry (monopolies) and in politics (empires 
and federations) merged political and economic power. Hobson extended his concepts of 
surplus beyond national boundaries. The extension of the unproductive surplus results in
 ^ These four international systems differ from Giovanni Arrighi’s four coordinates in The 
Geometry o f  Im perialism , ch. 1.
 ^ ‘Free Trade as a Factor in Civilisation’.
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imperialism, the cut-throat competition of the Great Powers. The cooperative surplus in 
international relations suggested an international federation of nations serviced by a network 
of functional institutions.®
These stages in the development of the international system are more than abstractions 
for Hobson, however. They are different views of the contemporary international system 
reflecting different ideological standpoints. Balance of power was the vision of the traditional 
diplomatist and foreign office minister; Cobdenism was increasingly in Hobson’s time, the 
view of the moneyed commercial and financial interests; imperialism was the vision of a 
particular group of financiers, businessmen and ambitious politicians; and constructive 
internationalism reflected the hopes of the radical liberals and social democrats. Nor are the 
international systems just ideological visions; there were (and were going to be), historical 
periods in which each of the visions would be the dominant ideology of the age. For Hobson, 
balance of power was the predominant vision of the international system in the pre-industrial 
Revolution era. It reflected a world before the rise of machine production and 
communications had undermined national isolation.^ Cobdenism was ascendant in the mid­
nineteenth century, coinciding with the pax Briiannica. This period had closed in the late 
nineteenth century (in 1870 or 1884), with the rise of monopolies and trustification in 
advanced economies and the increase in imperial activity of the Great Powers.® Hobson 
hoped that the end of the First World War would see the establishment of constructive 
internationalism. However, with the apparent betrayal and failure of this vision in the League 
of Nations, his analysis of international relations after the Great War oscillated between the 
apocalyptic vision of a Great Power condominium of inter-imperialism or the gloom of a 
reassertion of the competition of the imperial and protective systems in the Great 
Depression.®
® In addition to this analysis of the connection or autonomy of politics, there is the issue of 
predominance. It might be suggested that politics is the over-riding concern in the balance of power, 
economics in Cobdenism, politics reigns in economics in imperialism but is prompted by economic 
concerns, and economic function shapes political institutions in constructive internationalism.
 ^Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism^ ch. 3.
® From a British perspective, at least, see ‘Free Trade and Foreign Policy’, Imperialism^ pt. I, ch.
5.
® Compare his prognosis in Democracy and a Changing Civilisation or Property and Improperty 
with Towards International Government.
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Balance o f  Power
This traditional view of the international system was that it was made up of morally 
self-contained states interacting through the official contact of traditional diplomacy or 
through the physical force of war or armed intervention. Hobson used the term Hobbes- 
Machiavellianism, and occasionally Prussianism, to refer to this international system in which 
there is little cooperation and precious little organisation.^ This international system lacks 
moral community, instead emphasising ‘splendid isolation’. Its economic corollary is autarky 
or mercantilism. Hobson labelled moral isolationism the ‘fundamental vice’ of traditional 
foreign policy;
this false, immoral doctrine, inimical to humanity, that a State is an absolute morally 
self-contained being, living in a world with other similar beings, but owing no duties 
to them and bound by no obligations that it may not break on the plea of necessity...®
For Hobson, this international system operated according to the balance of power
(what Hobson called the ‘core of diplomatic falsehood’).® While his views owed something
to Cobden’s critique of Palmerstonian foreign policy, and were also influenced by the impact
of the First World War, Hobson criticised the balance of power as a disorganised and
decentralised system.
Following Cobden and Bright, Hobson saw the balance of power as the doctrine of a 
self-aggrandising foreign office keen to interfere in foreign affairs and a government which 
distracted their electors from domestic social reform with foreign quarrels.^® The root cause 
of international discord was the balance of power. Each state had sought this ‘vile idol’, 
competing for security through arms races and psychological warfare. World War One was a 
result of the secret treaties, covert diplomacy and competitive foreign policies of the Great 
Powers, especially outside Europe. The international balance of power was, then, a war-
 ^ Hobson’s reference to Hobbes and Machiavelli tended to show that Realpolitik  had roots in 
European countries other than Germany. See for instance. Free Thought^ p. 187; ‘The Morality of 
Nations’, p. 249; Morals o f  Economic Internationalism^ p. 5-6; Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 77; 
Democracy A fter  the War^ p. 113, 188; Towards International Government^ p. 179.
® Towards International Government^ p. 180. See chapter seven for Hobson’s condemnation of 
traditional diplomacy.
® Towards International Government, p. 182.
For an example, see T ra ffic  in Treason, p. 9, 61.
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system. Its operation rested on military force.
According to Hobson, the international balance of power *present[ed] no true harmony 
of interest and no organic p o l i c y H o b s o n  rejected all balances of power, whether 
domestic or international, because they failed to provide justice: ‘the term Balance of Power 
resolves itself into a policy of Pulls, distribution alike of effort and of product being 
determined by the relative strength of the parties or groups.’ Furthermore, the balance of 
power is an international equivalent of laissez faire. As with his theory of distribution, 
discussed in chapter two, force is the ultimate means of settling disputes; the powerful win 
in the resolution of conflicts. The inequitable distribution of income he so fiercely attacked 
in the domestic context was, for him, the result of the logic of a balance of power. This 
system was flawed to start with because balance did not mean equilibrium. There was the 
constant possibility of c o n f l i c t . H o b s o n  also opposed the balance of power as unjust and 
fraught with potential for future conflict, as can be seen in his criticisms of ad hoc resolution 
in industrial disputes.
According to Hobson, the traditional view was promulgated largely by a Realpolitik 
school of political theorists, but was also the operating premise of traditional statecraft and 
political conservatives.^® The view persisted, also, in the use of mechanical metaphors in the 
discussions of international relations: ‘The description of nation-states as Powers, great or 
small, ... are naive records of what politics actually m e a n s . F o r  Hobson, ‘[t]he fact that 
peoples are related to one another in the world not as groups of human beings, with the 
common quality and interests of humanity, but as Powers, is a stark negation of all morality 
in international relations.
Despite international law and treaties, states arrogated to themselves the right to 
breach commitments according to their own national interest. For Hobson,
Towards International Government., p. 181.
Incentives in the New Industrial Order., p. 147-8.
Hobson denied that there would be equilibrium, see Towards International Government., p. 182.
Incentives in the New Industrial Order., pp. 147-8; see also Democracy A fter  the War., pp. 175-6,
‘The Morality of Nations’, p. 248-9; Democracy A fter the War, p. 114.
Free Thought, p. 182. See also pp. 22-5, 30n; Towards International Government, p. 181-2; 
Modern State, p. 32; and Problems o f  a New World, p. 33-4.
Democracy After the War, p. 22.
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the actual history of treaty obligations indicates that a nation, as a moral personality, 
is on a lower level of development than an individual ... A nation, in its political 
aspect as a State, using as an instrument a Government, is not fully realised as a moral 
being, a personality at all.^®
Hobson claimed that the different ethics of individuals in society and nations in a society of
nations ‘only implies a feebler development of moral personality in the Nation, and a feebler
structure of international society.’ ®^
Hobson, however, expected this to change; moral isolation and mercantilism were
outmoded and obsolete. The argument that there was no significant intercourse between
nations (rather than states) and that therefore there was no international society had become
untenable. States increasingly found themselves bound by international law; they sought more
commitments through treaties and international conferences and a l l i a n c e s . M o s t
importantly:
[T]hat political and moral isolation and self-sufficiency, only qualified by agreements 
or conventions of no final validity, has, under conditions of modern intercourse, given 
place to an ever closer and more intricate internationalism ... Under the old philosophy 
there was not ‘society of nations’. States moved ‘like dragons of the prime’ or like stars 
in their courses. Now the facts of intercourse have brought into being a rudimentary 
Society of Nations.
Hobson was convinced that the advances in communications between nations had 
rendered the teachings of the Realpolitik  school unrealistic. Interaction between peoples was 
both inevitable and beneficial; anything that opposed such intercourse was against the progress 
of civilisation.^^
Cobdenism
The second international system operates according to Richard Cobden’s maxim: ‘As 
little intercourse as possible between Governments'^ as much connection as possible between
‘The Morality of Nations’, p. 254 
‘The Morality of Nations’, p. 260.
Modern State^ p. 31.
Free Thought, p. 199.
On the impossibility of splendid isolation, see Towards International Government, p. 23, 90; 
Morals o f  Economic Internationalism, p. 4; and Democracy A fter the War, pp. 85-6. On America as 
a possible exception to this rule, see Morals o f  Economic Internationalism, pp. 28-9. On Realpolitik 
and unreason, see Towards International Government, p. 99.
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the nations of the world/^* This international system consists of self-governing political 
communities trading and travelling freely, interacting as much as possible, but not interfering 
in each other’s political affairs. Government, both national and international, is reduced to 
a minimum, its goals reducing to the maintenance of law and order, to liberate the intercourse 
between people and peoples. This is an international society of peoples or nations, not of 
governments or states. It is also premised on the extension of democratic national self- 
government, contributing to a pacific international environment.^^
Hobson has been labelled a Cobdenite, reformed or otherwise. He admitted to being 
steeped in Cobdenite principles for freer trade.^® He supported free trade and condemned 
protectionism as a violation of progress and civilisation. He applauded the growth of 
international commercial, industrial and financial connections, advocating the open door to 
trade and investment. He claimed that economic internationalism led political
internationalism.^® During the War, he was a prominent member of the U.D.C., the 
twentieth century inheritor of the radical liberal critique of foreign policy.
Hobson identified Cobdenism as a improvement on the balance of power. There are 
two sides to Cobdenism: the negative political principle of nonintervention and the positive 
economic doctrine of free trade. Nonintervention was ‘the negative condition’ of free human 
cooperation:
Remove the fetters and obstructions which governments, laws, and customs have 
placed upon the free play of the harmonious forces which bind man to man, let their 
real community of interest have full sway to express itself in economic, intellectual 
and moral intercourse, the false antagonisms which now divide nations, classes and
Richard Cobden, p. 34.
Political Basis of a World State, p. 260-1. Hobson examines Cobdenism in his biography, 
Richard Cobden: The International Man, though it is also implicit in his critique o f  imperialism in 
Imperialism : A Study.
See Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, pp. 177-8, and Bernard Porter, Critics o f  
Empire, pp. 195-7. Though this identification of Hobson as a Cobdenite only makes sense in terms 
of the contemporary development of liberal international theory as then understood, that is Hobson 
was a radical liberal theorist of international relations, thus carrying on in the spirit o f  Cobden and 
Bright, not Gladstone. However, as we shall see the portrayal of Hobson as a Cobdenite is woefully 
inadequate when we examine his international theory. In short, if Hobson’s international theory can 
be called Cobdenite, then so can his new liberalism - a patently absurd proposition. For Hobson’s 
admission, see The Morals o f  Economic Internationalism’, also see The German Panic, a conscious 
reference to Cobden’s pamphlet, The Three Panics.
26 The Modern State, p. 32.
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individuals, will disappear and a positive harmony of mankind be established.^^ 
Hobson argued that nonintervention was an antidote to the interference from feudal 
aristocracies and their influence: ‘by removing the active obstacles of diplomacy, war, and 
protective tariffs it enabled the mutual interests and good feelings of the peoples to operate 
freely.’ ®^ Hobson interpreted Cobden’s doctrine as suggesting that ‘[i]f the peoples are to get 
into sane, amicable and profitable relations with one another, that intercourse is best 
promoted by leaving it to them, with as little interference as possible either in the way of help 
or hindrance by their respective Governments.’ ®^
In Cobdenism, all relations between nations are important, but trade is the most 
important of all, particularly in the encouragement of pacific and civilised relations. Cobden 
himself claimed that ‘commerce is the great panacea, which, like a beneficent medical 
discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilisation all the 
nations of the w o r l d . F o r  Hobson, ‘commerce has always been the greatest civiliser of 
mankind. All other fruits of civilisation have travelled along trade routes ... Cut off 
commerce, and you destroy every mode of higher intercourse.’^^  Similarly, Hobson rejected 
protection: ‘[t]he more numerous and higher tariff  barriers by which each nation seeks to 
minimise its co-operation with its neighbour ... is a continuous source of friction and ill- 
w i l l . A n d  he followed Norman Angel! in extending Cobdenite principles to the growth 
of international finance: ‘Modern finance is the great sympathetic system in an economic 
organism in which political divisions are of constantly diminishing importance’*^  His 
international relations writings in the decade prior to the First World War betray Angellite 
tendencies in his extension of the Cobdenite argument beyond international trade to the free
Richard Cobden, p. 21. See also, pp. 9-10.
Richard Cobden, p. 390-1. See also p. 35.
Richard Cobden, pp. 388-9.
Richard Cobden, The Political Writings o f  Richard Cobden, p. 36.
The New Protectionism, p. 115. See also Democracy A fter the War, p. 198; Property and 
Improperty, p. 205; International Government, p. 95; The Case fo r Arbitration, p. 3. See also ‘Free 
Trade as a Factor in Civilisation’. The arguments put forward by Hobson for free trade are considered 
in greater depth in chapter five.
** Modern State, p. 33.
** Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 121.
75
flow of capital.®^
Cobdenism entails the autonomy of politics and economics. It is based on laissez faire  
and denies the need for an extensive role of the state in the economy or society. Free trade 
is the corollary of laissez faire  in international economic relations, nonintervention its 
corollary in international politics. Therefore, while a certain degree of political separateness 
is maintained, this is within the general conception of the world that encourages international 
commercial and cultural exchange and cooperation. Both the moralistic tone of 
nonintervention and the economic verities of free trade are challenges to the Realpolitik  vision 
of the international system. Nonintervention brings morality into inter-state relations; free 
trade suggest that international interaction is beneficial and that there is a harmony of 
interests.
After the War, with the rise of economic and political instability, Hobson’s 
acknowledged the limits of free trade and called for more state and international intervention 
to remedy economic ills. The experience of the War taught Hobson that international law and 
the sense of justice would be insufficient to maintain international peace.^^
Imperialism
Imperialism has attracted the attention of scholars since the publication of 
Imperialism : A Study. There are, in fact, four dimensions to Hobson’s discussion of 
imperialism. For Hobson, imperialism is an aggressive and acquisitive foreign policy, the 
domination and dictatorial rule of a foreign people, an international system of competing 
empires and a phase in world politics. This section examines imperialism in terms of the latter 
two categories. Imperialism results from the expropriation of the unproductive surplus by 
sectional interests, both nationally and internationally. It was ‘the powerful movement in the 
current politics of the Western world.
Hobson usually dated imperialism as beginning in the mid-1880s. The precise date is 
1884, the year that the Great Powers discussed the division of Africa into spheres of influence 
at the Berlin Conference. This conference and treaty highlighted attempt to settle the rival 
claims of the imperial powers. The collusion in territorial division, though a superficial
See particularly the Economic Interpretation o f  Investment.
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 138-9; Problems o f  a New World, pp. 17-8, 32. 
Imperialism , p. [42].
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contribution to peace for Europe and possibly the world, was unlikely to hold, as with 
economic monopoly, because of the persistence of cut-throat competition between the 
imperial Powers.
According to Hobson, imperialism is a pathological social form. He argued that
The exclusive interest of an expanding nation, interpreted by its rulers at some given 
moment, and not the good of the whole world, is seen to be the dominant motive in 
each new assumption of control over the tropics and lower peoples; that national 
interest itself commonly signifies the direct material self-interest o f some small class 
o f  traders, mine-owners, farmers, or investors who wish to dispose of the land and 
labour of the lower peoples for their private gain,^®
Hobson, as we have seen, had by the First World War started to doubt the validity of 
Cobdenism. In fact, his questioning of Cobdenism had begun much earlier, and is indeed 
implicit in his discussion of international finance. For Hobson, the significant development 
in world economics and politics was the growth of combination and the decline of 
competition, in industrial and financial cartels and monopolies and in political empires. 
Combination rendered the autonomy of politics and economics an untenable premise. Another 
significant develo- ment in the growth of the world economy was the rise of foreign 
investment and the internationalisation of capital that had overtaken the importance of 
international trade in the course of international economic relations. Imperialism is in some 
senses the logical development from Cobdenism in the face of growing combination and the 
establishment of an international economy where finance, and especially direct foreign 
investment, play a major role. In this respect, imperialism, the contact of advanced and 
backward peoples, the end of laissez faire and free trade, are inevitable. They are the result 
of the development of the international economy along the lines of the theory of surplus 
value.
As we have seen, Hobson’s theory of surplus value showed that cooperation and 
organisation would replace competition. In the context o f  a modern industrial society, this 
meant that laissez faire was giving way to the control of the economy by combines, trusts, and 
monopolies. In parallel to this, world politics could no longer be a system of the relatively 
independent nations, the simple harmony of self-interest did not work here either. The
An alternative date is 1870-1, the unification of Germany and the Franco-Prussian War. This 
marks the beginning of Germany’s challenge to Britain’s ascendancy in international relations. See 
Imperialism^ p. 19, where Hobson prefers 1884 over 1870.
Imperialism  [1938], p. 281. For further examples of Hobson’s discussion of imperialism as or 
as the subjugation of national to sectional interests, see Property and Improperty^ p. 105; Problems 
o f  a New Worlds pp. 269-72; Democracy A fter the War^ pp. 85-6; Imperialism^ p. 106, 127, 168.
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modem world was being divided into spheres by competing empires, the political equivalent 
of monopolies, vying for supremacy.
Imperialism was the international conflict engendered by the unproductive surplus. 
In his theory of underconsumption, maldistribution of income results in underconsumption 
and thus surplus capital. Hobson argued that, in the capitalist system, economic surpluses 
appropriated by the powerful or wealthy for their own ends issue internationally in a drive 
for imperial ascendancy in the world. Financiers and investors call on politicians to protect 
their investments abroad and play upon feelings of national and personal pride, acquisitiveness 
and beliefs in the necessity of racial struggle. Foreign investment then becomes a rationale for 
increasing imperial control and expansion.^® The rise of combination and the merging of 
political and economic sectional interests turned the Cobdenite equation of economic relations 
with peace on its head. In the modern phase of world politics marked by imperialism, 
economics were now the source of war.^^ Concentration is not only a description of modern 
industry, but the quality that allows finance to dominate other interests: ‘the financial interest 
has those qualities of concentration and clear-sighted calculation which are needed to set 
Imperialism to work.’^^
Imperialism’s international context is that it is a form of separatism - a denial of the 
benefits of international cooperation and organisation. Imperialism modified logic of the 
division of labour, that the wider area reaps greater benefits, by applying the logic only to 
areas under the political control of the state and resorting to protection of that area. Hobson 
suggested that national or imperial boundaries are not limits to economic intercourse or 
benefits therefrom. Hobson also objected to the political and moral aspects of imperialism, 
based as they are, in part on a throw-back to the moral isolation of realpolitik and in part on 
the social Darwinist theories of the ‘survival of the fittest’. I t  was also sectionalism in the 
sense that a group of international financiers were identified by Hobson as predominant in
For the supersession of the premises of Cobdenism, both in terms of the growth of imperialism 
and constructive internationalism, see Richard Cobden^ pp. 406-8; Problems o f  a New Worlds pp. 19- 
21, 23-9, 190; Democracy A fter the War^ p. 28; Imperialism , p. 225.
On foreign investments, see Richard Cobden, p. 403-6; Imperialism , p. 357-8.
Richard Cobden, p. 400-1.
Imperialism , p. 59. For concentration and control being one of the facets o f  the new 
imperialism, see p. 356.
Imperialism, p. 135, 167, 181.
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this stage of world politics. Financiers, who had a significant and beneficial role to play in 
the growing world economy, were exploiting political division and nationalist ideologies to 
their own interests.'*^ Imperial sectionalism was also manifested in nationalistic and 
racialistic ideologies, such as the idea of Manifest Destiny, the provision of ‘good 
government’, the pressure of population and the Christian civilising mission/^ Hobson 
described the wealthy nations exploitation of the backward peoples as parasitism. The wealthy 
few live o ff  the majority of workers, not only in their own country, but in the empire.^®
Constructive Internationalism
Constructive internationalism is Hobson’s ideal for international relations."*^ Hobson
proposed an international federation with functional organisations dealing with issues with
the potential for conflict such as the global maldistribution of income. Constructive
internationalism returns to the emphasis on the freedom of international intercourse and the
possibility of cooperation for the international good in Cobdenism. However, the logic of
cooperative surplus and his theory of distribution leads to the requirement for international
organisation of international economic intercourse. There was a philosophical reason for this:
Modern internationalists are no longer mere noninterventionalists, for the same reason 
that modern Radicals are no longer philosophic individualists. Experience has forced 
upon them the truth that governments are not essentially and of necessity the enemies 
of personal or national liberty, but that upon certain conditions they may become its 
creators, either by removing fetters or by furnishing the instruments of active co­
operation by which both individuals and nations better realise themselves.'^®
Hobson believed that ‘conscious collective self-control ... [would] enlarg[e] the orderly
political government of the single city or the nation state to that society of nations which
comprises mankind.’^ ® International cooperation was based in ‘rational idealism’ and
See ‘For Whom Are We Fighting?’, in The War in South Africa.
See Imperialism^ pt. 2, for Hobson’s discussion of these ideologies.
For examples of Hobson’s use of ‘parasitism’, see Democracy A fter the War, p. 145, 172; 
Imperialism , p. 59, 107, 151, 313-4, 364-8, especially pp. 367-8.
He also referred to it as real or positive internationalism. See Modern State, p. 36, Richard 
Cobden, ch. 13.
®^ Richard Cobden, p. 406.
Recording Angel, p. 111.
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the co-operation of one personality with others in membership of a society continually 
[was] widening so as to comprise in closer contacts the entire body of 
contemporaneous mankind, while continually extending its outlook, so as to pay 
regard to the more distant welfare of humanity.
According to Hobson, constructive internationalism involves increased governmental 
intervention in international relations and also international organisation, both in ter-govern­
mental and non-governmental, and perhaps a central international government to manage 
human welfare in the international society.
This form of internationalism was based on an application of the theory of cooperative 
surplus and the human law of distribution beyond the boundaries of national societies to the 
international relations of the modern interdependent global economy. For Hobson, human 
society was evolving towards a society of all mankind, with the aid of improved 
communications;
There is in the modern widening of human intercourse a large and various growth of 
common interests and activities among men of different nations which for certain 
purposes requires and evokes the friendly co-operation of States and calls into being 
genuinely international institutions.®^
The implications, for Hobson, of this development were that laissez fa ire  had to be 
abandoned and functional institutions and instruments of international governance set up in 
order to ensure the control of the world economy in the interest of all humanity to achieve 
the greatest human welfare.®^
Hobson argued that the rise of industrialism and the use of machine technology had 
transformed modern societies and brought them into closer contacts with each other, through 
improved communication and the growth of mass production techniques. Increased financial 
integration of the world was making for a truly world economy, governed to a large extent 
by a single economy rather than separate national economies.®® With the advent of a world 
economy, cooperation was already international, and Hobson believed that it was time for
®° Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 139. See also Work and Wealthy pp. 350-1, 355.
®^ Democracy A fter the War^ pp. 85-6.
®® I use the term functional in the context of functionalism in the international relations literature. 
See Paul Taylor, ‘Functionalism: The Theory of David Mitrany’; E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: 
Functionalism and International Organization; David Mitrany, A Functional Theory o f  Politics; James 
A. Caporaso, Functionalism and Regional Integration: A Logical and Empirical Assessment; and R.J. 
Vincent, ‘The Functions of Functionalism’.
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism^ pp. 458-60; Economic Interpretation o f  Investment^ p. 17//; 
‘A World Economy’, pp. 274-5.
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international control and organisation to regulate and mitigate the excesses of the world 
market as had been done with capitalism in the domestic context: ‘[t]he chief desiderata of 
economic welfare, productivity, and economic justice, are impractical without international 
government’. ‘Real internationalism’, he argued, ‘means that nations and their governments 
shall consciously realise and co-operate in achieving common forms of welfare, positive in 
their nature and consciously conducive to the prosperity of the world.’
Hobson expected political internationalism to be shaped by, yet facilitate and further 
encourage, the growing international cultural and economic intercourse. At first, arrangements 
would be ad hoc and private, but increasingly governments would become involved in dealing 
with common interests and issues largely (though not exclusively) concerning technical 
matters, specifically regarding communications, as seen in the emergence of the functional 
international bodies such as the Inter-Telegraphic Union and the Universal Postal Union. 
There were also the Hague conferences, establishing general treaties and codifying 
international law. Hobson regarded the greater institutionalisation of the relations of the Great 
Powers in the Concert of Europe as a precursor to an international government that he hoped 
would be found in the League of N a t i o n s . Ho b s o n  saw these developments as the basis of 
a new arrangement of international r e l a t i o n s . H e  also proposed the need for international 
organisation in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. Hobson proposed in ter­
governmental cooperation for post-war reconstruction in Europe. For Hobson, the inter-war 
period was a time when humanity had to face the task of reconstructing domestic and 
international, social, political and economic arrangements after the dislocations and 
destruction of the Great War and the mistakes of the Bad Peace.®®
This account of Hobson’s constructive internationalism makes it appear that Hobson 
anticipated David M itrany’s functional approach to international organisation with his 
emphasis on the satisfaction of welfare needs through the innovation of international 
institutions. As with Mitrany, though at first international cooperation was conducted 
privately by individuals and groups, it would proceed by the establishment of functional
54 Case fo r Arbitration^ pp. 1-2; League o f  Nations, p. 4,7.
®® International Government, p. 193-4; League o f  Nations, p. 4 / / .  See also ‘The Origins of the 
I.L.O.’, pp. 497-9; ‘Political Basis of a World State’, p. 268.
®® Morals o f  Economic Internationalism, p. 31 //.
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institutions and the direction of economic internationalism by international political 
c o n t r o l . W h e r e  Hobson differs from Mitrany is in his emphasis the requirement of a 
beneficent and neutral instrument of government intervention at both the domestic and 
international levels. Hobson believed in an international government, Mitrany was more 
sceptical.^®
Hobson’s proposals for an international government varied. In Imperialism^ Hobson
proposes international government as one of the necessary elements of a just solution to the
problem of the development of backward countries, as an institution to oversee the control
of world population growth and as a guardian of free trade.®® The ideal of internationalism
conveyed in his books on human welfare, and even more so in his books on the economic
maladies of the Depression period, was an international government supervising a global
redistribution of wealth to avoid the world-wide underconsumption:
Closer and more effective international movements for such improvements in the 
distribution of income as will enable world consumption to keep pace with and 
stimulate improvements in production, form the foundation of the progressive 
economy and the humaner civilisation of the future.®®
However, it was the First World War that prompted Hobson to formulate a scheme for an 
international government, though even this, as he admitted, was only an outline.
While Hobson had high hopes for constructive internationalism, his evolutionary 
approach made him bluntly realistic in his assessment of morality in the conduct of 
contemporary international relations. Because international relations was an undeveloped 
realm of cooperation, Hobson did not expect morality to be well developed either. He believed 
that centralisation of force in an international government would reduce the aggregate level 
of force used in the international system.®^ Thus, in the current state of international rela­
tions, morality was backward, economics factors were more international than political 
factors, distribution according to needs was absent, laissez-faire predominated in politics and
Work and Wealthy p. 16; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation^ p. 121; International 
Government^ p. 196; Free Thought^ p. 259.
See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System .
®® Imperialism , pp. 191-3, 232-39.
®® Rationalization and Unemployment, pp. 124-5; Modern State, p. 36; Wealth and L ife , p. 390.
®^ Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 78. See also chapter six below. On the backward state 
of international morality, see ‘Morality of Nations’ and Morals o f  Economic Internationalism. For one 
of Hobson’s harshest statements on contemporary international relations, see The New Holy Alliance.
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economics, in the form of the balance of power, imperialism and the primacy of national 
interest, and laissez fa ire  free trade and economic exploitation. For Hobson, the society of 
nations was as yet undeveloped and international relations constituted a primitive, emergent 
community rather than a fully established and organised society.
Conceiving Humanity as a Social Organism
Hobson applied the analogy of society to an organism to international relations. The 
extension of the ‘organic analogy’ to international relations was the basis for Hobson’s new 
liberal version of internationalism. When humanity is conceived as a social organism by 
Hobson, inter-state relations appear as just one part of a global society of all humanity. The 
organic analogy applied to humanity as a whole did not, however, lead Hobson to conceive 
global mass society of isolated individuals. Instead, Hobson argued that ‘[ejveryone lives in 
a series of concentric circles of association which affect him in general as a human being. 
Such are the home, the neighbourhood (village or town), his class, his country, the world.’®^ 
This is a vision of a world society of overlapping groups and affiliations of which nations and 
international relations are only one facet.
The organic view is fundamentally at odds with monadistic disjunction of the domestic 
and the international which is the usual starting point for international relations analysis. It 
is not a state-centric view of international relations, but a vision of world society. Hobson’s 
schema suggests that the international realm is an integral part of social life and cannot be 
understood apart from it. International relations is dissolved into a web of systems overlaid 
on systems. The international system is, in many respects perhaps, the last and highest system, 
being the interaction of nations politically organised as states, but also representing the level, 
albeit currently disorganised, of the relations of humanity as a whole. In the organic view of 
the world as an expanding circle of order and rationality, rational ordering of global relations 
will constitute the achievement of the highest global welfare for all of humanity, through the 
coordination and organisation of the cooperative surplus of the nations of the world.
This perspective on international relations as one facet of a society of all mankind 
shapes Hobson’s internationalism. According to Fred Halliday, ‘internationalism is the idea
Wealth and Life^  p. 36, 222.
Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 266; Poverty in Plenty^ p. 81; Rationalism and Humanism^ p. 20; 
Moral Challenge to the Economic System^ p. 19.
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that we both are and should be part of a broader community than that of the nation or the
state.’®^ Hobson’s organic approach to international relations provided the theoretical basis
for his advocacy of internationalism. For Hobson:
Internationalism, as a policy of peace and progress, demands that the individual 
feelings of goodwill which give substance to the smaller groupings, from family to 
nation, shall be so extended that the single citizen of  England, America, Germany, 
France, Russia, shall supersede the governments of these countries as units of 
internationalism.®®
Hobson’s internationalism was, indeed, ‘a generally optimistic approach based upon the belief 
that independent societies and autonomous individuals can through greater interaction and 
cooperation evolve towards common purposes, chief among these being peace and 
prosperity.’®® Internationalism is both the peaceful relations of states regularised in in ter­
governmental organisations, but is also marked by transnational relations of groups and 
individuals.®^
According to Hobson, social problems could only be solved rationally by starting with 
‘the hypothesis of humanity as itself a collective organism.’®® Thus, rational solutions to 
international problems had themselves to be international. However, while communications 
were widening and deepening the international interdependence of social relations, Hobson 
was not prompted to propose a unified world state. He argued along similar lines to his 
rebuttal to the Idealist conception of the State, that national and international interests should 
be balanced. What he described as an organic principle, federalism, was the appropriate 
mechanism for the organisation of the world under constructive internationalism. Hobson 
argued that a federation of nations as a world organisation to supersede the balance of power, 
provided
an economy of government, each area, from the family through the widening areas
®^ Fred Halliday, ‘Three Concepts of Internationalism’, p. 187.
®® ‘The Ethics of Humanity’, p. 4.
®® Halliday, ‘Three Concepts of Internationalism’, p. 192.
®^ Hobson’s internationalism retains the meaning of national within it, unlike international (as in 
international relations) which has come to mean inter-state. See H. Suganami, ‘A Note on the Origin 
of the Word International’, pp. 226-32, for a discussion of the meaning o f  international. 
Internationalism has deviated from this meaning, although lately it has also been used to refer to the 
building o f  state relations, that is, inter-governmentalism. See Samuel Huntingdon, ‘Transnational 
Organizations in World Politics’, p. 338.
68 IVork and Wealthy p. 16.
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of local and national government to internationalism, practising free self-government 
in such matters as fall predominantly within the compass of its own knowledge, 
interest and capacity ... Its moral root lies in the basic concept of fraternity, 
interpreted in various phases and areas of the common life, the humanity which binds 
man to man ever more closely as practicing furnishes closer and more numerous modes 
of communication, material, intellectual and moral.®®
This conception of federalism permitted international control, while at the same time
acknowledging the separate features of individual nations. Arguing against both a wholesale
world state and the absolute right of national independence, Hobson claimed that:
The principle of federalism must qualify the principle of self-determination. This is 
the harmony of unity and diversity as it shows itself in every field of conduct. 
Autonomy so far as aims are separate, union so far as they are identical. Federation 
connotes the political harmony of the opposing principles. Upon every scale of social 
co-operation, from family to humanity, the problem is continually before us.^®
The organic conception of international relations was the basis of Hobson’s attacks on
the claims of priority of separate national interests in international relations. For Hobson,
national separatism was harmful to the whole of humanity and also to the members of that
nation. He argued that:
History is rife with instances where fear, hubris, or hate, rushes nations into wasteful 
or destructive wars. So likewise the narrow selfishness of small group-life everywhere 
cramps the progress of humanity, the preference of our city to our country, our 
empire to the world, in matters where the wider is the truer economy.^^
In summary, Hobson’s analysis highlighted the increasing level and widening range
of cooperation and organisation into international relations. Underlying this analysis are
Hobson’s ideas of cooperative surplus and the notion of humanity as a social organism that
both prompt his ideal of constructive internationalism, culminating in an international
federation. Hobson’s analysis does not focus on international relations solely, but considers
international relations as part of the emerging world society. This world society is not
identified with any one level of relations, personal, professional, social, international, but
applies to all of them. Hobson’s constructive internationalism of international organisation is
thus a theory of an emergent world society not of inter-state relations. It is a vision of
international relations as one part of a global network of interaction, cooperation, and
®® Democracy and a Changing Civilization, P- 138. See also Work and Wealth, p. 17; The Social 
Problem, p. 132,261; Wealth and L ife , pp. 23-4. For Hobson’s criticism of the Victorian complacency 
of the Cobdenite version of this argument, see Rationalism and Humanism, p. 20.
Poverty in Plenty, p. 84; Problems o f  a Hew World, p. 253.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 69. See also Problems o f  a Hew World, p. 151.
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organisation/^
Nations and Nationalism
During his long writing career, Hobson held a number of different and some conflicting 
opinions on nations and nationalism. This would not be a major issue, were it not for the fact 
that nations are central to Hobson’s conception of internationalism. As we have seen, Hobson’s 
constructive internationalism is a call for a federation of nations as well as an encouragement 
of functional institutions. His framework for international relations conceives a set of 
concentric circles, outward from the individual to the nation and humanity, and finally ‘in 
dimmer outline ... some larger cosmic organism’.^  ^ In his earlier writings, as exemplified by 
Imperialism , Hobson maintains an orthodox liberal perspective on nations, nationality and 
nationalism: that they are not incompatible with, but are the foundations of internationalism. 
However, with his increasingly Angellite acceptance of the financial integration of the world, 
and particularly after World War One, Hobson became a strident critic of nationalism and of 
the sovereign state.
Throughout his writings, a nation is considered an organic unity.^^ Hobson 
distinguished nation, state and government clearly, and emphasised the importance of nations 
over the latter in his internationalism.^^ Nations were a feature of civilisation, a beneficial 
social form as they encouraged and were the product of healthy cooperation that had ended 
local particularism in the nineteenth century. Nationalism a force for the good, because it was 
the political expression of the desire of nations for self-government.^®
Hobson saw nations as integral to internationalism. Not only was national self- 
government the first step to internationalism, but internationalism would not merit its name
By extension from Hobson’s comments in Social Problem, p. 61, 261, 271.
Work and Wealth, p. 17.
Work and Wealth, p. 358.
Crisis o f  Liberalism , p. 254.
Im perialism , p. - both on self government and nations as combinations. It is worth noting that 
the connection between nationhood and civilisation is close for Hobson. How close is indicated by the 
fact that he never refers to backward nations, but only backward peoples. As we shall see, this has 
further implications for his ideas on the participation of backward peoples in an international 
government.
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without self-respecting nations. Hobson’s view on the relationship of nationalism and
internationalism was that ‘[n]ationalism is a plain highway to internationalism.’ In his
Im perialism  and in later work, Hobson contrasted internationalism with cosmopolitanism:
A true strong internationalism in form or spirit would ... imply the existence of 
powerful self-respecting nationalities which seek union on the basis of common 
national needs. Such a historical development would be far more conformable to laws 
of social growth than the rise of anarchic cosmopolitanism from individual units amid 
the decadence of national life.^^
Cosmopolitanism disregarded the importance of nations and nationality, and of other groups
or cultures, in the creation of world order. There are, however, two forms of cosmopolitanism
in Hobson’s work. The first was cultural, considering each person as an isolated individual
'  j a r t  from their allegiances and background. Hobson was opposed to this. A second form was
the cosmopolitanism of global capitalism and the world market. Though Hobson often
approvingly called this economic internationalism, it rendered every one an ‘economic man’,
and reduced the significance of nations or nationalism.^®
Hobson modifies his opinion of nationalism later. This change resulted from his
criticisms of economic nationalism and, after the First World War, his argument that
capitalism and nationalism (as joined in imperialism, in particular) were the main threats to
civilisation.^® With the defeats for democracy, peace and internationalism in the 1930s,
Hobson retreated to the idea of internationalism as a halfway house between a world policy
and nationalism.®® Later in his life, Hobson began to stress the requirement of a reformed
sense of nationhood that would have to come before internationalism. He claimed that each
nation must put its own social, political and economic house in order before internationalism
could succeed.®^ In sum, Hobson maintained his belief in the importance of nations to
internationalism. He changed his mind about nationalism, which began as a beneficent force,
but became a separatist, exclusive and aggressive ideology.
77 Im perialism : A Study, pp. 10-11.
®^ See for instance the discussion of international finance in Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, 
p. 112, The Case fo r  Arbitration, p. 4, and Problems o f  Poverty, pp. 202-6. The second was a spiritual 
cosmopolitanism, a belief in the unity of all people as human beings, regardless of race, sex, age, etc. 
in Im perialism : A Study, p. 5, 10. In Imperialism , internationalism is also the third alternative 
between imperialism and nationalism.
See, for example. The Recording Angel: A Report From Earth, p. 43, 101.
®® Compare his opinions in Im perialism , p. 169, with From Capitalism to Socialism , p. 49.
®^ Confessions, p. 113; Property and Improperty, p. 106.
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As we have seen, Hobson was hoping for
the displacement of national by human sentiment, involving a willingness to sacrifice 
the interest of one’s own nation for the general good of hum an ity , ... the spirit needed 
to make the mind of modern man conform to the moral and economic fabric of the 
world in which we live.®^
However, there were a number of arguments that this could not or would not happen. The
first of these was that the state was the limit of people’s ‘consciousness of kind’. People only
had a limited ability to feel community with others, and a national society was its greatest
extent. Hobson conceded that a problem with the conception of humanity as a social organism
was that there was little feeling for its existence among people. He agreed that people were
more concerned with (and possessed more knowledge of) their own situation, their family and
friendship ties, than the wider whole of human relations. Hobson denied, however, that this
could be made the basis of a permanent obstruction to international understanding or that
such sympathy as was needed for a global social organism, in fact, halted at state
boundaries.®^ Hobson countered the sociological argument by stressing ‘social instincts, and
the loyalties and ideals which flow with them, [that] work through a series of concentric
circles of widening area and weaker feeling, from the close circle of the home to the wide
limits of humanity.’®^ While therefore such feeling for humanity might be weak, it was not
ruled out. Further, it was certainly not held permanently within the national state. Growing
international intercourse, especially in commerce, increased nations reliance on each other and
also their mutual sympathy: ‘Civilisation has expanded areas and weakened narrower
loyalties.’®® Hobson also claimed that education would overcome national separatism and
extend the range of human sympathy. Education would lead people to make welfare
valuations based on wider then merely national criteria. Finally, he suggested that experience
of international cooperation and organisation would itself educate a broader sense of the
meaning of internationalism.®®
There were also arguments that states would be unlikely to give up their central role
®^ Poverty in Plenty^ p. 84.
®® Social Problem^ pp. 284-5; Free Thought^ pp. 158, 259-60; Recording Angela p. 112.
®^ Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 142.
®® Wealth and L ife , p. 36. But see p. 43.
®® Wealth and L ife , p. 222; Social Problem, pp. 284-5; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, 
p. 163; The Importance o f  Instruction in Internationalism.
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in deciding international policy. These arguments rested on the importance of state 
sovereignty. One variant of this argument was that the historical record showed that states had 
not given up their sovereign powers in the past. A second variant argued that on legal and 
philosophical grounds there was no reason why sovereign states should give up their powers.
Hobson was a fervent critic of sovereignty. He argued that state sovereignty was the 
corollary of individualism or separatism in international relations. It was a failure to 
acknowledge the increasing connectedness and interdependence of the society of nations. 
Following a conventional liberal argument, Hobson opposed sovereignty as an absolutist 
doctrine and as empirically inaccurate. Hobson objected to the state drawing under one 
authority the right to decide policy on social, political and economic issues, without recourse 
to reason or even to reasonable discussion. Actions taken purely on sovereign right were likely 
to be irrational from the point of view of human welfare, he argued.®^ He criticised 
sovereignty as an outdated doctrine no longer reflecting of the true interests of the several 
national elements of mankind. It was, indeed, an obstruction to civilisation as it educated 
habits of thought opposed to the developing cooperation of humanity. Hobson claimed that 
sovereignty encouraged a power-oriented view of the world, and that this view had made for 
the anarchy of international relations.®® On the other hand, he argued that sovereignty was 
increasingly being tempered by obligations under international law and because of the growth 
of international interdependence brought on by trade, travel, e/c.®® Sovereign independence 
was undercut by the increasing contacts of nations despite governments’ attempts to control 
national economies. Attempts at economic planning and control were hampered by the cross­
national links of the world e c o n o m y .F i n a l l y ,  sovereignty was an obstruction to the 
ultimate construction of an international government and cooperation between nations because 
of its emphasis on separate national interests; ‘being the judge in your own cause’ was the root 
problem of sovereignty, as it privileged national interests over the global common good.®^
®^ See Free Thought in the Social Sciences, pp. 50-1, 234, 259; Incentives in the New Industrial 
Order, pp. 150-1. For a recent example of this argument, see Roy E. Jones, ‘The English School of 
International Relations’ and ‘The Myth of the Special Problem in International Relations’.
®® Free Thought, p. 257.
®® On international law limiting sovereignty, see The Case fo r Arbitration, p. 7; Towards 
International Government, pp. 33, 124-5.
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 134-5; Towards International Government, p. 180.
Towards International Government, pp. 81, 86-7, 178.
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To summarise, Hobson believed that nations were integral to internationalism, though 
he came to believe that nationalism and internationalism were implacably antagonistic. 
Though he realised that the state was the political aspect of the nation, he focused on the 
relations of nations and not states in his internationalism. States emphasising absolute 
sovereign rights and propounding exclusive and aggressive nationalist ideologies are accused 
of separatism by Hobson.
Critical Assessment
Hobson’s holistic and evolutionary framework for his study of international relations is an 
integral part of the theoretical system he developed to analyse domestic social, political and 
economic life. It is, therefore, open to the criticisms that were discussed in the last chapter. 
There are a number of other criticisms that apply to Hobson’s application of the organic and 
surplus concepts to international relations.
Economism
The first criticism is that Hobson’s framework is economistic when it is applied to 
international relations. Economism is ‘an exaggeration of the economic sphere’s importance 
in the determination of social and political relations, and as a result, an underestimation of 
the autonomy and integrity of the political s p h e r e . F o r  example, national income may be 
seen as the prime indicator of development or of great power status, and as the goal of 
national policy; outflows of capital to foreign countries cause imperialism; free trade leads to 
the peaceful relations of states; or the satisfaction of welfare needs causes international 
integration and removes the causes of international conflict. Hobson was particularly attentive 
to economic factors in internationalism to the expense of other political, social and cultural 
elements. In short, it could be asserted that the extension of the theory of cooperative and 
unproductive surplus to international relations shows that Hobson betrays a bias towards 
materialism and economism, because he emphasised the importance of international economic 
relations as the vanguard of the coming internationalism.
Richard K. Ashley, ‘Three Modes of Economism’, p. 463. Economism entails, first, the division 
of the various elements of social life into economic, cultural, personal, political, and so on. Second, 
it entails the privileging of economic factors over the rest, and usually the determination of the other 
factors by economic factors.
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Economism in Hobson’s internationalism is most evident in his defence of free trade 
along Cobdenite lines and his Angellite hopes for the financial integration of the world. For 
both Cobden and Angell, and Hobson as one of their followers, ‘economic peace would lead 
to military peace.’®^ Hobson has also been accused of economic determinism in his theory 
of imperialism.®^
Economism has been attached to at least two of the international systems Hobson 
described, therefore. However, there is a more subtle and pervasive form of economism in 
Hobson’s application of the theory of cooperative surplus to international relations. Hobson’s 
emphasis on the cooperative or destructive aspects of international economic relations (in 
internationalism and imperialism) overshadows his discussion of international politics. His 
theory of cooperative surplus is economistic because this clearly leads political relations: 
economic interests predominate, for Hobson, in both imperialism and internationalism.
There is another dimension to the economism of Hobson’s surplus concept applied to 
international relations. While Hobson wrote of humanity as society in its largest aspect, this 
depends on the facts of interdependence rather than being a statement of community on the 
basis of each person’s humanity. Though Hobson did acknowledge that a world community 
might exist even without contact between the nations of the world, the logic of his argument 
was that community depends upon communication and exchange.®^
The charge of economism is unfair because it fails to take into account Hobson’s 
holistic approach, especially the priority of ethics over economics. Hobson’s notion of human 
welfare is much more than economic factors, but is broadly based in the full range of human 
satisfactions. In the application of the theory of cooperative surplus to international relations, 
economic relations come first, but there is, nonetheless, a dialectic between the improvement 
of physical welfare brought on by economic exchange and gains in more spiritual, cultural or 
intellectual welfare gains. However, the bias towards economic factors in Hobson’s 
international relations has to be admitted, and this bias derives in no small part from his 
evolutionary theory of cooperative surplus.
®^ Property and Improperty^ p. 205. The context of this quotation is not, however, Hobson 
defending a Cobdenite or Angellite position.
®^ For a discussion of Hobson’s defence of free trade doctrine, see chapter five. For a 
consideration of the charge of economic determinism in Hobson’s theory of imperialism, see chapter 
four.
®® Wealth and L ife , p. 398. In other words, Hobson’s is not a theory of universal human rights, but 
is an analysis suggesting the obligations consequent on interdependence and cooperation.
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Domestic Analogy
The second charge is that Hobson’s approach to international relations and especially 
his constructive internationalism are premised on a domestic analogy. The domestic analogy 
is the analogy of institutions, theories or units of analysis from domestic society to 
international relations. Classically, it has entailed the advocacy of the creation of institutions 
for international relations along the lines of successful domestic institutions or 
arrangements.®®
There are two variants of the domestic analogy in Hobson’s writings on international 
relations. The first is a straightforward application of an analogy of nations in international 
society to persons in domestic society. For instance, Hobson argues that ‘just as an individual 
can only fully realise his personality in a society of other individuals, that is, a nation, so 
nations cannot rise to the full stature of nationalism save in a society of nations.’®^ However, 
this is underlaid by a more pervasive, yet more subtle use of the analogy by Hobson. Hobson’s 
international (or world) society is merely a domestic society writ large. He applies his concepts 
to international relations with little reflection that they might be specific to domestic society, 
frequently to Western or even Just British society. The problem with this is that, at the very 
least, it fails to take various aspects of domestic society into account, for example, that all 
domestic societies also have international relations. Hobson’s use of the organic and surplus 
concepts collapses to an application of domestic logic and principles to international relations. 
His analogy of society to an organism usually refers to domestic society. The application of 
these concepts beyond the state to inter-state relations or to global society is a presumption 
based on domestic rather than international experience and on guesswork about tendencies in 
international relations.
There are three criticisms of the domestic analogy that might apply to Hobson’s 
international thought. First, even if an international society can be said to exist, it is not 
similar enough to the domestic realm for the unreflective import of domestic institutions and
®® H. Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals^ p. 1, and ‘Reflections on the 
Domestic Analogy’, p. 155.
®^ The Morals o f  Economic Internationalism, pp. 62-3; see also Problems o f  a New World, p. 251. 
Hobson’s use of the domestic analogy as an institutional shortcut to radical reform of the international 
system combined with an argument for the centralisation of power as a route to international peace 
and order are discussed in chapter six.
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theory into the international realm.®® Second, it is simply illegitimate to draw an analogy 
between a domestic society populated by individual human beings and an international society 
populated by states. There are too many disanalogies: states do not sleep, for instance!®® 
Third, and related to the second point, the domestic analogy is flawed because international 
politics has to deal with the contrasting obligations of people as citizens and as humans.^®®
There are, however, problems with the idea that Hobson’s framework and his 
internationalism are based on the domestic analogy. First, Hobson imported international 
analogies to discuss, for example, domestic industrial strife, as in The Conditions o f  Industrial 
Peace. Here, industrial conflict is compared to international war, and the lessons from the 
international arena are re-imported to domestic affairs. Thus, industries’ ‘present condition, 
regarded from the standpoint of human security, appears analogous to the wider political 
groupings within the various countries, which, by repressing internal conflicts and 
establishing strong States, enlarged the areas of hostility and made warfare more destructive 
than before.’ ®^^  Much the same can be said of Hobson’s use of the term ‘balance of power’ 
in the context of domestic politics. Thus, there is an exchange of metaphors between 
international and domestic affairs in Hobson’s writings rather than a mere application of 
domestic examples to international relations.
Second, Hobson referred to international changes permitting the extension of domestic 
principles to international relations. Such recourse to evidence or principles from the world 
of international affairs refutes the charge of domestic analogy, which relies solely on evidence 
drawn from the domestic sphere.^®^ Hobson argued that communications and facilities for 
travel had improved, and that institutions such as the Hague and other international 
arrangements were the basis of the change in international relations.^®® Such reference to 
changes in the conduct of international relations suggest that Hobson’s proposals for 
international institutional reform are based in an understanding of the changing nature of the
98 See Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’ and The Anarchical Society.
®® For a classic statement of the difference between international relations and domestic society, 
see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan^ ch. 13.
®^® See Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  International Relations.
®^^  The Conditions o f  Industrial Peace, p. 22. Also p. 13, 30.
®^^  See Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, pp. 29-33.
®^® International Government, p. 193; League o f  Nations, p. 4 / / .
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international system, not merely by analogy to domestic arrangements. Thus Hobson’s 
references to the increasing institutionalisation of the Concert of Europe and the 
developments in the Hague somewhat mitigate the claims that Hobson’s internationalism was 
a case of a straightforward domestic analogy.
Third, one of the criticisms of Hobson’s organic analogy was that it committed him 
to an isomorphism of all social forms. For Hobson, federalism applied throughout organic 
systems including the international s y s t e m . T h i s  undermines the charge of domestic 
analogy as the prior division of the social world into domestic and international society at the 
basis of the domestic analogy is blurred. Hobson’s unitary perspective is another reason 
to suspect that the charge of domestic analogy might be misplaced. Internationalism based on 
the domestic analogy reinforces the very distinction of domestic and international that it is 
trying to overcome, because the domestic ‘inside’ is considered superior to (more ordered, 
organised, or peaceful than) the international ‘outside’. T h u s  we see the application of 
solutions to the international problems of strife, conflict, poverty, and economic problems 
drawn from domestic political experience where these have apparently been solved. The 
solutions however involve the establishment of the state boundaries that are the reason that 
there is a problem in international relations. Hobson’s insistence that domestic and 
international affairs were linked refutes the implicit separation being made in the domestic 
analogy.
Finally, there is a rebuttal to the charge of domestic analogy that is concerned with 
the portrayal of Hobson’s theories and concepts as domestically bounded. Under such a broad 
definition of domestic analogy, it is difficult to conceive what international theory, concepts, 
or indeed experience, might be; all social, political and economic theory, in this sense, has to 
begin ‘at home’. Domestic analogy is a less serious criticism because it is impossible to avoid 
in any theoretical discussion of international relations. Insofar as it is unavoidable, the charge 
either renders international theory in toto problematic or is itself a weak criticism because it 
simplistically identifies all political experience with domestic political experience.^®^
Case fo r Arbitraiion, pp. 1-2; League o f  Nations, p. 4,7.
Problems o f  a New World, p. 253.
R.K. Ashley, ‘The Powers of Anarchy: The Domestic Analogy and the Anarchy 
Problématique’, p. 47.
107 See Suganami, ‘Reflections on the Domestic Analogy’.
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Further Problems with the Organic Analogy
Some criticisms of Hobson’s use of the organic concept have already been outlined and 
the further charge that this amounts to domestic analogy in international relations has also 
been considered. However, there are several further potential practical problems with 
constructive internationalism that are rooted in Hobson’s organic conception of a world 
society and the role the international government.
According to Hobson’s organic analogy, in the domestic context the state is beneficent 
and necessary to a just order in its legitimate appropriation of the cooperative surplus of 
society. It is difficult to see why this legitimate position should be compromised by a weak 
(some would claim, nonexistent) international community of nations, peoples, or people. The 
interrelations of states would also compromise their ability to be impartial judges of their own 
society’s or of humanity’s good. For example, the growth of what today we would call welfare 
states does not appear to enhance but rather to upset the international o r d e r . H o b s o n ’s 
reply is that to the extent that such states are closed, they are militarist and dictatorial, 
because of the constraints of maintaining security of the national state. Only by being open, 
being part of the world economy and society, can nations and their governments fulfil the 
interests of themselves and the world in terms of welfare.
The problem of conceptualising the relations of the beneficent organic state and its 
society is magnified in international relations. Hobson is impressionistic on the role of an 
organic global authority and what its powers should be. An organic international government 
would in many ways be lacking a constituency; it would appear distant from the concerns of 
the member nations, let alone the people whom it was supposed to represent. Hobson provided 
few concrete answers to the puzzle of an international government in an organic world 
society.
Constructive internationalism looks forward to the rational management of 
international affairs, especially international economic relations, through some form of 
institutionalisation. The organic analogy in constructive internationalism implies, as we have 
seen, the application of government at the appropriate level. This is a thorny problem in the 
domestic context where there is already a state administration. The problems are multiplied
This is E.H. Carr’s opinion in Nationalism and A fter, pp. 17-24, where he predicts that the 
socialisation of the nation will lead to the nationalisation of socialism.
Democracy A fter  the War, pt. 2, ch. 5; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, chs. 7-8.
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by the fact that an international government has to be created to fulfil these functions. 
Furthermore, Hobson failed to account for the evolution of this institutionalisation in 
international relations. His ideas of an evolution to organisation in international relations are 
couched in vague terms. Such evolution is subject to the counter-influence of the states which 
it is supposed to transcend. As with liberal theories so often, Hobson’s conceptualisation of 
power, particularly the structural dimension, is inadequate.
In short, the application of the organic and surplus concepts to international relations 
suffers from the problems of the assumed harmony of interest reconciling the international 
and national interests and questions regarding the legitimate functions and powers of the 
international government. The very comprehensiveness of the organic and surplus concepts 
renders ideas drawn from them a collection of contradictory proposals, suitably malleable for 
rhetorical purposes, but ill-suited as the foundation for a substantive position on international 
relations.
Conclusion
The first fundamental conclusion of this chapter is that Hobson’s approach to international 
relations is unusual in that it is not a state-centric approach. Being based on the concepts he 
developed regarding human welfare, it was a holistic approach that considered humanity as 
a society. This is not simply a world society approach, however, because Hobson accorded the 
most important role to nations, politically organised as states. Hobson conceived four
visions of the international system. These international systems - balance of power, 
Cobdenism, imperialism and constructive internationalism - are implicitly located by Hobson 
on an evolutionary scale of forms. In an innovative piece of political economy, Hobson’s four 
systems are identified according to the relationship of political and economic factors, which 
are autonomous in the balance of power and Cobdenism and integrated in imperialism and 
constructive internationalism, and national interest and internationalism, balance of power and 
imperialism for the former, Cobdenism and constructive internationalism for the latter.
In his constructive internationalism, and the theory underlying it, Hobson had created 
a novel approach to international relations that was shortly to be adopted and modified by 
David Mitrany and called functionalism.
There were a number of serious theoretical criticisms of Hobson’s framework and his
See Michael Freeden, Liberalism Divided, p. 363. On structural power, see Susan Strange, 
States and Markets.
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constructive internationalism, but though these were damaging, they were not conclusive. The 
next part of the thesis will examine Hobson’s writings on international relations in greater 
detail.
PART TWO
Chapter Four 
The International Relations of Imperialism
Hobson’s Imperialism : A Study  is a classic in the field of international relations. His theory 
of imperialism is regularly cited in the international relations literature and has been an 
influence on neo-Marxist theories of imperialism from Lenin onwards. This chapter rectifies 
the stylised impression of Hobson’s theory conveyed in the international relations literature. 
It is argued that Hobson’s critique of imperialism was a political statement, not the statement 
of scientific theory as it has subsequently been understood. Hobson intended to unmask the 
ideology of imperial necessity and also transform the liberal discussion of international 
relations. The chapter particularly stresses the frequently overlooked international dimension 
of Hobson’s theory of imperialism.
The chapter is in seven sections. The first deals with the meaning of imperialism in 
Hobson’s theory. Hobson elaborated on one basic meaning of imperialism in his definition of 
the ‘new imperialism’. The second section outlines the economic, social and political context 
of imperialism as an aggressive foreign policy. Hobson’s economic theory of imperialism 
applies his theory of underconsumption and of unproductive surplus as it concerns industrial 
combination. Combination creates powerful organised financial and industrial interests that 
possess both economic and political power. Hobson’s account of the ideology and psychology 
of imperialism is then discussed as a mask for economic interests and as an active reason for 
imperialism.
The third section examines the international relations of imperialism in Hobson’s 
theory. These are the competition of rival empires, global underconsumption, protectionism, 
and militarism and war. These result from competitive imperial expansion and the imposition 
of imperial rule on unassimilable backward peoples. Hobson’s consideration of the domestic 
impact of imperialism as an international system entailing protectionism and militarism is 
described. The fourth section analyses Hobson’s proposed reforms of imperial societies and 
international relations that he believed essential to end imperialism.
The fifth section criticises the caricature of Hobson’s theory of imperialism in the 
international relations literature, concentrating on Kenneth Waltz’s elegant and powerful 
summary of prevalent ideas. The section rebuts the charges of reductionism, economism and 
determinism, and proposes an alternative understanding of Hobson’s theory of imperialism.
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The sixth section notes Hobson’s prophesy of the possible development of the collusion of 
imperial powers in inter-imperialism. The seventh section considers some of the some of the 
criticisms o f  Hobson’s theory. In the concluding remarks, it is suggested that Hobson’s theory 
is more sophisticated, ambiguous and contradictory than is frequently given credit in the 
international relations literature.
The Meaning of Imperialism
Imperialism has been a term with a wide variety of uses, so wide in fact that some have 
suggested that the concept is too broad to have any meaning and should be dropped from 
academic discourse. Hobson was well aware of the changing meaning of political ‘isms’.  ^ He 
maintained a basic but unstated meaning of imperialism throughout his work: imperialism is 
the forcible conquest and control of foreign peoples. Hobson embellished the basic meaning 
of imperialism through contrasts with other ‘isms’. There are four elements to Hobson’s 
understanding of modern or, as he called it, new imperialism. It is aggressive and exclusive 
unlike nationalism; it is unlike colonialism, by which Hobson meant what we now call 
colonisation, in that it imposes rule over foreign peoples; and it is unlike ancient empire 
because it involves competing empires.^
Imperialism and colonialism, according to Hobson, were the expansion of the nation 
beyond its natural limits. Colonialism was the overflow of nationality into vacant or sparsely 
populated areas of the world. Hobson approved of colonialism because the civilisation of the 
colonising nation is extended across the world. Hobson pointed out, however, that most 
colonies did not satisfy the conditions of genuine colonialism. So-called colonies were 
governed by a small, predominantly Western, elite, without any pretence of bringing 
civilization to the colony’s population, the vast majority of whom were native and (Hobson
 ^Imperialism^ p. 3. On the changing senses of imperialism, see Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan 
Schmidt, Im perialism : The Story and Significance o f  a Political Word, 1840-1960, p. 221. On the 
contradictory nature of some of the more recent meanings, see Roger Owen, ‘Introduction’, in Roger 
Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.). Studies in the Theory o f  Imperialism.
^ These distinctions are made in ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’ in Imperialism. Giovanni Arrighi 
has also used this chapter as the basis of his analysis of Hobson’s theory of imperialism. However, 
Arrighi’s aim of clarifying the Leninist theory of imperialism through an analysis of the ‘scientific 
treatment’ o f  Hobson leads him into error, specifically his understanding of empire and 
internationalism, which he conceives as formal and informal empire respectively, far from Hobson’s 
meanings. See G. Arrighi, The Geometry o f  Imperialism: The Lim its o f  Hobson's Paradigm, ch. 1. On 
Hobson’s use of the term colonialism, see Imperialism, p. 6.
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believed) unassimilable peoples. The colonial administration only ruled by proxy being 
themselves directly controlled by the government of their home country. For Hobson, this 
situation denoted imperialism rather than colonialism. Because of the nature of tropical lands, 
for instance the climate, ‘White men cannot "colonize" these lands and, thus settling, develop 
the natural resources by the labour of their own hands; they can only organize and 
superintend the labour of the natives.’  ^ The structure of imperial rule was superficial yet 
devastating. It was superficial because the links established by the imperial rulers were loose, 
temporary, nor did they bring Christianity or civilization to any great extent. Hobson argued 
that imperialism extended the area of despotism and exploitation in the world and destroyed 
ancient or native civilizations.^
Hobson claimed that ‘[t]he root idea of empire in the ancient and mediaeval world was 
that of a federation of States, under a hegemony, covering in general terms the entire known 
recognized world, such as was held by Rome under the so-called pax R om ana'^  Such empire 
was the realm of peace and internationalism, insofar as citizens came from across the whole 
empire. The new imperialism of the late nineteenth century, on the other hand, involved 
many empires. ‘The novelty of recent Imperialism regarded as a policy consists in its adoption 
by several nations. The notion of a number of competing empires is essentially modern.*® 
These empires competed for territory and were mutually antagonistic. The outcome, therefore, 
was not internationalism and peace, but militarism and war.
Hobson cited John Stuart Mill’s definition of nationality with approval. Modern 
imperialism was associated with the perversion of nationalism, the denial of internationalism 
and sacrifice of peace. Hobson claimed that ‘[wjhile co-existent nationalities are capable of 
mutual aid involving no direct antagonism of interests, co-existent empires following each its 
own imperial career of territorial and industrial aggrandisement are natural necessary
enemies.’^
Imperialism had one final connotation, important for scholars of international
® Imperialism : A Study, p. 227.
 ^ See generally, ‘Imperialism in Asia’, Imperialism,, pt. 2, ch. 5.
® Imperialism , p. 8.
® Imperialism , p. 8. See also p. 19, 304
 ^ Imperialism , p. 12. Mill’s definition of nationality is cited on p. 5. As we have seen in chapter 
three, Hobson’s opinions of nationalism subsequently changed.
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relations. In Imperialism^ Hobson sketched the imperialism of competing empires, the world 
hegemony of ancient empire and the internationalism of self-governing nations as alternatives 
forms of world order. Hobson claimed that the transformation of world politics into 
imperialism posed a threat to civilisation.®
In summary, new imperialism is an aggressive and conquering foreign policy, 
contrasted to nationalism. It is a dominating relationship of one people over another, 
contrasted to colonialism. It is a struggle between rival empires, contrasted to ancient empire. 
It is a phase in world politics, contrasted to internationalism.
The Domestic Context of Imperialism as a Foreign Policy
The most studied aspect of Hobson’s theory of imperialism is his account of the domestic 
determinants of an imperial foreign policy. This section examines Hobson’s account of the 
economic bases of imperialism, the psychology and ideology of imperialism and some of the 
common misunderstandings of the theory. The economic theory Hobson used identified the 
groups that gained from imperialism. His social and political theory explained how the rest
of the nation was convinced or coerced to go along with imperialism. Hobson’s analysis does
not rest, however, wholly on domestic determinants of foreign policy.
The Economic Bases o f  Imperialism
Hobson argued that imperialism was bad business and politics for nations (and for the 
world), but is beneficial for certain sectional interests. These sectional interests use their 
power and influence to push for imperialism at the expense of the rest of the nation and the 
world. Imperialism can, by analogy, be seen as a form of sectionalism in international society. 
But this international sectionalism is itself founded on the imposition of a sectional interest 
within a single nation. Hobson explained the economic interests in favour of imperialism in 
terms of underconsumptio: nd industrial combination.
The theory of imperialism begins with Hobson’s identification of some oddities about 
recent foreign policy (especially British). He noted the rapid expansion of empire of the 
advanced industrial nations. Running through the usual economic arguments for empire, 
Hobson found that empire has neither benefitted trade nor been an outlet for excess
® ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’ in Imperialism.
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population.® Instead, Hobson identified a number of groups who had an economic or
professional interest in imperialism: arms manufacturers, export trades, shipbuilding, the
armed services, the colonial civil service, and certain professions where employees could find
lucrative employment in the empire, such as lawyers, teachers, clerics, and engineers. ‘These
men’, claimed Hobson, ‘are Imperialists by conviction; a pushful policy is good for them’.^ ®
‘The vast expenditure on armaments, the costly wars, the grave risks and embarrassments of
foreign policy, the checks upon political and social reforms within Great Britain, though
fraught with great injury to the nation, have served well the present business interests of
certain industries and professions.’^^
During the period of imperial expansion after 1884, the most significant economic
aspect of imperialism was the growth of capital export. Hobson noted that investment income
from overseas had increased dramatically in comparison to the sluggish performance of the
profits from foreign trade. Investment income also was an increasing proportion of the value
of i m p o r t s . W h i l e  imperial expansion had not benefitted the nation politically or
economically, Hobson could now answer the cui boiw? question:
Aggressive Imperialism, which costs the taxpayer so dear, which is of so little value 
to the manufacturer and the trader, which is fraught with such grave incalculable peril 
to the citizen, is a source of great gain to the investor who cannot find at home the 
profitable use he seeks for his capital, and insists that his Government should help 
him to profitable and secure investments abroad.
Hobson used economic theory of underconsumption and his explanation of 
combination in industry to explain why investors and particularly financier, the controllers 
of investment capital, were involved in imperialism. Underconsumption, Hobson had argued, 
resulted from the maldistribution of income, leaving too much capital in the hands of the 
wealthy. Unable to spend all of the income they received, the wealthier classes sought to 
invest their savings. However, because of their own and the workers’ underconsumption, there 
was a correspondingly lower need for capital expansion. The result was, as we have seen, 
depression in trade, resulting not only in more goods on the market than would sell, but 
especially, surplus capital beyond current and future consumption requirements. This surplus 
capital and depressed market rendered investment opportunities poor, with prices, profits and
® Im perialism , pt. 1, chs. 2-3.
Im perialism , pp. 49-50, Democracy A fier the War, pp. 44-8. 
Imperialism , p. 46, 49.
Imperialism, p. 53.
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returns on capital falling.
Underconsumption resulted in a pressure to export capital. Hobson reasoned that 
investment in the domestic market looked unfavourable and that capitalists seeking to 
maximize returns from their investments would look to the higher returns available overseas. 
This would relieve the pressure on the home market. Hobson’s underconsumption theory 
explains why there was a differential, /.e., lower, rate of return on capital in the advanced 
industrial countries than in the underdeveloped a r e a s .H o b s o n ’s theory of imperialism as 
a foreign policy shows that capital is exported via trusts and financial institutions. The role 
that trusts and financial institutions play in Hobson’s theory is double-edged: ‘the controllers 
of capital are not only the largest recipients of "surplus" wealth, but the personal embodiment 
of what is dangerous and wrong in the economic system, regarded from the standpoint of the 
social good.’^^  In other words, they are both the product of a system in the grip of 
underconsumption, with its surpluses of capital, and the agents of imperialism who invest 
abroad and manipulate politics both at home and in the foreign country in order to protect 
their investments. Trusts and financial institutions are the controllers of surplus capital that 
was exported.
According to Hobson, trusts, cartels, monopolies, and the financial institutions are the 
creation of an economic system suffering from underconsumption.^® Combination is an
The theory of underconsumption has been discussed in greater depth in chapter two. For 
divergent opinions on the role of underconsumption and trustification in Hobson’s theory of 
imperialism, see P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic 
Imperialism’; Norman Etherington, Theories o f  Imperialism: War. Conquest and Capital^ ch. 3; T.O. 
Lloyd, ‘Africa and Hobson’s Imperialism’, p. 134; E.E. Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption., ch. 
4. Some have insisted on the necessity of trustification for Hobson’s theory (Norman Etherington, 
‘The Capitalist Theory of Capitalist Imperialism’); others who have claimed that underconsumption 
produces trusts which are therefore merely the conduits of surplus capital (P.J. Cain’s reply to 
Etherington, ‘Hobson, Wilshire, and the Capitalist Theory of Capitalist Imperialism’). As we shall see, 
there is also an international context to underconsumption that contributes to imperialism proper 
rather than merely to the pressure to export capital.
14 Democracy A fter  the War, p. 34.
Hobson’s main example of the trusts and trust-makers in Imperialism  is America. It was here 
that the processes of industrialisation and monopolisation in capitalism were most clearly played out 
without the obstacles of tradition. Imperialism , p. 73 //.
For Hobson’s discussion of trusts, under which head he included all similar combinations, 
associations, agreements, monopolies and cartels, see Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , chs. 7-9.
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attempt to avoid the cut-throat competition ensuing from underconsumption c r i s e s . I n
order to avoid the losses from cut-throat competition, firms combined and the created
powerful trusts regulated, that is, limited, output to maintain profits, either through price
rises or the closure of plants or both. Competition had led to waste; combination was an
attempt to remedy the situation by substituting regulation of output for reckless
overproduction.^® Unfortunately, ‘this concentration of industry in "trusts," "combines," etc.,
at once limits the quantity of capital which can effectively be employed and increases the
share of profits out of which fresh savings and fresh capital will spring’, and thus exacerbated
the maldistribution of income at the root of underconsumption and the depression in trade.
According to Hobson,
An era of cut-throat competition, followed by a rapid process of amalgamation, threw 
an enormous quantity of wealth into the hands of a small number of captains of 
industry. No luxury of living to which this class could attain kept pace with its rise 
of income, and a process of automatic saving set in upon an unprecedented scale.
The logic of combination in face of trade depression created an alliance between the
trust-maker and the financier. It also formed the basis of the export of capital.
The profitable management of a trust depends primarily upon regulation of output, 
which involves a limitation of the employment of capital. It is thus impossible ex  
hypothesi for a trust-maker to find full continuous employment for the high profits 
he makes by extending the plant and working capital of his own business: such a 
policy would be evidently suicidal. He must look outside his own business for fields 
of profitable investment for his profits.
These profits pass ... into general finance, and are thence directed into forming and 
financing other trusts and large businesses. Thus the process of concentration and 
consolidation proceeds apace over all the industrial fields where capitalist methods of 
production prevail. But if a single trust cannot usefully absorb its profits, neither can 
a group of trusts. The movement, therefore, seems to be attended by a growing 
restriction of the field of investment. Thus there is a growing natural pressure towards 
the acquisition of markets outside the present area of monopoly.
This is the primary economic basis of imperialism for Hobson. He went on to argue:
The economic tap-root, the chief directing motive of all the modern imperialist 
expansion, is the pressure of capitalist industries for markets, primarily markets for 
investment, secondarily markets for surplus products of home industry. Where the
While they could be the product of a healthy economic system, they were also powerful 
sectional interests. See chapter two.
Imperialism^ p. 85.
Im perialism , p. 74, 76.
Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, p. 257, 261.
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concentration of capital has gone furthest, and where a rigorous protective system 
prevails, this pressure is necessarily strongest. Not merely do the trusts and other 
manufacturing trades that restrict their output for the home market more urgently 
require foreign markets, but they are more anxious to secure protected markets, and 
this can only be achieved by extending the area o f  political rule}^
Hobson has explained the economics of capital export of capital has been explained.
My emphasis of the last phrase of the quote draws attention to the fact that Hobson believed
that the extension of imperial control was part of the investor, financiers and industrialists
aims. Intuitively, this might appear somewhat odd. After all, businessmen are usually thought
to dislike government interference and prefer a policy of laissez faire. Hobson provided three
different reasons for the change of attitude towards imperial control among capitalists.
Capitalists were eager to protect their investments.
Foreign investment was different from trade in the fixity of interest in the host
country that it entailed. For the industrialists, the increased connection of investment in a
foreign country (compared to the temporary and superficial links forged by international
trade) led them to push for a policy of increased involvement of government in the internal
affairs of  other countries to protect their interests. This longer term interest heightened the
desire for protection, first, in terms of governmental provision of law and order in the empire.
For industrialists, not usually in favour of governmental interference, imperialism secured
business for themselves, through monopoly privileges and a cheap supply of law and order.
Imperialism was a means by which investors could protect and raise the returns on their
money. The investments were protected from instabilities of the host country: ‘Investors who
have put their money in foreign lands, upon terms which take full account of the risks
connected with the political conditions of the country, desire to use the resources of their
Government to minimize these risks, and so to enhance the capital value and the interest of
their private investments.’^^
Second, imperialism and imperial protection excluded potential foreign competition.
Protection from rival capitalists from other nations was provided through
the combined or separate action of capital to obtain the help, financial, diplomatic, 
military, of the national government so as to secure preferential access to foreign 
markets and foreign areas of development by colonies, protectorates, spheres of 
preferential trade and other methods of pushful economic foreign policy
Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , pp. 262-3. My emphasis. See also Imperialism , pp. 77-8. 
Im perialism , p. 55, 56.
Imperialism, p. [58-9].
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Third, financiers, as large institutional investors and the middle men between investors
and entrepreneurs, were especially well placed to benefit from imperialism. Hobson argued
that financiers lack of a real connection with industry led them to push for a risky imperial
policy.^^ Their financial power allowed them to make further gains at the expense of the
ordinary investor,^^ Financiers not only gained as investors but as speculators on the value
of investments. ‘To create new public debts, to float new companies, and to cause considerable
fluctuations of values are the three considerations of their profitable business. Each condition
carries them into politics, and throws them on the side of Imperialism.’ According to Hobson,
financiers made profits from the instability associated with imperialism as opposed to the
gains made from the extension of imperial control itself:
A policy which rouses fears of aggression in Asiatic states, and which fans the rivalry 
of commercial nations in Europe, evokes vast expenditures on armaments, and ever- 
accumulating public debts, while the doubts and risks accruing from this policy 
promote that constant oscillation of values of securities which is so profitable to the 
skilled financier.^®
Hobson believed that capitalism and capitalists were a major source of international 
conflict and war. He believed that financiers benefitted from the wars that resulted from 
imperialism. He did not argue that they consciously aimed for war.^^ For financiers, war 
created uncertainty and arbitrariness by which they might gain. This was, however, a matter 
of degree; too much instability would undermine the system from which the financiers 
derived their profits.
The Ideology and Psychology o f  Imperialism
According to Hobson, there are few gainers from imperialism. Yet, it was a popular
Democracy A fter the War, p. 81, 203.
Imperialism , p. 57; Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, pp. 241-2.
Imperialism , pp. 57-8. Hobson believed that financiers were not interested in the actual 
operations of industry but merely the paper value of assets. They were interested in the gambling 
aspect of finance in order to make their gains. Hobson described the financiers as analogous to the 
owners of gambling halls, and the ordinary investor as the gamblers. Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , 
pp. 250-1. This gambling was the reason that financiers benefitted from a policy that might lead to 
war. See also ‘The Ethics of Gambling’.
He appreciated that this view could be refuted by evidence from diplomatic records, but argued 
that theories based simply on biography of leaders were superficial historical explanations. See 
Problems o f  a New World, p. 150.
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policy, supported by politicians and public opinion. Hobson explained this apparent 
irrationality through an analysis of the ideology and psychology of imperialism. He attempted 
to unveil the real nature of imperialism. There are three parts to this revelation. First, as we 
have seen above, Hobson linked the maldistribution of capitalist economies with imperialism 
and war. This overturned the liberal belief (advanced by Cobden and by Spencer) in the 
inherently pacific nature of capitalism and economic relations.^® Second, Hobson 
demonstrated that a sectional interest’s gain was behind imperialism; that there was no gain 
to society as a whole. Finally, Hobson exposed the fallacies in the various ideological defences 
of  imperialism.
Hobson identified a bloc of supporters of imperialism among the political and social
establishment and also the various vehicles that were used to propound imperialist ideology.
He devoted the majority of Imperialism: A Study  to a critical analysis of the contending
explanations for imperialism that made up its ideological defence. Empire was the ideology
of the time. Those with a stake in the new colonies or neighbouring areas were
disproportionately influential in political circles because of the prevalent ideas. Despite its
great cost, imperialism could be put forward as a viable option through phrases such as ‘a field
of corn does not ripen in a day’. Hobson argued that
it is only the interests of competing cliques of business men - investors, contractors, 
export manufacturers, and certain professional classes - that are antagonistic;... these 
cliques, usurping the authority and voice of the people, use the public resources to 
push their private interests, and spend the blood and money of the people in this vast 
and disastrous military game, feigning national antagonisms which have no basis in 
reality .29
Industrialists and financiers are the central agents behind imperialism. Their economic 
and political power permitted them to influence the decisions of their national government, 
through the manipulation of the press and public opinion, as well as directly through some 
government ministers. They also had the power to manipulate conditions in the empire or 
neighbouring area. While the trusts needed foreign outlets, they also had the political power 
to pressure for government protection of their assets. ‘Diplomatic pressure, armed force, and 
where desirable, seizure of territory for political control...’ were the means of this
2® Imperialism^ pp. 124-39. For a view of Hobson’s theory along these lines, see P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. 
Hobson. Financial Capitalism and Imperialism in Late Victorian and Edwardian England’ and ‘J.A. 
Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism’, p. 565.
29 Imperialism, p. 127; see also p. 46, [48]-[49].
107
protection.^®
Hobson rebutted the idea that capitalism had no interest in imperialism. The operation
of sectional interests invalidated the claims of the defenders of capitalism. Hobson wrote:
While it may be true that capitalism as a whole cannot in the long run gain by 
expenditure on armaments and territorial conquests, this consideration does not 
dispose of the facts that certain well-organized and politically influential industries 
gain for a short run by this spirited foreign policy, and that few business men concern 
themselves with "the long run" or the interests of capitalism as a whole.
But the economic interest was not the sole support of imperialism. Far from it. The
strength of imperialism derived from the patriots, jingoes and nationalists who, projecting
their egos onto their nations, supported imperialism as the extension of national power and
prestige. The political establishment, conservatives and bureaucrats supported imperialism
because it helped to maintain the status quo and their positions at home. Hobson extended this
analysis during the First World War into an interconnected ‘circle of reaction’ of which
imperialism was one part. The circle of anti-democratic forces included imperialism,
protectionism, militarism, legalism, distractions, emollients (charity, sport, etc.), regulative
socialism, conservatism, state absolutism, authoritarianism (church, school, press, etc.), and
bureaucracy; all of which revolved around the pivot of what Hobson termed ‘improperty’,
under which he listed landlordism, capitalism and armaments. Hobson melodramatically used
his organic metaphor to describe the connections of the reactionary forces:
The mechanical analogy of an endless chain is not adequate. For the vicious circle is 
organic and alive. It is a poisonous co-operative interplay of parasitic organisms, 
feeding on the life of the peoples by mastering and perverting to their own selfish 
purposes the political, economic and moral activities of humanity. Political oligarchy, 
industrial and spiritual authoritarianism, find natural allies in the servile Press, the 
servile School, the servile Church, which they utilize to drape their selfish dominion 
with the gallant devices of national service. Imperialism, "scientific management" and 
other cloaks of class mastery.
Hobson claimed that the educational establishment, the church, the press and certain 
political parties propounded the ideology of imperialism. While these groups taught the lessons 
of authoritarianism learned from the Empire in the schools and the church, they conveyed an 
impression of imperialism as a Christian mission for civilisation or as a necessary struggle for 
existence between nations. Hobson claimed that the press was largely in the pockets o f  the 
entrepreneurs behind imperialism, but noted also that newspapers had an interest in the
Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, p. 263. See also the example of South Africa on pp. 265-72. 
Democracy A fter the War, pp. 145-6.
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sensationalism of imperialism to sell copies.
Nearly two-thirds of Imperialism  is devoted to refutations of various arguments put
forward in defence of imperial expansion. In his revelation of an economic interest behind
imperialism, Hobson did not play down the influence of other honest motivations and
reasoning in the initiation of imperial policy. According to Hobson, these other reasons and
motivations were functional for imperialism. They were a mask for the economic exploitation
of the imperial enterprise. Nonetheless, these ideas were mobilizing forces for imperialism,
the main reasons why the great majority supported imperialism. Hobson criticised such
reasons by showing that these ideas are misplaced or erroneous and that imperialists use of
such arguments was self-serving in terms of an economic interest.
Hobson examined the arguments concerning the civilizing mission, biological
necessity, pressure of population, and the extension of good government. One of the most
prevalent and dangerous myths, according to Hobson, was that there was a ‘scientific basis of
Imperialism regarded as a world-policy’, where
[t]he maintenance of a military and industrial struggle for life and wealth among 
nations is desirable in order to quicken the vigour and social efficiency of the several 
competitors, and so to furnish a natural process of selection, which shall give an ever 
larger and intenser control over the government and the economic exploitation of the 
world into the hands of the nation or nations representing the highest standard of 
civilization or social efficiency, and by the elimination or subjugation of the 
inefficient shall raise the standard of the government of humanity,*^
Hobson refuted this and other arguments, such as the White Man’s Burden, that
posited a mission of civilization of the backward countries by the most advanced peoples; the
idea that the British, for example, had a genius for government and a duty to pass their
expertise on to less civilised peoples; and the argument that imperialism is the necessary
response to a growing population. Biological and sociological theory supported international
cooperation as much as international conflict. The mission of civilization was a fallacy, that,
through imperialism, had destroyed other civilizations rather than establishing a higher
civilization, particularly in Asia, British ‘good government’ could not be exported by
imposition on unassimilable peoples. Indeed, imperialism had extended the realm of despotism
in the world, rather than democratic self-government. Finally, Hobson refuted population
On the press, see Imperialism^ p. 60, 216; The Psychology o f  Jingoism^ pt. 2, ch. 1. On 
conservative forces using other institutions in general see Imperialism^ pp. 214-7. On the role of the 
church see in particular Psychology o f  Jingoism , pt. 1, ch. 3. Also Democracy A fter the War, pt. 1, 
chs. 6-7.
S3 Imperialism, p. 161. See also p. 155.
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outlet argument on three grounds: that economic progress supplied the needs of a growing 
population, that the new colonies had not in fact taken any greater number of British 
immigrants and that, with the advance of civilisation, population in the Western nations was 
not growing that fast anyway.®^
Hobson also examined the psychology of imperialism, both as it related to the beliefs 
of politicians and to public opinion. Hobson claimed that any explanation which relied purely 
on economic variables was either incomplete or stretched the meaning of economic to include 
psychological and biological factors.^^ His economic theory of underconsumption was 
founded on an ethical malady, the distribution of the product of cooperative enterprise 
through bargaining power rather than justice.^®
Hobson identified the instincts of pugnacity, acquisitiveness, assertiveness, and most 
of all, the ‘will to power’ in statesmen, financiers and industrialists as stimuli to their drive 
for imperialism. The jingoistic support for imperialism among the masses, Hobson attributed 
to the mob-mind. Hobson applied a crowd psychology in his suggestion that civilised values 
were submerged in the instincts of the herd. People were credulous and brutal in a way that 
civilised individuals were not. Pugnacity, bellicosity and predacity, basic instincts supposedly 
mitigated by in civilisation came to the fore, Hobson claimed, in imperialism and war.®^
M yths About Hobson's Theory o f  Imperialism
In this section, I consider a number of common misunderstandings of Hobson’s theory 
that persist in international relations literature.®® Scholars of international relations and 
economic history have attempted to expose Hobson’s theory through the analysis of the
These arguments appear in Imperialism. On social Darwinism, pp. 153-65; on the civilising 
mission, pp. 285-306, 325-6; on the British genius for government, pp. 114-24; on the outlet for 
population, pp. 41-5.
Democracy A fter  the War, p. 9, 36; Imperialism , p. [47].
®® See chapter two on force in bargaining.
See Psychology o f  Jingoism, pt. 1, chs. 1-4; Imperialism , p. [51]; ‘Militarism and the Will to 
Power’ in Democracy A fter the War, ‘The Spirit of the Herd’ and ‘The Submergence of Personality’ 
in Problems o f  a New World. Also see Property and Improperty, p. 121 and Hobson’s satire of 
government policy during the First World War in 1920: Dips into the Near Future.
®® More serious misunderstandings are dealt with in the section below on Hobson’s theory in the 
international relations literature.
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economic data concerning the costs of imperialism to states.®® However, in demonstrating 
that England (or any other nation) did not gain from imperialism, the empirical evidence 
supports Hobson’s theory, rather than refuting it. As we have seen, Hobson attempted to show 
that the nation as a whole did not gain from imperialism, but that sectional interests gained 
at the nation’s expense. If the evidence shows that nations did not in fact gain from 
imperialism, Hobson’s case against imperialism is in part proven. Hobson expected a negative 
balance sheet. Hobson’s problematic remains: despite the manifest losses, nations still 
embarked on imperialism. He argued that this was because of a contemporary delusion of 
necessity o f imperialism and the belief that, for any number of reasons, imperialism was good 
for the nation and /or  the world. The data cited against Hobson is, in short, irrelevant: it is the 
perceptions of the time, not the statistics as they appear now, that determined imperialism and 
by which Hobson’s theory must be judged.
Second, critics have claimed that Hobson believed that most capital exported abroad 
went to the new colonies. This is a mistake. In fact, Hobson compared the rise in foreign 
investment with accelerating colonial expansion, but cited no figures showing that a large 
proportion of overseas investment actually went to the new colonies. He merely denied that 
the foreign investment figures and the expansion of empire could be a coincidence and 
provided an explanation of the reasons why it was not so.^® This is a weaker argument than 
is usually attributed to Hobson. While underconsumption and industrial combination form the 
background to imperialism, it has been argued that Hobson’s theory posits influential people 
with investments in certain colonies, who asked for and obtained protection for their
®® Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit o f  Empire: The Political 
Economy o f  British Imperialism , 1860-1912\ A.K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment; John R. 
Oneal and Frances H. Oneal, ‘Hegemony, Imperialism and the Profitability of Foreign Investments’. 
Though Hobson’s discussion is specifically concerned with nations, some have investigated the effects 
on governments/states, e.g.,, Phillip Darby, Three Faces o f  Imperialism  and D.K. Fieldhouse, The 
Colonial Empires^ ch. 16. See also D.K. Fieldhouse (ed.). The Theory o f  Capitalist Imperialism^ where 
it is acknowledged by the editor that there was no gain to the nation in imperialism, while some of 
the contributions, by A.K. Cairncross and by R. Nuske, use data based on states. There are doubts 
as to the consonance of imperial expansion with the flow of foreign investment, claims that little 
capital was exported to the new territories, claims that the differential gains for investment in the new 
colonies were small if not non-existent; challenges the asserion that all imperial states had economic 
surpluses, that few national economies, including Britain, were in fact trustified and cartelised in the 
way in which Hobson described. See the contributions in D.K. Fieldhouse (ed.). The Theory o f  
Capitalist Im perialism  and the critiques listed in Julian Townshend, ‘Introduction’ to Imperialism,
Compare Hobson’s discussion of the growth of foreign and colonial trade in ‘The Commercial 
Value of Imperialism’ with his discussion of foreign investments on pp. 51-2 of Imperialism. C f. D.K. 
Fieldhouse, ‘Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision’, p. 110.
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investments from the government in the shape of imperial law and order. In this reading of 
Hobson’s theory, there is no necessary correlation between the size of the investment or the 
return on capital and imperial activity.
Third, the theory of imperialism has been associated with the search for foreign 
markets and for supplies of raw materials. However, Hobson linked the new imperialism to 
the growth in foreign investment. Capital export was primary in this process, the export of 
goods and the securing of raw materials secondary. The search for markets due to conditions 
of underconsumption at home does not, however, make sense. Backward peoples who have 
lower incomes than in advanced societies cannot be expected to buy these goods at the market 
price commanded in advanced economies. Foreign markets for goods must be advanced 
industrial societies to have the purchasing power to buy the goods. Undeveloped markets 
could only be useful areas in which to dump excess goods in order to maintain prices at home 
or as potential markets for the f u t u r e . T h i s  is how Hobson argued imperialism as a market 
for surplus goods: ‘[t]he maldistribution of wealth, which keeps the consuming power of the 
people persistently below the producing power of machine industry, impels the controllers of 
that industry to direct more and more of their energy to secure foreign markets so as to take 
the goods they cannot sell at home, and to prevent producers in other countries, confronted 
with the same necessity, from entering the home market.
The International Relations of Imperialism
Imperialism was an international phenomenon for Hobson. Imperialism as an international 
system entailed the clash of competing imperial powers, global underconsumption, the rise of 
protectionism in the international system, and the stimulation of militarism and war. Hobson 
was also concerned with the impact of the international relations of imperialism as 
protectionism, militarism and war, on domestic society. Hobson defined the new imperialism
See T.O. Lloyd, ‘Africa and Hobson’s Imperialism’, p. 141, 152; P.P. Clarke, Liberals and Social 
Democrats^ pp. 97-8, and ‘Hobson, Free Trade and Imperialism’; Bernard Porter, Critics o f  Empire,
pp. 216-8.
See ‘The Mystery of Dumping’, in International Trade. For an examination of the significance 
of this paper, see W.P. Culbertson, Jr., and R.B. Ekelund, Jr., ‘John A. Hobson and the Theory of 
Discriminating Monopoly’, pp. 273-82. For the argument that backward countries are inadequate 
markets for surplus goods, see Michael Bleaney, Underconsumptionist Theories, p. 167.
Problems o f  a New World, p. 26; see also Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 57.
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as the conflict of imperial powers for control of the rest o f the world. Imperialism in the post- 
1884 period involved the competition of advanced nations. This new imperialism meant that 
‘nations trespassing beyond the limits of facile assimilation transform the wholesome 
stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing 
empires.’^^
As we have already seen, one reason for the formal conquest of territory was the 
competition of foreign firms for markets for surplus capital. Hobson’s discussion of 
imperialism is marked by the prevalence of competition and the absence of central control in 
the international system. Hobson drew analogies between the monopolization of national 
economies and monopolization of the world by the imperial powers. Hobson believed that the 
era of laissez fa ire  was drawing to a close, in international politics as in economics, and that 
politics, like economics, was entering a phase of cut-throat competition.^^ The new 
imperialism had transformed the nature of world politics. It entailed the final division of the 
remaining areas of the world as yet not under imperial rule and the closing off  empires to the 
entry of other nationals. Both these factors bespeak monopoly, the monopoly of the imperial 
powers.^®
Imperial competition resulted in an international system based on force, a system that 
is frequently convulsed by war."^  ^ But conflict is engendered not just between imperial 
powers, or between imperial powers and backward peoples. In his 1938 ‘Introduction’ to 
Imperialism^ Hobson identified a major conflict in the international system between the ‘have’ 
and ‘have not’ nations, those that had empires and those that did not. The ‘have nots’ claimed 
their own right to areas of the world for their exclusive exploitation. These nations were given 
the pretext for imperial expansion and war by the actions of the ‘have’ nations that had 
already obtained substantial empires. They were also prompted to aggressive, competitive 
action because the international system of competitive empires was based on militarism and 
force. Hobson was perturbed by the implications of this analysis. Developing these ideas in
44 Imperialism^ p. 11.
This is the basis for Hannah Arendt’s incisive analysis of imperialism in The Origins o f  
Totalitarianism. On the lack of control in international economic relations, see Poverty in Plenty^ p. 
17-9.
Confessions, p. 59, 185. This is similarly Lenin’s meaning of monopoly as applied to the 
relations of states. Lenin acknowledged the dual meaning of monopoly in Hobson’s analysis and 
criticized Kautsky for neglecting this insight. See Lenin, Imperialism , pp. 83-7.
Wealth and L ife ,  pp. 392-3, 401.
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the thirties, Hobson realised that Germany, Italy and Japan could justify their aggressions on 
the grounds that the earlier imperial powers had done the sam e/^  This made for a dangerous 
world. However, Hobson believed that the wealthy ruling classes in the ‘have’ nations would 
prefer to avoid settling this issue because the system of imperialism benefitted them.^®
Global Underconsumption
Hobson claimed that underconsumption affected all advanced capitalist states as they
embarked on industrialisation and mechanisation. According to Hobson,
the system prevailing in all developed countries for the production and distribution 
of wealth has reached a stage in which its productive powers are held in leash by its 
inequalities of distribution; the excessive share that goes to profits, rents and other 
surpluses impelling a chronic endeavour to oversave in the sense of trying to provide 
an increased productive power without a corresponding outlet in the purchase of 
consumable goods.
Notice that this is a phenomenon that occurs in all developed states. In an argument strikingly
similar to his any/every paradox explanation of underconsumption, however, Hobson
extended his argument beyond the plurality of capitalist states to the international competition
of states. Underconsumption and the competitive economic expansion that resulted from it
thus have international dimensions. In a passage that is worth quoting at length, Hobson
argued that though each nation separately could industrialise and adopt a capitalist system of
distribution, it was not possible for every nation to follow this path without conflict:
The members of any single nation, taken as an aggregate, may ... save an indefinitely 
large proportion of the national income, provided that other nations, saving less 
themselves, will borrow and apply to productive purposes or to increased consumption 
the savings thus made available. This was the position of Britain during the greater 
part of the nineteenth century. No limit was set upon the savings of her people when 
most of the world were insufficiently provided with capital. But when the whole 
Western world and large parts of the hitherto undeveloped lands of Asia, America and 
Africa had been equipped with modern machinery of manufacture and transport, 
while agriculture in many staple branches was passing under machine-economy, the 
problem of the proportion of saving to spending stood out in its true significance. 
When the United States and Germany, with some smaller European countries, equalled
Problems o f  a New Worlds pp. 269-70; Imperialism , p. [55].
Problems o f  a New World, p. 177; Confessions, p. 109. Property and Improperty, p. 113, and 
Imperialism , pp. [49]-[50], [62]. Hobson had predicted a re-emergence of the balance of  power and 
imperial competition if there was no just solution to imperialism in Probelms o f  a New World, pp. 
269-70
50 Imperialism, pp. [51]-[52]. My emphasis.
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or passed England in the use of machinery and power, and competed for the export 
of capital-goods, while Japan cut into the Asiatic markets heavily, the restriction upon 
the effective saving in England and other advanced industrial countries began to be 
manifest. It appeared first in a strong competitive drive towards imperialism, the 
acquisition of exclusive or preferential areas for markets and for capitalist 
development in the remaining backward countries.
It is this competition that explains the economics of the new imperialism. Britain’s nineteenth
century economic expansion had little need of formal political control because there were no
challengers to British supremacy. Once Germany and the US had become industrial powers
comparable to Britain, however, competitive economic expansion ensued, of which formal
imperial control was a fundamental part. The imperial rivalry following 1884 posed a dilemma
for Britain, argued Hobson:
The spread of modern industrialism tends to place our "rivals" on a level with 
ourselves in their public resources. Hence, at the very time when we have more reason 
to fear armed coalition than formerly, we are losing that superiority in finance which 
made it feasible for us to maintain a naval armament superior to any European 
combination.^^
The international logic of imperialism is simple and straightforward. Without 
international competition, underconsumption in one nation might issue only in capital export, 
but imperial expansion. Once every developing nation embarks on this course, imperialism 
as the political securing of economic advantage appears to be necessary. This competition 
itself results in the reduction in the areas of profitable exploitation as each imperial power 
seeks to obtain and secure areas for itself. The limits of expansion are the various spheres of 
influence of rival states. Conflict intensifies as areas of the world set aside for exclusive 
exploitation diminish and expansion is restricted.
That trade depression was not merely a domestic economic problem had become quite 
manifest in the Great Depression of the thirties. Hobson resurrected his theory of 
underconsumption to explain the world depression. However, he also examined the economic 
dislocations of the post-war period according to his underconsumption theory. Hobson denied 
other economic analyses that suggested that economic woes were due to the tumult of the First 
World War as well as theories that posited monetary or credit explanations for depression. By
From Capitalism  to Socialism , pp. 11-12. See also The Recording Angel, p. 50.
Im perialism , p. 139. See also p. 72; Recording Angel, p. 53.
The logic of Hobson’s theory suggests that expansion would eventually result in crisis for the 
capitalist power. The outcome is different, however, for different international scenarios. If there was 
only one imperial state expanding, the limit would be the world, a world governed under the 
hegemony of free trade.
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contrast, he claimed that the war and the depression both had a common cause in the 
developing social relations of capitalist international economic relations, that is the 
appropriation of the social surplus and consequent maldistribution of income.
Imperialism  and Protectionism
As we saw in the last chapter, Hobson believed that an increasingly interdependent 
global economy was emerging. Industrialization, specifically the development of machine 
economy, was transforming the w o r ld .A c c o r d in g  to Hobson, this meant the possible 
extension of the division of labour and of specialization across the entire globe. On the other 
hand, the connection of economies rendered each economy vulnerable to trade disruption 
caused by its trading partners. ‘When a nation depends for the supply of its daily bread upon 
the economic activity of other nations, its political independence is felt to be imperilled.’ ®^ 
Combined with the problems of trade depression due to underconsumption making the need 
for markets abroad appear compelling, economic interdependence made control of external 
areas for investment and trade also appear necessary.
Imperialism, the extension and enforcement of political control over foreign peoples, 
was one means of securing the nation’s economic future. But imperialism, Hobson argued, was 
naturally allied with protectionism, the exclusion or discrimination against foreign goods and 
capital. National firms called for protection of their home markets and for preferential access 
to imperial markets. Both imperialism and protectionism are reactions to the an increasingly 
interdependent world economy. ‘Protectionism ... is an endeavour to struggle against certain 
dangers inherent in the world-economy of Free Trade, and to keep within the territorial limits 
of the nation [or Empire] a sufficient volume and an adequate variety of industry.’®^ 
Protectionism is an attempt to defend the nation against the apparently ‘disintegrating 
influences of commercial internationalism’.®®
‘Underconsumption: An Exposition and Reply’, ‘Reactions of National Policy on Trade and 
Unemployment’ and ‘The World’s Economic Crisis’.
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , chs. 3-5.
®® International Trade, p. 173.
International Trade, p. 174.
®® International Trade, p. 179. See generally ‘Imperialism and Protectionism’ in Imperialism', The
New Protectionism', Democracy A fter  the War.
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Hobson opposed imperialism and protectionism. He followed Cobden, believing in the
economic and pacific benefits of free trade. The argument was that openness to trade,
participation in the global division of labour and specialization would lead to economic gains
for all nations and would encourage friendly relations between trading peoples. Free trade was
the route to peace and p r o s p e r i t y .H o b s o n ’s critique of imperialism was an attempt to
demonstrate that imperialism was a bad policy for the imperial nation and for the world as
a whole. It was a bad policy because it entailed the abandonment of free trade.®® Hobson’s
first article concerning imperialism addresses the refutation of free trade in British foreign
policy. He argued that:
In total contravention of our theory that trade rests upon a basis of mutual gain to the 
nations that engage in it, we undertook enormous expenses with the object of 
"forcing" new markets, and the markets we forced were small, precarious and 
unprofitable. The only certain and palpable result of the expenditure was to keep us 
constantly embroiled with the very nations that were our best customers, and with 
whom, in spite of everything, our trade made the most satisfactory advance.®^
Protectionism was simply ‘economic militarism’, claimed Hobson.®^ It reinforced a view of
the world as a dangerous place, composed of hostile, exclusive empires each attempting to
keep trade to itself,
where a nation is exposed to have its foreign trade cut off during war, common 
prudence, it is held, must impel the State to make arrangements enabling the nation 
to be as self-sufficing as possible in supplies of the requisites of civil existence and 
military use ... Protection is urged, not as an instrument of national wealth, but of 
national defence.®®
Imperial protection was the policy of keeping the imperial and home markets closed
Hobson’s discussion of free trade and refutation of economic nationalism is discussed in depth 
in chapter five.
®® ‘Free Trade and Foreign Policy’. This is the first formulation of the imperialism theory and the 
influence of Cobdenite principles is clearer here than some of the later formulations. See P.J. Cain, 
‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1870-1914’.
®^ Imperialism^ pp. 65-6.
®^ Im perialism , p. 15; International Trade, p. 171.
®® New Protectionism, p. 16. For Hobson such a division was also a crime against civilization. See 
also p. 58, 113. Hobson applied this analysis to the proposals for a protective system around the allied 
powers after the First World War. The result of this proposal, claimed Hobson, would be a 
reinforcement of the war battle-lines and the breaking of Europe into hostile camps. See The New 
Protectionism, p. xvi, 58. Hobson also opposed the idea of Imperial federations or preference. Such 
closure to trade and investment would further stimulate the rivalry of other states. See Imperialism , 
p. 340//.,  and ‘Colonial Preference’ and ‘Canada’s Fiscal Future’ in Canada Today.
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to rivals’ trade. This closure of markets was achieved in the last resort by military force. 
Hobson criticised imperial protection as economically unsound and politically dangerous. Free 
trade was preferable to any policy of forcing markets open or keeping them closed to other 
competitors. The costs of this policy were prohibitive, due to the administrative and military 
cost of maintaining imperial exclusion and also of dealing with the strained relations with 
erstwhile trading partners, now imperial rivals.
Hobson argued, however, that imperial protection was bound to fail. Imperial self- 
sufficiency was an impossible end. The British Empire, for instance, could not be self- 
sufficient in food, could only pursue a policy of self-sufficiency at great cost, and would 
remain vulnerable in time of war. The final fallacy of imperial protection, then, was that it 
was a viable alternative. Indeed, according to Hobson, imperial rivalry created a perverse 
form of interdependence, that of the competition of an arms race: ‘Imperialism ... has brought 
a great and limitless increase of expenditure of national resources upon armaments. It has 
impaired the independence of every nation which has yielded to its false glamour. Great 
Britain no longer possesses a million pounds which it can call its own; its entire financial 
resources are mortgaged to a policy to be dictated by Germany, France, or Russia.’®^
Imperialism. M ilitarism and War
For Hobson, militarism was ‘the organization of physical force by the State, so as to 
be able to compel members of another State, and some members of the military State itself, 
to act against their will.’®® Militarism entailed a constant preparedness for war. The new 
imperialism was militaristic because it was a policy of forcible expansion, in its use of military 
force to exclude rivals and fight them when necessary.®^ Imperialism fostered exclusive and 
aggressive nationalism with a ‘close state’ that attempted to secure for itself national or 
imperial self-sufficiency.
In international relations, militarism became self-reinforcing, claimed Hobson in a 
crude formulation of the security dilemma:
®^ Imperialism., pt. 1, ch. 5.
®® Imperialism , p. 138.
®® Democracy A fte r  the War, p . 21.
®^ Democracy After the War, pt. 2, ch. 5; From Capitalism to Socialism, p. 12; Democracy and a
Changing Civilisation, p. 125.
118
The very existence of this militarism, by stimulating the fears, suspicions and hostility 
of other States, similarly dominated and directed by their group-interests, appears to 
justify itself by helping to create a dangerous world in which strong martial force is 
a necessary precaution.®®
Militarism was the product of imperialism as an international system:
‘The hostile grouping of nations for superior strength in a balance of power, the failure alike
of economic and of military disarmament, the open preparations for a future war...’.®®
Hobson claimed that this militarism chilled international intercourse and led to dictatorship.
It was a retrograde step for humanity, because an international system in the grip of
militarism was ruled in the last instance by force rather than claims of reason or justice.^®
While militarism was the normal result of imperialism, Hobson argued that war was also a
likely consequence. Instability and suspicions made for a constant potential outbreak of war.
War followed from the instability and the injustice of the international system and the
militarism engendered by imperialism.
Unfortunately, according to Hobson, war and militarism were not solely the result of
the direct competition of imperial states. Increasingly imperial conflicts were being fought by
proxies. Hobson forcefully condemned this: ‘The expansion of our Empire under the new
Imperialism has been compassed by setting the "lower races" at one another’s throats, fostering
tribal animosities and utilising for our supposed benefit the savage propensities of the peoples
to whom we have a mission to carry Christianity and civilization.’^^  Furthermore, the
kilom etritis  of imperial expansion and the compulsion to stiffen imperial control bred bloody
conflicts with backward peoples.
Hobson claimed that war was to a certain extent functional for the capitalist system:
Capitalism no doubt favours expenditure on armaments as a profitable business 
proposition. But it needs armaments because it needs war. War is a profitable business 
policy. Its destructiveness is the other way out of the plethora of peaceful 
productivity. If foreign markets do not expand fast enough to take o ff  the surplus of 
capitalist production, an era of destructive waste is the only acceptable alternative.^^
®® Democracy A fter the War, p. 101. See also Imperialism, p. 128.
®® Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 55-6.
Im perialism , p. 13, 186, 325; Democracy And a Changing Civilisation, p. 16, 129; Problems o f  
a New World, p. 245, 251-2, 272. This was reflected in the adoption by politicians and academics of 
realpolitik  and various other nationalist-imperialist theories. See Imperialism , pp. 12-13, 167.
Imperialism , p. 138. See also p. 126.
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 54.
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Hobson criticised the argument, exemplified by Norman Angell, that war does not pay for 
capitalism and that capitalism leads to peace rather than war. According to Hobson, this 
argument missed the role of sectional interests, which supported war. Hobson argued that 
‘though war, with its revolutionary aftermath, may well seem dangerous to the capitalist 
system, it is open to argument whether such risks may not appear worth running in view of 
the alternative piling up of unsaleable surpluses which the extension and improved methods 
of modern capitalism in v o lv e .F u r th e r m o r e ,  resuscitating an argument he first made with 
Mummery in 1889, Hobson claimed that ‘war ... does for the time being rectify the balance 
between productivity and consumption and give prosperity alike to capital and labour in the 
uninvaded and the neutral countries.
While Hobson initially criticised the financiers as the central agents of imperialism, 
during the First World War, he turned his attention to the arms manufacturers. He ironically 
remarked that the arms industry, an industry that would gain by the destruction of 
civilisation, was capitalism’s leading cosmopolitan industry. These industries had a positive 
interest in the strife of nations and were parasites on an international system based on military 
force.
The Domestic Impact o f  Imperialism
This section discusses the domestic impact of imperialism, protectionism, militarism 
and war.^® According to Hobson, imperialism reinforced anti-democratic forces in domestic 
society in three ways. First, following the nineteenth century radical critique, Hobson accused 
establishment vested interests of using foreign policy as a distraction from important political 
issues at home. Involvement in international and imperial politics diverted time and money 
away from domestic social and economic causes:
Whenever real issues of "the condition of the people" grew insistent, they were edged
73 Im perialism , p. [53].
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 54. This is very close to the situation Hobson claims 
that Veblen is describing. See Veblen, p. 146; Imperialism, p. [53]. Hobson argues a similar case 
regarding the effects of the Franco-German War in The Physiology o f  Industry, pp. 161-2, 176-7.
Democracy A fter the War, p. 48. See also p. 50.
The domestic impact of the foreign policy and international relations of imperialism was one 
of Hobson’s prime concerns in his Imperialism. In this sense, at least, Hobson’s theory of imperialism 
is as much a theory of British society as a theory of international relations theory.
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aside by one of those stage monsters of foreign or imperial policy, the menaces or the 
misdeeds of France, Russia, Turkey, or Germany kept for the purpose. In the early 
seventies the political wizard of the day invented Imperialism in order to keep the 
people quiet for a generation.
"To stay giddy minds with foreign quarrels" has long been a recognised expedient for 
threatened home despots, and a certain admixture of plausible economic incentives is 
found useful in order to turn the emotions of a confused popular mind away from, 
dangerous attacks on property.^®
Second, Hobson claimed that the despotism of imperial dependencies was reimported into the
imperial state. This was the consequence of the return of imperial administrators and military
officers used to autocratic rule in the empire. Hobson argued further that ‘[i]t is, indeed, the
nemesis of Imperialism that the arts and crafts of tyranny, acquired and exercised in our
unfree Empire, should be turned against our liberties at home.’ ®^ Precedents set in the
undemocratic empire reacted upon domestic institutions and traditions. Third, Hobson argued
that the requirements of controlling a huge heterogeneous empire resulted in centralisation
o f  political power. This centralization of government was reinforced by the need for secrecy
in dealings with foreign powers. The cumulative domestic impact of imperialism, then, was
to oppose democracy and encourage autocratic and bureaucratic government.
Hobson claimed that protection was a producers’ policy. He claimed that
organized financial, industrial, and trading groups within a nation [that] strive to 
direct its political and economic policy so as to secure for themselves as large a share 
as possible of the world’s wealth "under the name and pretext of the commonwealth." 
Thus a protectionist, imperialist, militarist system is maintained in order that these 
interests may make profits by isolating the home market and taxing "the 
consumer,"...®^
At the expense of the mass of consumers, powerful industries and firms able to get the 
attention of government sought the protection of their profits through import controls and 
tariffs. Cartels could use their sheltered status to make large profits. Protection was itself an 
encouragement to the creation of national monopolies. Protection funded imperial expenditure 
at the expense of the less well-off, Hobson claimed, because protection was a tax on
T ra ffic  in Treason^ p. 9; see also Democracy A fter the Ifûr, pp. 181-2; Imperialism^ pp. 141-2. 
®^ Property and Improperty^ p. 143. See also pp. 107-8. Imperialism^ p. 58, 127.
Imperialism^ pp. 151-2. Also p. 150, Democracy and a Changing Civilization^ pp. 108-9.
®° Imperialism , pp. 145-7.
®^ Poverty in Plenty, pp. 75-6.
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consumption and such indirect taxes were regressive.®^ Hobson’s opinions were qualified by
his support for social planning, which, though he did not acknowledge it, entailed
interference in the market tantamount to protection. He was impressed by the progress made
towards social control and planning of the economy during the War, claiming that this
demonstrated the gains from social organization,®®
Finally, Hobson claimed that, with an aggressive and exclusive imperial policy, the
aim of a national policy of protection became an economic nationalism premised primarily on
national defence or imperial efficiency rather than welfare. Protection was a central pillar of
an economic nationalism that encouraged wasteful military spending, withdrawing workers
from productive employment to put them into the armed services.®^ Hobson argued that
gains from social organisation were wasted not only by the costs of militarism and war, but
by the expropriation of the surplus by the ruling classes and the aura that the War had given
to force in the settlement of disputes.®® International competition also limited the possibility
of raising the standard of living of the workers because of the prospect of being undersold
by cheaper foreign goods.®®
Militarism restricted civil liberties and was an opponent of reason and democracy,
according to Hobson. The impact of war was similar, only more extreme. While he conceded
the necessity of some restrictions in time of war, he objected strongly to the imposition of
arbitrary rules over civil conduct, such as the suspension of habeas corpus. ‘War necessarily
cancels liberty, forcing obedience to imposed authority, and the war mentality is not
unnaturally carried on into the emergencies of an unstable and dangerous peace’, argued
Hobson, He refuted the argument that,
the personal rights good for peace are bad for war. By this argument have been 
defended military and industrial conscription, the persecution of conscientious 
objectors, the repression of liberties of speech. Press and meeting, the imprisonment
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism , pp. 195-6; International Trade, p. 181; New Protectionism, p.
12 .
®® Democracy A fter the War, p. 161; Problems o f  a New World, p. 49. For discussions of this issue 
during the in ter-w ar period, see Lionel Robbins, National Planning and International Order and E.H. 
Carr, Conditions o f  Peace.
®^ Im perialism , pp. 124-35.
®® Problems o f  a New World, p. 246, 267-8; Free Thought in the Social Sciences, p. 267; Modern 
State, p. 6.
86 r..From Capitalism to Socialism, p. 28.
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upon suspicion and without trial by administrative action, and, in short, the claim of 
absolute power by the Executive.®^
State autocracy, Hobson wrote, flowed from militarism short of war because
peace hath her emergencies no less than war, and the economic emergency, the 
creeping paralysis, which has seized the world during the past few years may seem to 
call for the suspension of the ordinary processes of government. Liberty and equality 
under such circumstances must give place to an enforced fraternity called the 
‘Corporate State.’®®
The imperatives of militarism and protectionism created an exclusionary, dictatorial
state, Hobson argued:
Not only the material life of the people but its soul would thus be nationalised and 
militarized under the closed State. Democracy could have no place in such a State. In 
industry, as in politics, the Government dominated in all matters of importance by 
considerations, not of general human welfare, but of national defence qualified by 
business pulls, must impose the arbitrary will of the political and business rulers and 
their paid agents upon the people.®^
The effect of imperialism was a ‘moral degradation’ from military and industrial ethics.
In the inter-war period, Hobson played down the significance of World War One as
a cause of economic troubles. While the War had buttressed the use of force in the settlement
of industrial and social disputes, Hobson argued, that it was easy to over-emphasise the
importance of the War’s dislocating effect on the world’s economy and the economic relations
of Europe in particular. This disguised problems associated with the social and international
order prior to World War One. Hobson stressed that attention to the War, like analyses of the
Depression that emphasised monetary factors, missed the key factor, that is, maldistribution
of income as the source of capitalism’s maladies.
Hobson neatly summarised the domestic effects of the new imperialism on democracy,
peace and justice:
It is a constant menace to peace, by furnishing continual temptations to further 
aggression upon lands occupied by lower races and embroiling our nation with other 
nations of rival imperial ambitions; to the peril of war it adds the chronic danger and 
degradation of militarism, which not merely wastes the current physical and moral 
resources of the nations, but checks the very course of civilization. It consumes to an
®^ Problems o f  a New World, p. 83. See also Wealth and L ife , p. 221.
®® Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 18; The Modern State, p. 6. See also Democracy and 
a Changing Civilisation, pp. 129-30; Imperialism , p. 135.
89 Democracy A fter the War, pp. 202-3.
For a general discussion of the atmosphere in pre-War Europe, see ‘The Surprise of 1914’ in 
Problems o f  a New World. On economic matters, see Economics o f  Unemployment, chs. 1, 8.
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illimitable and incalculable extent the financial resources of a nation by military 
preparation, stopping the expenditure of the current income of the State upon 
productive public projects and burdening posterity with heavy loads of debt. 
Absorbing the public money, time, interest and energy on costly and unprofitable 
work of territorial aggrandisement, it thus wastes those energies of public life in the 
governing classes and the nations which are needed for internal reforms and for the 
cultivation of the arts of material and intellectual progress at home. Finally, the spirit, 
the policy, and the methods of Imperialism are hostile to the institutions of popular 
self-government, favouring forms of political tyranny and social authority which are 
the deadly enemies of effective liberty and equality.®^
In conclusion, imperialism, for Hobson, was a consequence of
the confident belief that no real solidarity of interests exists between the various units 
of humanity, and that, therefore, it is possible for each person, class, or nation, to 
make a separate gain for himself by seizing and utilising the political and economic 
resources at his disposal.®^
It was a product of sectionalism, not only domestically or in economics, but in international
politics.
Hobson’s Proposals for Reform
This section discusses Hobson’s remedy for the malady of imperialism. Hobson succinctly 
summarised his position: ‘Imperialism is the fruit of ... false economy; "social reform" is its 
remedy’. This social reform aimed to ‘raise the wholesome standard of private and public 
consumption for a nation...’.®^  However, this does not mean that Hobson’s remedies are 
entirely confined to domestic proposals. Domestic and international reform are connected his 
proposals. Maldistribution of income and underconsumption are not merely a domestic 
phenomena but occur between nations and globally. For Hobson, the problem of 
maldistribution at the root of underconsumption can only be resolved through a combination 
of domestic and international measures.
Hobson’s analysis suggested that imperialism was an attempt to alleviate domestic 
economic and social problems. Imperialism was a policy choice for nations.®^ According to
®^ Imperialism^ p. 152.
®^ Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 160-1.
®^ Im perialism , p. 88.
®^ Im perialism , pp. [59-60]. This is one of the differences between Hobson and Lenin often 
remarked upon. For Hobson, imperialism was a policy pursued by capitalists which could be remedied 
by a change in governmental policy. Lenin suggested that it was the system of capitalism that was to
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Hobson, the imperial solution was only effective in the short run as it did not address the root
problem of underconsumption due to maldistribution of income. Furthermore, the imperial
solution created more problems than it solved: at home, it exacerbated the maldistribution of
income and, in international relations, it stimulated imperial competition. Hobson claimed that
imperial necessity is a ‘popular delusion’; a delusion he tried to dispel.
It is not inherent in the nature of things that we should spend our natural resources 
on militarism, war, and risky, unscrupulous diplomacy, in order to find markets for 
our goods and surplus capital. An intelligent progressive community, based upon 
substantial equality of economic and educational opportunities, will raise its standard 
of consumption to correspond with every increased power of production, and can find 
full employment for an unlimited quantity of capital and labour within the limits of 
the country which it occupies. Where the distribution of incomes is such as to enable 
all classes of the nation to convert their felt wants into an effective demand for 
commodities, there can be no over-production, no under-employment of capital, and 
no necessity to fight for foreign markets.®®
Hobson’s social reform aimed at tapping the improperty, the appropriation of 
unproductive surplus by the wealthy that was the source of maldistribution. He claimed that 
only truly democratic organization of polity, society and economy would resolve the ethical 
basis of maldistribution underlying underconsumption. He proposed political and social 
reform to remedy a social and ethical problem which has given rise to an economic 
dysfunction. Hobson specifically advocated fiscal measures to redistribute income through 
taxation, benefits, a minimum wage and some nationalisation and extensive public works. He 
also believed that trade union organisation could wrest some of the unproductive surplus from 
the wealthy.®^ He hoped that the rise in consumption due to higher wages/incomes of the 
workers to pick up the industrial slack and make productive previously unproductive 
investment ventures. Hobson believed that a policy that mitigated underconsumption would 
remove the pressure to export capital, thus undercutting the drive to imperialism.
blame and that nothing short of its overthrow would rid the world of the scourge of imperialism. See 
Lenin, Imperialism , p. 105. Though they have been described as reformist, Hobson’s proposals were 
nothing short of revolutionary in their implications, involving the restructuring of the entire system 
of distribution in the economic system. On attitudes to reformism, Hobson’s and others, see Peter 
Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats.
®® Imperialism , p. 71.
96 Imperialism , p. 86.
®^ Unlike Keynes he was not a proponent of deficit financing. See John Allett, New Liberalism, 
p. 128. Hobson attached his hopes not to the creation of credit, or to the taking out of loans in order 
artificially to stimulate demand, but purely in redistribution of income.
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Hobson was aware, however, of the international limits to high wage policies. Each 
national economy was exposed to the vagaries of international economic forces. Faced with 
the prospect of being undersold by nations where there were lower wage rates, nations could 
follow one of two courses. They could either rescind the wage rises to avoid being undersold 
by other nations, or to close off the nation from the international economy as much as 
possible. Hobson questioned both the viability and the desirability of the latter, while 
condemning the former,®® The fact that each nation had to consider their place in the 
international economy was an obstacle to the solution to underconsumption. With 
underconsumption being both a common problem for capitalist economies and one that 
prompted competitive economic policies between nations, Hobson’s proposals for economic 
reform had to include a significant international aspect.
If the scope of the economic problem underlying imperialism is unclear, there is no 
doubt that imperialism is an international political issue. As such, Hobson’s social reform 
ceased to be entirely concerned with domestic matters. Because the scope of the problem, 
imperialism, is international, the remedies also needed to be international, if they were to be 
addressed to the appropriate level. Thus, Hobson’s proposals for international reform reflect 
his concern with the international relations of imperialism. There are three proposals. First, 
Hobson proposed an international government to arbitrate the claims of the Great Powers. 
International government which could put down wars and suppress imperial competition 
would allow for the healthier competition of nationalities. International rivalry would be 
conducted on a ‘higher’ level. International government would allow nations to pursue 
policies for advancing national welfare rather than military preparations for war. Also Hobson 
suggested that nations should not come to the aid of their nationals in their dealing with 
foreign countries. A policy of nonintervention here would reduce the friction between 
nations, Hobson believed.®®
Second, he suggested the need of an international government to supervise the 
development of natural resources in the backward countries. Mandate policy would be a 
system whereby international government would be the arbiter of the rival claims of the Great 
Powers. The international authority would have the power and duty to monitor the respective 
mandated power to ensure that development policies were not prejudicial to the welfare of
®® For example. Properly and Improperly^ p. 106; ‘The Close State vs. Internationalism’, in 
Democracy A fler ihe War^ and ‘The Closed State’, in Democracy and a Changing Civilisation.
®® Imperialism, p. 360.
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the native population or the interests of other nations or humanity as a whole.
Third, Hobson hoped that an international government would institutionalise an 
international economic order of free trade, thereby undercutting imperialism’s drive to 
protection. He acknowledged that international interdependence had proceeded too far to 
permit a return to a system of laissez fa ire, because this would merely result in the 
reinstatement of the imperial conflicts. Hobson believed that free trade and the Open Door 
could thus be made to apply to all nations, a condition conducive to global welfare. 
Hobson is suggesting an international government as a neutral beneficent instrument that 
would enforce the rules of free trade, decide imperial claims and direct the development of 
the world in terms of global welfare.
Hobson’s Theory of Imperialism in the International Relations Literature
The theory of imperialism has become something of an industry in itself since Hobson’s 
writings on the s u b j e c t . T h i s  section considers the characterisation of Hobson’s theory 
in the international relations literature. The orthodox international relations interpretation of 
Hobson’s theory of imperialism is summarised elegantly and powerfully by Kenneth 
Waltz.^®^ Waltz’s reading of Hobson’s theory is examined as the most straightforward 
presentation of an interpretation of Hobson’s theory common in international relations.
See H.N. Brailsford, The L ife-w ork  o f  J.A. Hobson, p. 25, who claims that Hobson was a 
forerunner of the mandate policy. See Imperialism , p. 232, and chapters five and six for further 
discussion of Hobson’s ideas on mandates.
Imperialism , p. 164, 186, 193.
There has been much work developing neo-Marxist theories of imperialism and dependency 
theory. For example, see Owen and Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory o f  Imperialism', Johan Galtung, 
‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism; Samir Amin, Unequal Development', Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, 
Monopoly Capital', Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevlopment in Latin America. For a 
collection of writings on imperialism, see Kenneth Boulding and Tapan Mukherjee (eds.). 
Imperialism. There are even different names for the theory: the theory of economic imperialism, the 
economic theory of imperialism, and the theory of capitalist imperialism. See Charles Reynolds, 
Modes o f  Im perialism , ch. 3; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, p. 19; and D.K. 
Fieldhouse (ed.). The Theory o f  Capitalist Imperialism.
Man, the State, and War, pp. 145-55, and Theory o f  International Politics, pp. 19-27. The 
discussion is also a contribution to the restoration of the reputations of scholars criticised by Waltz. 
For counter-critiques of Waltz’s interpretations of Rousseau and Kant, see Michael Williams, 
‘Rousseau, Realism and R ealpolitik ', and Andrew Hurrell, ‘Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in 
International Relations’.
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There are three areas in which Waltz’s criticisms of Hobson are seriously 
m i s t a k e n , F i r s t ,  Waltz portrays Hobson’s theory as a ‘second image analysis’ or 
‘reductionist theory’ of international relations, claiming that it explains external outputs, i.e., 
state behaviour, through the specification of internal conditions. Second, Waltz criticises 
Hobson’s theory as being economistic, claiming that Hobson saw political outcomes as the 
result of changes in economic variables. Third, Waltz misinterprets Hobson’s theory aspiring 
to natural scientific status. On the basis of this misunderstanding he charges that Hobson’s 
theory is a monocausal determinist account of the relationship of maldistribution of income 
and imperialism. However, Waltz’s version of Hobson’s theory of imperialism lacks the 
complexity, the ambiguities, and contradictions of the original. His criticisms of Hobson are 
misplaced.
Waltz claims that Hobson’s theory of imperialism ‘can be summarized in one sentence: 
Uncontrolled capitalist production gives rise to industrial surpluses; from the attempt to 
market these surpluses an international fight for markets ensues; war results, directly or
Waltz makes other less serious errors of interpretation. For instance, Hobson was a liberal in 
1902 and cannot in any case be regarded a Marxist revisionist (Mau, the State and War, p. 149).
Waltz makes a number of points against the general theory of imperialism he attributes to 
Hobson. For instance, if Hobson is pointing to a condition of capitalist countries causing imperialism, 
there are the problems that imperialism, the effect, as in the Roman Empire, is older than the cause, 
capitalism; that not all imperialist countries were capitalist or surplus-producing for the time Hobson 
discussed; and that not all capitalist countries were imperialist. Waltz attempts to soften this test of 
Hobson’s theory by stressing that only most (not all) capitalist states must be imperialist, and only 
most imperialist states must be capitalist. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 24-5. These are 
well-worn criticisms derived from the economic history literature cataloguing the deficiencies of 
Hobson’s empirical analysis. See footnote 40, above. Waltz fails to specify what he means by 
‘capitalism’, ‘socialism’, ‘imperialism’ and ‘surplus’, and whether these are Hobson’s meanings. For 
instance, Hobson’s notion of surplus differs from the Marxian notion that Lenin used and Hobson’s 
economic theory lacks the monetary aspects so central to Keynesian economics {Theory o f  
International Politics, p. 2 In.). Waltz conflates Hobson’s and Lenin’s theories of imperialism {Theory 
o f  International Politics, p. 20). Waltz misunderstands the importance of the distinction between 
ancient empire and new imperialism. As we have seen, Hobson extended the meaning of imperialism 
beyond the basic meaning of control of foreign territory to incorporate the competition of empires 
in the new imperialism {Theory o f  International Politics, p. 25).
Underlying all of these misinterpretations is a fundamentally different approach to 
international relations. This is exemplified by Waltz’s claim that Hobson neglects the ‘good’ 
international political reasons for war. It is, indeed, true that for Hobson there were no ‘good’ reasons 
for war, international political or otherwise {Theory o f  International Politics, p. 36).
Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 81, 146; Theory o f  International Politics, p. 18, 20.
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indirectly, from this struggle for m a r k e t s . W a l t z  has constructed a theory of linear 
causality where capitalism means the maldistribution of income, which causes 
underconsumption, which causes excess capital in the national economy, which leads to 
foreign investment, that causes imperialism, which causes war. This characterisation leads 
Waltz to criticize Hobson for second image reductionism and economic determinism in his link 
of a domestic economic condition, surplus capital, to an international political outcome, 
imperialism.
The description of Hobson’s theory in the previous two sections contradict Waltz’s 
view. Waltz claims that in the theory governments are somehow ‘easily drawn’ or ‘led 
naturally’ into i m p e r i a l i s m . H o b s o n ,  however, explained government involvement in 
imperialism, one of the major causes being the international competition of states. When Waltz 
accuses Hobson of a second image analysis of the cause of war he has overlooked Hobson’s 
attention to the international system of competitive empires that issued in militarism, conflict, 
and war. Waltz determinedly concentrates on the social conditions examined in Hobson’s 
theory, reduces them to domestic and economic factors and then extrapolates these into a 
theory of i m p e r i a l i s m . I t  is only through a discussion of Hobson’s ideas of an 
international system of rival empires, however, that it makes sense to talk of Hobson believing 
that imperialism caused war.^°®
There is further evidence that Waltz is wrong in his accusation of reductionism when 
Hobson’s proposals for reform are considered. Hobson proposed a classically third image - 
international system level - solution to imperialism in the shape of an international
K.N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 145. See also Theory o f  International Politics, pp. 20-
2 1 .
Indeed, Waltz recognises this rationale. See Theory o f  International Politics, pp. 21-22, in 
particular the question ‘If one government supports its businessmen abroad, can other governments 
do less?’.
Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, p. 20, advises students wishing to understand Hobson’s 
theory of imperialism to read only Chapter 6 of the wide-ranging Imperialism. For a criticism of 
Waltz’s tendency to reduce an argument and then accuse the author of reductionism, see R.K. Ashley, 
‘Three Modes of Economism’, p. 467.
Accepting Waltz’s characterisation would mean that Hobson’s theory would break down before 
we reached Waltz’s criticisms regarding a domestic condition causing an international outcome. 
Hobson’s theory of underconsumption has been challenged by economists, including Keynes. Indeed, 
every link in the chain of causation has been challenged. Waltz’s is only one, and not the most 
significant, criticism of Hobson’s theory. See chapter two for some of the criticisms of the economic 
theory that underlies the theory of imperialism.
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government. Hobson also wandered beyond strictly domestic analysis when he examined the 
effects of imperialism domestically. The impact of the international system on domestic 
institutions and policy making has been called ‘The Second Image Reversed’ because it turns 
the direction of causation of Waltz’s second image upside down. This was an important part 
of Hobson’s study of i mp e r i a l i s m. F i n a l l y ,  Waltz considers underconsumption to be a 
domestic phenomenon. However, it was a problem that Hobson identified for all capitalist 
countries and was exacerbated by imperial competition. Imperialism, Hobson could argue, was 
the product of several nations attempts to deal with common problems of underconsumption.
Waltz seems to be on safer ground with the charge of economism. Hobson conceded 
in his autobiography that he initially overemphasised the economic elements of 
i m p e r i a l i s m . Y e t  there are a number of reasons why Hobson’s concession need not be 
taken as an admission of economism in the theory of imperialism. First, new imperialism has 
political and ethical causes domestically. Maldistribution was the result of a social and ethical 
malady that issued in economic dysfunction. In other work, Hobson had stressed the 
importance of non-economic factors in the determination of economic activity. Indeed, 
Hobson believed this to be his own contribution to e c o n o m i c s , S e c o n d ,  Hobson 
concentrated on financiers as the beneficiaries of imperialism. But theirs was not a purely 
economic interest. To begin with, those behind imperialism used power their political power 
to influence press, public opinion, parliamentary representatives and even ministers. Hobson 
emphasised the key role of some economic actors, but their influence in bringing about 
imperialism is primarily political. Furthermore, Hobson’s conception of combination in 
industry and in social life generally meant that, for Hobson, economic and political interests 
could no longer be divorced as had been claimed by the proponents of laissez faire. Hobson’s 
opinions on the economic determination of history varied over his lifetime, but usually he 
condemned it as one of the errors of Marxism, overstretching the meaning of the term, 
e c o n o m i c s . T h i r d ,  Hobson’s theory of imperialism was an attempt to undermine the 
liberal belief that economic relations are inherently pacific that rested on the supposition of 
the autonomy of economics and politics. Hobson did concentrate on economic factors as a
Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed’.
Confessions, p. 63.
See Confessions, ch. 16. Hobson’s humanist welfare economics is developed in, for example, 
Work and Wealth and Wealth and L ife .
113 Thought, pp. 77-8.
130
means of subverting this liberal tenet. However, Hobson’s analysis reintegrated economics and 
politics into what might now be described as a political economy of imperialism. Finally, 
clearer indications of economism appear in Hobson’s internationalism, where economic forces 
are directed towards peace.
Waltz’s third charge is that Hobson advanced a simplistic monocausal, determinist 
theory of imperialism. This underpins the previous two charges in their assumption of 
unilinear causation in Hobson’s theory, but is a misinterpretation by Waltz. Hobson’s theory 
is not a ‘hard’, natural scientific theory of international politics. Waltz, in common with many 
other international relations scholars, interprets Hobson’s analogies as if they were assertions 
o f  scientific fact.^^® The result of such an interpretation is a hard but brittle theory, a 
general theory of wide application that Waltz has little trouble demolishing.^^®
First, Waltz fails to take account of Hobson’s complex formulation of the relationship 
of international and domestic, political and economic, ethical and social factors. While Waltz 
accuses Hobson of developing a theory where domestic economic conditions cause 
international political outcomes, in fact, Hobson developed a political economy of imperialism 
where international and domestic political and economic conditions result in international and 
domestic political and economic outcomes. Hobson did not claim that maldistribution of 
income caused all or most wars. He provided the intervening factors of political interest and 
international structure. Hobson never claimed that imperialism was the sole cause of war or 
that peace would reign supreme if only imperialism were eliminated.
Second, the theory itself was developed in the heat of controversy over the British 
involvement in the Boer War. Imperialism: A Study  is a collection of essays written for 
different journals over four years from the initial formulation presented in Contemporary
This is discussed in greater detail in chapter five. See Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, 
pp. 121-2; The Case fo r  Arbitration, p. 4. This change in Hobson’s position has been noted by Peter 
Cain, ‘Variations on a Famous Theme: Hobson, International Trade and Imperialism, 1902-1938’, pp. 
31-4.
Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, p. 25, even compares the theory to Newtonian physics.
Construed as a general theory applying across time and space, Hobson’s theory is easy to 
falsify. However, the most significant doubt concerns the credibility of any general theory as an 
explanation of history. Any such theory must inevitably overlook other important factors in specific 
imperial expansions, and thereby be compromised.
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Review  in 1898.^^^ This belies the criticism of Hobson that he generalised his experiences 
in South Africa just before the Boer War into a general theory of international relations. In 
fact, it was the article ‘Free Trade and Foreign Policy’, Hobson’s first presentation of his 
imperialism thesis, and his contacts in radical circles that led to his being sent to South Africa. 
The theory preceded Hobson’s trip to South Africa, not the other way a r o u n d . F u r t h e r ,  
the chapter Waltz isolates as the key chapter was one of the last to be written by Hobson.
Third, the theory continued to evolve over the rest of Hobson’s life. It receded 
somewhat during the decade before the First World War, only to reappear with renewed force 
in the context of the War and the troubled inter-war period. The changed context of 
imperialism involved an expansion of its application during the First World War, similar to 
the imperialism as an international system, propounded by Lenin around the same time. Some 
of Hobson’s views on imperialism and its vital elements changed, notably, as we have seen, 
with regard to the influence of international finance and the role of nationalism.
The result of controversy, changing historical context and Hobson’s exclusion from 
academia is that his theory of imperialism is considerably less neat than Waltz claims. Waltz 
simplifies Hobson’s theory, making its ambiguities and contradictions invisible. Waltz has not 
giving us Hobson’s ‘best’ theory, however, but has, rather, extracted his own theory from 
Hobson’s writings.
Fourth, Hobson’s theory of imperialism is not as straightforwardly determinist as Waltz 
believes. Hobson’s is an explicitly normative theory: social reform is posited as the alternative 
to imperial policy. He did not see imperialism as an inevitability; rather, he believed that 
given certain social conditions imperialism was one solution to a series of domestic problems
Parts of Imperialism  were published as articles in The Speaker^ The British Friend, Political 
Science Quarterly and Contemporary Review. Imperialism  was preceded by The War in South Africa, 
The Psychology o f  Jingoism, and a number of articles and letters written to newspapers and journals 
during the Boer War. There were a number of extremely hostile reviews of Imperialism  in the press 
of the time. See Hobson papers for cuttings of these reviews. For another controversy, see Hobson’s 
critique of the Fabian support for imperialism in ‘Socialistic Imperialism’.
See Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 145, and J.D.B. Miller, The World o f  States, p. 116n.
It appeared first in the Contemporary Review in the summer of 1902. For alternative esimations 
of the significance of this article/chapter, see Bernard Porter, Critics o f  Empire, p. 176-7, 190, and 
Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, p. 96, on the historical context of the development of 
Hobson’s theory.
See P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 
1898-1914’; P.F. Clarke, ‘Hobson, Free Trade and Imperialism’; and P.J. Cain, ‘Hobson’s Developing 
Theory of Imperialism’.
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that conditioned the relations of states. In this sense, it is reduction of Hobson’s analysis to 
contrast his idea of imperialism as a policy with Lenin’s view of imperialism as a system. That 
imperialism was a policy chosen by nations implied for Hobson that this was an moral issue 
requiring ethical analysis. Hobson was, therefore conscious of the temporal and geographical 
limitations of his theory. The notion that imperialism was a necessary part of advanced 
civilised society was abhorrent to him. He hoped that imperialism would be a passing phase 
in the development of Western civilisation. The notion that Hobson’s theory of imperialism 
is a general theory of Western capitalism is erroneous.
Fifth , a large part of the purpose of his theory was ideological. He attempted to reveal 
the delusion of imperial necessity and suggest that imperialism and its deleterious 
consequences were a v o i d a b l e . H o b s o n ’s theory of imperialism, like much of the rest of 
his writing, is a conscious attempt to adapt liberal ideology to the changing circumstances of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is addressed ‘the intelligence of the 
minority who are content neither to float along the tide of political opportunism nor to submit 
to the shove of some blind d e s t i n y . I t  was a political theory, not a scientific theory. 
Lastly, as we have seen, Hobson opposed the importation of natural scientific methodology 
into the social sciences.
The notion that Hobson’s theory aspires to scientific status is wholly a creation of 
Waltz himself. In fact. Waltz’s attribution of linear causality in the theory is inappropriate. 
The theory of imperialism rests, as does much of Hobson’s theoretical writings, on an organic 
analogy. Imperialism is sectionalism in both domestic and international society. These rebuttals 
of Waltz’s criticisms suggest that two important revisions of the common international 
relations interpretation of Hobson’s theory of imperialism are necessary. First, Hobson’s 
theory is more sophisticated than is usually given credence, especially with regard to 
international relations. Waltz’s version of the theory neglects Hobson’s discussion of the 
international relations of imperialism and accuses him of attempting to construct a general 
theory of international relations from an explanation of British economic conditions. 
However, this is a consequence of an illegitimate extrapolation, in the common international 
relations version, of Hobson’s theory of imperialism as an aggressive foreign policy into a 
general theory of international relations. While Lenin’s concept of uneven development has
Psychology o f  Jingoism^ pt. 1, ch. 6. 
Im perialism , p. [43].
123 See chapter two.
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been adopted, Hobson’s monopolistic competition of empires has been completely 
ignored.
Second, the nature of theory in Hobson’s theory of imperialism has been misconstrued. 
While this is part of a much greater miscomprehension of political theory in the behavioural 
revolution, there is a specific implication of the confusion over Hobson’s theory. Hobson has 
been accused by some historians of seeing history through a Cobdenite lens. His view that 
there was an increase in imperial activity is premised on the idea that there was a mid­
nineteenth century pause, in short, the pax Britannica of free trade and nonintervention. This 
is an ethnocentric viewpoint to begin with, but is arguably inaccurate even for Britain. 
However, despite these criticisms of Hobson and because of the ‘scientific’ interpretation of 
Hobson’s theory, international relations has uncritically accepted his statement that there was 
a period of increased imperial activity at the turn of the century. This appears in Waltz’s 
reformulation of the theory as the ‘imperialism of great power’, but even more significantly 
in hegemonic stability theory. In short, international relations scholars have interpreted 
Hobson’s interpretation, including his ideological assumptions, as history.
The Problem of Inter-imperialism
After writing Imperialism , Hobson became increasingly concerned by the possibility that the 
competition of national empires might be transformed into collusion and combination, much 
as had the cut-throat competition of firms. Much maligned by Lenin, and called ultra­
imperialism by Karl Kautsky, Hobson initially discounted the idea. Increasingly, however, 
he came to accept the possibility of ‘an economic international co-operation of advanced 
industrial peoples for the exploitation of the labour and the undeveloped natural resources of
On Lenin and uneven development, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International 
Relations, p. 39-41.
John Gallagher and Ronald Robinsion, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’. Also see their Africa  
and the Victorians', and Bernard Semmel, The Rise o f  Free Trade Imperialism.
In this context, Hobson is a possible avenue of criticism of the anti-democratic tendency of 
theorists of hegemony. Hobson also provides arguments that suggest that any hegemony is chronically 
unstable. While the debt to Lenin in hegemonic stability theory is well known, Hobson’s liberal 
democratic critique of imperial policy, paradoxically perhaps, provides more room for criticism of 
recent international theory. For the acceptance of Hobson’s claim about the increase of imperial 
activity, see Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, p. 26. The classics o f  the hegemonic stability 
theory literature are Robert Gilpin, IVar and Change in World Politics’, Robert O. Keohane, A fter  
Hegemony", Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  Great Po'^vers.
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backward countries, chiefly in Africa and Asia.’^^^  Inter-imperialism, as he called it,
described the organisation of the world through the collusion of the imperialist states to set
up a world economic system which would benefit them as a group at the expense of the
backward nations. Pitting the rich nations of the world against the poor, this is the final twist
of Hobson’s analysis of the sectional interest that produces imperialism. Logically, national
imperialism cannot be the final stage of combination. National capitalisms could collude and
bring their national states together, solving the problem of imperial strife in order that the
imperial system be maintained. The change in the imperial system from national competition
to international combination of businesses and of states is analogous to the movement from
competition to combination in the capitalist economy.
Inter-imperialist combination was a possibility created by the growth of international
cartels and cosmopolitan f i n a n c e . ‘As capitalism generated imperialism,’ Hobson wrote,
‘this intercapitalism will generate an i n t e r - i m p e r i a l i s m . H e  argued that by substituting
a race cleavage for the class cleavage at home:
Western industrial civilisation, organised internationally under industrial, commercial, 
transport, and financial cartels, would exploit the tropics, and other backward 
countries containing or receiving supplies of cheap submissive labour, for the benefit 
primarily of profit-making syndicates, but, secondarily, of the skilled white labour 
in the final manufacturing processes and other economic services still retained in the 
Western world.
Hobson claimed that inter-imperialism was a means by which domestic opponents of 
imperialism were bought off, as it allowed high wages in industrial countries. The workers 
as well as the capitalists in the advanced countries could then live comfortably off the sweated 
labour of the rest of the world. This would be a ‘world-order’ where ‘the ruling classes of the 
most powerful Western allies undertake in the name of pacific internationalism the political 
government and the economic exploitation of the weaker peoples and the less developed
Rationalisation and Unemployment, p. 115.
Problems o f  a New World, p. 183.
Hobson had previously been skeptical of the prospects of international cartels. See The Fruits 
o f  American Protection, p. 34.
Wealth and L ife , p. 402,
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 402.
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countries of the world.
Hobson thought that this might give capitalism a lease of life for a generation. 
However, the inter-imperialist system was the final world conflict of economic interest. The 
sectional interests within firms, trades, industries and nations would be represented at the 
international level: ‘The conflicts of economic interest ... between capital and labour within 
the single business and industry, between sheltered and unsheltered industries within each 
nation, between Western national capitalisms, struggling for a restricted world market, will 
now have given place to a final conflict between the interests of the advanced and backward 
peoples.’^^  ^ Inter-imperialism could only delay the day of reckoning for the imperialist 
system. Though the problem of inter-capitalist rivalry would have been transcended and the 
possibility of war between the Great Powers reduced, the underlying conflict in the capitalist 
system, engendered by the appropriation of surplus value would have reached its climax, 
This system would ultimately collapse because, as with industrial and financial combination, 
it failed to address the root problem of the unjust system of maldistribution of income. 
Increasingly the profits extracted from this ‘huge ‘sweating system” would fall because of the 
insufficiency of demand as it had in the competitive and monopolised national economies and 
also in the competitive imperial s y s t e m . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  like imperialism, in ter­
imperialism stimulated exclusive nationalism in the exploited backward peoples, potentially 
engendering a global conflagration between the advanced and backward countries.
While the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa between the Great Powers was 
the first inkling of an attempt at inter-imperialism, Hobson was most concerned with the fate 
of China. With the fervour for a new world order after the First World War, Hobson argued 
that the new League of Nations might become a vehicle for inter-imperialism. It would be
a League from which all non-European States, except perhaps the United States and
League o f  Nations^ p. 20; Democracv A fter the lVai\ p. 191. See also Problems o f  a New Worlds 
p. 183, 186.
Poverty in Plenty^ pp. 79-80.
Poverty in Plenty, p. 80. See also Democracy A fter the War, p. 195. Hobson withdrew the 
comment ‘final’ from this passage in Problems o f  a New World, p. 185.
Problems o f  a New World, pp. 28-9.
Conditions o f  Industrial Peace, p. I l l ,  116; Wealth and L ife ,  p. 403, Poverty in Plenty, pp. 80-
1.
Wealth and L ife ,  pp. xxvii-xxviii.
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Japan, were excluded, would be exceedingly likely to develop a wide conscious 
"imperialism" which would in the long run prove not less dangerous to the peace of 
the world than the national antagonism of the past, in that it was the expression of 
the joint ambitions and pretensions of a group of powerful white nations 
masquerading as world government.
Critical Assessment
There are a number of criticisms above and beyond those advanced by Kenneth Waltz. In this 
section I will consider a few of the more significant theoretical controversies concerning 
Hobson’s theory.
Some accounts of Hobson’s theory have seen it as a series of accusations about the 
activities of a number of people or groups of people as they manipulate governments and 
popular opinion for their own selfish purposes. Hobson extended the Cobdenite critique of 
foreign policy to include the businessmen who Cobden a p p l a u d e d . T h e s e  accounts 
suggest that Hobson’s theory of imperialism is a conspiracy theory, one that has a heritage in 
liberal radical approaches to foreign policy. Conspiracy theory personalises issues and suggests 
that the reform of policy will be effected by the removal of certain people or classes from 
their dominant positions. The evidence for this type of theory could be gleaned from the 
official statements, private remarks (for example, in memoirs) and actions of the 
representative actors in the imperial drama. However, Hobson is criticised for providing little 
evidence to prove that these people actually did conspire and influence policy makers, even 
in his strongest case, the Boer War. *^*®
There is no doubt that conspiracy theory plays a large part in Hobson’s explanation 
of the Boer War, and that the Boer War was, for Hobson, the classic instance of modern 
imperialism. In this case, Hobson was not afraid to name names. Nor did he flinch from 
claiming that a particular race were at the centre of the financial machinations leading to the 
war, that is, that the war in South Africa was the result of a Jewish conspiracy.^^^
138 A League o f  Nations, p. 20.
Richard Koebner, ‘The Concept of Economic Imperialism’, Economic History Review, p. 3, 6; 
Charles Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics, pp. 219-20.
Charles Reynolds, Modes o f  Imperialism , pp. 108-9, 113-4.
See The War in South Africa', ‘Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa’; Evolution o f  
Modern Capitalism , pp. 266, 268-72. On Hobson’s anti-semitism, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins 
o f  Totalitarianism, p. 135; Harvey Mitchell, ‘Hobson Revisited’, pp. 398-405; and A.J.F. Lee’s PhD
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However, the Boer War case was ‘only exceptional in the directly conscious nature of 
its "engineering"’, according to H o b s o n . H o b s o n  does not provide the documentary 
evidence that critics charge he should, because conspiracy is not the central feature of 
Hobson’s theory of imperialism. Elsewhere, the conspiracy aspect of Hobson’s theory gives 
way to more general accusations against particular classes or g r o u p s . H o b s o n  also queried 
the idea that the wealthy and powerful who benefitted by imperialism consciously sought their 
interest in an imperial policy. The ideology of imperialism encourages the self-deception, not 
only of the public, but of statesmen and b u s i n e s s m e n . I n  addition, it is difficult to 
conceive why Hobson would propose social reform if his theory rested merely on the actions 
of a group of malefactors.
Bernard Porter has claimed that Hobson had not one but two theories of imperialism, 
a conspiracy theory derived from his experiences in South Africa and an economic structural 
explanation derived from his economic s t u d i e s . W h i l e  Porter’s claim appears plausible, 
there are reasons to reject it. Porter has rejected the idea that structural and conspiracy 
theories are mutually complimentary, indeed, integrally linked, in Hobson’s theory. The trusts 
and financiers could not, indeed would not need to, play the role they do in imperialism if 
the domestic economy were structured differently. By the same token, Hobson’s structural 
theory is complemented by mechanisms for capital export of which the trusts and the 
financiers are manifestations.
Furthermore, Hobson provides a structural explanation of the power and influence of 
this group in his economic theories of underconsumption and combination. Financiers and 
industrial magnates have benefitted from the growing concentration of industry and 
interdependence in the economy, both national and international.^^® However, there is a 
double meaning in Hobson’s writings that has been overlooked by other studies. 
Concentration, as it is used by Hobson in reference for instance to industry, means that
thesis. For further examples of Hobson’s pursuit of the conspirators, see ‘The Proconsulate of Milner’, 
‘The Testimony From Johannesburg’, and ‘Mr. Rhodes on the Future of South Africa’.
Democracy A fter the War, p. 85.
For instance, in Imperialism  and in Democracy A fter the War.
Im perialism , p. [49]; Democracy A fter the War, pp. 131-2.
As argued by Bernard Porter, Critics o f  Empire, p. 215.
^^ ® Imperialism, pp. 357-8.
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businesses have combined and/or become more organised. But concentration also denotes 
conscious thought and planning. Concentration of industry and finance makes, then, for an 
organised powerful interest that knows what it wants. As sectional interest groups, financiers 
and magnates are both powerful and able to influence policy makers because they are 
organised. Where this intention is lacking, the disorganisation of opposing interests is enough 
to permit their manipulation. This double meaning of concentration has two important 
implications. First, there is just one ‘structural’ theory of imperialism. Concentration joins 
structural and personal influence. Second, the double meaning of concentration reinforces the 
importance of the ideological purpose of Hobson’s theory. It was Hobson’s attempt, through 
an appeal to an intelligent minority, to raise the consciousness of the silent majority, to get 
them to concentrate, a preliminary to their organisation against imperialism.
Bernard Porter also accuses Hobson of basing his theory on ‘intellectualist’ 
a s s u m p t i o n s . P o r t e r  argues that Hobson observed a malady in British politics, and then 
sought a rational cause. Thus, Hobson showed that while the whole of the imperial enterprise 
is irrational, it was in fact rational for some, i.e., the financiers. This is fallacious because 
Hobson has deduced backwards from the financiers’ gains in imperialism to their active part 
in the enterprise. It is not implausible that they could in fact have been third party 
beneficiaries of imperialism. Porter argues that the strategic concerns of statesmen led to 
imperialism which was a situation where no-one benefitted and no group or individual was 
specifically to b l a m e . A c c o r d i n g  to this view, substantially supported by, among others, 
Fieldhouse and Waltz, the security dilemma facing each state forced it to pursue imperial 
policies. Hobson failed to account for irrational action or for the irrational outcome of the 
aggregation of rational actions of statesmen. In his critique of the anti-democratic forces, 
Hobson also exaggerated the congruence of interests in imperialism. There are numerous 
differences that divide financiers and imperial entrepreneurs. Financiers have no clear interest 
in protection, while some manufacturers do and some do The pride and
aggrandisement behind the imperial politician and entrepreneur are unlikely to find favour 
with those who believe in the Christian mission of civilisation. In short, Hobson’s
Porter, Critics o f  Empire, p. 225.
Porter, Critics o f  Empire, p. 229.
Im perialism , p. 359. As Hobson conceded {Wealth and L ife , p. 402), ‘[wjhile for some purposes 
[big business] may disregard tariff  barriers, its general interests are definitely opposed to such 
interferences with free trade and the commercial division of labour that it serves.’
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identification of groups behind imperialism is high on polemic and low on rigorous analysis.
Though it is doubtless accurate to describe Hobson as a rationalist, the problem with 
this critique is that the security dilemma/strategic interest explanation is dangerously close 
to being an apologia for imperialism. Also, this critique rests on a problematic distinction 
between political, military, strategic interest and economic and social interests. It is exactly 
the consonance of these interests that makes Hobson’s theory of imperialism so powerful, both 
theoretically and rhetorically.
Peter Cain has criticised Hobson for overlooking a serious contradiction in his 
economic explanation of imperialism. According to Cain, Hobson’s underconsumption theory 
is founded on a rejection of Say’s Law, but his critique of imperialism as undercutting rests 
on a Cobdenite argument that must validate Say’s Law,^^^ Cain goes on to claim that 
Hobson remedy this contradiction but only in reducing his critique of the operation of 
international financial capitalism. Peter Clarke refutes Cain’s arguments and points out that 
Hobson was both less consistent at any one time and more consistent over time than he is 
given credit by Cain. Both Clarke and Cain, however, fail to grasp the changing nature of 
Hobson’s understanding of the international economy. Both also consider Hobson a Cobdenite 
on international economic issues. This is a misleading categorisation of Hobson’s ideas that I 
deal with in the next chapter.
Hobson has been criticised for failing to develop his concept of finance. Hobson did 
not make distinctions between real and money capital or between finance as part of the 
structure of a world economy and finance as the personnel and managers of financial 
h o u s e s . G i v i n g  credence to Porter’s claim that Hobson has two theories of imperialism, 
he oscillated between a view of finance as an overflow created by surplus capital due to 
underconsumption and the identification of finance as the activities of certain financiers. In 
Imperialism , when he discussed finance, Hobson meant the business of financiers
See John Allett, New Liberalism, p. 150; Julian Townshend, ‘Introduction’, Imperialism , p. 
[39], for criticisms of Porter.
P.J. Cain. ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1870- 
1914’, p. 570-6.
P.F. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats,p^. 177-8; Bernard Porter, Critics o f  Empire, p. 
197; and also P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 
1870-1914’, p. 581.
I discuss the distinction of national and international finance further in chapter five.
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manipulating domestically produced surplus c a p i t a l . H i s  theory neglects the influence 
of transnational firms that build plants abroad, seeing capital movements across national 
boundaries purely in terms of money.
Though Hobson’s theory was not simplistically economic determinist, there is 
determinism in his theory. While Hobson attempted to expose the illusion of imperial 
necessity, he wrote that underconsumption was a real problem for the business community 
with only two basic solutions. His argument was that only radical reform would be successful: 
in short, given unreformed capitalism, then imperialism. However, the choice for social 
reform is hardly a choice at all, at least for a civilised people. Hobson did not supplant 
imperial necessity by choice, but merely imposed a parallel necessity for social reform. 
Hobson’s theory is, in this sense, determinist; his argument is that a rational course of action 
must be adopted if catastrophic consequences are to be avoided. The dichotomisation of 
imperialism and social reform suggests a necessitarian outlook.
Conclusion
There are a number of conclusions that follow from the foregoing analysis. The first section 
demonstrated that Hobson maintained one basic meaning of imperialism, of which the ‘new 
imperialism’ was a variant. The second section revealed that, while domestic economic factors 
were important, Hobson also critically examined the ideology and psychology of the new 
imperialism. The third section showed that Hobson’s theory of imperialism contained a 
significant international relations dimension; imperial competition, imperial protection and 
militarism are not reducible to domestic factors. The fifth section applied lessons from the 
previous three sections to refute the prevalent conception of Hobson’s theory in international 
relations as exemplified by the interpretation of Kenneth Waltz.
Hobson’s theory is an attempt to expose certain fallacies. First, the liberal doctrine of 
laissez faire had been invalidated by the facts of increasing political and economic 
combination both nationally and internationally. Second, the trend to combination invalidated
154 Imperialism^ pp. 56-7, 59, 84-5.
This is an unfortunate omission because if he had dealt with this distinction, he would have 
been close to developing a theory that included multinational corporations. See Arrighi, Geometry o f  
Imperialism^ ch. 4, for a critique of Hobson along these lines.
This necessitarian perspective and strict bifurcation into imperialism and social reform is 
redolent of idealism as identified by R.N. Berki. See his On Political Realism, pp. 194-5.
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the view that politics and economics were autonomous spheres of social life. Both in fact and 
in theory Hobson argued this was an untenable view. Hobson also unseated the liberal conceit 
that capitalism led to peaceful international relations - capitalism was now exposed as a cause 
of war. Finally, Hobson exposed the self-deception of the ideology of imperial necessity. 
Imperialism was definitively a choice for nations.
In conclusion, the chapter has suggested that Hobson’s theory of imperialism has been 
stylised and caricatured in the international relations literature. There remain a number of 
serious ambiguities and lacunae in Hobson’s theory of imperialism. It is a complex and 
sometimes contradictory political theory, a political diagnosis of the social pathology of 
imperialism, rather than the scientific theory it is usually understood to be.^^^ He also 
exposed the self-deception of the ideology of imperial necessity and restored imperialism as 
a definitively political choice for nations. A renewed examination in international relations 
of these aspects of Hobson’s theory is long overdue.
Imperialism, p. [43]. This is Hobson’s description of the book in the preface to the First 
Edition. Note that Hobson claimed this was a scientific treatment in the sense of diagnosing an ill and 
providing a remedy, a distinctively normative aim.
Chapter Five
Economic Internationalism, Free Trade and International Government
Many of Hobson’s writings on international relations concentrate on economics. The chapter 
explores the apparent contradictions in Hobson’s economic internationalism, between his 
defence of free trade and his advocacy of international economic government. Considering 
Hobson’s theoretical framework for his writings on international relations, it explains why 
Hobson saw no contradiction. In his discussion of economic internationalism, Hobson divorced 
free trade from its dependence on laissez faire  doctrine, instead making it part of his 
evolutionary approach to economic relations between nations.
The chapter is structured thematically rather than chronologically. The first section 
considers Hobson’s arguments in defence of free trade as the condition for the maximisation 
of national and global welfare. For Hobson, free trade was also a bulwark against the sectional 
interests of protectionism and imperialism. The second section considers Hobson’s reservations 
and criticisms of the free trade argument.
The third and fourth sections consider Hobson’s proposals for international economic 
government. First, he proposed that an international government might establish the 
conditions for the orderly and just operation of a free trade world economy. Second, he 
suggested that, ideally, international institutions should plan and direct the world economy, 
with the aim of maximising total human welfare through redistribution of income. Hobson’s 
opinions on international economic relations are placed in the context of his evolutionary 
perspective on international relations. Hobson’s arguments for and against free trade, and for 
international economic government, were his prescriptions for an emerging international 
economic order.
The fifth section examines his analysis of three issues in international economic 
relations: the internationalisation of capital, the international mobility of labour and the 
development of the world’s natural resources. The sixth section considers a number of 
critiques of Hobson’s economic internationalism. The chapter concludes by suggesting that 
Hobson’s contribution to international political economy is not limited to his explanation of 
the economic bases of imperialism. Hobson advanced theoretical arguments that transformed 
the liberal debate on economic internationalism, moving it away from laissez faire  and 
individualism.
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Defending Free Trade
Hobson was quite open as to the bias of his perspective on international economic issues. He 
wrote:
As an economist, steeped in the principles of Cobden and his British school of liberals, 
my predilections (prejudices if you will) have always been in favour of the freest 
possible movement, alike of trade and persons, and against fiscal protection and 
immigrant restrictions.^
In defence of the validity of free trade principles, Hobson followed orthodox liberal and
classical economic tenets. For Hobson, free trade was good for all concerned; there was
nothing to be gained from national economic isolation and many benefits to be lost. His view
was that ‘liberty of exchange benefits a whole society and each of its members where complete
mobility of capital and labour and equal access to natural resources of the land exist’, and
‘[t]he wider the area, the freer and more secure the nature of this intercourse, the greater is
the net gain, both to those parties directly engaging in each act of commerce and to those who
indirectly profit by doing business with parties thus enriched.’^
In International Trade and The Science o f  Wealthy Hobson used parables of a small
trading community to illustrate the benefits of free exchange between communities and, by
extension, nations.^ According to Hobson, free trade principles showed that the division of
the community of traders into two separate political communities did not alter the gains from
the division of labour and specialisation through exchange:
Freedom of exchange would still tend to make each person on either side dispose of 
his labour-power and his capital in a manner which conduced to the maximum 
productivity of the two villages, regarded as an economic group ... The political 
separation of the two villages could not itself affect the economic gain of maintaining 
old relations. Except where political interference with these trade relations is expressly 
contrived, there is no plausibility in the mistaken notion that villages, towns, or 
nations engage in trade with one another.^
Hobson claimed that this logic applied to the nations of which these smaller political
communities were a part; national boundaries could only be a harmful interference to the
 ^ The Morals o f  Economic Internationalism^ p. 29.
 ^International Trade: An Application o f  Economic Theory^ p. 13. See also, Imperialism: A Study^ 
p. 68; Democracy After the War, pp. 70-1. Compare these opinions with the analysis advanced by 
David Ricardo, Principles o f  Political Economy and Taxation.
^ International Trade, pp. 14-22; The Science o f  Wealth, ch. 13.
 ^ International Trade, p. 20. See also Economics o f  Unemployment, p. 148.
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gains from free exchange so far as nations were part of a single economic system. Hobson 
claimed that with a single world economy of trade, nations could not be considered economic 
units.® International trade was not, argued Hobson, trade between nations conceived as acting 
like unitary firms, but trade between the individuals, households, groups, firms and industries 
that constituted nations. It was only the intervention of governments that led people to believe 
that nations were economic rivals.® In fact, international trade did not imply conflict between 
nations: ‘no such collective competition exists at all. So far as trade involves competition, that 
competition takes place, not between nations, but between trading firms, and it is much 
keener and more persistent between trading firms belonging to the same nation that between 
those belonging to different nations.
Indeed, far from being an economic heretic, on international economic issues, 
Hobson’s extension of the free trade argument to apply to factors of production as well as 
goods suggested more rather than less laissez faire.^ Hobson argued that international 
economic relations were governed by the same laws of economics as the domestic economy. 
This meant that the economic theory could be applied not only to the trade of commodities 
but also to international movements of the factors of production.
Hobson’s observation of the theoretical implications of a single world economy 
paralleled his observation of the increasing volume and importance of foreign investment as 
compared to commerce between nations. He believed that with the increasing mobility of 
capital, the world was becoming one economic system, and that there was a consonant 
international interdependence of industries and nations. In this sense, Hobson goes beyond 
classical free trade arguments to claim that Ricardian comparative advantage is outmoded in
® In International Trade, chs. 1-4, esp. p. 53, Hobson refuted the argument that nations were non­
competing groups, the argument he believed to be the basis of the separation of theories of national 
and international trade.
® For Hobson’s discussions of why the nation was not an economic unit, see Problem o f  the 
Unemployed, Second Edition, p. 86; International Trade, p. 21; The Case for Arbitration, p. 3; 
Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 95; The German Panic, pp. 25-6; Work and Wealth, p. viii; 
The New Protectionism, pp. 2-5; Democracy After the War, p. 75; Morals o f  Economic 
Internationalism, pp. 9 - 10. The fallacies of economic nationalism were f  urther supported by mistaken 
impressions of a national economy created by national accounting. On economic nationalism, see 
below.
 ^ Work and Wealth, p. 273.
® ‘Economic Heretic’ was Hobson’s self-adopted label, a reflection of his challenge to the liberal 
economic orthodoxy on social organisation and distribution. See chapter two.
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the modern industrial world because of the increased fluidity of capital and the emerging 
global economy. This is the difference, essentially between Cobdenism and free trade 
doctrine, on the one hand, and Angellism and the interdependence of international finance.®
In conclusion, Hobson stressed the overriding importance of a wider division of labour 
- a truth handed down by political economists from Adam Smith onwards. This view of 
course fits well with Hobson’s theory of surplus value in one major respect: greater 
cooperation leads to the production of a greater surplus and higher (in this case global) 
welfare.
The Critique o f  Protectionism and Economic Nationalism
A central element of Hobson’s economic internationalism was his rejection of the 
arguments put forward in favour of protection and economic nationalism. Hobson countered 
these with classical free trade arguments. Protection, for Hobson, was a futile attempt to close 
off a national economy from the effects of internationalisation. The result of protection was 
that there would be a worse division of labour and thus lower productivity in the protected 
area, and thus a rise in prices. A corollary was that capital would flow out of the protected 
area, because ‘[ejvery fresh barrier against freedom of exchange, rendering less effective the 
division of labour among nations, causes the capital and labour in the country which imposes 
it to be less productively employed than it would otherwise have been.’ ®^
Hobson was well aware of the various justifications and rationalisations of 
protectionism as an argument against free trade. He discussed and dismissed the arguments 
for protection of key industries, of infant industries, protection as military necessity, and the 
argument that defence comes before opulence. In each case, Hobson attempted to show that 
the arguments fall for both political and economic reasons. Protection neither enhances 
economy, due to the imposed constraints on the division of labour, nor does it help defence. 
Rather it stimulates rivalry and c o n f l i c t . H e  argued that all these arguments appealed to 
sections of society, but that they could not be applied generally to the economic system
Particularly Economic Interpretation o f  Investment.
International Trade, p. 165. For similar arguments, see International Trade, p. 120, 177-8; 
Towards International Government, pp. 131-2; New Protectionism, pp. 50, 56-9; Economics o f  
Unemployment, 151-2; The Modern State, p. 33; Imperialism, pp. 103-4.
Work and Wealth, pp. 348-9; Democracy After the War, p. 76; Economics o f  Unemployment, pp. 
20-1; Imperialism, p. [50].
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without huge costs.
Hobson claimed that import taxes could not both protect and keep prices down, that 
protection would retard rather than encourage economic development, that it would result in 
damaging retaliation from trade rivals, that it benefited certain producers (usually the more 
powerful) over others and that producers as a whole would benefit at the expense of 
consumers, and that this was a bad policy g lo b a l ly .P ro te c t io n  was a sectionalist policy 
according to Hobson because it could only benefit the protected firms or industries. Other 
industries and consumers would lose out in lower incomes and higher prices. Powerful 
business interests called for a policy of protection to defend their interests at the expense of 
the rest of the nation and indeed of global welfare as a whole.
Hobson extended the argument further to imperial protection and regional customs 
unions. According to the free trade argument, it was clear that any barrier to exchange would 
result in a loss of the benefits from the division of labour: ‘It is true that the possibility of 
economic self-sufficiency is greater as the group is larger and admits more division of labour; 
but this does not cancel the damage of erecting barriers. For every extension of the area of 
free markets secures a more effective division of labour, and a larger absolute share for each 
free participant.’^^  Imperial protection viewed the world market as something to be fought 
over and failed to recognise the benefits of free trade were available to all should the 
reduction of obstacles occur. Similarly, though customs unions could mean the reduction of 
tariffs within the union, they also entailed exclusion of other nations’s goods. This exclusion 
constituted a loss to productivity and hence welfare. Hobson claimed that ‘Free Trade has 
nothing but commendation for proposals for closer or more effective trade relations between 
allies, provided they are not intended, and do not in fact work out, as a policy of exclusion 
and hostility to other c o u n t r i e s .A c c o r d in g  to Hobson’s free trade arguments, in each case
For examples of Hobson’s examination of the economics of tariffs, see The Fruits o f  American 
Protection; Canada Today, pt. 2; The Industrial System, ch. 15; New Protectionism, ch. 3; Taxation 
in the New State, pt. 1, ch. 8. Hobson was also concerned by the potential impact of an economic 
boycott imposed by the League of Nations. See Towards International Government, ch. 7.
13 The Fruits o f  American Protection, p. 29; New Protectionism, p. 11; Poverty in Plenty, p. 65.
International Trade, p. 21. See B. Semmel, The Rise o f  Free Trade Imperialism for a discussion 
of attempts to reconcile imperialism and free trade.
See New Protectionism, p. xiii. For Hobson’s discussions of the prospects for systems of imperial 
preference and the more extensive suggestions for an imperial federation, see The War in South 
Africa, pt. 3, ch. 5; Canada Today, pt. 2; ‘The British Imperial Conference’, ‘The British Empire in 
Conference’ and ‘Britain’s Protective Budget’. On regional zollvereins, particularly the suggestion for
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there would, however, be a loss in terms of a potential global division of labour. An increased 
chance of international conflict engendered by the competition of rival imperial or regional 
blocs was a potential economic cost, as well as a hazard for humanity.
Hobson claimed that the retrogression to economic nationalism would lead to the 
deterioration of international relations which would have its own costs above and beyond 
those resulting form the reduction in trade and thereby economic activity. First, there were 
the costs of setting up the protective system both in terms of civil government and the need 
for military expenditure. Second, the economic costs included the need for constant 
preparedness to fight for markets in the instance of imperial protection, for instance to force 
doors open and to protect trade routes and markets from the encroachments of competitors. 
Third, the economic consequences of retaliation for both sides redoubled the losses caused by 
the initial protection by closing down more of the trade and commerce on which welfare 
depended. Hobson condemned protection as leading to conflict both domestically and 
internationally.^®
There were more than just economic costs to protection and economic nationalism, 
however. Hobson claimed that free trade was part of an ‘economic internationalism [which] 
is an essential feature of civilization.’ Free trade was, for Hobson as it had been for Cobden, 
the foundation of peace and prosperity: ‘commerce has always been the greatest civilizer of 
mankind. All other fruits of civilization have travelled along trade routes ... Cut off 
commerce, and you destroy every mode of higher intercourse.’^^  Economic nationalism, as 
we have seen, Hobson believed to be a form of militarism. This militarism prompted 
international conflicts. Meanwhile, should there be conflict between nations, Hobson claimed 
that protection was a feeble instrument of national defence both before and during war. 
Hobson denied the opposition of defence and opulence. Free trade made for economic 
strength, the basis of military power, while also making friends of neutrals in the conflict, 
thus potentially helping in terms of supplies in the war effort.^®
In contemporary disputes over f ree trade, Hobson opposed Chamberlain’s British tariff
an economically united Europe, see ‘The Economic Union of Europe’, ‘The Economic Organization 
of Europe’ and ‘The United States of Europe’
Imperialism^ pt. 1, ch. 5; New Proteciionism, ch. 4.
New Protectionism, p. 115; Morals o f  Economic Internationalism, p. 20. See also Free Thought 
in the Social Sciences, p. 79; New Protectionism, p. 107.
New Protectionism, pp. 24, 103-5, 112.
148
reform movement on the grounds that it was a producers and a capitalist policy which would 
reduce the incomes of the least powerful groups, workers and unsheltered industries, and 
would encourage conflict between Britain and its economic r i v a l s .H o b s o n  opposed 
imperial protection and condemned the abandonment of the free trade by Britain during the 
War. Hobson opposed the proposals, made at an allied conference on trade issues during the 
First World War, for a post-war blockade of enemy nations, the curtailing of trade with those 
nations and with certain neutrals, and the proposals for a trade bloc of the entente powers 
after the War. After the War, Hobson was a vociferous critic of the Versailles peace 
settlement, especially its reaction on the international economy in the reparations forced on 
Germany, the failure to cancel war debts, and also the implications of the creation of new 
states in Eastern Europe. Hobson argued that the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire at least 
permitted the relatively free flow of goods across a large part of Europe. On the other hand, 
the new states, being weak economically attempted to control their own economies with state 
direction of the economy and high tariffs. This along with the rise of protectionist sentiment 
in Europe meant that the new boundaries in Eastern Europe were a hindrance to trade 
between nations.
Hobson’s Critique of Free Trade
While he supported the general goals of free trade doctrine, Hobson recognised a number of 
problems with the free trade argument. First, protectionism was on the rise in the 
international economy. This was especially the case with the rise of competitive imperialism 
and even more so after the First World War. Even if free traders were winning the theoretical 
argument, Hobson wrote, they were nonetheless losing in the struggle to implement their 
policies.^^ Free trade theory and practice were beginning to look like distant ideals.
‘Free Trade and Foreign Policy’; ‘The Approaching Abandonment of Free Trade’; and The New 
Protectionism, ch. 3.
In these criticisms of the post-war settlement Hobson differed little from Keynes’ The Economic 
Consequences o f  the Peace, in that he also attributed many of then political and economic woes to the 
artificial division of Europe into separate small states. However, Hobson, like Keynes, was aware 
however that a return to the free trade era was now impossible because of the shattering effects of 
the War and because of the trend to combination in industry superseding laissez faire that was evident 
before the War. For Hobson’s criticisms of the economic aspects of the Peace, see The Obstacles to 
Economic Recovery in Europe and The Economics o f  Reparation.
Democracy After the War, pp. 73-5; Veblen, pp. 144-5.
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irrelevant to the contemporary world economic situation, particularly during the Great 
D e p re s s io n .S e c o n d ,  Hobson realised that free trade was part of the ideology of laissez 
faire. As such, far from being a universal principle, free trade was a Victorian illusion and 
a pretext and cover for British imperialism. Third, free trade doctrine, as a part of the laissez 
faire  ideology, did not address questions of unequal distribution of income and opportunities, 
either within or between national societies. It thus glossed over the questions of the just 
operation of free trade in conditions of national or international inequality, or whether free 
trade principles would be applicable to a protectionist world economy at all. In this section, 
three qualifications to Hobson’s support for free trade are considered.
Free Trade and Unemployment
Hobson became increasingly disaffected with free trade arguments during the period 
after the First World War and especially during the Great Depression. Arguing against those 
who claimed that economic troubles were solely the result of deviations from free trade, he 
asserted that ‘the irrational condition of general unemployment during a world depression 
throws out of gear the simple logic of Free T r a d e . U n d e r  conditions of general 
unemployment, protection may benefit a nation, he claimed. He had already argued that free 
trade logic determined that no individual nation’s level or configuration of employment could 
be guaranteed. The dynamics of competition led to the creation of new products, and 
different countries taking advantage of new products and innovations in production 
t e c h n i q u e s .F r e e  trade, therefore could not guarantee full employment at any particular 
time. However, general unemployment undercut the laissez faire  assumptions of free trade 
doctrine. ‘Given a general depression and unemployment in the industrial world,’ Hobson 
argued, ‘a tariff  might be used to distribute the aggregate volume of employment for the time 
being favourably to the political area which set it up.’ With a margin of unemployment in the 
national economy, a tariff  would exclude foreign competition and redirect production to 
national industries. Protection thereby increased national employment and ‘exported’ 
unemployment to other countries, assuming ‘that the tariff  keeps out foreign goods and so 
substitutes domestic goods, increasing the total volume of goods made in this country and
International Trade, p. 22; Property and Improperty, p. 175-6.
The Science o f  Wealth, p. 192.
Imperialism, pp. 308-9; International Trade, p. 174.
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reducing the volume of goods made in the foreign exporting countries.
Hobson supported this argument with a quote from Adam Smith. If all trade is 
beneficial, Hobson reasoned, international trade could not result in greater gains than 
domestic trade. However, because domestic trade involved gains for a buyer and seller both 
of whom were from that nation, there was a gain ‘at both ends’ of the exchange for the nation. 
In the case of international trade, only one national gained. Domestic trade, thus, had twice 
the impact on the national economy that international trade had.^®
While, for the nation setting up tariff  barriers, a protectionist policy would maintain 
employment and incomes, Hobson cautioned that tariffs only redistributed unemployment to 
other countries; they did not reduce the world level of unemployment. Indeed, as we have 
seen above, Hobson believed that further barriers to trade would tend to reduce the 
productivity of capital and labour, thereby creating more, rather than less, unemployment in 
the world economy.
More generally, Hobson was not convinced by the argument for protection as a 
solution to unemployment. He used the argument solely to point out the defective reasoning 
of free traders. Hobson cited four flaws in the protectionist case. First, there was the 
possibility of retaliation and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies. If other states also raised tariffs, 
then unemployment would effectively be re-imported back into the country that imposed the 
first tariff. Worse still, with more and higher barriers to trade, unemployment would rise, 
both globally and in the protecting nations. Second, such a policy would only work if the 
redirection of production did not involve large increases in domestic prices. If domestic prices 
rose, then the real value of national incomes would fall and the gain to the nation from 
increased levels of employment would be wiped out. Similarly, the redirection of funds to 
protected industries might well result in the failure of unsheltered industries, again resulting 
in a decrease in employment. Third, Hobson argued that, once established, tariffs tended to 
be difficult to remove. Politically, strong interest groups behind the tariffs argued for their 
maintenance. Economically, protection encouraged the dependence of industries on protective 
measures and an ‘appropriate’ time for the removal of protection never arrived, because there 
were always reasons not to remove the tariffs. Tariffs, then, tended to persist into periods of 
‘normal trade’ with all the deleterious effects noted above.
Economics o f  Unemployment^ p. 149-50; The Science o f  Wealthy pp. 190-1. See also. 
International Trade^ pp. 154-8; Property and Improperty, pp. 125-8.
The Science o f  Wealth, p. 192; Economics o f  Unemployment, p. 147. See Adam Smith, The 
Wealth o f  Nations, p. 469-72.
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Most seriously, however, Hobson pronounced that ‘[p]rotection is a bad palliative [for 
unemployment], because it does not increase the capacity of consumption to keep pace with 
production.’^  ^ Hobson argued that, though free trade had failed to deal with the depression 
at the root of unemployment, this did not mean that protection was the solution to trade 
depression. Hobson preferred to explain trade depression in terms of the failure of effective 
demand in capitalist economies. Unemployment was a result of underconsumption, itself a 
consequence of the maldistribution of income. Protection was no solution because it did not 
tackle the maldistribution of income. Indeed, Hobson claimed that tariffs encouraged the 
formation of national cartels which restricted competition and production, thereby worsening 
the distribution of income and also reducing employment. Furthermore, indirect taxation, 
hitting the poorer sections of the nation harder than the richer, exacerbated the 
maldistribution of income which was at the root of unemployment. Hobson’s opinion was that, 
even in periods of general unemployment, free trade was, in the long run, the best 
international economic policy.^® National economic policy, however, had, according to 
Hobson, to be modified if free trade was to operate fully and justly.
National Economic Reform and Free Trade
Hobson applied his insight that laissez faire doctrine was no longer relevant to modern 
industrial economies to his discussion of international economic relations. 
Underconsumption reduced the relevance of free trade doctrine because it compelled 
capitalists to seek foreign trade and capital exports as a way of avoiding trade depression. This 
compulsion, Hobson had argued in his theory of imperialism, resulted in the ‘irrational’ 
policies of protectionism and im p e r ia l i sm .S u c h  circumstances made a return to free trade 
unlikely, and meant that it would not have the desired effects should it be implemented.^^
Hobson argued (against laissez faire  doctrine) that governments could be the creators
International Trade^ p. 163.
Property and Impropertv, pp. 128-30; The Science o f  Wealthy p. 193; International Trade, pp. 
155-8.
29 Democracy A fter the War, p. 78; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 161.
The Science o f  Wealth, pp. 186-8; Democracy After the War, p. 178; Richard Cobden, p. 402; 
Physiology o f  Industry, pp. 205-6.
31 Property and Improperty, pp. 56-7; Confessions, p. 186-7; Imperialism, p. [50].
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as well as the destroyers of l i b e r t y . H e  claimed that state intervention in the economy to 
mitigate the maldistribution of income in the advanced industrial nations would undermine 
the drive to imperialism and economic nationalism. Addressing the problem of 
underconsumption at the root of imperialist and protectionist policies, Hobson advocated a 
policy to establish the domestic conditions for just and orderly operation of free trade in 
international economic relations. Hobson hoped that domestic reform would bring 
fundamental economic equality within societies, and that, in these circumstances, free trade 
could operate justly and efficiently between people(s). National economic peace was essential 
to peaceful internationalism.^^
Hobson did not follow the implications of domestic economic intervention as a basis 
for free trade. He only briefly discussed the idea that nationally planned economies would 
trade with one another as corporate entities.^'* The discussion of national economic reform 
as the primary solution to international economic problems only appears in Hobson’s writings 
in the thirties as the prospects for international cooperation and the League looked bleak. 
Though this went against his earlier arguments that the nation was not an economic unit, 
Hobson hoped that state intervention in domestic economic affairs would not disrupt the 
freedom of individuals and groups in their commercial and financial relations across state 
boundaries.
Free Trade and Human Welfare
Hobson advanced a humanist critique of the emphasis in free trade on economic (that 
is, material) values to the exclusion of wider notions of welfare, such as the quality of life. 
Early in his career, particularly before the turn of the century, Hobson applied Ruskin’s 
critique of political economy, that the division of labour was a mechanism that achieved 
monetary gain at the expense of human well-being, to international economic relations. He
New Protectionism^ pp. 122-3; Richard Cohden, PP- 398-9; Imperialism, pp. 230-1.
Property and Improperty, p. 106-7. See also, pp. 204-5; Confessions, p. 113. Similarly Hobson 
denied the right of intervention in national economic government, e.g., with regard to the setting of 
tariffs. See International Trade, pp. 184-90; International Government, p. 136. For a discussion of the 
conflicting logic being employed by Hobson here, see Peter Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the 
Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism’.
In Property and Improperty, p. 200-5. See the discussions of the problems of national economic 
planning and international relations in Lionel Robbins, National Planning and International Order.
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claimed that specialisation degraded producers, that the division of labour divided not just 
of tasks but the people doing those tasks. Hobson used this argument to claim that Britain’s 
place in the international division of labour had removed of British workers from clean air 
and pleasant scenery to put them into crowded towns in unhygienic conditions.
Free trade was a doctrine of the rising middle classes, the merchants and industrialists 
who had done well out of the industrial revolution. Hobson did not follow Ruskin as far in 
the latter’s critique of the effects of industrialism. While Ruskin claimed that industrial system 
degraded workers through the division of labour and over-specialisation, the effects of 
mechanisation and of urbanisation, Hobson believed that the industrial revolution was indeed 
progress and that machines could improve productivity, allowing more time for welfare 
enhancing l e i s u re .H o b s o n  vacillated on the benefits of the division of labour. Early in his 
career, he was an ardent c r i t i c . B u t  soon the benefits of this ‘mechanism’ as part of the 
division of functions in society became clear. Thus, ‘the one great "economy" which modern 
science has most powerfully impressed upon us as a means of progress - the division of 
labour, or "differentiation of functions."’ ®^ Nonetheless, he cautioned that ‘division of 
labour is only a true economy when a sound principle of co-operation underlies and dominates 
division, maintaining the unity and harmony of the whole process.’®® Hobson was, then, 
aware of the two sides to the division of labour in the national and international economies. 
This qualified his adherence to the free trade principle as is demonstrated in his hesitations 
on the question of the international mobility of labour, considered below.
International Government and Free Trade
35 John Ruskin Social Reformer, pp. 230-1; Social Problem, pp. 17-20, 229-30.
Wealth and L ife ,  pp. 7-8 has a four point critique of industrialism. See also Crisis o f  
Liberalism, p. 162. For Hobson’s disagreement with Ruskin, see, for example his opinions in Free 
Thought, p. 283, and Wealth and L ife ,  p. 8, 83.
John Ruskin Social Reformer, pp. 116-8; Problems o f  Poverty^ p. 125; Social Problem, pp. 11 -
12 .
®® Social Problem, p. 9.
®® Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 265. See also Social Problem, p. 237; Work and Wealth, p. xx; Free
Thought, p. 95.
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Free trade principles can be considered the international analogues of laissez faire  
doctr ine/^  According to Hobson, combination had come to predominate over competition 
in the contemporary world economy/^ It had become clear to Hobson through his studies 
of imperialism that Cobdenism and free trade had been transcended by the monopolistic 
developments of modern industrial e c o n o m i e s .T h i s  was evident in the emergence of 
national and international cartels. The growth of an international financial market and 
increasing levels of foreign investment further qualified the simple logic of free trade. 
Governmental interference in international economic relations, in the shape of imperialism, 
was an established fact.
In the modern world economy, Hobson claimed, laissez faire  solutions would not 
operate effectively or justly. The challenge was to establish a government to watch over the 
economic relations of nations. Hobson’s suggestions for reform of international economic 
relations parallel his proposals domestically. He believed that the free traders’ analysis of the 
world economy was incorrect because they neglected the maldistribution of income within and 
between nations. Hobson realised that competitive imperialism and rising protectionism made 
any national arrangements a fragile basis for free trade. The increasing interdependence of 
the world economy meant unilateral national policies had international repercussions. The 
danger of the disorganised world economy was that each nation pursuing its own immediate 
self-interest, for example in protectionist policies, would culminate in global rivalry, 
uncertainty and impoverishment. Liberal free trade rules could only be maintained through 
an international institution or, at the very least, the coordination of national economic 
policies. Hobson proposed an institutionalisation of the principles of free trade in some form 
of international government to alleviate the problem of exclusionary economic policies. Free 
trade would be established by ‘the extension of its principles to the new conditions of 
international intercourse by the establishment of public international control and guarantees.’
The first function of the Hobson’s international economic government was the 
maintenance of free trade rules, particularly the ‘open door’ to trade and investment, that is.
40 See R.D. McKinlay and Richard Little, Global Problems and World Order^ pp. 29-36.
However, his opinions on the implications of this trend varied over his lifetime. Compare 
Hobson’s belief, in Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism^ that a world market would establish true prices 
and, in The Fruits o f  American Protection, that there could be no international cartels, with his 
worries about inter-imperialism and capitalist collusion in Wealth and L ife  and his changing opinions 
on international finance discussed earlier.
Richard Cobden, ch. 13; Problems o f  a New World, p. 20.
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free and fair access of each nation to the natural and human resources of the whole world. 
Reasserting that ‘[t]he effective liberty of every people demands freedom of commercial 
intercourse with other peoples...’, Hobson claimed that an ‘International Government ... 
representing the commonwealth of na tions... would seek to remove all commercial restrictions 
which impair the freedom of economic intercourse between nations.’ According to Hobson, 
if  the international government could enforce an open door provision, then the ‘sting’ of 
national imperialism would be drawn and needless wars averted.^^ The matters to be dealt 
with by this international authority included freedom of access to trade routes, admission to 
markets, equal opportunities for investors, and an international commission to oversee the 
development of the backward countries.
The second function of the international government or of coordinated national 
economic policies was to instil certain into the world economy so to enhance economic 
performance by reducing the role of chance and uncertainty in economic decisions. Hobson 
believed that an international government would ensure equitable and stable international 
economic relations and thus encourage international trade and investment. ‘Let international 
government put down wars and establish Free Trade, the truly vital struggles of national 
expression will begin.
Hobson hoped that ‘so far as the needs and interests of the peoples can find expression 
in foreign relations, the deep constant underlying identity of human interests will constantly 
react in efforts to mould international institutions that are favourable to cooperation.’ ®^ An 
international economic government would, Hobson believed, reveal this underlying harmony 
in free exchange:
Remove all the fetters and obstructions which governments, laws, and customs have 
placed upon the free play of harmonious forces which bind man to man, let their real 
community of interest have full sway to express itself in economic, intellectual and 
moral intercourse, the false antagonisms which now divide nations, classes and
International Government^ pp. 134-5; New Protectionism^ p. 137. See also New Protectionism^ p. 
121. Hobson’s first proposal for an international government to maintain free trade appears in 
Imperialism^ p. 146.
New Protectionism^ p. 132-4.
Imperialism^ p. 185. See also, Veblen, p. 152; Problems o f  a New World, p. 228; New 
Protectionism, pp. 127-8; Work and Wealth, p. 280; Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 105.
Richard Cobden, p. 408.
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individuals, will disappear and a positive harmony of mankind will be established/^ 
International Government and Human Welfare
According to Hobson, international economic organisation had a second function beyond
providing stability and maintaining the rules of free trade. Hobson argued that ‘social control
... must in the long run be international, so as to correspond with the area of the economic
system itself.’ What Hobson called constructive internationalism, his proposals for the
economic functions of an international government, were not limited to the negative
conception of the role of removing obstacles to free exchange or stabilising contemporary
international economic relations. He claimed the international government would play a part
in the creation of international economic equality of opportunity that just international
economic relations and the goal of maximising human welfare required.
Hobson argued that ideally an international government would manage international
economic relations rather than be merely the guarantor of free trade. International
government would implement policies to remedy inequality and maximise global human
welfare, to provide ‘[t]he world’s wealth for the world’s w a n t s . H o b s o n  posited ‘the
authority of some international government competent to deliver ‘the economic goods’, i.e.,
to control the development of world-resources in the interests of humanity...’.
The goal, or ideal, itself, derives its validity from the same principle which is the 
ruling element in all forms of community, the essence of all economy, viz., 
distribution of work and wealth in accordance with ability to make and enjoy. If the 
world for economic purposes could be organised upon this principle, its natural 
resources, assigned to the cultivation of the inhabitants of the various countries, 
according to their capacities, and supplemented where necessary by suitable drafts 
from other countries: a broadcasting of the pooled skill and technique and organising 
power available from all world-sources, a central distribution of capital, a common 
saving fund, available according to the industrial needs of different countries and 
industries, the world would then be raised to the level of its highest productivity. If 
also, this greatest economic product were able to be distributed, or rationed, according 
to the diverse needs, or capacities of enjoyment of the members of this world 
community, such an economy of production and consumption would yield a maximum 
economic contribution to human welfare.
Richard Cobden^ p. 21
Morals o f  Economic Internalionalism, p. 67. See also Wealth and Life^ p. 390; Modern Stale, p. 
36; Poverty in Plenty, p. 83. New Protectionism, p. 121; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 
134-5.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 399-400..........................
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International economic government could deal with the malady of global
underconsumption that had undercut laissez faire, through coordination of economic policies
and directives to ensure a just distribution of w e a l th .H o b s o n  argued that
as full productivity implies international co-operation in industry, commerce and 
finance, so the provision of an adequate expenditure upon consumption goods 
involves, if not a fully planned international policy, at any rate the adoption by all 
advanced industrial nations of a common economic strategy of high wages, public 
services and increased leisure, in order to secure a right equilibrium between 
productivity and consumption.®^
Hobson only made a few scattered and sketchy remarks concerning the specific 
functions and shape of an international economic organisation. He was most specific on the 
policies needed to assure rapid reconstruction of Europe in the emergency immediately 
following World War One. He called for international cooperation to aid the devastated 
countries. In particular, he called for the US with its relative gains from the War to transfer 
some of its surplus to destitute Europe.®^ Hobson was cautious to note, in his discussions of 
the need for an international economic government during the twenties and thirties, that this 
phrase did not necessarily mean centralised international control and planning, but the 
extension of some already existing common national principles to the international economy 
and a federal economic authority to monitor national policies.®® He believed that inter­
governmental conferences, agreements, and institutions would widen in scope and become 
increasingly institutionalised. He was especially hopeful with regard to international 
cooperation on labour and working conditions in the newly formed l.L.O. He thought that 
some form of international bank and financial controls should be set up. He also suggested 
that an international economic government might be a gatherer and disseminator of 
information on the world economy.®^
®° Economics o f  Unemployment, p. 132.
®^ Rationalisation and Unemployment, pp. 124-5; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 162. 
See also Poverty in Plenty, pp. 80-1; Free Thought in the Social Sciences, p. 245; Conditions o f  
Industrial Peace, pp. 112-3; Confessions, p. 112.
®® Richard Cobden, pp. 408-9; Morals o f  Economic Internationalism, pp. 35, 44-5.
®® Conditions o f  Industrial Peace, p. 114
®^ Modern State, p. 33; From Capitalism to Socialism, pp. 50-1; Democracy and a Changing 
Civilisation, pp. 145-6; Economics o f  Unemployment, p. 138; Conditions o f  Industrial Peace, p. 110, 
115. Hobson was suspicious, though, of formal economic organisation at the imperial or regional level, 
arguing that thiis would likely reinforce and magnify rather than mitigate economic conflicts.
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International Government, Free Trade and the Theory o f  Cooperative Surplus
Hobson did not consider his opinions on free trade and his advocacy of a redistributive 
international government to be in contradiction. On the face of it, though, Hobson’s 
constructive internationalism appears to compromise free trade. Hobson’s ideal vision of an 
international economic government and his proposals to restore the European economies 
through inter-governmental cooperation leaves little room for free exchange or laissez faire. 
This is a defensible position, given Hobson’s evolutionary theory of cooperative surplus, 
which, i f  super-imposed onto international economic relations, maps out a logical 
development from free trade to interventionism in international economic relations.
In Hobson’s evolutionary theory, international relations are the last and least developed 
realm of human organisation. Hobson claimed that cooperation is produces a social surplus. 
In his theory of cooperative surplus as applied to international economic relations, free trade 
is the minimal requirement for international economic cooperation. Free trade encouraged 
openness of nations to the exchange of goods and ideas and opposition to imperialism and 
protectionism. Such openness is the precursor to ‘higher’ forms of cooperation and 
organisation. In so far as the international relations were relatively primitive, that is, based 
on nationalism, mercantilism or imperialism, free trade was a progressive principle. However, 
as the global economy became more organised, there was a need for central rational control 
of international economic relations. Such control was absent in the so-called world market and 
could only be rationally administered and the world economic international system efficiently 
organised by an international government. Hobson believed that the nascent international 
functional institutions, such as the I.L.O., would be forerunners of and subsequently agencies 
of a new international economic government.
Hobson’s proposals for international economic institutions were premised on the 
internationalisation of economic activity and growing international interdependence. For 
Hobson, international economic cooperation and organisation were well in advance of 
primitive international political relations. Following his theory of cooperative surplus, Hobson 
suggested the importance of organisation and the correct distribution in achieving maximum 
human welfare. Accordingly, free trade was inadequate to international welfare as far as it 
relied on the outdated dogmas of laisse: faire  and construed contemporary international 
economic exchange as free and fa ir  market relations. Though he acknowledged the importance 
of free trade as a starting point and minimum for international economic relations, Hobson 
suggested national and international governmental intervention in the international economy.
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reflecting the need for the organisation of economic relations and a solution to global 
underconsumption and capitalism’s cyclical depressions.
In his constructive internationalism, Hobson extended the meaning of equality of 
opportunity beyond mere freedom from hindrance in exchange, advancing a conception of 
‘positive liberty’ in international relations parallel to that he discussed in the domestic context. 
This positive conception of economic equality of opportunity demonstrated that equality and 
liberty were not opposed but complements. ‘Equality of opportunity for commerce, for 
investment of capital, and for participation in the development of the world’s resources,’ 
argued Hobson, ‘is the first condition for the progress of national civilization in the world. 
In the fruits of such progress every people should get its share, and the co-operation in this 
common task is the surest bond of peace among n a t i o n s . H o b s o n ’s arguments for 
international government and free trade converge as principles for free and fair exchange 
between nations and people.
Hobson did not, however, maintain any one position with constancy. This variation 
in opinions can be explained not as inconsistent analysis but as the application of his 
theoretical system to the changing circumstances of the world economy, especially the 
tumultuous period during and after the First World War. Before the Great War, Hobson was 
becoming more confident of the importance and beneficence of international financial 
relations. He became less optimistic about the benefits of untrammelled free trade during the 
First World War. He was ambitious for his plans for economic government during the War and 
immediately afterwards. He believed that economic government was a central pillar of the 
function of the League of Nations, and that if it did not address economic issues that it would 
fail. With this failure becoming increasingly obvious in the thirties, Hobson became more 
cautious in his advocacy of international economic government, at the end of his life calling 
for domestic social reform in order to remedy international economic ills. Living through a 
period of major international economic dislocation, Hobson’s proposals reflected his hopes, 
fears and realistic assessments of the contemporary international economic outlook, but all 
within his theory of cooperative surplus applied to international relations.
International Government, p. 137. See also Imperialism, p. 318; International Trade, p. 192. See 
Michael Freeden, Liberalism Divided, p. 148-50, on Hobson’s arguments on equality of opportunity. 
See Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. .
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Three Aspects of Economic Internationalism
The focus of Hobson’s discussions of international economic relations are the same as the 
focus of the rest of his work: through what (international) economic arrangements for the 
development and allocation of human and material resources, can the greatest human welfare 
be attained? This section addresses three issue areas which Hobson discussed as part of his 
analysis of international economic relations, and highlights some of the difficulties he 
encountered.
Foreign Investment, International Finance and Cosmopolitan Capital
It has been argued, by Peter Cain among others, that Hobson’s attitude to foreign 
investment changed after his denouncement of the role of capital export in Imperialism. 
Finance appears in the theory of imperialism as a national and international sectional interest 
that is the cause of national and international conflict. But, in the decade before the First 
World War, it is argued, Hobson held a more simplistic view of the effects of foreign 
investment on international relations, believing that international finance was the developer 
of the world and therefore beneficial in terms of both peace and prosperity. These views 
contradict one another, it is said.^®
Peter Clarke has challenged this view, but only on the grounds that Hobson 
contradicted himself less over time than he did at any one moment. Catching Hobson in 
inconsistency is an easy game, according to Clarke. While this is true, it does not challenge 
Cain’s t h e s i s . I n  fact, Cain is incorrect because throughout his writings Hobson conceived 
finance as potentially playing a functional role in the world economy, while having the 
potential to be a powerful sectional interest.
In Imperialism., Hobson offers three reasons why capital export, as opposed to the 
export of goods, should lead to pressure for extension of imperial control: first, investors 
wanted to secure or enhance the value of their investments; second, investors hoped that the 
new colony would make possible new speculative ventures; and third, financiers as an
P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1870- 
1914*, pp. 569-76. See also E.E. Nemmers, Hohson and Underconsumption^ p. 22; Harvey Mitchell, 
‘Hobson Revisited’, p. 415.
P.F. Clarke, ‘Hobson, Free Trade and Imperialism’, p. 308.
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international class benefitted from the instability and public debt created by imperialism.^® 
In the first two cases, the reason for imperialism is the pressure of national capital on its 
governmental representatives to secure investment opportunities. In the last, Hobson’s 
explanation of the sectional interest behind imperialism is that ‘[t]he wealth of these houses, 
the scale of their operations, and their cosmopolitan organisation make them the prime 
determinants of imperial policy.’®^
These views do not contradict those expressed later, at least not in terms of Hobson’s 
theoretical system. Investment abroad ‘binds members of different political communities more 
closely by bonds of plain business interest’ and is ‘a powerful interest in the peace, well-being 
and progress of those foreign countries [where capital is in vested]’. W h a t  Hobson objected 
to in Imperialism  and continued to object to, was the pressure to invest created by trade 
depression at home as a result of underconsumption.®^ There was, on the other hand, 
nothing inherently malevolent about foreign investment. Hobson argued that ‘the cross­
ownership among nations is by far the substantial guarantee of the development of a general 
policy of peace.
Furthermore, according to Hobson, so far as finance is truly international, it will be 
a harbinger of peaceful international relations. There is a fundamental difference between 
foreign investment, i.e., national surplus capital financing of production overseas, and 
international finance. The reference point for the first is the national interest, and for the 
second is the international economy. With improvements in transport and communications, 
the world was truly a single economic system. In this system, finance had an important role 
to play as ‘an automatic apparatus for the application of economic stimuli and the generation 
of productive power at points of industrial efficiency...’.®® Deprecating the defects of 
modern finance (which I will discuss shortly), Hobson claimed that ‘genuinely international 
finance’ would be a pacific force:
Where the international character of an investment has been further marked by the
®® Imperialism, p. 56-8.
Imperialism, p. 59.
®® Science o f  Wealth, pp. 241-2.
®^ Imperialism, pp. 85, 87-8.
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, p. 237. See also Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 104. 
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, p. 236.
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substantial participation of investors of several nationalities, there will not be either 
the same temptation or the same ability to induce a government to bring pressure upon 
a foreign state in the interests of financiers, many of who, are not its own 
subjects.®^
Hobson believed that ‘international will continue to gain upon national purely finance, and 
that this will help to secure peace and order over all areas of international investment.’®®
Hobson also considered the cosmopolitan as opposed to international aspects of 
finance. Investors abroad became ‘cosmopolitan capitalists’, true ‘men of the world’.®® But 
the truly cosmopolitan figure was the financier. While they had a functional role in the world 
economy ‘using skilled foresight, so as to direct the flow of industrial capital into the most 
serviceable channels’,®^  they could also become a powerful sectional interest, a global 
financial interest exploiting the products of world industry. Cosmopolitan financiers were ‘in 
a unique position to manipulate the policy of nations.’®® They promoted companies, were 
the unproductive middle-men between investors and entrepreneurs, and through their control 
of finance, particularly credit, they could manipulate prices. Their interest in public debts and 
in financial fluctuations through them on the side of risky and conflict-ridden ventures such 
as imperialism.®®
Cain overstresses the importance of Say’s Law in Hobson’s analysis and attributes a 
chronology to Hobson’s thought where there is not one. While there is, as Cain points out, a 
contradiction in Hobson’s imperialism theory between his Cobdenism and his 
underconsumption theory, his later writing on economic internationalism is not fundamentally 
different. Say’s Law applies to a closed economy. Hobson draws our attention to the 
implication of Say’s Law in the national context in Imperialism. However, despite the 
omission of a reference to this in his analysis of economic internationalism, Say’s Law is being 
applied to the international economy. The contexts, in short, are different, but the analysis
®^ Economic Interpretation o f  Investment., p. 112-3. 
®® Economic Interpretation o f  Investment., p. 132.
®® Economic Interpretation o f  Investment., pp. 104-5. 
®^  Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, p. 248-9.
®® Imperialism, p. 57.
®® Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism, p. 242//.
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is the sam e /°
Hobson continued to be a critic of imperialism after 1902. His criticisms of finance’s 
role in imperialism can be found, even during his support of international finance in the years 
before 1914. During and after the War, Hobson returned to his critique of imperialism, yet 
maintained his belief in the importance of economic internationalism, of which international 
finance was a central element. For Hobson, there would be no contradiction between the 
deleterious impact of foreign investment as a root of imperialism and the beneficial impact 
of international finance in economic internationalism. The first derives from national 
sectionalism in international relations; the second is a part of the development of an organic 
world economy. The difference between his opinions in Imperialism  and in Economic 
Interpreiaiion o f  Investment, so often referred to, is traceable to differences in immediate and 
contemporary social contexts rather than being rooted in theoretical inconsistency. Economic 
Interpretation o f  Investment was written with a capitalist investor audience in mind. Hobson 
moderated a number of his criticisms of investment activity because of the audience. In the 
pre-World War One period, there was a good deal of optimism concerning international 
economic and social relations - this was the high tide of Norman Angell’s influence, especially 
in his book. The Great Illusion, which Hobson cited at length.
Hobson’s discussion of finance is problematic for another reason, though. His 
economic internationalism involved cosmopolitan capital and cosmopolitan financiers directing 
it so despised in Imperialism. Hobson usually condemned cosmopolitan finance, using a racist 
jibe in Imperialism, but also acknowledged the positive role played by financiers in greasing 
the wheels of the new world e c o n o m y .N o n e th e le s s ,  at times, his economic 
internationalism became indistinguishable from cosmopolitanism.
International Mobility o f  Labour
Hobson expounded the logical conclusion of laissez faire  doctrine in his suggestion
On Say’s Law, see Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, p. 77, and William J. Barber, 
History o f  Economic Thought, pp. 68-9, 187-8.
See, for instance. Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 119-20. There were simultaneous 
concerns with the international political situation and the accelerating arms race, but this only 
heightened the emphasis of writers such as Hobson on the benefits (and constraints) of the new 
economic interdependence.
Imperialism, pp. 56-7.
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that maximum human welfare would be achieved with free mobility of both capital and 
labour factors of production. Hobson, therefore, sanctioned the internationalisation of labour 
to parallel the internationalisation of capital. Not only was this desirable because of increased 
prosperity, welfare, but was inevitable in view of the improved communications and 
transport of the international economy, Hobson b e l ie v e d .N a t io n a l  and local attachments 
were already loose and would become weaker, he claimed. The world economy determined 
this, free trade could not guarantee employment in a particular national area, competition of 
foreign labour would be beneficial in global welfare terms but would mean that labour could 
not be certain of staying in one place, and communications had so improved that labour could 
be more mobile.
However, Hobson was alive to the fact that labour was not made up of ‘economic 
men’, nor was it a fluid factor, infinitely divisible. The idea that there was a single world 
labour market was false and would remain so. Other attachments and other aspects of welfare 
were important. These conditioned and opposed the fluidity of labour as proposed in laissez 
faire7^
There were even greater difficulties when it came to protecting the social measures, 
such as minimum wage, improved working conditions and terms of employment, from being 
undercut by cheap imports, either of labour itself or by the products of cheap labour imported 
from abroad. The social policies of the advanced nations in particular aimed at improving the 
quality of life for workers in the national area. But these policies were dependent upon the 
exclusion of immigrants who would undersell the native workforce. Here, human welfare and 
economic welfare appeared to be in contradiction for Hobson. He failed to see the 
contradiction of an open labour market and his standard of human welfare. Presumably, he 
assumed that social reform and increased civilisation would remedy the inequalities in labour 
rates. He criticised the policies of states, like Australia, which had large undeveloped natural 
resources, yet sought to exclude immigrants.^® He admitted, however, that this issue would
Economic Interpreiaiion o f  Invesimenl, pp. 137-9; Work and Wealthy pp. 274-5; Poverty in 
Plenty^ p. 73.
Rationalisation and Unemployment, p. 119; Physiology o f  Industry, p. 212; Social Problem, p. 
207; Problems o f  Poverty, pp. 59-62, 125.
Problems o f  Poverty, p. 136; Economics o f  Distribution, p. 161; Economic Interpretation o f  
Investment, pp. 138-9; Rationalisation and Unemployment, pp. 119-20.
Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 139; International Government, pp. 143-4; Economics 
o f  Unemployment, p. \1>5, Recording Angel, pp. 76-7.
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be a difficult issue for an international government to resolve. Hobson pointed out that the
advanced West was unlikely to welcome unlimited numbers of immigrants. Yet, in his attempt
to compromise on this issue, the taint of bias attaches to him: why should the West with its
riches of economic development be permitted to exclude to poorer workers from other
countries. Why should they be permitted to evade a policy that would be for the benefit of
the whole of mankind including themselves in the long run? This is a protection scheme for
Western labour. Presumably, again, Hobson was hoping that a reformed capitalism would
mean that such flows of labour and capital would either not be necessary as each nation
developed its own resources or that they would not cause drastic dislocations. This seems a
somewhat vain hope. Indeed, Hobson seems to believe that freedom of movement would lead
to flows of labour to the undeveloped world. In fact, it seems much more plausible to expect
that immigrants will come to the wealthiest parts of the world - a conclusion a laissez faire
economist could embrace, but one which Hobson, hoping for overall development of the
world according to global welfare could not.
Hobson contradicted his laissez faire  attitude to labour mobility when he considered
the role of an international government in the direction of the world's labour force. Neither
absolutely free mobility nor exclusion seemed to Hobson to be the best policy for the
achievement of the greatest human welfare. Instead, he f u d g e d .H o w e v e r ,  he argued that
one of the roles of an international government in the future would be to direct labour where
it was needed, rather than where it would desire to go:
Such a World-Government, devoted to the best development of Earth’s resources for 
the benefit of mankind, would find its chief task in the direction of migration from 
over-populated into under-populated areas, and the selection of fit types of 
immigrants, having regard to racial, climactic, and other conditions.^®
Though Hobson discussed this ideal in abstract terms, it is all too easy to see an
implicit authoritarianism in the direction of a mass labour force over the entire face of the
earth. The role of an international government in the direction of world labour is a stark
rebuttal of his laissez faire  position of allowing labour freely to flow to the best paying jobs.
His proposal of international direction of labour also brings into stark relief the
problem of value in international relations. While Hobson stressed human welfare over
economic welfare elsewhere, this is lost in most of his discussions of labour mobility. Beside
this blurring, Hobson also acknowledged but turned away from the difficult issue of cross-
Wealth and L ife ,  pp. 356-7; International Government, p. 143; Physiology, p. 214. 
Recording Angel, pp. 79-80.
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cultural valuation of work and of the individual units of labour, that is, human beings/® He 
noted only that this was a difficult question, but one that must be addressed.
Hobson was similarly illiberal in his discussion of the international implications of and 
need for an international policy of population control.
While he acknowledged rational planning of population intruded upon ‘the most highly valued 
of the self-determining functions of nations’, and that it was a distant ideal, Hobson embraced 
the idea as one of his four conditions for civilised humanity.®® Hobson argued that ideally 
internationalism would be guided by ‘the right of mankind as a whole to determine what 
numbers and kinds of men shall occupy the different areas of the earth.
The arguments for free trade in labour, being based on the idea that the international 
division of labour is a good thing, collide with Hobson’s humanism. He never set about 
resolving the contradiction between his Ruskinian attack on industrialism’s alienated labourer 
with his view that human welfare was enhanced by the international specialisation of the 
world capitalist economy. Hobson did have an argument that could deal with this 
contradiction, but he failed to use it. Productivity gains from specialisation and organisation 
create the potential for increased leisure time, thereby improving workers’ human welfare. 
Nevertheless, his defence of free trade and cosmopolitan finance bore the marks of capitalist 
apologia; it was an analysis based on material rather than his much vaunted human welfare.
The Development o f  the World's Natural Resources
The issue of how to develop the world’s natural resources was to be one of the most 
serious problems for economic internationalism, Hobson claimed. This is because the 
development is central to the attainment of welfare, yet the exploitation of resources by 
imperial countries had led to international conflict.
Hobson was aware of the problem of exploitation of backward peoples by the 
advanced countries. By keeping the benefits to themselves the imperial nations deprived the 
rest of the world of the benefits of the diffusion of wealth throughout the economic system. 
Imperialism also involved the exploitation of the workers of the backward country. The result 
would be that the distribution of the benefits of the development would be unjust and
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 353; Social Problem, p. 275.
®® Wealth and L ife ,  p. 453.
Wealth and L ife ,  p. 357.
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‘inefficient’ in terms of global welfare. The waste of imperialism, despite the gains from 
development, are in the exploitation of the native population and the stimulation of conflict 
between the Great Powers in their rivalry to gain areas for exploitation.
By the same token, Hobson was not persuaded by the Socialist or nationalist arguments 
for the absolute right of nations to do what they wanted with ‘their’ natural resources. Hobson 
rejects this on the grounds that there is no such absolute right to property. He refutes the right 
of nations to do with their territory and what’s in it, under it, etc., as they wish, just as he 
denies that individuals have an absolute right of private property. The criterion for national 
as well as individual property is, for Hobson, the ability to use it. Thus, for example, any 
backward nation occupying territory that could be exploited for the common good of 
humanity had no right to stand in the way of that development.®^
Some interference was inevitable, however, because of the increasing connection of 
the international economy. It was the responsibility of western governments to make sure that 
this process was not overtly exploitative as it would be if left to private business interests.®® 
Rather than imperialism or nationalism, Hobson looked to his touchstone of human welfare.
His approach here can be construed as global utilitarianism of the maximum of human 
welfare. Hobson supported interference in other countries to exploit natural resource in 
principle because this was a route to the attainment of higher human welfare. Many of these 
resources were in backward countries populated by peoples unable or unwilling to exploit the 
resources. Under such circumstances, advanced countries could benefit all of humanity, and 
not just themselves, by developing these resources. Accordingly, advanced nations who could 
exploit these resources should do so, even if this was at the expense of the inhabitants of a 
particular area.®^ Thus, ‘all interference on the part of civilized white nations with "lower 
races" is not prima facie illegitimate’ and ‘civilized Governments may  undertake the political 
and economic control of lower races - in a word, ... the characteristic form of modern 
Imperialism is not under all conditions illegitimate’ because ‘[t]he natural resources of the soil 
belong to nobody.’®®
Having said that imperialism to develop natural resources is not in principle
®® Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 256; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 141-2.
®® New Protectionism, p. 128.
®^ Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 257; International Government, pp. 139-40; Economic Interpretation o f  
Investment, p. 77; Wealth and Life ,  p. 394.
®® Imperialism, p. 232; Recording Angel, p. 77.
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illegitimate, Hobson went on to place a number of conditions on such activity. First, the aim 
of the interference should be humanity-wide welfare; ‘every act of "Imperialism" consisting 
of forcible interference with another people can only be justified by showing that it 
contributes to the "civilization of the world."’®® It followed that such interference must be 
premised on the Open Door for all people(s) to have access to the developed resources. This 
is Hobson’s principle of equality of economic opportunity derived from his views on 
distribution. ‘If all backward countries, whether under the political control of some European 
or other "advanced" State or still politically independent, were formally recognized by 
Conventions of the civilized Powers as similarly open to the trading and investing members 
of all countries on a basis of economic equality, with adequate mutual guarantees for the 
enforcement of treaty obligations, the greatest step towards lasting and universal peace would 
have been taken.’®^ Second, the rights of and benefits to the native population should be of 
primary importance in the consideration of whether intervention to exploit natural resources 
might take place. These would, most likely, be upheld though not by the ‘backward’ nations 
themselves but by international agreement.®® Third, there must be international sanction for 
the interference. In other words, imperial countries should not intervene on the basis of a 
claim that their self-interest accords with the global good or that their self-interest has 
priority. Such self-assertion was, for Hobson, the ‘radical moral defect’ of imperialism.®® 
Hobson was thus one of the early proponents of the Mandate system set up in the League of 
Nations. Advanced nations could only develop the natural resources of a backward country 
with the permission of an international government and if monitored by that international 
government so that it abided by the first two conditions above.®®
While mandates might seem a perfectly reasonable suggestion on practical grounds, it 
throws the whole of Hobson’s suggestions with regard to economic equity on the international 
level into doubt. Hobson conflated the issues of the global utilisation of natural resources with 
the unequal relationship of the advanced and backward nations. Hobson’s concern with the
®® Imperialism^ p. 232.
New Protectionism^ p. 131-2. See also. International Government, p. 141; Wealth and L ife ,  p. 393; 
Recording Angel, p. 78; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 142.
®® New Protectionism, p. 130; Wealth and Life ,  p. 393; Recording Angel, p. 78; Imperialism, p. 232.
®® Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 259.
®® Wealth and L ife ,  p. 393; Recording Angel, p. 79; Imperialism, p. 232.
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development of natural resources as an international issue was skewed through this conflation.
The issue of natural resources poses the problem of the rival claims of humanity and
nationality, that is, universal versus particular claims. Hobson addressed this almost
exclusively as an issue in the relationship of the backward and advanced nations. While he
tried to counter the imperialist arguments for the rights of the advanced nations to exploit the
resources of the undeveloped countries, this conflation only leads him to advocate a form of
international paternalism. For some reason, the allocation of resources in the advanced
countries is left undiscussed. Because of this conflation, we are faced with the notion that
backward peoples were to be the subjects of paternalism, to be led to development by the
advanced West - presumably for the benefit of all, but with little choice it would seem for the
large population of the world that was the backward nations.
There are problems with Hobson’s scheme for the development of global resources.
To begin with he does not spell out what part the mandated territories would play in the
international government. If they were not represented it would appear that international
government is merely an institutionalisation of the inter-imperialism of advanced nations
Hobson hoped to avoid. It would certainly take on the air of paternalism. If mandated
territories were represented, interference by other states and by the international government
would give them a lower status than that of advanced nations. Hobson was apparently
untroubled by such paternalism.®^ This is a strange conclusion for someone who was
supposedly so concerned about questions of welfare and just peace in the relations of
advanced and backward peoples®^ He condemned inter-imperialism of the League of
Nations as it was established, and yet his own proposals seem to imply the same
conclusions.®^ Hobson also seems to forget the distinction between material and human
welfare that he is usually so careful to draw. For instance, one of the more startling
contradictions in his work is his eulogy of the development of natural resources by Western
capitalism in Economic Interpreiaiion o f  Invest mem:
The development of a backward country by foreign capital is always beneficial to the 
country itself, to the industrial world at large, and to the investing country in 
particular.
Compare this with his opinion ten years earlier:
®^ Democracy and a Changing,' Civilisation, p. 143.
®^ Wealth and L ife ,  p. 391.
®® Problems o f  a New World, p. 186; Modern State, p. 35.
170
The successful exploitation of certain sources of material wealth might, for a time, be 
taken as tokens of success, and as constituting a service to the world; but a wider 
range of vision would show that these material gains were purchased by great racial 
disturbances, which made the price too costly.®^
Finally, a number of times Hobson remarks that the producers of raw materials are at an
advantage compared to manufacturers and traders. This argument seems to be a remnant of
Ricardian worries for the future of the capitalist compared to the landlords. Yet this
perspective suggests an improving condition for the countries with these natural resources.
This was clearly not the case in Hobson’s time; it is an even more dubious proposition today.
It is especially problematic in relation to Hobson’s other claims with regard to economic
internationalism, where the internationalisation of the economy can be expected to benefit
commerce predominantly, through improved communications and a wider division of
labour.®®
Critical Assessment
Hobson’s economic internationalism has been a rather neglected aspect of his work. This is 
unfortunate, since Hobson’s proposals were, if general in character, an important contribution 
to the transformation of liberal internationalism in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Two categories of criticisms that can be levelled at Hobson’s economic internationalism and 
his broader discussion of international economic relations are considered here. First, the 
relevance of Hobson’s work for the current international political economy is challenged. 
Second, there are criticisms of Hobson’s theory of international trade and his optimistic 
suggestions of the directions of economic internationalism on their own terms.
Despite this important contribution to liberal economic internationalism, Hobson’s 
theory of international trade and his discussion of international finance has been superseded 
both by subsequent developments and by more sophisticated theory.®® His discussion of 
international trade did not include an analysis of the effects of non-tar iff  barriers to trade,
®^ Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, pp. 100-1; Social Problem, p. 278.
®® Problems o f  a New World, pp. 224-5; Wealth and L ife , pp. 181-2.
®® The paradigm for international trade theory has, until recently, been the Heckscher-Ohlin 
modification of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. See Paul K rugman and Maurice Obstfeld, 
International Economics: Theory and Policy, ch. 4. This paradigm was challenged by radical 
development economists. For recent approaches to international trade theory, see Paul Krugman, 
Rethinking International Trade.
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a significant obstruction to the operation of free trade in the p o s t-1945 world economy. 
Though he acknowledged the role of international investment, Hobson did not grasp the idea 
of a multinational company or the internationalisation of production. For example, there is 
no discussion in Hobson’s work of intra-firm international trade, that is, trade across 
international borders between branches of a single multinational firm, and the consequent 
problem of transfer pricing. In Hobson’s defence, changing circumstances make the 
application of economic theory across the best part of a century tenuous at best. In his own 
time, Hobson was ahead of many in his recognition of the impending internationalisation of 
the economy, even if he could not work out the implications of this tendency. In short, 
Hobson’s defence of Cobden is peculiarly appropriate to Hobson himself: ‘The element of 
truth in this criticism is for the most part attributable to economic developments, the 
character and pace of which neither Cobden nor any other statesman of his time could have 
foreseen.
Hobson’s analysis of foreign investment is unsophisticated. He did not discuss or 
distinguish the different implications of direct investment of physical plant and portfolio 
investment, foreign investment that takes over already existing businesses as opposed to those 
that establish new industries, the repatriation of profits and dividends, and the issue of the 
creation of a dependent economy in the host country. For Hobson, ‘[cjapital invested abroad 
goes out in the shape of goods, for we have no money to send out, and it is not money but 
money’s worth that foreign borrowers want.’®® This is linked to Hobson’s simplistic notion 
of investment ‘as the process of the distribution of productive energy over an ever-widening 
area of activity, the movement of capital which it primarily effects being accompanied by a 
corresponding flow of business ability and labour-power, to co-operate with concrete capital 
in the production of wealth.’ Hobson considered activities ‘divorced from the solid facts of 
business life’, that is actual production of commodities, to be pure, wasteful speculation.®®
Hobson’s defence of free trade is premised on a unilateral free trade argument, that 
is, that each nation would benefit from free trade whatever other nations did.^°® This view
®^ Richard Cobden, p. 401.
®® Science o f  Wealth, p. 240. Foreign investment was thus a department of export trade, according 
to Hobson.
®® Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, preface.
International Trade, ch. 9. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism, pp. 24-37, for a critique of 
the unilateral free trade argument.
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has been refuted from the experience since the inter-war period. Indeed, Hobson 
acknowledged the need for political institutionalisation of free trade rules in his correction 
of free trade logic. Hobson also over-emphasised the harmful impact of protection on 
international relations, claiming that was a backward step for civilisation positing nations as 
inherently antagonistic actors. More recently, Susan Strange has argued that the effect of 
protection in world politics is negligible. The relations of nations continue during periods of 
high tariffs and other protective measures, because these relations are more important than 
mere trade.
There is something of an anomaly in Hobson’s writings on the increasing importance
of international trade. Hobson believed in the increasing internationalisation of the economy
in absolute lerms^ but at the same time admitted that:
When a modern nation has attained a high level of development in those industrial arts 
which are engaged in supplying the first physical necessaries and conveniences of the 
population, an increasing proportion of her [sic] productive energies will begin to pass 
into higher kinds of industry, into transport services, into distribution, and into 
professional, official and personal services, which produce goods and services less well 
adapted on the whole for international trade that those simpler goods which go to 
build the lower stages of civilization.
Unfortunately, he did not follow out the implications of the quandary of an internationalising
economy, yet a growing importance of domestic relative to international trade. Though this
is an intriguing point, Hobson’s belief that tertiary sector services and commodities were less
suitable for international trade has been proven mistaken by the internationalisation of
financial services, the international media and information networks and the growth of
tourism.
Placing Hobson’s free trade arguments in the historical context reveals another 
inconsistency. Hobson’s imperialism can be seen as a response to the Britain’s relative 
economic decline in the world economy. Under increasing pressure from the industrial 
competitiveness of the United States and Germany, British policy makers and industrialists 
were considering a move away from the hegemonic policy of free trade. Hobson, however, 
argued against, protectionism for Britain, because at the turn of the century British 
maintained trade supremacy. Turning from the benefits of free trade was folly for a great 
power which had the most to gain anyway for this policy, especially with its dominance of
Susan Strange, ‘Protectionism and World Politics’.
Imperialism^ p. 30-1. See also. International Trade^ p. 7. Though he had changed his opinion 
by 1911. See Science o f  Wealth, p. 241.
173
shipping and other transport. In the post-war period, Britain’s position in the world had 
clearly declined. Hobson now argued that Britain could not afford adopt protectionist 
measures because to do so would be to cut off the trade, e.g., in food and raw materials, that 
Britain was dependent on. Hobson shifted from free trade as beneficial to the hegemon, to 
free trade as essential to smaller powers reliant on foreign trade. The question remains, 
however, whether middle powers (for want of a better term) might benefit from protectionist 
policies, as the US and Germany had done.
Hobson’s proposals for national reform to allow free trade to operate fairly are flawed 
because nationally planned economies might well behave as monopolists in the world market 
rather than as beneficent states looking to maximise not only their own national welfare but 
global welfare. The corporatist states’ industries would compete with each other replicating 
the imperialism and protectionism Hobson was seeking to remove.
Hobson reconciled free trade and international government within the international 
application of his theory of cooperative surplus. Yet, this allows him to paper over the 
contradictions of an interventionist international government aiming to maximise global 
human welfare and the international economic system based upon laissez faire, as we saw 
with his writing on the mobility of labour. The theory of cooperative surplus appears to be 
so broad that it is applicable to any conceivable circumstance, even - as in Hobson’s work in 
the thirties - to the reversal of liberal hopes for a free and open international economy. 
Hobson avoided the contradictions by staying with general principles and abstract analysis, 
except for his economic analysis of the effects of tariffs.
Hobson can be charged with economism for his emphasis on the importance of 
economic over political internationalism and reliance on traditional political economy 
arguments in his defence of free trade. While economics will dominate a discussion of 
economic internationalism, his reduction of the theory of cooperative surplus in international 
relations to a defence of free trade arguments. Two forms of argument that are rejected by 
Hobson elsewhere appear in his economic internationalism: first, that social and political 
relations are determined by economic relations; and second, that social and political relations 
are irrelevant to the more important economic aspects of international relations. In short, the 
autonomy of politics and economics that he challenged in old liberalism is restored in his 
economic internationalism. In contrast to his writings on the domestic economy, in 
international relations Hobson put economic advance ahead of social justice. Hobson’s
Hobson acknowledged the monopolistic tendencies of such an arrangement in Properly and 
Improperly, p. 205.
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economic internationalism reveals more clearly than elsewhere in his work the materialist, 
economistic aspect of his evolutionary theory of cooperative surplus. He claimed that nations 
were not economic units. This sounds plausible until it is asked, what then is an economic 
unit? Hobson’s implicit answer was that the individual or the firm is the unit in the global 
market. This, though, is an answer dangerously close to laissez fa ire  dogma.
Hobson acknowledged that states were becoming important traders in their own right, 
just as they grew to fill the welfare role that Hobson carved out for them. It might be argued 
that Hobson disposed of the economistic arguments of laissez faire  in his proposals for 
international economic government. Yet, the basis for his argument for political intervention 
in the economy is itself economistic, the need to control the economy to maximise welfare. 
We have seen that, for Hobson, welfare was not exclusively an economic category. However, 
in his stress on the predominance of economic relations in international affairs, Hobson 
deviated greatly from his humanism. Even as he proposed the need for political control in 
international economic relations in parallel to the control of the economy domestically, 
economics rather than politics still seem to predominate; ‘international economics must be 
supported and sustained by international p o l i t i c s . I n  international organisation, as for 
the functionalists, political form follows economic function. Economic factors lead where they 
do not determine political factors.
Hobson was optimistic on the prospects for international economic relations. He 
believed that the economic contacts of nations were beneficial and encouraged cooperation 
and with it brought the prospect of political unity, peace and prosperity. This optimism can 
be a bourgeois Western ideology of international relations, as is reflected in Hobson’s 
discussion of mandates and the development of natural resources. Hobson was unconscious 
of the authoritarian tenor of his open door proposals and the possibility that contacts between 
nations could be disastrous for some, though he was aware of the possibility of abuse of 
international economic government.
In Hobson’s defence, his proposals were meant to be general rather than specific and 
to sketch the outline of what was needed rather than construct a blueprint or analyse a 
particular aspect of international economic relations. His economic analysis has been 
superseded, perhaps, but the political purpose remains. In the context of his time, Hobson
Evolution o f  Modern Capitalism^ p. 493. International Government^ p. 196; Democracy A fter the 
War, pp. 175-6.
105 Ashley, ‘Three Modes of Economism’.
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attempted to push forward discussion of important political issues without getting sidetracked 
by details or detained by excessive caution. In the longer term, Hobson’s special contribution 
was the development of a new context for theorising about international economic relations. 
Hobson transformed the liberal debate on international economic relations, from the free trade 
of Cobdenite radicalism towards a functional approach to international economic organisation. 
Hobson’s approach foreshadows the work of scholars concerned with the development of 
international institutions to stabilise economic relations, to mitigate the effects of the world 
market and to alleviate poverty. However, the similarity between Hobson and the 
functionalists and those who followed on from functionalism can be over-stretched. Hobson’s 
political purpose and his normative standards, that underlie his advocacy of an international 
economic government, distinguish him from the positive analysis in international relations
today.
Conclusion
The majority of Hobson’s discussion of international relations is devoted to the positive and 
negative aspects of the economic relations of nations, imperialism and economic 
internationalism. Hobson held apparently contradictory views on international economic 
relations that he made compatible with his theory of cooperative surplus. While there are some 
problems of internal consistency, of the theory being outdated by subsequent events and being 
too general to be operationalisable, Hobson’s work was influential in the study of international 
relations. He was one of the contributors to what has since been labelled the functional 
approach to international organisation.
Hobson deviated from the liberal paradigm in international economic relations. Liberal 
approaches to international economic relations are usually characterised as individualist and 
laissez faire. The paradigm liberal international economic policy is free t r a d e . H o b s o n  
developed an approach to international economic relations at odds with the usual 
characterisation of liberal approaches. While he supported free trade, he also advocated
For instance, John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order’; R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr., 
Transnational Relations and World Politics.
See for instance, R.D. MacKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order., chs. 2, 5. 
For the paradigmatic status of ‘economic liberalism’ in interpretations of liberal international political 
economy, see R. Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International Relations., p. 26-31, and Stephen Gill 
and David Law, The Global Political Economy., ch. 4.
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international economic government, qualifying the classical liberal tenets of economic 
internationalism and proposing reforms of international economic relations to make them 
more equitable.
Chapter S ix
International Government and the Maintenance of Peace
That Hobson should propose an international government as a rational organisation of 
international relations appears to follow logically from a consideration of Hobson’s theoretical 
system. The functional logic of his theory of surplus value, emphasising the benefits of 
cooperation, organisation and social control by the state, also points to government for the 
society of nations. Hobson’s detailed proposal for international government appeared during 
the First World War. In Towards International Government and the Union of Democratic 
Control pamphlet, A League o f  Nations, Hobson addressed the questions of international 
peace, security and order, and suggested international government as an alternative to the 
Balance of Power system which, he believed, had been a major cause of the First World War.^ 
He argued that peace could only be achieved by centralising force to strengthen international 
law and methods of peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Hobson justified his ideas 
on centralised force through an appeal to the surplus and organic concepts. His discussion of 
international government as the culmination of the growth of international institutions and 
his broader proposals for an international federation are also couched in terms of these 
concepts. Hobson’s reliance on a centralised force sits uneasily with his evolutionary 
discussion of international relations, however. This chapter explores the tension between 
Hobson’s idea of an international government maintaining the peace and his ideas on the 
emergence of peace through international cooperation.
The first section of the paper examines Hobson’s proposals for an international 
government involving extended provisions for arbitration and conciliation and the 
establishment of an international force. Hobson’s broader conception of international 
government as a federation of nations united by a network of international functional 
institutions is discussed in the second section. The third section considers Hobson’s reaction 
to the League of Nations and international developments during the twenties and thirties. The 
fourth section places Hobson’s proposals for an international government in the context of his 
surplus and organic concepts. The fifth section assesses his proposals for an international 
government and his critique of the fledgling League as a preliminary stage to international
 ^Towards International Government, A League o f  Nations. Hobson was not alone in making such 
proposals. Other proposals, Leonard Woolf, International Government, Viscount Bryce and others. 
Proposals fo r the Prevention o f  Future IVars. See the collection of schemes and proposals in Leonard 
Woolf (ed.). The Framework o f  a Lasting Peace and in Lord Phillimore, Schemes fo r  Maintaining 
General Peace.
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government. In conclusion, Hobson’s discussion of the foundations of the international 
government is placed in the context of the tradition of institutional reform of international 
relations.
The Logic of International Government: Collective Security, Law and Peace
Hobson argued a simple, logical case for international government. He did not detain himself 
with the intricate details of how such an institution might actually operate. Hobson claimed 
that it would be bad intellectual economy to get bogged down in the details.^ He argued that 
the international government must have extensive powers and functions ceded to it by states. 
He proposed that arbitration and conciliation should replace war as the means to resolve 
disputes between states not settled through diplomatic means. The kernel of his proposals, 
however, was that nations should use their joint pressure to ensure that disputants agree to go 
to peaceful settlement. Members of the new international organisation would deter aggression 
both from within and outside the organisation through the threat of the use of their 
predominant force in Joint action against an aggressor. Hobson believed that collective force 
would not only enhance peaceful settlement but would encourage nations to disarm.
Hobson hoped that his proposals fulfilled three requirements of international peace: 
first, the consolidation, extension and addition of sanction to international law; a second, the 
establishment of a method of just and peaceful settlement; and third, the reinforcement of 
methods for constructive cooperation.® The first two of these are the subject of this section; 
the last is discussed in the next.
Arbitration, Conciliation and the Extension o f International Law
Hobson approved of the development of arbitration agreements in the Hague and in 
bilateral treaties before World War One. He argued, though, that the War had exposed their 
flaws as means of peaceful settlement. Arrangements for arbitration were weak because there 
were a multitude of separate treaties with different rules. There was little consistency among 
them to permit the extension the rules of arbitration into general principles of international
® Towards International Governntent, preface.
® For a summary statement of Hobson’s version of what a League treaty should look like, see 
Towards International Government, p. 27; ‘Political Bases of a World State’, p. 263.
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law. While agreements on arbitration varied widely in scope and application, Hobson decried 
two common features. First, honour and vital interests were usually excluded from arbitration 
treaties. Second, dispute settlement utilised a tribunal putatively balanced by an equal 
representation of partisan judges. For Hobson, the first created a loophole for aggression; the 
second mistook ‘balanced’ partisanship for impartiality. Hobson also condemned arbitration 
arrangements before the War for their lack of sanction.^
Hobson proposed a single arbitration treaty to be signed by all states. This universal 
treaty would standardise international legal procedure. He argued that submission of disputes 
and observation of arbitration awards be compulsory. He called for a sanction to be attached 
to failure to submit disputes or to honour awards.®
Hobson acknowledged that not all disputes were amenable to arbitration. Disputes that 
could be arbitrated were those involving legal interpretation of treaties or international law, 
disputes that could be settled within international law, and disputes concerning facts that 
could be scrutinised according to the legal rules of evidence.®
Non-arbitrable disputes were those that involved political issues and economic and 
other interests. These were by their nature more controversial, but also were likely to the 
greater source of international strife. To deal with these disputes, Hobson suggested drastic 
changes to the Hague’s International Commissions of Inquiry to transform them into what he 
called a Conciliation Commission. Hobson’s proposals for the new Commission parallel those 
for the arbitral tribunal. There was to be a general treaty adhered to by all states, including 
provision for the compulsory submission of all disputes without reservations. The proposal 
that the restructured Commission should be permitted to discuss all non-arbitrable disputes 
widened the scope of the Commissions of Inquiry considerably.^
Hobson further proposed that the Conciliation Commission should not be limited to 
making reports based on their inquiries and attempts at conciliation. It would, like the arbitral 
court, make awards. Awards would propose resolutions to disputes which must be abided by
 ^ See Towards /niernational Governmeni, ch. 3; League o f  Nations, p. 8; and ‘Political Basis of a 
World State’, p. 272.
® Towards International Government, pp. 34-40. League o f  Nations, p. 8
® Towards International Government, p. 34; League o f  Nations, p. 10; ‘Political Bases of a World 
State’, p. 269.
 ^ League o f  Nations, p. 11; Towards International Government, pp. 47 -8 .
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the disputants.® Hobson suggested another major innovation: he hoped that the Conciliation
Commission could have a preventive as well as a curative role in dispute resolution. To this
end, he recommended that the Commission should have the power to initiate inquiries into
disputes or potential areas of conflict, even if the case had not been submitted by the
disputants. Hobson hoped that the commission might intervene in the early stages of disputes
and thus facilitate peaceful resolution and avoiding outbreak of hostilities.®
Hobson also advanced the idea of ‘cooling off’ as an aid to peaceful settlement.^® For
Hobson, halting a state’s pursuit of its cause by military means gave ‘the opportunity for a full
rally o f  the resources of informed public opinion on the side of peace’. He claimed that:
Delay, the statement of the case and the consequent appeal too justice, will, therefore, 
insensibly and not slowly undermine the absolutism of the modern State, by enabling 
statesmen to perceive that the reasonable self of a nation can only be maintained by 
membership of a Society of Nations, and that such membership involves a submission 
of its private arbitrary judgement on international matters of conduct to the rational 
will of the whole Society.
In short, rational thought would prevail given time and the pacific influence of world and
national public opinion would have time to assert itself.
Finally, Hobson wished to support the activities of the commission with a sanction to
enforce submission of disputes and compliance with its awards, if required.
To summarise, Hobson proposed measures to facilitate and enforce legal settlement
of disputes between states. These measures were to replace war and mitigate states’s attempts
to be the judges in their own cause. To effect these proposals, Hobson insisted upon two
fundamental changes in the nature of contemporary international law. First, treaties for
peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration and conciliation had to be made wider in
their scope and have the (near) universal adherence by states. Submission of disputes to the
Court or Commission was to be compulsory and without reservation, as was the observation
of awards handed down. Hobson tried, then, to close the loopholes through which states had
® Or an alternative resolution agreed to by both disputants.
® Towards International Government^ pp. 55-6.
He cited as examples the treaties made in 1914 between the United States and a number of other 
countries, that established a ‘cooling o ff’ period and set up Permanent International Commissions to 
examine any disputes between the signatories. See Towards International Government^ pp. 51-2.
Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 134, p. 136. See also Towards International Government^ pp. 50-3; 
‘Political Bases of a World State’, pp. 270-2.
Towards International Government^ pp. 4 7 -8 ;  League o f  Nations, p. 11.
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been able to avoid arbitration and fight aggressive wars, such as the First World War.
Hobson’s proposal for peaceful settlement of disputes entailed a treaty setting up an
international organisation of which all states would be members:
The Treaty establishing a League of Nations would, ... in the first instance, bind the 
signatory Powers, not to a particular mode of settlement by Arbitration or otherwise, 
but to submit all issues on request to a Joint Committee of Investigation, empowered 
to determine whether the particular issue was by reason of its nature, or the point of 
its development suitable for settlement by Arbitration or Conciliation, or by a 
preliminary process of Inquiry by the Council of Conciliation with a view to 
subsequent reference to Arbitration.^^
Collective Force, an International Executive and Disarmament
Resolution of disputes by arbitration and the rules of international law instead of war 
rested ultimately on the ability of the international community to compel disputants to come 
to arbitration or conciliation and observe awards. The third major change in international law 
Hobson called for was that there be sufficient sanction to enforce submission and compliance 
with awards. Hobson claimed that arbitration and conciliation would come to nought if there 
was no adequate sanction for non-compliance with the obligation to submit disputes or honour 
awards. Without a credible sanction, Hobson argued, states would not be able to trust in 
arbitration or conciliation. He asked Mf no provision is made for enforcing the acceptance of 
the recommendations of [the conciliation commission], what measure of security has been 
attained?’. States would fear that others would ‘defect’ (to use recent game theory terminol­
ogy), that is, continue to use war as an instrument of national policy and not abide by 
international decisions. They would therefore continue to rely on traditional means of 
providing for national security. This fear, Hobson pointed out, was at the root of the arms 
races between states and was a major source of international conflict.
Collective force involved a cession of certain sovereign powers by states. Hobson 
recognised that states would be reluctant to undertake to make an international force that 
could conceivably be used against themselves. He hoped, however, that the manifest failure 
of international mechanisms lacking such central power to back up the law would persuade 
states that collective force was the only way forward.
The emphasis on the necessity of force is a novelty to Hobson’s discussions of
Towards International Government, p. 56.
Towards International Government, pp. 99 -100 .
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international r e l a t i o n s . Hobson both defended and criticised the arrangements for peaceful 
settlement at the Hague. These arrangements failed, he claimed, not because they were 
fundamentally misguided but because they were not supported by an adequate sanction. 
According to Hobson, the first essential of the international government was to keep the peace 
and that it must be strong enough to do so.^® In The Case for Arbiiration and Imperialism^ 
Hobson had argued that public opinion and a sense of justice are sufficient for the operation 
of international arbitration. Arbitration is taken to be the peaceful alternative to settlement 
of disputes by war. By contrast his view in Towards I niernational Government shows a 
something of a realist turn towards the use of force in the face of the failure of such moral 
sanctions.
Hobson argued that a sanctioned scheme would encourage peace because it would be 
an incentive to disarmament. A collective force as a sanction for arbitration decisions would 
break the cycle of fear of one state of another’s aggression, Hobson believed. Such an 
arrangement would only work though, if all states were convinced that there is no gain to be 
made from aggression. Under such conditions, it might even attract states initially outside the 
treaty: ‘If the united strength of the Treaty Powers remained so great as to render the 
pursuance of [a state’s] aggressive designs impossible or too dangerous, the lawless Power 
might learn the lesson of the law, and abandoning its hopes of aggression, come into the 
League.’ ®^
Hobson believed that states would trade their nationally provided security through 
military forces for the international law backed by a collective force. He claimed that alliances 
are notoriously short-lived and that the new international government collective security 
mechanism would reverse the motives of national policy, encouraging particularist ties will
The turn to force was not uncommon in international relations writing at the time. See H. 
Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals^ ch. 5; Fred Northedge and Michael 
Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects^ p. 21.
Towards International Government^ p. 84, 96; cf. ‘Political Bases of a World State’, p. 269.
Kenneth Waltz is thus in error when he claims that Hobson emphasizes the force of public 
opinion as a sanction for the international government. This is misreading of Hobson’s ideas of the 
long-term nature of democratic international government. See Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 150. 
For the context of Hobson’s remarks, see Towards International Government, ch. 12.
Towards International Government, p. 21. See also pp. 22-3. Hobson believed that the treaty 
would be so effective as to have to bind member states to ‘maintain a proper quota of military and 
naval forces for common purposes of defence.’ (p. 58).
183
tend to fade away.^® Hobson hoped that states would calculate their security gains in the 
international government and thereby be convinced to abandon their old alliances, intrigues 
and arms races.
Hobson dismissed the idea of creating an independent international force or 
permanently allocating national units to a joint force. Instead, he advocated a formal 
arrangement whereby member states in a collective security arrangement would take joint 
action as decided against an a g g r e s s o r .H e  also proposed that, as a result of  increasing 
international interdependence, an economic blockade of an aggressor could be a weapon in 
the collective security mechanism. However, he counselled that boycotts were prone to evasion 
by those supposedly implementing them and liable also to rebound on the initiators. 
Nonetheless, he particularly approved of the idea of a financial (as opposed to trade) boycott. 
A financial boycott, he suggested, would be facilitated by the creation of an international 
financial institutions as part of the international government.
Hobson conceded that a Joint Standing Committee would be sufficient to direct the 
collective force of a minimal League of Peace. More extensive international arrangements for 
peace, such as he was proposing, would require an international council, representing the 
member-states, to act as the executive of international d e c i s i o n s . ‘Without such a 
representative body in permanent being,’ he argued, ‘a deep sense of unreality will continue 
to attach to the Court of Arbitration and the Committees of Conciliation and to the treaty 
which shall claim to establish them as authoritative modes of settlement.’^  ^The international 
council would embody the universality of the arbitration and conciliation agreements as well 
as the collective security mechanism. Being a permanent international body, the international 
council could take action to prevent as well as remedy international conflicts.
Towards Internalional Covernemnl^ p. 84.
Towards Internalional Government, pp. 76-9, 96-100. Collective security is not a term used by 
Hobson but his proposals are equivalent to such a system.
Towards International Government, pp. 90-5.
Towards International Government, pp. 55-6, 101-9; League o f  Nations, p. 12.
Towards International Government, p. 109. See also pp. 110-11, and ‘Political Bases of a World 
State’, pp. 272-5.
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The Membership and Structure o f  the Internalional Government
Hobson’s use of terms such as international government and society of nations are not 
particularly specific. By world state, Hobson meant ‘any body of political arrangements to 
which most of the principle nations of the world are parties, sufficiently stable in character 
and wide in scope to merit the title of international g o v e r n m e n t .H e  is not even consistent 
in his use of the phrase ‘society of nations’, which sometimes appears to mean the collectivity 
of the nations o f  the world, and sometimes the government of that collectivity.^^ The 
binding together into a treaty for arbitration, for Hobson was the basis for confederation.^®
An international court overseeing arbitration and conciliation and an international 
executive council, Hobson believed, formed the basis of an international government. Hobson 
did not discuss an international secretariat or administration to any great degree, except to 
assume that there should be one to support the operations of the new international institutions. 
More significantly, Hobson proposed that there should be an international legislature to go 
with the executive and judiciary. Hobson suggested that an international council would be an 
inadequate solution to the problems of international relations. The potential for international 
conflict was constantly being created by the rapidly changing world. He proposed that a legis­
lative institution was essential to the new international government. This international 
parliament would make and amend international law and treaties to facilitate international 
cooperation and avoid potential conflicts. For Hobson, an international legislature was a 
logical consequence of his analysis. He had allocated the Conciliation Commission the power 
to initiate inquiries into disputes and potential conflict situations. He acknowledged that the 
awards and inquiries of the Commission would amend old international law and create new 
ones. A legislative body was required to oversee the modifications and development of 
international law to ensure its coherence and relevance to contemporary international
‘Political Bases of a World State’, p. 260.
Michael Freeden mistakenly argues that Hobson used ‘Society of Nations’ as a replacement for 
the flawed League of Nations during the thirties. See his Introduction to J.A. Hobson: A Reader^ p. 
21. In fact, Hobson used the term inconsistently. However, he used the term both before and during 
the First World War, usually to mean the collectivity of nations. Occasionally, using capitals Hobson 
referred to the Society of Nations to mean the government of the collectivity of nations. For Hobson’s 
early uses of the term, see ‘The Morality of Nations’, p. 248; The Case for Arbitration^ p. 2; and 
Towards International Government^ p. 192.
Towards International Government^ ch. 2.
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conditions.
Hobson argued that all willing nations should be admitted into the new in ter­
governmental arrangements. There were immediate and practical as well as long-term reasons 
for Hobson’s arguments for universality in his international government. A fter the First World 
War, the exclusion of the defeated powers, particularly Germany, would mean that the 
international government was effectively a continuation of the victorious alliance. Ultimately, 
Hobson believed, a League only of the war-time allies would bring about the reassertion of 
the balance of power. Inclusion of Germany would, he believed, aid the reduction of lingering 
resentment of war between the combatant nations. While Hobson hoped that the new 
international government would be the international manifestation of democracy, Hobson 
argued that non-democratic states, such as Russia, and of non-European states such as Japan 
and the USA, because ‘an attempt to treat Europe as a separate political system would be 
mischievous’. Furthermore, in the long term, international justice and the ‘wider task of 
preserving world-order could only be performed with equity if all the nations were 
represented in the League’.
In his discussion of voting power in the international council, clearly the hub of the 
international government in Hobson’s eyes, he argued against ‘one state one vote’. To begin 
with there was a huge disparity between states. There was little prudential need for formal 
equality of nations in an international government, as there was with individual representation 
in national government. Hobson argued, further, that setting voting rights according to 
sovereign statehood would have a deleterious impact on internationalism. He speculated that 
population might be a basis for representation and voting, and later that standard of
civilisation might be an important qualification to a strict population measure. Hobson
claimed that this utilitarian notion was not sound in principle but the most likely to be
adhered to by the statesmen of the Great Powers who will be the ones most needed in the
establishment of the new organisation: ‘putting the matter at its worst,’ he argued ‘it would 
be better for the interests of the great nations to prevail than for those of the small nations, 
not because a great nation is more likely to be in the right, but because it is better for a larger
Towards Iniernational Governmeni, pp. 114-9.
The quotes are from League o f  Nations, p. 19 and Towards International Government, p. 157. 
For more extensive discussion, see pp. 24-5, 154-61; League o f  Nations, pp. 17-9.
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number of human beings to have their way than for a smaller.’ ®^
Hobson was concerned about the matter of the type of person who should participate 
in the activities of the international government. Appropriate appointments for the Court of 
Arbitration and, to a lesser extent, the Conciliation Commission, would be ‘men of legal 
eminence’.^ ® The Executive Council should be made up of representatives from the 
member-states. These representatives, Hobson hoped, would be men of public affairs, such 
as politicians, literary figures, and so on, rather than the career diplomats who represented 
and espoused what he regarded as the old order. He hoped that democratic nations would elect 
their representatives. Democratic representation would give the representative legitimacy and 
ensure that he was respected at home. Democratic election would also, Hobson believed, 
encourage the participation on the Council of men imbued with the spirit of internationalism. 
To operate effectively, Hobson believed that the Council would have to be made up of 
permanent representatives. These men could devote their time and energy to the international 
government and avoid the distraction of national commitments.
The issues of the character of international personnel and (where possible) democratic 
representation were critical in Hobson’s eyes. To remove the diplomats of the old order was 
essential in order to give the experiment in internationalism a chance of succeeding. Old ways 
would cramp internationalism and infuse international cooperation with the tradition of 
suspicion that had predominated in the past. In the long run, election of representatives to the 
international government was considered by Hobson a step towards a truly democratic 
international government, accurately representing ‘the international mind’.^^
Though he later admitted (in Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic) that the notion of 
democratic control of foreign policy was harder to pin down than many had thought, in 
Towards International Government^ he stressed the importance of public scrutiny and input 
from democratically-elected representatives into the main lines of foreign policy, including
Towards International Government^ p. 165. See also, pp. 162-6, League o f  Nations^ p. 19, though 
he was to contradict this argument later. See Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 147-50; The 
Modern State, p. 35.
Towards International Government, pp. 64-71. No doubt intending this remark also to apply to 
women, women maintained the convention throughout his writing of using ‘men’ to mean all people.
Towards International Government, pp. 62-4, 67-70, 104-9; League o f  Nations, pp. 15-6. 
International Mind was a phrase first coined before the First World War by Nicholas Murray Butler 
in The International M ind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement o f  International Disputes.
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the signing and amending of t r e a t i e s . F i r s t ,  in the early stages of the international 
government, democratic control would prevent a swift return to the old politics by ousting the 
personnel of that era. Second, democratic control was part of Hobson’s larger vision of a 
democratic federation of nations; in other words it was a long-term goal of ‘real 
internationalism’ and the triad of peace, democracy and internationalism.
International Government, Cooperation and Peace
Hobson’s arrangements for international government conceived peace and security as of the 
greatest importance. However, according to Hobson, the institutional arrangements of 
arbitration, an international council and collective force were of curative or preventive 
measures. Hobson believed that international government could resolve some of the 
underlying tensions that led to the outbreak of hostilities. He proposed international 
cooperation as a route to a more fundamental peace than would be achieved merely through 
institutional innovation; it could do more than simply keep the peace. The positive role of 
international government in encouraging international cooperation, Hobson’s constructive 
internationalism, was based on his organic analogy and theory of cooperative surplus. 
Constructive internationalism was, as we have seen in chapter three, the latest stage in the 
evolution of international relations, according to Hobson.
Hobson’s suggestions for international government-led cooperation mirror his surplus 
and organic concepts. Hobson hoped that the international government would be able to tackle 
international economic problems and especially to address the issue of international economic 
inequality. He claimed that international institutions had grown over the course of the 
nineteenth century, largely to deal with international issues raised by commerce, 
transportation and communications, and other technical matters. Hobson believed that ‘[w]e 
possess already the beginnings alike of the legislative, judicial, and administrative apparatus 
of international government’ and advocated building on these rudimentary organs of 
international government.
Hobson argued for international regulation of the rapidly changing and increasingly 
complex technical cooperation across national boundaries. An international body to monitor
Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic^ p. 104; Towards International Government, p. 200-11; on 
British policy. League o f  Nations, p. 20, but compare to point 2 in New Holy Alliance, p. 8. Also see 
Democracy A fter the War, p. 210.
‘Political Bases o f  a World S ta te ’, p. 268 -9 . See also pp. 26 1 -2 ;  League o f  Nations, p. 3 -4 .
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and oversee these new developments was required. Regulation effectively created new law, 
implying a role for the international legislature. He argued that the benefits of central 
organisation of technical and commercial international cooperation would lead to a steady 
growth in functions for the international government, because ‘an immensely enhanced 
economy would be given to this co-operation if its various branches could be gathered into 
a single centre and placed under a single international supervision and control.’^  ^ This 
centralising tendency had been manifest in all smaller areas of society, and Hobson believed 
that the same would apply to the society of nations.*® At the same time, international 
functional agencies would be delegated specific functions. Thus, the international government 
would grow from its beginnings as a minimal arrangement to secure peace to one that would 
forward human welfare through constructive cooperation and positive internationalism.
Another serious issue in international relations was nationalism.*® While he supported 
the rights of nations, Hobson was concerned about the exclusive and aggressive aspects of 
nationalism. He suggested therefore that the international government should be organised 
according to the twin concepts of federalism and autonomy. Reflecting the concentric circles 
of community, autonomy did not require, Hobson argued, full sovereign rights in the form 
of a nation-state. Autonomy could be achieved within the current states, once they had been 
reformed and democratised, he argued.*^ The alternative, the creation of many small, new 
states was fraught with potential dangers, from international instability to a stimulation of 
economic nationalism.*®
Federalism was, according to Hobson, ‘the international aspect of democracy’.*® An 
international federation would be a single overarching political structure for the world, to
*^  Towards Internalional Government, p. 117. See also pp. 112-118; League o f  Nations, p. 7. Such 
private intercourse could also benefit from the central direction of the international government.
** Towards International Government, pp. 147-8, 170-2.
*® Towards International Government, pp. 119-27.
*  ^ Towards Internalional Government, pp. 23, 126, 134.
*® This idea fulfilled a significant political purpose for Hobson as well as being a theoretically 
satisfying solution to the problem of nationalism. At the end of the First World War, the victorious 
allies were openly discussing the dismemberment of their erstwhile opponents. Hobson and others on 
the Left opposed this idea as destabilising and reactionary. The irony of Leftist support for Austria- 
Hungary, Turkey and Russia has been remarked upon by A.J.P. Taylor in The Trouble-M akers, p. 
147.
39 Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. viii.
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match the world economy, while reflecting the diversity of political and cultural world.
Federalism was, for Hobson, a functional mode of government:
Federalism implies everywhere the subordination of the absolute sovereignty of one 
political area to the claims of a wider rule on the ground that certain aspects of local 
or national government vitally affect the wider area. It may be regarded as an 
economy of government, each area, from the family through the widening areas of 
local and national government to internationalism, practising free self-government in 
such matters as fall predominantly within the compass of its own knowledge, interest 
and capacity.'^®
The international government would be concerned with matters of international peace, 
security, economy and so on, but would delegate many of the other functions to national 
governments, which in turn would deal with their particular concerns and delegate the rest 
to local governments.
An international federation was Hobson’s ideal for an international government. He 
believed that an international federation was an expression of civilisation. It would give 
substance to the emerging international mind, the spirit of internationalism, that was growing 
among civilised peoples. Besides the federal structure, Hobson’s ideal involved democratic 
states, along the lines of Kant’s scheme in Perpetual Peace. Another important facet of 
Hobson’s vision was the democratic control of foreign policy. If the peoples controlled their 
relations with one another, there would be less likelihood of armed conflict. The operation of 
public opinion within the nation and worldwide would be in favour of peaceful international 
relations. Education in internationalism, part of which was participating in the experiment 
in international government itself, would be required for an informed and reasonable public 
opinion to be formed, Hobson thought. This public opinion as expressed in the nation’s 
foreign policy would then be in tune with the international mind. Hobson hoped that 
education would correct public opinion and mitigate the influence of the capitalist media. 
Hobson also believed in education through experience in internationalism; international 
government teaches the benefits of international co-operation.^^ Similarly, Hobson hopes 
that nations and their governments who are, as he puts it ‘unenlightened’ about 
internationalism, will learn from the experience of international government and the activities 
of the internationalist-inclined nations, that this is the way forward.
Hobson did not hold that all these elements were required for any experiment in 
international government, such as the League of Nations, to be worthwhile. However, he did
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 138. See also Problems o f  a New World, p. 253, 260. 
Towards International Government, chs. 12-13.
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believe that an international federation of democratic nations was the political arrangement 
of the world to guarantee a true, lasting peace.
Hobson’s conception of the international government differed from his idea of the 
League as a collective security mechanism. The latter involved a strong central government 
with decisions being made at the centre in order to be authoritative. The international 
federation Hobson saw as the ideal would have to delegate authority for many political 
decisions to the respective national states, and on industrial, financial and commercial matters 
to what he calls ‘federal functional bodies’. T h e  contrast between these two approaches is 
the subject of the fourth section.
The League of Nations
It would be an understatement to say that Hobson was not impressed with the League of 
Nations. He poured scorn upon the new international arrangement, ‘this sham league’, as he 
called it. The League of Nations was ‘oligarchic’, ‘a conspiracy of autocrats’, ‘a League of 
Governments’, ‘a travesty of internationalism’, ‘a Holy Alliance of the Entente Powers’, but 
most explicitly, ‘a League of the Foreign Offices of the Governments of the victorious 
Allies...’. The League was a sham because it was not the League of Nations or Peoples but a 
‘League of Conquerors’.'*^  The tenor of Hobson’s criticisms of the new League can be 
indicated in a sentence: it was an inadequate international government. All this, despite the 
fact that he had initially dismissed the idea that a League of Nations could become a New 
Holy Alliance!^^
Hobson wrote a stinging critique of the Peace negotiations at the end of the First 
World War and the creation of the League within that framework. He exposed what he called 
the idealism of the peoples and the politicians, and demonstrated how this idealism was 
exploited by powerful cliques of politicians and businessmen who had an interest in the re­
establishment of the old order of international relations.
Towards International Government, p. 117, 148, 191-2; Democracv and a Changing Civilisation, 
p. 143-7, 150-2, 173.
New Holy Alliance, p. 1 ,7; Problems o f  a New World, pp. 119-20, 186, 228, 235; Democracy 
A fter the War, p. 196.
Cf. Democracy A fter the War, p. 209; New Holy Alliance, p. 1.
See Problems o f  a New World, pt. 3, p a r t icu la r ly ,  chs. 1-2.
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Hobson criticised the creation of new nationalities in the Peace terms.^® Hobson 
decried unfair application of the principle of national self-determination. The principle was 
qualified by ‘military necessity’, ‘historical right’ and ‘economic need’. The principle and its 
exceptions were invoked in such a way that they worked against the defeated central 
European powers. The new states in central and Eastern Europe created new German 
minorities. The most stark abuse of the principle of national self-determination, however, was 
the refusal to allow the newly truncated Austria to join Germany, despite the express wishes 
of the Austrian population to do so.
The pandering to nationalist sentiment and the creation of new national boundaries 
to trade in the break-up of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires fostered resentment 
in the defeated nations, stimulated aggressive nationalism across Europe and stored up 
economic troubles for a stricken continent following an exhausting war.^^ The implications 
for the League were disastrous. With few provisions for sound economic internationalism in 
the League Covenant, Hobson correctly predicted that the League would preside over an 
increasing level of nationalist animosity and economic exclusion.
The Critique o f  the League o f Nations
The first problem with the League was that it was part of the peace negotiations. 
‘Instead of being founded on the broad basis of peaceful equality of nations,’ Hobson claimed 
that the League was ‘an appendage to a dictated peace, thus absorbing the principle not of 
equal justice but of force in its very origin.’
Hobson accused the makers of the League of seeking to perpetuate the conditions of 
the international order established by the Entente Powers victory. According to Hobson, the 
Covenant was ‘an extended War Alliance impudently masquerading as international’.'*® The 
League was made by the victorious allies and was composed of that alliance plus ‘good’ 
neutrals. Bad neutrals and enemies from the War were excluded from the new international 
organisation. This injustice was magnified by the provision in the Covenant that subsequent
Hobson’s opinions on the outcome of the Great War, its effects on national and international 
relations, along with some of his reactions to the Peace at Versailles, can be found in Problems o f  a 
New World, pt. 5.
Cf. Towards International Government, p. 120; Problems o f  a New World, pp. I l l ,  117 ,2 3 4 ,  252;
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 121-2.
*® Democracy A fter the War, p. 208.
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accessions to the League would be accepted only on a two-thirds vote of the League 
Assembly. Even then new member-states joined at the status of a small power. Hobson 
pointed out that the terms for Germany’s accession to the League meant that it would rank 
with Siam and Newfoundland rather than France or the United Kingdom.
Hobson was worried by the exclusion of Germany and Soviet Russia and the refusal 
of the US to take part in the League. The lack of universal membership, particularly the 
absence of a number of great powers, rendered the justice of its arbitral decisions and the 
activity of its collective force problematic. It created another complication: the League should 
not intervene in non-mem ber states’ affairs. Hobson argued that such interference was to rule 
without consent. The League Covenant should apply only to those states that signed it.^^
According to Hobson, the victorious great powers domination of the new international 
arrangement was institutionalised by their control of the Council, the most powerful decision­
making body in the League s e t - u p .H o b s o n  also criticised the allocation of votes in the 
League Assembly to the self-governing dominions of the British Empire. Hobson denied that 
these dominions were self-governing, particularly in the all-important area of foreign 
relations. The votes of the self-governing dominions were in fact British votes. He argued that 
this violated any pretence to democratic representation as it gave Britain six votes to every 
other state’s one.^^ Hobson argued, however, that the League was ‘futile’ anyway, because 
amendments to the League Constitution could only be effected with a unanimous vote of the 
membership. Hobson scoffed that this gave every member-state a veto on internationalism, 
effectively reinstating state sovereignty as the organising principle of the international 
experiment.®^
According to Hobson, the League was designed not as a mechanism for disarmament 
but as a second line of military defence for the great powers. The first means of defence was 
the retention of full national forces.®® Hobson pointed out that the retention of large 
national forces by League members would render disarmament impossible, because the arms
Problems o f  a New World, p. 229.
®° Towards International Government, p. 173, Democracy A fte r  the War, p. 208; New Holy Alliance, 
pp. 3-5; Problems o f  a New World, p. 113, 124, 228-9, 269-70; Modern State, p. 32.
®^ New Holy Alliance, p. 5.
®® New Holy Alliance, p. 8; Problems o f  a New World, p. 229.
53 New Holy Alliance, p. 6.
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race would continue.
He later criticised the League for failing to acknowledge underlying tensions that were 
major causes of international instability, such as imperialism and exclusive nationalism. 
League supporters had, claimed Hobson, over-emphasised narrow concerns with peace and 
disarmament to the neglect of the positive, constructive cooperation required as the basis of 
a true, lasting p e a c e .D is a rm a m e n t  and arbitration had failed and would continue to fail, 
he argued, if the international antagonism and fears that caused nations to build up their 
armouries were not removed.
Hobson attacked the Mandate system instituted in the League as ‘a thin veneer for the 
distribution of colonial spoils among the Big Five.’^^  League Mandate provisions were to 
apply to derelict empires and territories unable to govern themselves. However, this was a 
pretext for the division of the Ottoman and German overseas empires between the Allies, 
especially favouring the British dominions. The division of mandates had been decided by the 
victorious allies at a conference before the creation of the League. This division of mandated 
territories was then imposed on the League and the vanquished empires by the allies,
Hobson claimed that ‘[t]he mandatory clauses of the Covenant furnish the political 
machinery for the completion of the process by which Western Europe has absorbed in 
colonies and protectorates so large a section of the e a r t h . T h e  League mandates constituted 
a new phase in imperialism where the ruling classes of certain Powers would govern the entire 
world under the cloak of internationalism. Hobson was outraged that the League permitted 
the evasion of a provision only for ‘equitable’ (as opposed to equal) treatment of all trading 
and investment concerns in mandate territories. The mandatory power was effectively 
accorded economic privileges that it could hand to its nationals, excluding or restricting other 
nations’ industries. The transformation of the mandate idea, which Hobson supported as 
beneficial to internationalism, into a new form of imperial control was most obvious for 
Hobson in the absence of effective monitoring of the mandate territories by the League.
Modern State, p. 36; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 171; Problem o f  a New World, 
p. 227. Cf. League o f  Nations, p. 6
New Holy Alliance, p. 6. 
Democracy A fter the War, p. 193.
67 New Holy Alliance, pp. 6 -7 ;  Democracy After the War, pp. 191-3; Problems o f  a New World,
pp. 106, 186, 219, 226, 230-2 ; Modern State, p. 35; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 141-3.
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A Q ualified  Defence o f  the League
Hobson was not, however, all criticisms. He reserved a few kind words for the League
as the first tentative steps towards organising international cooperation and ultimately
international government. He defended the ultimate end of the League as the permanent
embodiment of an internationalism that had been evolving since the nineteenth century.
Before the War, Hobson had argued that ‘[t]he insistence upon freedom to make war
and bring havoc into the social order of the world, is a right not to rational liberty but to
anarchy.’ ®^ Hobson continued his opposition to unreserved rights for states after the War.
Indeed, the failure of the League was making ‘manifest the urgent peril of an anarchy of
States as an alternative’. R a m p a n t  sovereignty resulted in international anarchy, of which
international government was the only solution.
An ill-constructed State is generally better than anarchy. Now, the present alternative 
to a League of Nations, however unsatisfactory in its personal control, is a return to 
international anarchy.
This might appear a rather conservative idea, being the defence of the status quo. However, 
the League was, for Hobson, a flawed but vital institution in the creation of international 
peace and human welfare.
Hobson approved of the League’s acknowledgement of the principle that ‘effective 
self-government requires that the area of such government shall be related to the particular 
groups interested in the objects of such government.’®^ The League, thus, incorporated 
national interest as part of internationalism. This was preferable to an attempt to transform 
international relations with a cosmopolitan government or unitary world state. While wary of 
assertions of nationalism and sovereignty, Hobson viewed a single world state as unnatural in 
the context of contemporary international relations.®^
Hobson even excused the League’s failure to make significant advances in 
international cooperation. Hobson accounted for the slow progress in the tying of the new
Modern State; p. 32, Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 140.
The Case for Arbitration, p. 6.
®® Democracy A fter the War, p. 208; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 160, Cf. Towards 
International Government, p. 5.
®^ Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 135-6; see also p. 144.
Towards International Government, pp. 192-3; Political Basis o f  a World State, pp. 260 -1 .62
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international organisation to an unjust peace treaty. Furthermore, in the post-war period there
was, according to Hobson, an unparalleled atmosphere of antagonism and desire for revenge
in international relations. The suspicions of France, the exclusion of Soviet Russia, the
isolation of the United States, the feeling of betrayal and disillusionment in Germany and the
struggles of new European nation-states contributed to a renewed militarism and nationalism.
Hobson apologised for the failures of the League’s economic institutions. Effectual
operation of international economic institutions was precluded by the international economic
dislocation created by national economic insecurity, the fall-out of indebtedness and monetary
instability from the War and then the onset of the Great Depression.®^
Hobson proposed a series of reforms to improve on the League’s feeble performance
and reduce its biases. Reiterating the requirements of a successful international government,
he listed the following conditions:
The inclusion at the formation of the League of all willing nations, the detachment 
of the constitutions and functions of the League from all war associations, the 
adoption of open diplomacy and popular representation in the League government, 
effective international control over the relations between advanced and backward 
peoples, the application of the Open Door policy to all backward countries and new 
areas of economic development...
He also called for the immediate inclusion of Germany with status equal to the other Great
Powers, a truly representative international Parliament with deliberative and legislative
powers, a fairer basis for representation on the League Council, the replacement of the
unanimity provision by majority rule, and the creation of an international commission
reflecting the interests of labour to decide on international standards for working
conditions.®^
In Towards International Government, Hobson was cautious enough to admit that his 
more extensive proposals could not be expected to happen overnight.®® In his calls for 
reform, however, Hobson calls for immediate changes to the League that go far beyond
®® Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 234; Modern S ia u \  pp. 32-4; Democracy and a Changing 
Civilisaiion, p. 140. Hobson had hoped that the post-war world would not be so disrupted, see League 
o f  Nations, p. 2. This, however, does call into question Hobson’s optimistic belief in the 
transformative capacities of the populations in the wake of the war.
®^ New Holy Alliance, p. 8; Problems o f  a New World, p. 233. The International Labour Office did 
come into existence. For an example of Hobson’s later thoughts on constructive internationalism, see 
‘The Origins of the I.L.O.’
®® Compare the tone of Towards Internalional Government, preface and p. 127 with New Holy 
Alliance.
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merely remedying its defective origin. His calls for change to more constructive cooperation 
are apparently to be enacted as soon as possible.
The League and Internationalism in the Twenties and Thirties
Hobson continued to advocate reform in the name of the progress of civilisation 
through peace, democracy and internationalism, though he claimed that the First World War 
shook his conviction in the rationality of man. While he was concerned during this period with 
the problems of a new world, as he called it, there were new opportunities as well as looming 
dangers.
Hobson’s tone on international issues changed during the thirties. He became 
increasingly disillusioned with the League and the prospects for internationalism. The thirties 
were a period of instability and crisis, to be sure. Hobson was by now an old man who had 
outlived most of his life-long friends. The difficulties were greater still. The crises of the 
thirties, the failure of the League as a system of collective security, the rise of fascism and 
the Great Depression, confronted Hobson and his liberal and radical friends with the apparent 
failure of all they had hoped for. Can democracy survive? was a central question in Hobson’s 
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation. He even asked whether, in its present form, it should 
survive. His answer was (as ever), more or less, yes. Internationalism and peace, the other two 
parts of the triumvirate of political causes to which Hobson applied himself appeared to be 
suffering secular decline. For Hobson, the League manifestly failed in the crises over 
Abyssinia, Manchuria and Spain. His belief in the League as an instrument of international 
cooperation waned.®®
Hobson changed his opinion on the need for a single international force. He called for 
an international air force to deter aggression and keep the peace, a proposal similar to that by 
David Davies. This rather fantastic suggestion for reform can be seen simply as another 
variant of the centralised force, advanced in Towards International Government. However, 
there is a tone of desperation here. The suggestion strikes one as the outdated view of a 
Victorian who considered bicycles revolutionary.®^ Hobson closed his discussion of an
®® Property and Impropert)\ foreword, p. 132//.; ‘Thoughts on our Present Discontents’, p. 48.
®^ For an instance where Hobson appears rather Victorian, see Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 42. 
A note of caution shoudl be added to this criticism. After all, the structure of the suggestion of an 
international air force is not too dissimilar from the proposal that all nuclear weapons and knowledge 
concerning such weapons be collected in the United Nations. This latter proposal has been, and
197
international air force on an alarming note that sums up one of the problems with the idea of 
an international force: ‘can we look forward to an early time when humanity will triumph 
over nationality - or when the bombing of a city will be accounted a defence of 
humanity?’.®®
Hobson’s renewed emphasis on the importance of domestic reform further reflected
his withdrawal of support from the League. The ‘hard saying’ of 1915 became the only way
forward in the late thirties:
It is impracticable to hope for peace and justice in international affairs unless the 
conditions for internal peace and justice within the nations have already been 
substantially obtained.®^
Internationalism, democracy and peace were still intimately linked. However, now Hobson
believed that democracy within the nation-state had to come first, controverting his warnings
about the ‘Close State’ being of necessity militaristic. Though Kenneth Waltz has suggested
that Hobson’s is a state-level analysis of international relations, this is the first time that
Hobson places a temporal priority on domestic reform over international reform.^®
What remained of Hobson’s commitment to practical internationalism became a
defence of the achievements of democracy against the rise and aggression of the Fascist
Powers. He conceded the necessity of a limited organisation for collective defence. No doubt,
he admitted, this would reinstate the balance of power, but such were the circumstances that
this policy was necessary. For instance, Hobson approved of Clarence Streit’s plan for the
union of the democratic c o u n t r i e s . A t  the beginning of the Second World War, Hobson
hoped for US intervention in the war in the hope that the war would thus be prevented from
escalating or made shorter. His gloomy conclusion was that the Second World War could end
in a victory for Fascism or, even if the Western Powers were to win, a re-run of the iniquities
of Versailles.
In his war-time proposals, Hobson hoped that the peoples would lead internationalism.
continues to be in some quarters, considered seriously. See also Fred Northedge and Michael Donelan, 
International Disputes, p. 20.
®® ‘Force Necessary to Government’, p. 342.
®® Confessions, p. 113. See also Property and Improperty, p. 106; and ‘Ethics of humanity’. 
Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 146; J. Townshend, ‘Introduction’, Imperialism , p. [32]. 
‘Nationalism, Economic and Political’, p. 4.
‘A m e r ic a  in the W ar?’, p. 4.
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He closed Towards Iniernalional Government in a confident mood:
[The peoples] will insist that the obsolete rhetoric of Power and Sovereignty, with the 
ideas of exclusiveness and antagonism which it sustains, shall be swept away, and that 
the affairs which concern nations shall be set upon the same footing of decent 
reasonable settlement that prevails in every other human relation.
With his growing disillusionment with the League, Hobson admitted, however, that ‘[t]he
sentiment of humanity, human sympathy, still lags far behind the requirements of a sound
World Government’ and also behind the actual facts of economic and political
internationalism.^^ In his last writings, Hobson argued that a spirit of internationalism was
needed, rather than rational arguments why internationalism was sound or institutions
claiming to represent the international interest. While this spiritual internationalism was a
theme common to many of Hobson’s writings, here he contrasted it with the failure of the
practical experiment. There is the suggestion that true internationalism would have to wait
until the distant future and that no amount of international institutional reform would change
that.
The Logic of International Government and Hobson’s Evolutionary Approach to International 
Relations
Hobson’s discussion of international government is underpinned by his organic and surplus 
concepts. However, his proposals for the extension of international law and an international 
force, though he claimed it as a part of his scheme for a fully democratic international 
government, does not fit well with his evolutionary approach to international relations.
A central feature of Hobson’s proposals for an international government in 1915 was 
his emphasis on the need for a central force. Hobson claimed that peace was the first function 
of government. In international relations, he argued that the international government had to 
use force to maintain peace. The collective international force would impose justice and 
enforce decisions of the international court, as well as deterring aggression. He argued for a 
centralised force by appealing to an argument analogous to the theory of cooperative 
surplus.^^ According to Hobson, force could not be done away with entirely, because 
society or the world was neither entirely rational nor entirely just. However, with advances
Political Basis o f  a World State, p. 276-8. C f. League o f  Nations, p. 2; Towards International 
Government, p. 100, 153, 196-9. For the quotes, see p. 212 and Modern State, p. 36.
Towards International Government, p. 89.
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in civilisation, force was a diminishing element in social relations. Legitimate force had 
become more or less monopolised by a central agency representing the whole of society, i.e., 
the state, creating what Hobson called the economy of force in the progress of civilisation. 
Force (nearly) monopolised by the central agency resulted in an aggregate reduction in the use 
of force in s o c ie ty .F u r th e rm o re ,  Hobson argued, along the lines of his organic theory, 
that physical force per se was not a bad thing. It was only a malevolent factor when used 
disproportionately to ends secured or for an irrational purpose. For example, war in the 
international system was a bad thing because of its sectional nature. International force, 
representing the will of the international society, would be more likely to just. Nonetheless, 
Hobson argued, other rational methods of altering behaviour were to be preferred over force 
if these were available. Opponents of a world super-state, ‘moral force anarchists’, as Hobson 
called them, opposed Hobson’s arrangement on the grounds that as states were tyrannical, a 
super-state would be super-tyrannical. Hobson argued against this that central force was 
needed in all societies, large and small, throughout history, and that it was highly irresponsible 
to abjure the use of force in a society where morality was as yet undeveloped. ‘It is idle to 
imagine,’ he argued, ‘that a society starting with so little inner unity of status and purpose can 
dispense entirely with the backing of physical force with which the most highly evolved of 
national societies has been unable to dispense.’ ®^
In Towards Iniernalional Covernmeni, Hobson was hoping for a revolutionary change, 
exemplified by significant institutional innovation, in international relations. He described 
this, in his organic terminology, as a ‘rapid mutation’.^  ^ At the end of the First World War, 
he expected that the nations, tired of war, would call for a drastic change in international 
arrangements to avoid a recurrence of the Great War. He appears to have believed that such 
a rapid transition was possible, indeed a necessity, because of the unusual and traumatic 
conditions of the war and its immediate aftermath. He believed that the dread of the 
alternative, that is, a return to the war system of the balance of power, would be sufficient 
to convince people to support an international government.^®
Hobson’s economy of force argument for international government rested on a
Towards Iniernalional Governmeni, pp. 86-9.
Towards Iniernalional Governmenl, p. 96. See also p. 74-7, 87-9. 
‘Political Bases of a World State’, pp. 276-8.
Towards Iniernalional Governmeni, p. 109, 153, 212.
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presumption derived from his evolutionary approach to international relations; international 
relations was a backward realm of social organisation when compared to domestic society. As 
we have seen, Hobson believed that the morality of international relations was primitive but 
developing with the advance of internationalism. The economy of force argument suggested 
that force was necessary even in an advanced and civilised society such as Britain. How much 
more, Hobson maintained, did international relations require central force to maintain 
peaceable and just relations in the primitive, predominantly egoistic, morality of the society 
of nations.
Hobson’s conception of the primitive nature of international relations gave rise to an 
anomaly in the first half of Towards International Government. Though he condemned the 
use of the term Power when referring to the relations of nations, Hobson used this term 
throughout his discussion of his proposed League as an arbitration treaty, a collective security 
system and in his sketch of the structure of an international government.^®
Though adopting some of the rhetoric of an evolutionary approach, the force-oriented 
perspective of his international government proposals contrasts with the evolutionary 
perspective on international relations embodied in his broader suggestions for an international 
federation. Hobson recognised that government’s role goes beyond peace-keeping, as he had 
shown in the domestic context. Hobson stressed the need for curative or constructive 
cooperative measures over the purely preventive or curative for peace to be achieved in 
international relations.®® International government, like national governments, could 
encourage and direct cooperation. With Hobson advancing his view that international relations 
was developing and becoming more integrated, particularly in international economic 
relations, it would be appropriate for an international government to fulfil the role of the 
international cooperative institution representing the interests of the society of nations as a 
whole. The premise underlying this suggestion is that it is cooperation rather than a 
centralised force that brings peace. It also follows that international government reflects not 
the economy of force but the economy of organisation. This argument contradicts the premise 
of his argument for a centralised force. The argument for centralised force suggests that peace 
and order needs to be maintained in international relations for the achievement of 
improvements in human welfare to be possible; the argument for constructive internationalism
He even attacked the use of the term power in international relations later in Towards 
International Governmentl See pp. 180-1.
®® League o f  Nations., p. 6; Towards International Government., p. 116.
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suggests that the satisfaction of human welfare involves human interaction and institutions 
that will bring peace and order to international relations.
Hobson’s organic analogy and theory of cooperative surplus are incremental compared 
to the revolutionary change he called for his blueprint in Towards International Government. 
In contrast to his centralised international government as a collective security mechanism, 
Hobson’s ideas on international government as an international organisation performing 
welfare functions and reflecting the federal nature of international political life are 
evolutionary and incrementalist. They rest not on the dramatic changes of political opinion 
grasping international institutions and bending them to its will, but on gradual change in 
international organisation as a response to the underlying conditions of global welfare 
requirements. This, again, reflects Hobson’s belief that international relations was an evolving 
realm. Though it was backward, the emerging internationalism brought a more developed 
sense of morality for international relations. The standard bearers of the developing morality 
of civilisation were the democratic, advanced nations of the world, rather than the powers that 
currently ruled international relations to whom Hobson had turned in his force-oriented 
proposal.
Despite the similarities and Hobson’s attempt to portray them as a unified approach, 
the path of institutional reform through the centralisation of force and Hobson’s constructive 
internationalism conflict. The latter fits into his evolutionary framework, suggesting the 
development of functional international institutions and a federal government to reflect the 
changed nature of international relations. The force-centred analysis o l Towards International 
Government and also his argument for an international police force is less easily reconciled 
with the rest of Hobson’s work. His arguments for a central force appear to be illiberal and 
anti-democratic. The incongruity results from an error by Hobson. Hobson mistook an 
emergency measure, the last resort of established authority, for the foundation of that 
authority. International force is an emergency measure both at the end of the First World War 
and in the face of the threat of fascist aggression. The international force was a way of 
stabilising international relations in a time of chaos. However, Hobson did not question the 
premise of this stabilisation sufficiently; it is not a basis for a democratic federations of 
nations. For instance, Hobson hoped for the inclusion of all the nations of the world, yet his 
international set-up strictly only required the adherence of the Great Powers for its successful 
operation.®^
Towards International Government, p. 161.
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Hobson was not simply inconsistent in his discussion of international relations, 
however. His analysis of international relations remained the same. What changed was his 
estimation of the current potentialities and progress of international relations. His force- 
centred analysis reflected a deep pessimism about the morality and altruism in the relations 
of states. Considering the state of the world in 1915, in the period immediately after the War 
and during the crises of the thirties, this pessimism is not surprising. Pessimism led Hobson 
to emphasise the need for central force as the vanguard of more constructive internationalism 
later. The condition of international relations required immediate, revolutionary change, and 
the condition of the peoples indicated that such as change might indeed be possible. This 
contrasts with the optimism of the progress of civilisation that predominated in his discussion 
of constructive internationalism as the pinnacle of his evolutionary scale for world order.
Critical Assessment
Hobson’s proposals for an international government sit uneasily with his evolutionary 
perspective on international relations. There are further difficulties with his proposal for an 
international government and the assumptions that underlie the proposal.
Hobson’s proposal for international government as a collective security mechanism 
suffers from many of the problems common to collective security schemes.®^ In world of 
diverse nationalities, states and their interests, Hobson’s desire for a universal international 
organisation conflicted with his emphasis on the need for a coherent and coercive 
international government punishing non-compliance. Hobson understood the problem: the 
heterogeneity of nations meant that an international government would need a long list of 
aims and/or there will compromise, say on the matter of sanctions, inimical to his scheme. 
Hobson preferred a wider membership, but admitted that this would result in a looser 
union.®^ Yet a looser union must mean the absence of mandatory sanctions, compulsory 
arbitration and the centralisation of force. Surely, by Hobson’s own logic, his scheme must, 
therefore, fail.
Hobson hoped for universal consent from the nations of the world for the international 
government, with its consequent benefits in terms of impartiality and justice from true
For a classic statement on collective security, comparing it as an international system to the 
balance of power and world government, and surveying some of the criticisms of each system, see Inis 
Claude, Power in International Relations.
Towards International Government, p. 39.
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internationalism. However, the logic of the centralisation of force to keep the peace suggests 
stringent restrictions on the sovereign rights of states in the international government. In 
short, the universalist organisation presumes finding a consensus, while the international force 
presumes a consensus already exists. Hobson can only avoid this dilemma by ignoring his own 
criticism of political thought, that ‘we do not believe in ideas as we believe in force’.®^ This 
tendency reveals a potentially reactionary streak in Hobson’s thought.®®
Another problem is that Hobson’s hopes for disarmament rest on the creation of a 
preponderantly strong universal organisation. Any non-universal organisation would have to 
retain arms to defend itself from potential aggression from an outsider. This might, as Hobson 
argued, result a reinstatement of the balance of power. Hobson believed that the League also 
had to be strong enough to continue should one of its members defect from the 
organisation.®® These precautions make it seem implausible that arms will be reduced rapidly 
through Hobson’s international government. Indeed, the dispersion of forces in the collective 
security arrangement he envisaged makes matters worse because coordination of the 
international force will reduce the gains from the economy of force.
Hobson tended to wish away the problems of internationalism in his assumption of an 
implicit harmony of national interests. Yet, it can be argued that nations do indeed have 
conflicting interests, and that these conflicts of interest are not the product of irrationality 
on the part of individual nations, but a reaction to their circumstances. Still, he optimistically 
believed that democratic election of representatives to the international government would 
enhance internationalism. The potentially conflicting role of an international representative 
(between the international and national interests) are not simply be solved by correct 
representation. Hobson believed that democratic control of foreign policy would bring peace, 
as it would give expression to the true pacific nature of the peoples of the world. Hobson 
believed that populations would be at the least more pacific than their governments, even 
though he also attacked the mob mind and the manipulations of the press whipping up 
bellicosity and xenophobia.®^ Hobson also assumed that a cooling o ff  period would
®^ Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 110.
®® For a comparison of conservative tendencies in Hobson’s thought, see John Allett, ‘The 
Conservative Aspect in Hobson’s New Liberalism’.
®® ‘Polit ica l Bases o f  a World S ta te ’, p. 273-5 ;  League o f  Nations, p. 9; pp . 13-14; Towards
International Government, p. 4 2 -3 ,  81-5 .
®^ International Government, p. 204-5 .
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encourage rational consideration by the parties of the issues in a dispute, thus facilitating a 
peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, a cooling-off period could also be exploited in order to 
build up forces. Furthermore, cooling-off may be a fundamentally conservative idea: where 
there is no institutionalised means for peaceful change, cooling off may maintain an unjust 
status quo. While he intended there to be a system of peaceful change, Hobson’s proposals on 
this issue were more nebulous than his concrete suggestions on cooling off. The assumption 
of harmony in international relations, indeed, can be see more as a conservative device than 
a liberal one from this example. Hobson’s assumption of the justice of international force rests 
on the argument that the international authority or international interest appealed to is clear 
to all. If this were not the case, an appeal to the justice of international action would be 
problematic: what one nation regarded as the international interest would be regarded as 
merely as that first nations’s interest by other nations.
Besides the common realist rejection of his proposals that Hobson gave short shrift, 
there were also criticisms from other reformers, among others, Leonard Woolf and J.M. 
Keynes. Lowes Dickinson argued that Hobson’s project was too ambitious and far-reaching 
to be achieved. Furthermore, Hobson’s revolutionary scheme would scare governments from 
any o f  the less ambitious international schemes, he argued. In short, Hobson was making the 
best the enemy of the good. Hobson replied that the logic of international government 
demonstrated that smaller proposals were themselves unworkable.®®
It could also be objected that Hobson’s scheme would be impossible to realise. Hobson 
noted the argument Rousseau’s argument against St. Pierre’s Projet - that the statesmen who 
would be required to agree to the plan would be opposed to it. Despite this, Hobson goes on 
to propose what Rousseau rejected, a Social Contract of Nations. Hobson tried to close the 
loopholes in his scheme with compulsory arbitration and conciliation backed up by a military 
sanction to punish non-compliance. Unfortunately, if the sanction and compulsion of the 
treaty are credible, it would more than likely deter states from joining the arrangement, as 
Hobson admitted.®®
Hobson turned out to be wrong on the potential transformative effects of public
®® Towards International Government^ p. 175-6; League of Nations, p. 13. Dickinson’s criticism 
quoted in Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats^ p. 178-9. See also the debate between Hobson and 
Leonard Woolf, Nation (Vol. 17, August 1915), p. 615, 639; J.M. Keynes, The Collected Writings o f  
J.M. Keynes., Vol. 28, p. 11; and Alfred Zimmern, ‘Nationality and Government’.
®® Towards International Government., pp. 81-5 ; League o f  Nations, p. 9, 13-14; ‘Political Bases o f
a World S ta te’, p. 275.
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opinion at the end of World War One. The peoples of Europe carried the resentment and 
nationalist fervour of the War into its aftermath, rather than seeking to change the 
international system that Hobson believed was at the root of the strife between nations. He 
realised this and later described the change of ideas necessary to bring international 
government as being akin to a religious conversion. Where he had hoped for the rational 
expression of a desire for peace among the peoples of the world, he later believed that a leap 
of faith (in internationalism) by civilised humanity was required.
Hobson eschewed a detailed programme and analysis of international government, but 
it is in the practical details, as we have just seen, that problems emerge. Another example is 
the lack of specification of the meaning of federalism. This term is made so general that it 
becomes meaningless. This is especially true of Hobson’s use of the term confederation in 
Towards Iniernalional Covernmeni. Hobson argued that there should be confederation of states 
rather than a single federal state, but used the terms loosely.®®
There are a couple of broader criticisms of the assumptions underlying Hobson’s 
proposals. The first is that Hobson has a pro-organisation bias that blinded him to a number 
of inadequacies of his proposals. Hobson defended the League as the only alternative to 
nationalist anarchy and an important contribution to the struggle for national democracy 
against militarism. It could be argued that, for many peoples, an oligarchic League dominated 
by the great powers would be worse than a less ordered alternative.®^ Hobson argued in 
Imperialism  that the Congo Conference of 1884, where the European Great Powers divided 
Africa into spheres of influence, was the starting point of the modern period of imperialism. 
However, in A League o f Nalions, he claims that the Berlin Treaty (that followed the Congo 
Conference) could have been a basis for pacific internationalism.®^
Hobson attacked the oligarchic nature of the League of Nations, yet his proposal for
®® Towards Iniernalional Government ch. 2.
®^ He was accused by his friend H.N. Brailsford, of attempting to build an international 
government, before the democratic basis of domestic governments were laid. The implication is that 
Hobson unwittingly supported a capitalist project. See H.N. Brailsford, The L ife-w ork  o f  J.A. Hobson. 
Also J. Townshend’s Introduction to Imperialism, p. [31 ]. Hobson proposes but dismisses this problem 
in Democracy A fter the War, p. 191-6, 209. But he takes a rather different view in Democracy and 
aChanging Civilisaiion, p. 133, and his reference to Kant in Towards International Government 
with his reversion to putting your own house in order qualify this assessment.
®^  C o m p a re  Imperialism  w ith  League o f  Nations, p. 3. Also q u a l i f ica t io n  in Towards International
Government, p. 139.
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an international government would have been very similar.®^ Hobson hoped that small states, 
concerned at the prospect of constitutional tyranny of the Great Powers where ‘one state one 
vote’ was no longer the rule, would still join the international organisation because the 
alternative, international anarchy, was worse and, he argued, the prospect of great power 
condominium small. On the other hand, Hobson’s ideas on voting according to population and 
size, and later some measure of the level of civilisation and contribution to internationalism, 
would also have been controversial.®^ While a pure population measure might have had 
unfortunate consequences, the application of a civilisation test, especially tied to the 
contribution to the advance of internationalism, would be biassed in favour of the Western 
nations. Hobson’s self-consciously utilitarian proposals would have trampled the rights of 
minorities and would effectively have set up a ‘tyranny of the majority’.®^
Another product of his pro-organisation bias is that Hobson sees all international(ist) 
factors as good and all national(ist) factors as bad.®® Having argued that force is necessary 
in a morally undeveloped realm, Hobson believed that international force was just, because 
it was international. He defended the League longer than he might have any national 
institutions that had failed him as badly. According to Hobson’s logic, the only alternative 
to international government is anarchy. Besides the fact that this misconstrued the economic 
(if not the political) character of the modern world, Hobson committed an error for which he 
had previously criticised imperialists. Hobson’s proposal reinvoked ‘the inevitable in politics’, 
but this was an international as opposed to an imperial necessity.
The organisational bias also contributed to Hobson’s ethnocentric blindness to the 
integrity of cultures other than Western civilisation. His arguments for the defence of 
backwards peoples are a form of paternalism that, it has been argued since Hobson’s time, 
place the undeveloped countries forever in a subordinate position in the global political
®^  With the exception of the detachment from any Peace Treaty. Hobson stated in Towards 
International Covernmeni that the constitution of the League should not be in any peace at the end 
of the war, see p. 173. See also Towards International Government^ p. 166. Similarly his views on 
mandates and the possibility of inter-imperialism on pp. 144-6. Also see Democracy and a Changing 
Civilisation^ p. 141-3.
®^ Compare Towards International Government^ p. 164-6 with Democracy and Changing 
Civilisation, p. 148.
®® Towards International Government, pp. 165-6.
®® See William T.R. Fox, The American Study o f  International Relations, p. 8, for a critique of this 
bias.
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economy. The tyranny of the powerful Western nations is completed by Hobson’s 
arrangements for the inclusion of the colonies into the international government. Such 
territories and the peoples living there are not to be represented by their own appointees, but 
the territories are to be trusts of the international government.®^ The second broader 
criticism is that, in the logic of international government, Hobson’s organic analogy became 
a simplistic domestic analogy. He considered the international government to be a government 
of the society of nations like any other government of a society. Hobson argued that his 
proposals for international government involved ‘the introduction of no new political 
principle, but only an extension of that moving force of the mutuality of interests which has 
everywhere and always been operative upon smaller areas.’®® Thus principles that applied 
domestically could be applied to the international realm.
A domestic analogy drives Hobson’s view that it was crucial to a scheme for 
international peace to strengthen international law to make it more like domestic law, 
Hobson’s proposal for some form of sanction to deter states from engaging in aggressive war 
is analogous to the role of the police and the courts domestically. Hobson relied on a domestic 
analogy of states or nations in international relations to persons in domestic society in his 
discussion of international arbitration, national self-government, the role of an international 
legislature in international law, and in his arguments that international government must be 
based on consent, denying the private right of states to wage war, against absolute national 
property rights and the right of rebellion in international relations.®® An interesting case 
here is the principle of representation in the international government. Hobson argued that 
domestic equality in voting, that is, one person one vote, was maintained not on the principle 
of equality but for prudential reasons. In international relations, with the patent inequality 
of states and fewer prudential constraints, the principle of equality could be dropped in 
favour of, what Hobson considered the more fundamental maxim, treating only equals 
equally.^®®
®^ There is also a linguistic aspect to Hobson’s paternalism. Hobson never referred to backward 
peoples as nations. This is because a reference to nationhood would be an admission that these peoples 
were civilised and should be part of the international government on an equitable basis.
®® Problems o f  a New Worlds p. 253; see also Towards Iniernalional Covernmeni^ p. 85, 153.
®® Iniernalional Covernmeni, p. 70, 125, 176; A League o f  Naiions, p. 19; Free Thoughl, p. 259; 
Weallh and L ife , p. 395; Democracy and a Changing Civilisaiion, pp. 115-6, 121.
®^® League o f  Nalions, p. 19.
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Hobson’s evolutionary constructive internationalism is also reduced to a form of the 
domestic analogy. Hobson interpreted past internationalism, such as Hague institutions and 
conferences as well as the private international cooperation as the rudiments of an 
international government, that is, a primitive form of domestic institutions and law. Hobson’s 
conception of international institutions as if they were stages to international government 
prohibited him from considering the institutions on their own merits in the international 
system in which they operated. This led him both deprecated the diverse functions of 
international institutions and law and to advocate changes inappropriate to the peculiar 
circumstances of contemporary international relations.
In Hobson’s defence, a blueprint for an international government is easy game for the 
realist critic. Realists simply assert the primacy and logic of the contemporary states-system 
and point to the eternal verities of international politics, such as the struggle for power and 
the pursuit of national interest. Blanket condemnation of utopian schemes is a staple of 
international relations scholarship. However, the challenge to reform is based on an 
assumption of recurrence and repetition that is as unwarranted as the assumption of progress. 
During the inter-war period, Hobson himself came to wonder if international government 
overextended the world’s current ‘enthusiasm for humanity’, in short, the belief in 
internationalism. He was also largely unimpressed by the League of Nations. 
Furthermore, Hobson dealt with a number of the realist criticisms. His argument that 
consciousness of kind extends beyond national states is a plausible retort to realist emphasis 
on national over international interest, and that the previous failures of internationalism need 
not be repeated because economic and social conditions had changed.
A number of Hobson’s criticisms of the betrayal of the internationalist ideal in the 
League of Nations still have considerable purchase. Finally, the logic of the increasing 
cooperation of people and peoples, the extension of the theory of cooperative surplus to 
international relations, can be characterised as proto-functionalist. As such, Hobson 
contributed to the formulation of the functionalist approach to international organisation.
Conclusion
To summarise, Hobson’s proposals for international government have two logics within them: 
the logic of centralised force and the logic of the centralisation of function. These involve
From Capitalism to Socialism, p. 36; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 140;
Imperialism, p. [62].
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different routes to internationalism. The logic of centralised force is an anomaly in Hobson’s 
evolutionary approach to international relations.
In the context of other proposals for the reform of international relations, Hobson’s 
is admittedly quite bold. At the end of the War a considerably watered-down version of the 
League idea was instituted, indicating that Hobson’s proposal was too much for statesmen and 
other reformers of the day. Plans for international government have since fallen out of favour, 
making Hobson’s ideas appear rather quaint. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War and 
the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism that went with it, there is the 
prospect that some of Hobson’s ideas will again be apposite. For today’s reformers, the main 
lesson to be learned from Hobson’s discussions of international government, like so many 
others of its kind, is that international peace and global welfare cannot be fabricated simply 
be innovating institutions based on a domestic model without some critical examination of the 
original and the new {i.e., international) contexts. Specifically, international institutions must 
have legitimacy if they are to contribute to the progress of justice and civilisation.
PART THREE
Chapter Seven 
Hobson and Idealism in International Relations
This thesis has examined the logic underlying Hobson’s approach to international relations as 
well as assessing his writings on imperialism, economic internationalism and international 
government. Hobson is famous in international relations for his theory of imperialism. He is 
also, though less famously, categorised as one of the idealist writers on international relations. 
In addition, he contributed to a tradition of liberal thought on international affairs. Hobson 
as an idealist is the subject of this chapter, while his place in the liberal tradition of thinking 
about international relations is discussed in the concluding chapter.
Hobson lived just long enough to see the final collapse of his hopes for an 
international government and peaceable international relations. Appropriately enough for a 
writer who has been identified as an idealist international theorist, Hobson died on April 
Fools’ Day in the first year of the Second World War.^ There has been a recent growth in the 
literature on idealist international theorists, with papers on Alfred Zimmern, David Davies 
and Norman Angell.^ This chapter critically assesses whether Hobson’s international relations 
writings can fairly be categorised as idealist. It is shown that there are three strands of idealist 
thought of Hobson’s writings. Though idealist in their own terms, they differ on fundamental 
propositions about international relations as well as in their prescriptions for a reformed world 
order. The implication for the history of international thought is that a consideration of 
Hobson’s work revealing three modes of idealism destabilises the monolithic category of 
idealism in international relations. To put it another way, the idealist label blurs important 
distinctions in Hobson’s writings.
The first section outlines idealism in international relations and notes Hobson’s 
rationalist world-view and its ramifications in his approach to international relations. The 
second section examines Hobson’s idealist-inspired critiques of contemporary international 
relations. The third section considers Hobson’s prescriptions for an ideal international polity
 ^ A.J.P. Taylor uses Hobson’s tumble down the stairs from the 1917 Club as a metaphor for the 
collapse of idealism in 1931. See The Trouble-Makers^ p. 145-6.
 ^D.J. Markwell, ‘Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On’, pp. 279-92; Brian Porter, ‘David 
Dabies: A Hunter After Peace’, pp. 27-36; Cornelia Navari, ‘The Great Illusion Revisited: The 
International Theory of Norman Angell’, pp. 341-58.
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and demonstrates that there are three different approaches within Hobson’s writings: 
traditional idealism, Cobdenism, and constructive internationalism. The fourth section assesses 
the significance of the three modes of idealism developed in the third section, first for 
Hobson’s writings on international relations, and second, for international relations scholarship 
on idealism.
Idealism in International Relations
In international relations, idealism is the label commonly attached to the well-wishing, 
optimistic rationalists, particularly of the inter-war period, who believed that progress in 
human relations is attainable through the application of human reason and that underlying 
human interaction is a basic harmony of interests. Realism, with which idealism in 
international relations is routinely contrasted, recognises the nature of man as an essentially 
self-interested creature, that the relations between men, especially in international relations, 
are mediated by political power and are based on conflict and the exercise of physical force.
The opposition of realism and idealism has dominated, indeed, has been constitutive 
of the international relations discipline.^ The story of the development of international 
relations tells us that idealist international theory was predominant in the inter-war period but 
that its hopes were dashed by the disasters of the thirties, including the rise of aggressive 
fascism and the collapse of the League of Nations leading up to the beginning of the Second 
World War. We are told by Carr that ‘[njearly all popular theories of international politics 
between the two world wars were reflexions, seen in an American mirror, of nineteenth- 
century liberal thought’.  ^ A legalistic, rationalistic worldview dominated the early years of 
the Anglo-Saxon pursuit of international relations as an academic discipline. After a period 
of normatively based analyses (for example, the search for ‘peace through law’), the discipline 
saw the errors of its ways and took a more empirically sound approach, centring on the 
recognition of the supremacy of sovereign states and the requirements of state power.®
The tenets of idealism in international relations can be stated negatively (in opposition 
to realism) as the foolish searching for something beyond current international realities and
® See M. Banks, ‘The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, pp. 14-5; K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline^ pp. 
28-31; and S. Smith, ‘International Relations as a Social Science’, pp. 190-2.
 ^ Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 27
® H. Suganami, ‘The ‘Peace Through Law’ Approach: A Critical Examination of Its Ideas’.
212
the hope for change in an unchangingly repetitive realm.® For Hedley Bull, idealist writing 
was ‘not at all profound’ and ‘none is worth reading now except for the light it throws upon 
the preoccupations and presuppositions of its time and p la c e .Id e a l is m  can, however, also 
be defined positively in terms of its claims about the nature of human beings and the world 
in general. People are rational, there is a fundamental harmony of interest between people(s), 
and there is the possibility - or even inevitability - of progress.®
Hobson believed in man’s rationality despite the setbacks of the Boer War and the First 
World War.® He even believed in the (albeit limited) rationality of the agents of the irrational 
phenomenon of imperialism. While developments in philosophy and in science had thrown 
some doubt on the certainty of the claims of nineteenth century determinists, Hobson stoutly 
defended the rationalist tradition. For Hobson, ‘[t]he wide significance of rationalism surely 
demands a reasonable explanation of every course of human thought and conduct, especially 
in that great area, or arena, of political, social, and economic reconstruction which confronts 
every reasonable man or woman as essential to the salvation of a civilized w o r l d . H e  
modified but still accepted the idea of a basic harmony of interests between people. Rather 
than being a natural law, though, harmony was, for Hobson, the result of a conscious 
collective application of reason. Finally, he believed in progress, despite his criticisms of 
nineteenth century complacency in this r e g a r d . T h e  First World War and the rise of 
Fascism was certainly a setback to the progress of democracy, civilisation and justice, but this 
was expected to be temporary. Just as important, Hobson believed that some notion of 
progress motivates human action: ‘If we really disbelieved in any process of betterment of 
ourselves and for humanity, every human activity would be sapped at the source.
® M. Wight, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’.
 ^ Hedley Bull, ‘The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969’, p. 34,
® For various discussions of the liberal, rationalist world-view which underlies idealism in 
international relations, see B.L. Crowley, The Individual. S e lf  and Community^ p. 2; J. Gray, 
Liberalism , p. x; M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 11; B. Crick, In Defence o f  Politics, p. 128; 
and H. Morgenthau, Scien tific  Man vs. Power Politics.
® The Modern State, p. 30; Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic, p. 96, 104; Rationalism and 
Humanism, p. 31.
Rationalism and Humanism, p. 10, 34-46.
Rationalism and Humanism, p p .20-1 ; Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 17-8.
The Recording Angel, p. 75.
213
According to the South Place Monthly Record, Hobson was ‘strangely unworldly’ and ‘an 
unrepentant idealist’.
There is a further element to idealism as it appears in politics in general and not only 
in international relations. ‘Idealism is born of the endeavour to comprehend political reality 
in unitary terms, in a series of straightforward and precise propositions’, according to R.N. 
Berki. However this means that ‘[t]he world of idealism is the bifurcated, abstract world of 
good and evil, black and white, desirable and undesirable, something to be advocated and 
justified, something to be relentlessly opposed, rejected.
Hobson’s work is full of dichotomies between good and evil. His theory of cooperative 
surplus is opposed to the sectional appropriation of ‘unproductive surplus’. Upon this 
dichotomy, Hobson produced a series of oppositions, such as wealth and ‘illth’, socialism and 
capitalism, combination and competition and justice and force. These dichotomies were given 
their most stark presentation in Democracy A fter the War, where Hobson lines up the forces 
of reaction on one side against the forces of peace, democracy and internationalism on the 
o t h e r . I n  each opposition, we find that Hobson condemned present arrangements for 
failing to come up to the standards of his rational ideal.
Hobson hoped that the world could undergo a spiritual and social transformation. The 
categorisation in international relations of Hobson as an idealist contrasts with the other work 
for which he is famous, namely the so-called theory of economic imperialism. Yet here again 
Hobson’s gloomy prognosis of contemporary world politics is a reflection in an idealist mirror 
of his idealist internationalism, the manifestation in international relations of his belief in 
progress. For Hobson, imperialism was the dark reality of modern world politics. It was the 
product of a sectional interest, certain financiers and industrial magnates, manipulating the 
press, public opinion and politicians of industrialised societies in order to attain their self- 
interested goals. While Richard Cobden had blamed aristocratic meddling in the political 
affairs of nations, Hobson attacked financiers for their economic interest in imperialism and
Article commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of J.A. Hobson, South Place 
M onthly Record, 63 (July 1958).
R.N. Berki, On Political Realism, pp. 193-4. According to Berki’s definition, Carr’s dichotomy 
of realism and utopianism as the opposition of power, relativism and necessity on the one hand, and 
reason, universalism and choice on the other, is itself a product of idealism. E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, ch. 2. Thus, both Hobson and Carr are idealists in Berki’s definition. The difference between 
Carr and Hobson is that, in The Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr placed himself on the realist side, while 
Hobson remains on the utopian, according to Carr’s criteria.
Democracy After the War, pt. 2, ch. 1
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even international conflict. Contrasting this gloomy view of present politics, Hobson’s vision 
of the alternative to imperialism is a paradigm of idealism. Social reform and redistribution 
of income for industrial societies, and an international government to monitor nonintervention 
between nations would bring peace, prosperity and the reign of reason, justice and humanity 
to the world.
Hobson condemned the betrayers of idealism, among those he accused being the 
American President most closely identified with the idealism of the inter-war period: 
‘[Woodrow] Wilson ... has made the very name of idealism a term of d e r i s i o n . H e  also 
hoped for the vindication of idealism from the assaults upon in the years at the end of the 
First World War.^® This brief survey of Hobson’s worldview and his opposition of 
internationalism and imperialism in international relations appears to confirm that Hobson has 
accurately been labelled an idealist.
Hobson’s Idealist Critique of Contemporary International Relations
Hobson’s concern with international affairs was prompted by a perceived problem in 
international affairs with which his reforming spirit sought to grapple. Hobson was 
profoundly dissatisfied with contemporary international relations. He criticised a number of 
the central elements of contemporary international theory: sovereignty, international law, 
diplomacy, the balance of power and the use of force. Hobson’s assessment of these elements 
of international theory d iffer from contemporary analysis and subsequent realist theory. His 
critique of the ‘old’, ‘traditional’ or ‘obsolete’ ideas can be identified with a rationalist, 
idealist, liberal conscience.^®
Sovereignty and International Law
He argued, as we have seen, that sovereignty was associated with a power-oriented
Imperialism^ pp. 86-90, 360.
Hobson’s review of  W.E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, The Nation, pp. 189-90. 
Problems o f  a New World, chs. 4-5.
M. Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience.
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view of the world, that had contributed to the creation of international a n a r c h y . F o r  
Hobson, assertions of sovereign independence were instances of individualism in international 
relations, a failure to acknowledge the increasing connectedness and interdependence of the 
society of nations. Sovereign independence was outdated, he argued because it was tempered 
by obligations under international law and because of the growth of interdependence nations 
brought on by trade, travel and other communications.^^ It no longer reflected the true 
interests of the several national elements of mankind. Privileging national interests over the 
global common good, it was an obstruction to international cooperation and an international 
g o v e r n m e n t . I t  was thus an obstruction to civilisation, educating habits of thought opposed 
to the developing cooperation of humanity. Sovereignty, according to Hobson, was states 
being a law unto themselves. He denounced the absence of a central enforceable sanction and 
called the legal rules of international relations ‘a loose code' of ‘so-called international 
law’.^  ^ Peace and justice in international relations, according to Hobson, relied on the 
extension and strengthening of international law, so that nations could no longer plead ‘vital 
interests’ or ‘honour’ to evade their obligations. International law could no longer be merely 
‘voluntary’ for states. The lawlessness (as he saw it) of contemporary international relations 
prompted him to offer suggestions in terms of backing up law with sufficient force.
Hobson believed that domestic law was the model for all law. In common with much 
contemporary opinion, Hobson believed that international law was at a primitive stage of 
development. In so far as international law failed to measure up to the standard of domestic 
law, it was not law at all. Its progress could be measured by its increasing similarity to 
domestic law, through the growth of universal rather than bilateral treaties, conferences on 
international legal matters, an international judiciary, and the strengthening of sanctions. 
While international law was feeble, Hobson was hopeful that the mechanisms of peaceful
Free Thought in the Social Sciences^ p. 257.
On international law limiting sovereignty, see The Case for Arbitration^ p. 7; Towards 
International Government^ pp. 33, 124-5.
Towards International Government^ pp. 81, 86-7, 178.
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 139.
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 139, 145; The Case fo r Arbitration, p. 4. This might 
appear to be a realist proposition; only force could compel nations to behave in terms of the 
international interest rather than their own narrow self-interest. However, thought the logic is realist, 
the prescriptions are unlikely to be sanctioned by realists.
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settlement and of functional cooperation set up in the latter part of the nineteenth and the 
early part of the twentieth centuries would be a basis for future development, paralleling the 
supersession of the priority of individual over social interests domestically.^^
Sovereignty, as understood in much of the international relations literature today, 
however, is a category of legal status, a badge needed to participate in international 
relations.^® According to this perspective, Hobson’s critique based on the facts of 
interdependence are an idealist critique of the consequences of sovereign statehood and not 
of the concept per se. His idea that international law qualifies sovereignty misunderstands the 
nature of both sovereignty and international law. Sovereign statehood is the basic qualification 
for a state to be party to international law. International law is by definition the law between 
sovereign states. Thus, as states have to consent to be bound by international law, it is 
difficult to argue that international law is a limitation on states.
Hobson’s mistake with regard to sovereignty is compounded by his flawed conception 
of law. International law is usually considered distinct from domestic law by virtue of its 
different enforcement measures and the structure of the society within which it is placed. 
Nevertheless international law is law, not just a primitive set of rules or p r e - l a w . I n  his 
analysis, Hobson assumed that international law would take on the character of English 
criminal law. He neglected the civil law aspect of the English legal system and also the 
different approaches to law in other parts of the world. His critique of international law did 
not extend to the argument, advanced by Carr, that international law merely reflected the 
interests of the Great Powers.^® He optimistically believed that the weakness of international 
law was a greater danger to small states and weaker peoples because it gave powerful states 
a free hand. He discounted, as we have seen in his discussion of the League of Nations, the 
long-term prospects of constitutional tyranny in international relations.
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
Hobson had criticised the diplomacy that led to the Boer War. The experience of the
Notes on Law and Ordei\ pp. 24-5; The Case fo r Arbitration, p. 7; on functional cooperation, 
see A League o f  Nations, p.2; Towards International Government, p. 177; Imperialism , p. 167.
See Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f  International Society.
See Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, ch. 1.
C arr ,  The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 182.
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First World War and his involvement in the U.D.C. both reflected and reinforced these strong
opinions on diplomacy and foreign policy. Hobson’s critique derived from the nineteenth
century Radicals’ attacks on British foreign policy. Hobson did not wish, as did the Radicals
before him, for the end of foreign policy, but rather looked to the democratic representation
of the true interests of society in foreign policy.
The first problem with traditional diplomacy, according to Hobson, was class bias.
Diplomats were drawn from the ranks of and propounded the viewpoints of the rich and
powerful; they were ‘unrepresentative types of men, with ... false, antiquated conceptions of
States and statecraft...’ These conceptions were opposed to the interests of society as a whole
and to the interests of the international society. Instead, modern diplomacy required ‘able,
broad-minded men of large personal experience of the people and the popular activities of
the people, experience amplified by contact with the peoples and activities of other countries,
men accustomed in large, free intercourse to test and assimilate new facts and valuations and
to practise arts of mediation and of arrangements’.^ ® If the old diplomatic and foreign
ministry officials could be removed and replaced by people who more truly represented the
interests of society, then the relations of states would cease to be competitive and the relations
of peoples, thus freed up, would be a harmonious pursuit of welfare.^®
The structure of traditional diplomacy also bred to international antagonism. The cult
of secrecy, distrust of foreigners, calculations of your rival’s power and unprincipled
compromise, multiplied the problems of class bias in the embassies and foreign ministries.
Drawn from this narrow section of society, they [recruits to the diplomatic corps] 
enter a calling strongly stamped with the traditions of an even less enlightened and 
more autocratically ordered past, in which the normal relations of States and 
Governments are envisaged in terms of suspicion, hostility, and jealousy.
Diplomacy reflected and reinforced the militarist attitude engendered by the competition of
sovereign states with one another. Hobson also that thought multilateral diplomacy was
preferable to bilateral negotiation.^^ Hobson criticised traditional diplomacy for its class bias
Towards Inteniaiional Covernmeni, pp. 65, 67-8. See also p. 7, 70, 169; A League o f  Nations, 
p. 15, 20.
Free Thought in the Social Sciences, p. 217; Richard Cobden: The International Man, p. 10, 408; 
Democracy A fter the War, p. 210; The Case for Arbitration, p. 1; The German Panic, p. 23.
Towards International Government, pp. 67-8.
Richard Cobden, p. 388; Democracy After the War, p. 210; The German Panic, p. 27; A League
o f  Nations, pp. 15-6; Towards International Government, pp. 6 6 -8 ,  70.
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and its formal structure of diplomacy, and criticises the formulation and evaluation of foreign 
policy. If, Hobson claimed, the whole process of foreign policy making were public and open 
to debate, different, more pacific, foreign policies would emerge, as the pacific nature of the 
people gained expression.^^
In summary, the necessary reforms were, first, opening the foreign office and 
diplomatic corps to all qualified people; second, public discussion and Parliamentary sanction 
of treaties, including the establishment of a Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs; third, 
representatives to the International Council that Hobson had proposed should be directly 
elected rather than appointed d i p l o m a t s . O n  diplomatic negotiations, Hobson’s view, was 
similar to the Wilsonian call for ‘open covenants, openly arrived at’. He summarised his 
approach as follows: ‘Different men, different methods, different motives and ideals are 
required.’
Hobson countered the suggestion that the people could not be trusted with diplomacy 
and foreign policy because they were too ignorant of international affairs or as bellicose as 
their representatives. Hobson retorted that the ignorance and bellicosity of peoples was a 
function of their being kept in the dark about international affairs. Publicity and openness 
would at least mitigate against these factors, if not end them altogether. Hobson’s response to 
this challenge highlights his idealist critique of traditional diplomacy and foreign policy.
Hobson claimed that democratic formulation, execution and evaluation of foreign 
policy would significantly alter international relations. This is a reductionist idea so 
effectively criticised by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz’s realist retort is that all states in the 
international system face constraints imposed by that system and that changes to the domestic 
formulation is insufficient to change international relations. Hobson would have agreed with 
this, however, suggesting that democratic control was just one aspect of his reform of 
international relations that also included social reform and an international government.
Hobson’s ideas deviate from mainstream international relations literature that says 
little about the personnel of diplomacy, other than to suggest that skill and tact are useful 
characteristics. The structure of diplomacy, as the formal communication of states, is accepted 
as a reflection of the structure of international society, within which diplomacy is beneficial
Free Thought in the Social Sciences, p. 259; The Crisis o f  Liberalism, p. 9; Towards 
International Government, p. 184-6, 203-6, 211; Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic, p. 104.
A League o f  Nations, p. 20. See also Towards International Government, pp. 2 0 0 -1 ,  209.
See Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 150.
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in so far as it is an alternative mode of communication between states to physical force.^® 
Hobson’s involvement in the UDC and discussions of how democratic control should be 
implemented, tempered his radical views, though only marginally. By the end of his life, he 
was admitting that it was difficult to be specific about the precise meaning of ‘democratic 
control’ or its implementation.®^
The Use o f  Force and the Balance o f Power
Hobson’s opinions on the use of force by states follow his general views on the role 
of force in social life. Special problems do appear, however, because of the lack of a central 
enforcement agency in international relations. For Hobson, the legitimate use of force entailed 
its use by the right authority, only in so far as it achieved some definite just end, and only 
as a last resort. The use of force by states violated all these criteria. States used force 
indiscriminately or universally in the pursuance of sectionalist or separatist interests in order 
to ‘settle’ disputes or to (re)create social order.®® War was the classic instance of the misuse 
of force. Wars resulted from states pursuing their own ends; the results were frequently 
inconclusive but always bloody.
Hobson believed that, in civilisation, reason increasingly supplanted force as the means 
of settling disputes, and that cooperation replaced conflict at the ‘lower’ levels of existence, 
which was transposed into beneficial competition at ‘higher’, e.g., intellectual and cultural, 
levels. His proposals for international government, as we saw in chapter six, were attempts to 
economise on this use of force as well as making it more Just. International force as articulated 
by an international authority was legitimate for Hobson to even to the point if using force to 
compel the backward nations to participate in the international economy, on the grounds of 
an argument that drew parallels between backward nations and the education of children.®®
International government was designed to replace the balance of power system. 
Balance of power did not, claimed Hobson, result in a sensible or civilised ratio of force to 
reason in the relations of states. Instead, international relations was an arena where force was
®® For an example, see K.J. Holsti, Iniernalional Polilics: A Framework for Analysis, ch. 7. 
®^ Confessions o f  an Economic Hereiic, pp. 104-5.
®® Raiionalism and Humanism, p. 31.
®® Democracy and a Changing Civilisaiion, p. 72. See also chapter five.
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the ultimate arbiter: ‘What we are now confronted with is force as a gospel and a mission, 
force as the supreme arbiter within the nation and among the nations that constitute 
h u m a n i t y . T h i s  was reinforced by the outbreak of the First World War, which Hobson 
attributed to the balance of power, and the war’s consequences, that Hobson claimed was a 
celebration of force in all forms of human relations and a derationalising effect on personal 
and social life in general. This second outcome contributed itself to the increased possibility 
of war in the future, argued Hobson.
The legitimacy or otherwise of the use of force by states in the pursuit of their 
interests is conceived to be at the centre of the differences between idealists and realists. 
Realists on the whole sanction such the national use of physical force. The centrality of the 
use of force as the ultimate arbiter of the relations of states is accepted in realist scholarship 
in international relations. Contrary to Hobson’s view, while there may be concern to limit the 
use of force by states, there is little love among international relations specialists for the idea 
of centralising force in an international government in order to eradicate state-sponsored 
conflict or as a route to disarmament. Practically, this has seemed an unlikely prospect. There 
are also doubts as to the validity of the theory that centralised force would be just or would 
lead to a less armed world. For Hobson, on the other hand, so long as an international 
government is democratic, that is, federal in structure with the rights of all nations fairly 
represented, then, by definition, its use of force could not be arbitrary.
To summarise the last two sections, there are idealist tendencies in Hobson’s general 
approach to social and political life, including international relations. Hobson’s criticisms of 
contemporary international relations are inspired by an idealist desire to transform 
international relations. So far, then, it would appear to be quite appropriate to call Hobson an 
idealist.
Three Modes of Idealism in Hobson’s International Theory
This thesis has provided a more sophisticated interpretation of Hobson’s writings on 
international relations than can be summarised in the term idealist. The estimation of Hobson 
as an idealist provided above is qualified by an examination of his ideal international polity. 
There are, in fact, three contending visions of the ideal for future world order. These are
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, P- 72.
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traditional idealism, Cobdenism and constructive internationalism/^ These modes of 
internationalism emerge from the discussion in chapters three, five and six: Cobdenism and 
constructive internationalism are the two internationalist phases of Hobson’s evolutionary 
framework for international relations. Traditional idealism is evident in Hobson’s proposals 
for an international force during the War. The three modes of idealism differ on the 
fundamental goal of the international polity, whether it should be world order or global 
welfare. They also differ as to whether or not it is necessary to establish some form of 
international government to attain the goal. In the discussion that follows, the modes of 
idealism will be sketched in abstract, with examples from Hobson’s writings. The discussion 
is thematic rather than historical in order to highlight the differences between the three 
modes. It shows how they differ, why they might be labelled idealist, and provides examples 
of the three modes Hobson’s writing.
Traditional Idealism
Traditional idealism is the projection of a need of a centralised world state with a 
monopoly of legitimate force to obtain and maintain peace and order in international relations. 
While, traditional idealists ‘advocate progressive reform, via such devices as disarmament, 
collective security, strengthened law, sanctions against aggressors, and even - potentially - 
world government’, the most important feature is the use of force internationally in order to 
discipline deviant members of the international c ommun i t y . Tr a d i t i ona l  idealism creates 
international order by abolishing the anarchy of inter-state relations through the establishment 
of a world state. The perspective follows Hobbesian logic but applies it to inter-state relations. 
Following a domestic analogy, it stresses the importance of the state control over society in 
enforcing justice, peace and order.
Traditional idealism is idealist in its belief that the abolition of anarchical state 
relations by the centralised power of a world state is possible and that it can be achieved quite 
soon and relatively painlessly. The idealism of this perspective is not its neglect of the 
importance of power and the security dilemma between states. In fact, the issue of power is 
central. Traditional idealism accepts the overriding importance of power in an analysis that
Banks, ‘The Inter-paradigm Debate’, p. 15. Traditional idealism is a phrase used by Michael 
Banks to refer to inter-war progressive thought in international relations. Hobson also described 
Cobden’s approach to international politics as non inter ventionalism. See Richard Cobden, p. 406.
B anks, ‘T h e  I n te r -p a ra d ig m  D eb a te ’, p. 15.
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stresses the need for centralising power. It is thus different from the rationalism and 
liberalism of the other two modes.
Traditional idealism appears in Hobson’s writings during the First World War and 
during the crises of the thirties. Hobson supported collective security, the need for military 
sanctions to back up international arbitration and called for an international police force.^^ 
He argued for a strong League of Nations, in effect an international government with a Court, 
Executive and Legislature to which states would bring their disputes; and a collective security 
system whereby the use of legitimate force was concentrated in the hands of the society of 
states’ representative, the international government. This League would have to be as inclusive 
and as powerful as possible in order to avoid the possible reinstatement of the balance of 
power within the League and between the League and outside p o w e r s . F o r  Hobson, the 
balance of power in contemporary international relations had failed to maintain peace. 
International government was the solution to the anarchy and constant menace of war of the 
old international system. Hobson’s main concern in the early pages of Towards International 
Government and in ‘Force Necessary to Government’ is to impose order on the anarchy of 
inter-state relations through the institutional innovation of an international government.
Cobdenism
Cobdenism advocates a policy of political nonintervention of one nation in another 
nation’s affairs. In international relations, Cobdenism rests on a belief in national self- 
determination as the realisation of political maturity, though it sees this as the achievement 
of individual nations and not something that can be achieved through intervention from 
without. It advances the doctrine of free trade for the world economy. Richard Cobden
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 145; Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic, p. 112-3; 
Notes on Law and Order, p. 24; The Case for Arbitration, p. 8; A League o f  Nations, p. 14; Towards 
International Government, p. 21, 77. On an international police force, see ‘Force Necessary to 
Government’,pp. 338-42.
A League o f  Nations, p. 18; Towards International Government, pp. 3-6, 86-7.
With regard to anarchy in international relations being based in national sovereignty, see 
Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic, p. I l l ;  Free Thought in the Social Sciences, p. 257. For the 
inadequacy of noninterventionism in the face of the international anarchy, see Confessions o f  an 
Economic Heretic, p. 112; Towards International Government, p. 6, 86. For Hobson’s preference of 
an international government over a return to anarchy, see Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, 
pp. 150-1; Towards International Government, pp. 86-7.
223
believed that governments should as far as possible stay out of the affairs of their people. It 
was still worse, following this line of argument, for governments to interfere in the affairs 
of foreign p e o p l e s . I n  the absence of government interference, it is argued, the hidden 
hand of the market would conjure up not only the greatest possible welfare, but also social 
order and security. Cobdenism presumes that liberty is the primary social goal, but believes 
that this will inevitably lead to an optimum of welfare and social order. In international 
relations, this was an argument for the removal of all arbitrary political restrictions to trade 
and travel, and the restriction of government activity in international relations. Foreign policy 
for Cobdenites should be reduced, or at the least democratised.
A Cobdenite noninterventionist could propose an international government, but it 
would be a ‘the night-watchman state' of laissez faire  liberalism writ large. The role of 
government nationally and internationally is conceived to be that of maintaining the rule of 
law only. The international government fulfils a function analogous to the domestic minimal 
state in maintaining the a rule of law to prevent interference by states in the affairs of 
individuals. In contrast to traditional idealism, international government does not so much 
maintain law and order between states as prevent interference of states in both foreign 
people’s and their nationals’ affairs. Competition and the free market is protected by 
preventing states from having interventionist constitutions that restrict individual liberties,
Cobdenism is idealist because it assumes a natural harmony of interests between 
people(s) in the achievement of global common welfare. It also presumes that order will be 
established ‘naturally’, that is, spontaneously. Cobdenism commonly relies on the operation 
of world public opinion and the rule of law in international relations’ in the settlement of 
disputes.**®
Hobson’s Cobdenism was a restatement and modification of the radical liberal 
perspective on foreign policy.*^ Political nonintervention in international relations was part 
of his solution to imperialism. Nonintervention was also central to the distinction that Hobson 
made between inclusive and exclusive nationalism. Inclusive nationalism, for Hobson, was the 
basis for the construction of an international order of self-governing nations with minimal
See R.J. Vincent, Noninlervention and Iniernalional Order, pp. 45-54.
An example of this argument appears in F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom , ch. 15. 
See F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f  Peace, ch. 5.
See, e.g., P eter  C la rke ,  Liberals and Social Democrats, p. 178.
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relations between their governments and internationalism based purely on enlightened 
individual self-interest; exclusive nationalism, on the other hand, promoted aggressive 
imperialism and national self-glorification.
Hobson’s defence of free trade and proposals for the open door to trade and 
investment are arguments along Cobdenite lines. He believed that free trade and the mobility 
of capital and labour would be a force for peace and prosperity. In discussions of international 
trade especially, Hobson emphasised the ‘negative’ aspects of liberalism - the removal of 
obstacles to free exchange of ideas and g o o d s .C o b d e n ism  appears in Hobson’s earlier work 
particularly, in his optimistic hopes for economic internationalism in the decade and a half 
before the First World War and in some of his work for the U.D.C. Economic internationalism 
and free trade persist in Hobson’s later writings but they are invariably accompanied by a call 
for a more extensive international government.
Constructive Internationalism
Constructive internationalism follows some of the logic of Cobdenism. However, it 
questions the idea of the natural harmony of interests in Cobdenism. For constructive 
internationalism, global welfare is only achievable through the application, /.e., intervention, 
of conscious human reason. Social order is not ‘natural’ or spontaneous, but can only be 
achieved through collective action. Constructive internationalism seeks to remedy the failings 
of Cobdenism with elements of control and planning by the state. The agenda of welfare can 
only be achieved through planning and attention to positive as well as negative liberty. 
Contrasted to traditional idealism, this intervention is premised on the importance of welfare, 
not on the supreme requirement of order as in traditional idealism. Likewise, constructive 
internationalist proposals for the future governance of the world do not derive from the 
imperatives of law enforcement. Instead, they range from establishing the conditions under
Richard Cobden^ pp. 9-10, 34-6, 74, 388-9; Democracy A fter  the IVar, p. 85-6; Imperialism , p. 
356, 360; The German Panic, p. 26. On the distinction of inclusive and exclusive nationalism, see 
Imperialism , p. 10-2. For Hobson’s future perplexity on this issue of economic internationalism and 
rising political nationalism, see Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 22. For a discussion of 
Hobson’s ideal of independent nations, see P.J. Cain, ‘International Trade and Economic Development 
in the Work of J.A. Hobson Before 1914’, p. 415.
Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 22-3; Wealth and L ife , p. 187; The Morals o f  
Economic Internationalism, p. 29; The New Protectionism, p. 116; Economic Interpretation o f  
Investment, pp. 110-2, 117; The German Panic, p. 26; Towards International Government, pp. 134-7.
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which Cobdenism can operate to a federal international government to control and direct 
global welfare policies. The logic of this mode of idealism is close to the functionalist 
perspective of David Mitrany in its emphasis of the provision of welfare needs through 
increasing international functional organisation.®^
Constructive internationalism is idealist in it belief that a harmony of interests can be 
found in the conscious application of human reason through collective planning and 
organisation. Harmony is manifested in and expressed through social and, in this case, 
international institutions. There is in the functionalist aspect of constructive internationalism 
a strong element of idealism, particularly in the assumption that ‘form follows function’. Such 
a criterion for international organisation excludes considerations other than that of the felt 
need and concentrates on an economic conception of social welfare that can be discussed 
without reference to political power, which might oppose it and is probably needed to achieve 
it.®3
Constructive internationalism emerged in Hobson’s writing as a response to the failures 
and criticisms of Cobdenism. Hobson reacted to the rise of imperialism and the First World 
War by questioning the adequacy of Cobdenism as a route to peace and global welfare. In the 
first place, it failed to address the question of how the inequities in the international economy 
were a source of conflict (both between Great Powers, and between the ‘advanced’ nations and 
the ‘backward’ peoples). Second, Hobson acknowledged that, contrary to the free trade 
argument, economic interdependence could breed tensions and conflict.®^ On domestic social 
and economic matters, Hobson had refuted Cobdenism. He called for increased governmental 
intervention to alleviate poverty and unemployment. Hobson’s interventionist proposals in the
®^ David Mitrany, A Working Peace System . This position is similar to that of McKinlay and 
Little’s ‘compensatory liberalism’ and Suganami’s ‘welfare internationalism’. See R.D, McKinlay and 
R. Little, Global Problems and World Order, ch. 2; and H. Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World 
Order Proposals, pp. 101-11.
®® Another area where the idealism of new liberal internationalism is betrayed is in Hobson’s 
paternalist suggestions for international development o f ‘backward countries’, which was to be guided 
by an impartial international council in the interests of both the local peoples and the world at large 
without succumbing to the sectional interests of the capitalist Great Powers. On this issue, see, for 
instance. Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 134, 145; The Modern State, p. 36; Poverty in 
Plenty, p. 81; Wealth and L ife , p. 403-4.
®^ Towards International Government, p. 127-8, though he did not make much advance with regard 
to the unequal benefits of international exchange. Indeed, his position from Imperialism  to the First 
World War and to some extent beyond, was a more orthodox free trade argument. See P.J. Cain, ‘J.A. 
Hobson, Cobdenism, and the Radical Theory of Imperialism, 1898-1914’, pp. 565-84.
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domestic context challenged the laissez faire  upon which his defence of free trade
internationally was apparently f o u n d e d . W h i l e  he accepted the benefits of free exchange
of ideas and goods, he claimed that the present system resulted in uneven distribution of
wealth because of the sectional interests of a powerful business class. As he had argued for
the augmentation of the functions of the state, only institutions could remedy this inequity.
‘In other words,* he wrote, ‘the ideal ‘natural harmony* of interests to which economic
idealists of a century ago looked for the cooperation of the world, must become a conscious
calculated policy of modern internationalism.*®® Free trade, he argued, had to be
supplemented with institutions for its effective operation:
If the Free Trade policy is to fulfil its mission as a civilizing, pacifying agency, it 
must adapt itself to the larger needs of [the] modern situation. ... This fuller doctrine 
of the Open Door, or equality of economic opportunity, cannot, however, be applied 
without definite co-operative action on the part of nations and their Governments.®^
Constructive internationalism was the final and ideal form of international system for
Hobson. ‘Just as in the course of recent centuries,’ he argued, ‘mainly through improvements
of communications, nationalism has come more and more to displace provincialism and
localism for most purposes of human co-operation, so the direct conscious activities and needs
of mankind will displace nationalism.’®® The revolution in communications and industrial
organisation, meant that ‘the policy of independent sovereign States, that was compatible with
some limited measure of peace and security so long as governments kept their economic
functions within narrow limits, is no longer possible when every government is committed to
a planning and control of all essential business processes, including the regulation of foreign
trade and the money that finances it.’®^ There is more than a little functionalism in his
discussion of the growing links of nations through the increasing numbers and power of
intergovernmental regulatory bodies and of transnational relations.®® In tones that are
striking reminiscent of the functionalists, Hobson predicted that
‘[t]he gravest social-economic problems will be found insoluble except by international
®® Richard Cobden^ p. 406. See also p. 408.
®® Wealth and L ife , p. 404.
®^ The New Protectionism, pp. 121-2.
®® From Capitalism to Socialism , p. 49. See also Free Thought in the Social Sciences, p. 260. 
®® Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, pp. 134-5.
®® See The Modern State, p. 3 A League o f  Nations, p. 12.
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arrangement. An era of free conferences and of more or less loose agreements between 
States will lay the foundation for what in time must amount to international regulation 
of industry. In other words, the economic internationalism ... will weave for itself the 
necessary apparel of political institutions.’®^
Unlike the functionalism of Mitrany, however, Hobson believed that overall governmental
coordination of the functional organisations, in the shape of a central international
government, was an essential prerequisite for the enhancement of human welfare. Hobson’s
proposal of international government along constructive internationalist lines is founded in
his social philosophy. For Hobson,
[t]he time has come for man to make his supreme effort at the task of conscious 
collective se lf -con tro l ... enlarging the orderly political government of the single city 
or the nation state to that society of nations which comprises mankind. ... [R]eason 
equally favours the substitution of law for war among nations as among individuals, 
and the active union of all Governments for health, trade, travel, culture, and all 
ingredients of human welfare.®^
Hobson’s constructive internationalism appears in his work during and after the First 
World War. He was most optimistic about the prospects of the League of Nations and of large- 
scale change in international relations in this period, when he believed that ‘[t]he rudiments 
of political internationalism, judicial, legislative, even administrative, already exist, weak, 
fragmentary, circumscribed in area, no doubt, but genuine beginnings of government’ were 
already in existence.®® Unfortunately, as we have seen, Hobson only sketched in outline the 
nature of world society and international government under constructive internationalism. 
Indeed, Hobson’s constructive internationalist writings are not so much the forerunner of 
functionalism as the working out of the theory on which functionalism is premised.
Hobson and Idealism in International Relations: An Assessment
The identification of three distinct modes of idealism in Hobson’s writings implies that we 
must revise our understanding of Hobson’s international thought as it is usually understood 
in international relations. It also means that we must re-examine the international relations 
category, idealism.
®^ Wealth and L ife , pp. 405-6; Work and Wealth, pp. 280-1. See also Wealth and L ife , p. 399; 
Towards International Government, p. 196.
®® The Recording Angel, pp. 111-2. See also Democracy and a Changing Civilisation, p. 23.
®® A League o f  Nations, p. 4; see also Imperialism, p. 7; The Case for Arbitration, p. 2.
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Hobson and the Three Modes o f  Idealism
If there are three modes of idealism in Hobson’s writings, what becomes of the label 
idealist as applied to Hobson? Idealism is too general a term accurately to describe Hobson’s 
international theorising. His writing was too sophisticated and too varied comfortably to fit 
into this pigeon-hole. There is a rather different problem, however: is it possible to resolve 
the three modes of idealism in Hobson’s writings or was Hobson merely inconsistent? 
Hobson’s inconsistency would not be surprising. He wrote an enormous amount over a period 
of more than fifty years, spanning the late Victorian era to the beginning of the Second World 
War.
The argument that Hobson was inconsistent is not only unsatisfying; it is incorrect. 
Hobson’s changes in outlook and even theoretical stance over the years were the result of his 
attempt to reconcile his evolutionary new liberal international perspective on international 
relations with the rapidly and drastically changing international scene. There are four 
potential reasons for Hobson’s change of position. The first reason accounts for Hobson’s 
inconsistency by arguing that his theoretical approach to international relations developed 
over the period of his writings. It has been argued, by Peter Clarke among others, that 
Hobson’s approach to social life was more or less complete by the turn of the century.®^ 
While there were twists and turns in his articulation of his theoretical system, the completion 
of Hobson’s theoretical system is indisputable. Hobson modified the radical critique of foreign 
policy in his theory of imperialism. The three modes of idealism reflect Hobson’s modification 
of liberal internationalism as well as his estimation of the condition of international relations 
at the time. For Hobson, the central issue for international relations was the same as that for 
any social realm, that is, welfare.®® However, there is no account here is the changes in 
Hobson’s ideal for contemporary international relations. The second two reasons are linked. 
They are the logical and historical aspects of his evolutionary approach to social life.®® In 
brief, according to Hobson’s evolutionary logic, constructive internationalism is the ideal 
beside which the other forms are inadequate. However, as Hobson pointed out, according to 
the historical aspect of his evolutionary theory, it was impossible to attain constructive 
internationalism without first having gone through the stages that are represented in
®^ Peter Clarke, ‘Introduction’, p. xix.
®® See Confessions o f  an Economic Heretic^ ch. 16. 
66 See chapter two.
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traditional idealism and Cobdenism. The major premise of Hobson’s approach to international 
relations was, as with domestic affairs, the transition from laissez fa ire  (Cobdenism) to a new 
liberalism (constructive internationalism). However, before this transition could take place, 
the conditions for laissez faire  had to be created from the anarchy of inter-state relations, the 
basis for the extreme centralisation of traditional idealism. The fourth reason for Hobson’s 
apparent inconsistency is that international relations altered drastically and Hobson’s 
estimations of the possibilities for internationalism changed with these transformations. There 
were a number of significant changes in the international environment which it would have 
been surprising if Hobson had not responded to. Among these were the internationalisation 
of the economy, the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the creation of the League of 
Nations, the liberation of the nations of Eastern Europe, renewed protectionism, the Great 
Depression, the rise of dictatorship and parallel decline of democracy in the thirties and, 
finally, the Second World War.
Hobson argued along the lines of each of the three modes of idealism, but at different 
times and in different contexts. The Cobdenite noninterventionist phase in Hobson’s writing 
more or less ends with the First World War. From his earliest consideration of international 
issues until the War, Hobson’s arguments remained largely within the classical liberal tradition 
on foreign policy. This is true of his Cobdenite critique of the spirited foreign policy that led 
to the Boer War and of his Angellite pronouncements on the internationalisation of capital in 
the decade before the War. Despite his involvement in the U.D.C., and his authorship of a 
book on Richard Cobden, during the War Hobson turned away from the nonintervention 
solutions to international problems of the nineteenth century radicals. Instead, he turned to 
institutional reform in international relations.®^ During the War and into the twenties and 
thirties, Hobson propounded his constructive internationalist ideas on international economic 
government. However, during the War, he was also putting forward proposals for the 
strengthening of international law through the imposition of sanctions on aggressors and the 
creation of an international force. While his constructive internationalism was more prominent 
in his writings after the War, the call for an international force never goes away entirely and 
traditional idealism resurfaces in his writings in the thirties. By the end of the thirties, Hobson 
was quite disillusioned with the League of Nations and indeed the prospects of 
internationalism in general.
The combination of these factors accounts for the change in Hobson’s (implicit) ideal
This applies in particular Richard Cohden and The Morals o f  Economic Internationalism^ p. 29, 
that might superficially appear to be straightforward tributes to Cobden.
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for international relations. Hobson’s work is pervaded by the criticism that laissez faire  was 
no longer a functional as a system for organising society. He extended the logic of this 
argument to international relations, increasingly denying the validity of Cobdenism. However, 
Hobson was guarded in his estimation of international relations. He believed that international 
society was a backward but developing social realm. Thus, he could not transfer new liberal 
prescriptions wholesale onto international relations. His constructive internationalism was an 
ideal towards which international relations was evolving rather than an established fact. For 
the time being, Hobson was content to encourage peaceful relations between peoples through 
the minimal measures of Cobdenism, with ameliorative measures taken to remedy the defects 
in the system, for example, the mandate system and international arbitration. Hobson’s 
defence of free trade did not rely on a dogmatic adherence to the doctrine of laissez faire. 
Free trade policies were simply a bulwark against autarkic economic nationalism and were 
preliminaries to constructive internationalism.
With economic processes in the vanguard, however, international cooperation was 
advancing. Cooperation made possible and beneficial the organisation of international 
relations to attain the greatest human welfare. The main, though not the only form of 
organisation in international relations was, for Hobson, a beneficent government. Hobson 
believed that the time was ripe for constructive internationalism during and after the Great 
War.
The smooth progress from Cobdenism to constructive internationalism was disrupted, 
however, by the First World War. Traditional idealism appears in Hobson’s writings during 
periods of crisis for example the collapse of international relations into the chaos of the First 
World War and the strife of the post-war period. Traditional idealism also appears with 
Hobson’s increasing disillusionment with the League of Nations in the thirties, with the 
failure to deal with the rise of aggression by the fascist states. In Hobson’s estimation, 
international relations has retrogressed (in terms of his evolutionary scale) to its primitive state 
during these chaotic interludes. In the context of international anarchy, coercive measures that 
are inappropriate to a developed society are necessary.
In summary, constructive internationalism is Hobson’s ideal, which he sometimes felt 
to be close at hand. More often, however, his constructive internationalist ideals took a back 
seat to more modest reforms in his concrete proposals. Cobdenite policies such as the open 
door to trade are minimal requirements for international cooperation. On the other hand, 
traditional idealist suggestions like an international police force are an extreme reaction to 
what was perceived as an extreme challenge to peace and security of the emerging
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international society.
Idealism  and International Relations
Idealism has been conceived as a single category of idealism in international relations. 
Yet, while the three modes of idealism remain idealist in their own way, they conflict on basic 
assumptions, on their analysis of the problems of international relations, and on their 
prescriptions for dealing with those problems. The three modes of idealism are easily 
distinguished. Traditional idealism aims for a World State, centralising power to provide 
international peace and order. Cobdenism aims for international maintenance of the rule of 
law between states to ensure the individual liberty and welfare through the survival of 
‘minimal states’ domestically. Constructive internationalism ranges in its various forms from 
being a functionalist approach to international organisation to proposals for an international 
federation to achieve maximum social welfare.
The reason that these diverse prescriptions have been gathered under the one heading, 
idealism, is related to the development of international relations as an academic discipline. 
Idealism as a category itself has a history and current ideological and theoretical significance. 
While idealism and realism were in common currency during the inter-war period, the current 
understanding of idealism is anachronistic. First, Carr’s famous critique caricatured the 
‘utopian’ position as he called, distorting many of the arguments of the so-called idealists. 
Second, subsequent to the realist critique of idealism and the establishment of realism as the 
dominant paradigm in international relations, idealism was broadened to mean almost any 
argument for reform or even change in international relations.
The category idealism emerged as a staple of international relations scholarship 
following the realist critiques of the two decades around the Second World War.®® 
Revealingly, William Olson claims that Carr’s critique ‘both focused and ended the debate’ 
between realism and idealism. Indeed, ‘[i]n retrospect, one sometimes wonders, though, just 
how much of a debate it ever really was...’.®® According to the realist critiques, idealism is 
rooted in a rationalism that is fundamentally apolitical. Idealism and realism have classically
®® These are now among the classics of the discipline: E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis\ H. 
Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics; J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. 
While Carr refers to utopianism, Morgenthau to liberalism and rationalism, and Herz to idealism, 
these writers identify a particular body of thought now labelled idealist.
®® William C. Olson, ‘The Growth of a Discipline’, p. 23.
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been distinguished by their contrasting attitudes to political power, especially the military 
power of states. The concentration on power as physical force wielded by the state in realist 
international relations permitted a reasonably straightforward distinction of realists and 
idealists: the former acknowledge its central role in politics, the latter neglect it.
The three modes of idealism are not of one voice on power, however. The liberal 
distinction of the state and civil society highlights the differences between the modes of 
idealism;^® traditional idealism, Cobdenism and constructive internationalism can be 
distinguished by the attitude to the role of the state that they project onto international 
relations. Traditional idealism embraces the need for centralised government and the 
monopoly of legitimate force in a way that trumps the realists. Accepting the logic that peace 
and order are achievable only through enforcement by the state, traditional idealists turn to 
the establishment of a super-state to overcome the competition for power among national 
states. Cobdenites neglect or seek to minimise the importance of power in international 
relations (and in politics generally). They assume the beneficence or neutrality of the power 
of a minimal state ‘holding the ring’ and defending individual rights. Power wielded other 
than by legitimate states according to the rule of law is irrational and unjust to Cobdenites. 
The position of constructive internationalists on power is, perhaps, confusing compared to 
these two straightforward extremes. The state is conceived as an instrument for improving 
social conditions, state power is used to improve the welfare of society and therefore its power 
is limited to those areas and issues where it can effect welfare positively. The functionalist 
logic of organisation implicit in constructive internationalism tends to expand state functions, 
however. In short, as opposed to the ‘peace through law’ of Cobdenism and constructive 
internationalism’s ‘peace through organisation’, traditional idealism offers a ‘peace through 
power’ startlingly close in argument to realism.
The conflation of different arguments into the dichotomy of idealism and realism 
makes an understanding of the actual debates conducted in the inter-war period impossible. 
Not only have three modes of idealism been conflated in a single category, but the monolithic 
category of idealism as one side of the realism/idealism dichotomy has obscured the politics 
of international relations thought in the inter-war period. The debate was not simply between 
realists and idealists, but between socialists, liberals and conservatives, internationalists, 
nationalists, pacifists, and so on. For example, among the so-called idealists, there were 
important differences between the supporters of an international force (like David Davies),
For an examination of the implications of the state/society distinction for international 
relations, see Fred Halliday, ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’.
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unreconstructed Cobdenites (such as Norman Angell), Gladstonian liberals (like Gilbert 
Murray), and the radicals and socialists (such as Harold Laski). Realism and idealism are 
inadequate to a full understanding of the development of international theory in the inter-war 
period.
The aggregation of the different arguments into one idealism has led to a number of 
misunderstandings. Inis Claude, for instance, confuses constructive internationalist and 
traditional idealist proposals for international government because of his distinction between 
international systems purely on the basis of the distribution of power. His typology of 
international systems makes no distinction between world government of a traditional idealist 
variety and an international federation along the lines of constructive internationalism.^^ 
However, the premises for the establishment of international government within traditional 
idealism and constructive internationalism are not only not consonant, but are diametrically 
opposed. While traditional idealism founds its claim on the establishment of order through the 
super-sovereignty of a unitary world state, constructive internationalism hopes for the 
dissolution of sovereignty through the progressive allocation of functions to relevant organs - 
not only international but national and sub-national.^^ The international federation of 
constructive internationalism is not a global Leviathan or Great Power concert inexorably 
seeking power for power’s sake. Furthermore, the founding texts of realist international 
relations, Carr’s The Twenty Years' Crisis, is itself effectively depoliticised by the realist- 
idealist dichotomy. After a realist critique of latter-day Cobdenism in The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, Carr advocated international planning in Conditions o f  Peace. Carr’s collectivist 
scheme for international planning and his attacks on laissez faire  liberalism owed much to 
writers such as H o b s o n .H o w e v e r ,  the collectivist aspect of Carr’s critique and proposal 
for reconstruction is lost in the realist-idealist dichotomy as it has been constructed since then.
Idealism is not, however, merely a category for the history of international ideas. It 
persists as a taboo term by which much of the progressive writing in international relations
Inis Claude, Power in International Relations, p. 9. See also J. Herz, Political Realism and 
Political Idealism .
For example, see Mitrany’s critique of Clarence Streit’s proposals in A Working Peace System , 
pp. 13-16.
Carr, ch. 14. Carr’s approach is probably too collectivist for the label new liberal 
internationalist. Nonetheless, the influence of new liberal internationalism is clear. For an exploration 
of Carr’s ‘idealism’, see H. Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, pp. 101-5. 
Similarly, Morgenthau, in his introduction to the 1966 edition of Mitrany’s A Working Peace System , 
advocates functionalism as a route to peace.
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has been labelled and marginalised through association with the apparently flawed approach 
to international relations of inter-w ar idealism. Today, those who advocate change towards 
a just and peaceful world politics are subjected to the derogatory label, idealists. Idealism is 
denotes the disciplinary immaturity of the inter-war period. Lastly, the most significant 
feature of the realist-idealist debate was reduction of the meaning of politics in international 
relations because of the emphasis on physical power as the basis and legitimisation of realism 
(and delegitimisation of idealism). In this emphasis on power, realism retained idealism’s 
opposition of reason and politics. Carr and Morgenthau, the arch-critics of idealism, merely 
inverted the preference for power in the dichotomy of power and reason (or justice or peace 
or welfare).^^ Realism reinforced rather than challenged the defective conception of politics 
in idealism. International theory passed from an idealist rationalisation of politics to a 
discussion of the importance of power as a mediating principle of inter-state relations and the 
centrality of the security dilemma.
Conclusion
To summarise, an analysis of Hobson’s worldview and his critiques of international relations 
convey an impression of Hobson as an idealist. However, three distinct approaches were found 
to underlay his proposals for world order. Differences among the three modes of idealism 
render a single category of idealism and therefore a simple dichotomy of realism and idealism 
problematic.
Renewed attention to the writers of the inter-war period, such as Hobson, would bring 
a clearer understanding of the development of international theory. Not all these writers were 
idealists and the aggregation of idealist writings does violence to the diversity of opinions that 
during the twenties and thirties. The three modes are a more appropriate starting point for an 
enquiry into in ter-w ar international theory, because they are derived from the writings of one 
of the idealists and reflect some of the different approaches to international issues of the
A similar conclusion can be drawn from R. Niebuhr, ‘Introduction’, Moral Man and Immoral 
Society. See, particularly, the way in which Morgenthau’s critique of rationalism becomes a set of 
rigid rules in H. Morgenthau, Power Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace., 3rd edn.
In the haste to reinstate power (or the passions) alongside or over reason in politics, realism 
Itself became an apolitical theory of international politics. The best example of this is K. Waltz, 
Theory o f  International Politics. Thus, international theory under the hegemony of realism has been 
emptied of politics; the choice is between an ideal polity where the common good is administered and 
an international balance of power operating according to the logic of micro-economics.
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period.
There is more than historical revision at stake, though. Utilising the three modes can 
rescue so-called idealist writings from the dustbin of history by highlighting continuities with 
current international theory. The concepts and concerns of idealist writers remain relevant 
today. Many idealist proposals are prevalent in current alternatives to realist international 
theory, for example, in the writings by those scholars identified with the World Order Models 
Project. Idealist writings can be a resource for international theorists to rediscover the roots 
of a particular approach or theory, such as functionalism. They can be a way of challenging 
the claims to a classical tradition of international relations, be that some variant on realpolitik, 
or economic liberalism in current international political economy. Inter-war studies o f  the 
relationship of international politics and economics in the inter-war period merit attention. 
Finally, we live in a rapidly changing world where the dogmas of realism appear inadequate 
and dated. The progressive, reformist aspects of idealist writings can be of renewed relevance 
for students of international relations, not only for what was erroneous, but for what was 
prescient. The three modes of idealism are a starting point for study of these writings.
Chapter Eight
Hobson and the Liberal Tradition in International Relations
Hobson has been labelled an idealist. To be more specific, he wrote in the liberal tradition of 
thinking on international relations. This concluding chapter examines Hobson’s contribution 
to the tradition of liberal internationalist theory.
Hobson’s international theory does not comfortably fit into any of the so-called 
paradigms of international relations. For realism, international relations is the relations of 
states. Hobson would have regarded this, as he considered the earlier realpolitik theories, as 
succumbing to the separatist fallacy. Though the theory of imperialism is the foundation of 
the structuralist paradigm, Hobson does not fit this category well because he is not a Marxist, 
criticised the labour theory of value and the Hegelian dialectic.^
Hobson’s concern with the dynamics and interconnections of the social world appears 
to bring him close to the pluralist paradigm. However, this paradigm is also concerned with 
the relations of things, such as people, groups, and international organisations as well as states, 
and of networks. Hobson’s holism, his emphasis on the interconnectedness and unity of the 
world system seems to place him outside the usual understanding of this paradigm. Hobson 
was constantly attempting to move beyond pluralism. Nonetheless, pluralism certainly comes 
closest to being the category to which Hobson’s international theory would belong. We can get 
a clearer appreciation of Hobson’s place in international theory by looking at the liberal 
tradition on international relations, of which pluralism is in many respects only one part.
Hobson’s evolutionary framework for international relations has been described as new 
liberal internationalism. It is apposite, despite the qualms about adding another term to a field 
already overburdened with labels, categories and neologisms. Other terms have been suggested 
for the general approach to international relations that Hobson takes, such as welfare 
internationalism, embedded liberalism or compensatory liberalism.^ While none of these
 ^Further, for Hobson, the opposite of organic harmony was disorganisation rather than structural 
inequality. Inequality derived from disorganisation. This is a different approach to that in Marxism, 
which can be illustrated by the contrast of Hobson’s understanding of the imperial international 
system with Lenin’s in Imperialism , the Highest Stage o f  Capitalism,, where he puts forward the idea 
of ‘uneven development’, a concept alien to Hobson.
 ^See Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, pp. 100-11; R.D. McKinlay and 
Richard Little, Global Problems and World Order, pp. 36-41; and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International 
Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order’, and 
‘Political Structure and Change in the International Economy’ in J.G. Ruggie (ed.). The Antinomies 
o f  Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division o f  Labour (New York: Columbia
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terms were in currency during Hobson’s time, new liberal internationalism is preferred 
because it reflects more closely the historical and ideological development of Hobson’s 
thought. Hobson’s internationalism was liberal in its assumptions of rationality, the harmony 
of interests, and the possibility (or inevitability) of progress in human affairs.^ Hobson’s 
approach was new in a couple of respects. It was, at the time, a novel approach to 
international relations, using the organic and surplus concepts to highlight the importance of 
international organisation. It was also a new liberal approach. The new liberals, of whom 
Hobson was an important figure, turned away from laissez-faire and towards intervention in 
social and economic affairs, through the instrument of the State, as representative of the 
whole of society. His was a new liberal approach to international relations because his 
modifications of liberal international theory were consonant with the changes in liberalism 
at the turn of the century.
Hobson was a major figure in the transformation of the liberal tradition in 
international re la t io n s .H o b s o n ’s part in the transformation of liberalism has recently 
received attention from scholars. No longer are we in the dark as to how the liberalism of 
Mill, Cobden and Gladstone (to take a rather diverse group of nineteenth century liberals) 
became the liberalism of today associated with the welfare state and intervention in the 
economy. Unfortunately, the parallel change in liberal international theory, from the 
noninterventionism that underpins Mill’s and Cobden’s approach to international relations to 
the institutionalism and managerialism of today’s liberal approaches has remained under­
researched. In the story of the development of international theory, the liberal approach leaps 
from Cobdenism to functionalism apparently with no stage in between. What would, on the 
face of it, appear to be a crucial period in the development in international relations, the years 
just before and after the establishment of international relations as an academic discipline, 
is thus omitted.
The omission can be traced to both scholars of international relations and those 
scholars studying Hobson. Hobson scholars have either considered him a Cobdenite on
University Press, 1983), p. 433.
 ^For a discussion of liberalism in international relations, see Christopher Brewin, ‘Liberal States 
and International Obligations’, p. 322-3. Other writers in this tradition include John Stuart Mill and 
John Maynard Keynes.
 ^ Hobson would perhaps have considered the phrase liberal tradition to be an oxymoron. Liberal, 
for Hobson, was synonymous with a rationalist, critical (and constructive) political philosophy that 
challenged the oppressive traditions and customs of society.
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international matters or have been perplexed by Hobson’s apparently schizophrenic approach 
to international relations of Cobdenite free tradism, on the one hand, and organic-inspired 
institutional reform, on the other.^ Understanding Hobson’s approach to international 
relations as new liberal internationalism demonstrates that it is as incorrect to label Hobson 
a Cobdenite in international relations as it would be to label him a Cobdenite in domestic 
affairs. There have been two limitations to the assessments of Hobson’s international theory 
by Hobson scholars that have led to their confusion. First, Hobson’s theories are understood 
as applying purely to the domestic context in the first instance, /.e., the British state. While 
this is true to some extent, Hobson’s theories were also universalist. Attention purely to the 
domestic context therefore results in a failure to extend the implications of Hobson’s 
theoretical system to international relations. There is also a failure to understand that Hobson’s 
international theory was an integral part of his social philosophy. Instead, Hobson’s 
international theory becomes an application of theory to practical policy comparable in status 
to taxation, unemployment or poverty. There has been no attempt to map a parallel shift by 
Hobson of liberal international theory as he conducted domestically.
The problem has been exacerbated by the dominance of historians and historically- 
oriented research on Hobson. The commendable concern with where Hobson’s ideas came 
from, who his intellectual predecessors were and so on underplays Hobson as a producer as 
well as a consumer of ideas; of Hobson himself as an intellectual forebear in the liberal 
tradition. The relative lack of an exchange of ideas between international theory and 
historians, particularly intellectual historians, has contributed to the neglect. Hobson scholars 
have not studied the development of international theory; international theorists have not 
studied the work on the development of liberalism.
Liberal Internationalism from Cobdenism to Functionalism
Hobson’s place in the liberal tradition on international relations and his contribution to the 
development of liberal international theory can best be illustrated through a comparison of 
his work with the contribution to international theory of three other liberal thinkers: Richard 
Cobden, Norman Angell and David Mitrany.
The most important liberal figures for Hobson’s international theory are John Stuart 
Mill and, particularly, Richard Cobden. Mill provided the liberal line on nationalism and
® See, for example, P.F. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats^ p. 177; and also J. Townshend, 
‘Introduction’ to the 1988 paperback edition of Imperialism, pp. 20-22.
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internationalism; Cobden had supplied the radical liberal position on peace, internationalism, 
free trade and foreign policy.® Cobden is best known to international relations as the 
campaigner for free trade and for nonintervention in foreign policy. His approach to 
international affairs mirrors his approach to domestic affairs. He was concerned with liberty 
of all to go about their business without hindrance from governments and claimed that 
personal liberty in economic intercourse would lead to peace as well as prosperity. Cobden’s 
position on international affairs followed this analysis; government should stay out of people’s 
business as much as possible. He was a major proponent of free trade. According to Cobden, 
free trade permitted international specialisation of industry and increased commerce, thus 
creating the greatest good both for individuals and national societies. Prosperity was not the 
only result of free trade, however. Commercial intercourse encouraged sympathy and 
friendship between mutually dependent traders in different localities, countries, or national 
areas. For Cobden, peace and prosperity were mutually reinforcing; prosperity would lead to 
peace and peace enhance prosperity. Peace was easier to come by in a prosperous world than 
in a desperately poor one. Likewise, prosperity is more readily maintained or created in 
periods of peace than in war-stricken times. Both are dependent on arrangements to safeguard 
economic liberty and encourage commercial intercourse. Cobden was a strident critic of 
current international affairs: he was anti-protection; against the Balance of Power, which he 
claimed was a justification for intervention in the affairs of other nations; and strongly 
criticised British imperial policy.
Hobson maintained the liberal vision propounded by Mill and Cobden of peace, 
democracy and internationalism. Hobson updated the vision by adding positive liberty to 
liberal internationalism in the shape of equality of opportunity in international relations.^ 
However, he queried the easy relationship of nationalism and internationalism, implicit in 
Mill’s analysis, especially as he pointed when nationalism issued in aggressive imperialism. He 
modified Cobdenite doctrine by bringing interventionism into the liberal tradition of 
international thought, justifying a role for the growing numbers of international organisations 
and proposing a central international government to coordinate them. In his theory of 
imperialism, Hobson altered the radical liberal critique of foreign policy in two related ways. 
First, economics and politics could no longer be regarded as autonomous. Hobson conceived
‘Free Trade and Foreign Policy’; Richard Cohden, esp. ch. 13.
 ^ Compare Hobson’s discussion of the domestic implication of equality of opportunity in The 
Crisis o f  Liberalism , pp. 96-113, with Towards Iniernalional Governmenl, p. 134, 137-40, where it 
is discussed in an international context.
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of economic power in a way that would have been meaningless to Cobden. Second, capitalism 
was no longer a force for peace, but was an incitement to war, due to the influence of 
sectional interests.® The centrality of economic issues in Hobson’s analysis is not solely a 
result o f  his being an economist. He was concerned that powerful political interests in the 
economic system had been neglected by previous liberal, especially Cobdenite, analysis that 
had accorded economics autonomy from the political and social realms.®
The most important of Hobson’s contemporaries in liberal internationalism was 
Norman Angell. Hobson and Angell were long-time associates in the U.D.C.^® Angell was 
something of an unreconstructed Cobdenite, a defender of the pacific tendencies of 
international financial capitalism. His development of Cobdenite doctrine was to apply the 
connection of free trade and peace to international finance. Angell was also concerned very 
greatly with the psychology of public opinion.
Hobson’s opinions of Angell’s arguments are something of a barometer for the changes 
in his own opinions. In 1911, he lauded Angell’s The Great Illusion}^  In the decade before 
the War, Hobson was an Angellite.^® After the War, and particularly in the later thirties, he 
criticised Angell’s insistence that capitalism could not gain by war. Hobson pointed out that 
this was debatable for the capitalist system as a whole. More importantly, Hobson argued, 
capitalism did not operate as a whole; individual capitalists pursued their own interests at the 
expense of others. Sectional interests led capitalism to be a cause of war contrary to Angell’s 
beliefs.
® On the influence of sectional interests, see Imperialism: A S iu d \\  pt. 1, chs. 4 and 6. For the 
connection of imperialism and tyranny, see pt. 2, ch. 1.
® Hobson calls them economic interests, see Imperialism^ pt. 1, ch. 4. See also his discussion of the 
political interests in the development of political economy in Free Thought in the Social Sciences, pt. 
2 .
See the letter appealing for funds on behalf of the U.D.C. from Angell and Hobson in New 
Statesman and Nation, 2 October 1937, p. 483.
Angell’s works include: The Great Illusion', The Great Illusion 1933', Preface to Peace; Foreign 
Policy and Our Daily Bread. See J.D.B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility o f  War, for a 
discussion of Hobson’s international theory.
Economic Interpretation o f  Investment, p. 118-23.
See J.D.B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility o f  War.
Imperialism, p. [59].
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Bernard Porter has made the claim that Angell was less of a rationalist than Hobson 
because he explained war in terms of the irrational beliefs of the masses rather than the 
manipulations of a business c l i q u e .H o w e v e r ,  Angell is just as much of a rationalist as 
Hobson. He did not challenge the underlying rationalist premise, that there is a fundamental 
human of interests between people(s). Indeed, in his emphasis of sectional interests, Hobson 
comes closer to showing a real conflict of interests between individuals and between members 
of society and society as a whole. Angell on the other hand, believed that these irrational 
sentiments could educated away and a pacific public opinion created.^®
David Mitrany drew on diverse influences in his functional approach to international 
organisation, the institutional turn in liberal international theory. Mitrany is the first liberal 
international theorist discussed to be an academic. Cobden was a politician, campaigner for 
free trade and peace and a pamphleteer. Angell was a politician and publicist. Hobson was a 
journalist and public campaigner.
Mitrany’s functional approach to international organisation focuses attention on 
economic issues and particularly welfare concerns, relegating security issues or high politics, 
the common subject matter of international relations. He suggests that the national basis of 
government is inadequate to fulfil people’s welfare needs. Satisfying these needs is impossible 
for national governments and requires international cooperation and organisation. Mitrany 
argued that nation-state institutions will be superseded by functional international 
organisations, and that peoples loyalties will turn to the international organisations. He claims 
that administrators of these functional organisations will supply the needs of humanity more 
efficiently and justly than national politicians or political institutions. Mitrany further argues 
that the shape of international organisation will be along the lines of functional requirements 
rather than reflecting the aggregation of political authorities of sovereign states, as had been 
the common shape of reformism in international relations to that time.^^
While the so-called ‘Red Professors’, G.D.H. Cole and R.H. Tawney, as well as Fabians 
such as Leonard Woolf, have been put forward as prominent influences on and forerunners
Porter, Critics o f  Empire, p. 221-6.
For instance, see Angell’s defence of his economic internationalist argument in The Great 
Illusion 1933, p. 15.
For example, David Mitrany, ‘The Functional Approach to World Organization’.
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of functionalism, Mitrany’s connection to Hobson has been largely overlooked.^® Mitrany 
remarks on his days as an undergraduate at the L.S.E. and particularly the formative influence 
of Leonard Hobhouse and Graham Wallas, two of Hobson’s good friends with similar outlook 
to his own.^® Both Hobson and Mitrany wrote for the Manchester Guardian^ though at 
d ifferent times. Mitrany’s personal connection to Hobson is confirmed in his friendship with 
Ted Scott, the son of the editor of the Guardian, who was Hobson’s son-in-law. Mitrany later 
commented that he had been surprised at the apparent exclusion of Hobson, someone who he 
considered a knowledgeable writer on international issues, from the newly-created Royal 
Institute for International Affairs after World War One.^°
The influence of these personal connections and the liberal milieu in which they both 
moved is reflected in the consonance of Mitrany’s functionalism and Hobson’s new liberal 
internationalism. Functionalism and constructive internationalism share certain common 
elements. Both stress the importance of welfare in international relations and especially in 
moulding the new international institutions. Both approaches are institutionalist and 
evolutionist.^^ Hobson’s federalism is driven by functionalist logic, and, as such, is not 
perhaps as vulnerable to the anti-constitutional critique that Mitrany advanced of other 
international federalist s c h e m e s .M i t r a n y  deviated from some of Hobson’s new liberal 
internationalist ideas, however; for instance, the emphasis on the necessity of a central 
international government, the belief in federalism as a way of combining states in an 
international government and the radical notion of democratic reform as manifested in the 
call for industrial democracy. Mitrany retains the decentralist aspect of the guild socialist 
tradition of G.D.H. Cole and the ‘functional society’ of R.H. Tawney. Hobson, on the other
Paul Taylor, ‘Functionalism: The Theory of David Mitrany’, p. 237; and Paul Taylor, 
‘Introduction’, to Mitrany’s A Functional Theory o f Politics.
Mitrany, ‘The Making of the Functional Theory: A Memoir’, A Functional Theory o f  Politics, 
p. 16-7. Mitrany notes also the influence of James Shotwell at a slighter later stage in his career.
Hobson’s exclusion from membership of the Royal Institute for International Affairs is noted 
by Mitrany in A Functional Theory o f  Politics, p. 39. Mitrany’s personal connection to Hobson is 
remarked upon on pp. 53-4.
Unlike structural functionalism in sociology, see Talcott Parsons, The Structure o f  Social Action. 
For the mistaken view that Mitrany’s functionalism and structural functional sociology can be simply 
equated or cross fertilised, see R.J. Vincent, ‘The Functions of Functionalism in International 
Relations’ and Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 6.
22 Notably Clarence K. Streit’s Union Now. See Mitrany, A Working Peace System , p. 13-5.
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hand, sees a much larger role for the political state and sees no opposition between political 
and legal reform and economic reform.^^ Hobson’s use of the organic analogy highlights the 
benefits from organization. Mitrany also uses organic terminology, but Hobson’s constructive 
internationalism goes much further than functionalism towards centralisation as a means to 
rationalisation and organisation of international relations. Hobson and Mitrany both emphasise 
welfare and organisation to satisfy welfare needs. However, Hobson saw the need for central 
control, rather than the diffuse links that Mitrany felt would be most beneficial. Hobson’s 
holism not only contributed to his greater centralism but also required him to deny the 
narrowly economic meaning welfare gained in Mitrany’s formulation of functionalism.
Cobdenite liberalism and Mitrany’s functionalism are usually distinguished as 
categorically different forms of liberalism.^'* However, when we consider the changes 
wrought in liberal theory by Hobson and Angell, it is straightforward that liberalism in 
international relations passed through an institutionalist ‘tu rn’ at the end of the last century. 
There are similarities and differences between each of the figures from liberal international 
theory; these are clearest in the comparison and contrast of Cobden and Mitrany. There is a 
similarity in both goals and analysis between Mitrany and Cobden that shows they are part 
of the liberal tradition. Both Cobden’s and Mitrany’s proposals for improving international 
relations are welfarist. Mitrany’s welfare resolves to economic criteria control over which will 
result in the setting up of institutions to provide such functions as are n e c e s s a ry .C o b d e n  
hoped that the removal of legal and political hindrances would enable people to increase their 
prosperity. Both have a negative attitude to national governments rooted in a disapproval of 
politics. In both cases national political government is seen as outmoded and detrimental to 
the improvement of the human lot. Mitrany’s division of the high political and low political 
issues, so much attacked by his critics, mirrors the distinction made by Cobden. Peace and 
prosperity flow from the correct functional arrangements, and this is true also for Norman 
Angell.
The difference is the stress on some form of intervention, not by government to be 
sure but by groups in Mitrany’s writing and the importance of institutions as routes to 
satisfying needs. The difference between Cobden and Mitrany is the attitude to liberty.
Wealth and L ife , pp. 228-9.
As in McKinlay and Little, Global Problems and World Order, ch. 2; and Joseph M. Grieco, 
‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Internationalism’.
R.I. Tooze, ‘The Progress of International Functionalism’, p. 212-3.
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Cobden defended negative liberty, the right of noninterference, though he did believe in 
treaties to facilitate free trade and to provide for arbitration of international conflicts. Angell, 
though he did not go as far as Mitrany with respect to institutionalism, has recently been 
plausibly labelled a functionalist, because of his search for guarantees for international 
financial stability in international political institutions.^® Mitrany believed that international 
institutions were required to provide for certain welfare needs to guarantee positive liberty.
Hobson can be seen as the intermediate stage in liberal internationalism between 
Cobdenism and functionalism. While there is a certain amount of circumstantial evidence for 
this construction of Hobson’s part in the development of the liberal approach to international 
relations, it is also peculiarly appropriate to Hobson’s conception of liberalism and his self- 
image as a social reformer. He consciously advanced beyond previous formulations of 
liberalism to incorporate the implications of recent events and social phenomena. The classic 
example is his theory of imperialism, which was an updated formulation of a Cobdenite attack 
on a spirited foreign policy. Hobson’s new liberalism also expresses itself, however, at the 
international level in his call for a free trade tempered by international institutional control 
modifying the excesses and deficiencies of national laissez faire  policies.
The change of emphasis in the liberalism of Cobden and Mitrany might be seen as 
parallel to changes in domestic arrangements and liberal theorising concerning them. Changes 
in liberal internationalism have been interpreted as an instance of the domestic analogy by 
Hidemi S u g a n a m i . T h i s  explanation of the changes in liberal internationalism is 
insufficient. It does not explain why liberalism changed, and merely draws parallels between 
liberal domestic and international policy. The consonance of liberal policies is not considered 
to be a result of the logic of liberalism itself. Studying Hobson as part of the liberal tradition 
in international relations shows that institutionalisation and internationalisation go hand in 
hand, rather than simply being applied from the domestic realm to the international. The logic 
of Cobden’s and Hobson’s domestic proposals is international; the international proposals of 
Angell and Mitrany are integral parts of a general social philosophy.
New Liberal Internationalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism
®^ Cornelia Navari, ‘The Great Illusion Revisited: The International Political Theory of Norman 
Angell’, p. 343.
27 Suganami quoting Hans Morgenthau in Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals^ p. 2.
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Liberal internationalism has taken on many different guises since Hobson’s formulation. It 
has, for instance, been profoundly influenced by the institutionalisation of international 
relations as an academic discipline. Liberal academic theories and approaches have ranged 
from functionalism, neo-functionalism and (regional) integration theory to studies of 
transnational relations, interdependence and, most recently, the neo-realist synthesis of 
regimes and cooperation t h e o r y . T h e  changes wrought in liberal international theory since 
Hobson’s time can be illustrated by a comparison of Hobson’s new liberal internationalism 
with Robert Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism, which has been described as the ‘newest 
liberal institutionalism’ and for which Keohane self-consciously adopts the mantle of the 
liberal t r a d i t i o n . T h e  comparison also permits a glimpse of the contribution that a study 
of Hobson’s approach to international relations might make to today’s liberal international 
theory.
Keohane deploys game theory and rational choice in an attempt to transcend the 
anarchy problématique in international relations. Drawing particularly on Robert Axelrod’s 
The Evolution o f  Cooperation, Keohane argues that cooperation and the creation and 
maintenance of international institutions are a rational and predictable part of the behaviour 
of states. Keohane uses this insight to deny the realist assertion of international anarchy and 
consequent potentiality of war of all against and the supremacy of the (in)security 
dilemma.
While Keohane’s analysis has undoubted merits, its contrast to Hobson’s new liberal 
internationalism could hardly be greater. Keohane adopts an economic liberalism or narrow 
utilitarianism that posits rational egoistic actors seeking their own in te r e s t s .K e o h a n e
Ernst Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe and Beyond the Nation State; R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye 
(eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics and Power and Interdependence; Joseph Nye, Peace 
in Parts; Robert O. Keohane, A fter Hegemony; Stephen Krasner (ed.). International Regimes; and 
Kenneth Oye (ed.). Cooperation Under Anarchy.
Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism’. For Keohane’s discussion of neoliberal institutionalism, see his International 
Institutions and State Power, ch. 1.
Keohane, A fter Hegemony, ch. 5; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f  Cooperation, esp. chs. 1, 
4; Axelrod and Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, in Oye 
(ed.). Cooperation Under Anarchy.
R.B.J. Walker, ‘History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations’. This approach, 
the application of the methodology of economics and game theory to the other social sciences, has 
been called ‘economic imperialism’. See Gerard Radnitsky and Peter Bernholz (eds.). Economic 
Imperialism : The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field o f  Economics.
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defends international institutions on economic liberal utilitarian grounds which Hobson had 
criticised in his attacks on classical and neoclassical political economy. Though both 
approaches use the concept of evolution, Keohane’s depends on competition and rational 
selection among individuals. Hobson’s conception of evolution is much broader including 
within it the idea not only that learning is an outcome of evolution but that culture, 
civilisation and reason also evolve. Hobson denied the atomistic rational egoism of Keohane’s 
approach and sought to defend the growth of sociability and institutions in evolution as part 
of the realisation of the common good and a result of the operation of his theory of social 
surplus. Hobson sought the common good and believed in a collective social will, both alien 
to Keohane’s approach. Finally, Keohane restricts his attention to the behaviour of states, 
playing down the importance of other actors. Hobson was emphatic that liberal 
internationalism consisted in the actions of nations, rather than states, not just in the 
aggregate but severally as the groups that makes up nations.
Hobson’s approach to international relations based on his concepts of cooperative 
surplus and the organic analogy are an alternative to the subjective utility-based game 
theoretic approach that underpins the current literature on international cooperation of which 
Keohane’s is the paradigm. Hobson’s new liberal internationalism, by contrast, restores the 
common good and a broader conception of cooperation to the liberal agenda for international 
relations.
While Hobson can be construed as part of the liberal tradition, he is also in some 
important respects an outsider. His radicalism and his emphasis on the priority of social 
cooperation and the common good place him outside the current understanding of the classical 
tradition of liberalism, which centres on individual rights and laissez faire. He does not fit 
into the modern utilitarianism of cooperation theory either. Indeed, Hobson’s writing on 
international relations avoids the economism that pervades all the other liberal approaches that 
I have considered. His international government goes further than Mitrany’s interventionism 
in transcending the political/economic division at the core of the liberal tradition. In a sense, 
the revitalisation of economic liberalism in transnationalism in the 1970s and in cooperation 
theory more recently is just another manifestation of the isolation of economics from politics 
that marks out the liberal tradition. Instead of the concentration on economic variables, like 
trade and investment flows, recent liberal internationalism adopts the radically individualistic 
methodology of liberal economics.
To summarise, in the development of liberal international theory, Hobson’s approach
Richard K. Ashley, ‘Three Modes of Economism’, p. 471-6.
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can be described as a new liberal internationalism; a new liberal institutionalist challenge to 
laissez-faire. Hobson’s contribution to liberal internationalism consists less in the details of 
specific theories than in the transformation he effected in liberal social, political, economic 
and international theory. Hobson reflects the turn in liberal internationalism away from 
Cobdenism towards the welfare internationalism and integration theory of David Mitrany’s 
functionalism, and is in a sense a transitional phase in liberal internationalism. However, 
Hobson’s ideas have since been treated as dead-ends. Hobson’s opinion on the need for an 
international government to maximise human welfare has been lost to current liberal theory. 
Hobson’s contribution to the liberal critique of foreign policy is in large part contained within 
the theory of imperialism.
The Impact of the First World War on Liberalism in International Relations
The First World War was a cataclysmic event for European politics, society, economics and 
c u l t u r e . T h e  days before 1914 now appear unnaturally distant. Even in understanding the 
work of authors like Hobson, there has been a tendency to expect a sharp break in writings 
before and after the War. The Great War was certainly a watershed in a number of respects. 
In regard to politics, it is now believed that the War catapulted socialism and fascism to the 
fore and drove a nail into the coffin of liberalism. The British Liberal Party faltered after the 
War and was in ideological crisis from this point fo rw a r d .U n f o r tu n a te ly  the very drama 
of the Great War has meant that it has been used as casual excuse for the many drastic changes 
in society, politics and in international relations that occurred in the early part of this century.
Hobson was certainly shaken by the coming of war and by its protracted horrors. 1914 
was a surprise and Hobson later claimed that the war had halved the percentage of rationality 
that he ascribed to humanity. Prior to 1914, Hobson and other liberals had been swept along 
on a wave of optimism, though the gathering crises of the decade after the turn of the century 
- the arms races and the crises in North Africa and in the Balkans - cast a cloud over the rosy 
assessment of advancing internationalism.^^ Nonetheless, the War’s impact on his theoretical 
approach to social life, including his international theory, can easily be exaggerated. As was
David Mitrany quoted in Suganami, Domestic Analogy^ p. 79.
Michael Freeden, Liberalism Divided.
For one of Hobson’s less optimistic assessments, see his reaction to the treaty between Britain 
and Russia in ‘England’s Duty to the Russian People’.
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shown with his international theory in the last chapter, the changes in international relations 
caused Hobson to alter his estimations of the potential for progress but not his outlook as a 
whole. The War simply led Hobson to revise his estimation of international realm downwards. 
Hobson’s theoretical analyses of politics, economy and society were sufficient to explain the 
collapse into war.^® Among other things, Hobson resurrected his theory of imperialism 
during the War and returned to it constantly afterwards. His emphasis on the importance of 
unproductive surplus ass a source of conflict and injustice in the national and international 
economic systems continued unabated. His analyses of militarism and protectionism were 
refined in response to the Great War and the Bad Peace, but he did not need to innovate 
significantly to make his theoretical analyses appropriate. During and after the War Hobson 
emphasised the need for a strengthened international government to prevent war. The details 
of the proposal were new to Hobson’s internationalism. Before, Hobson had only remarked 
on international government rather vaguely as part of the evolutionary advance of 
international relations. Again, however, the idea of international government pre-dated the 
war and was implicit even in his pessimistic estimation of international theory, diplomatic 
practice and the morality of nations, as his alternative. His proposals for international 
government were more elaborate after the War, reflecting the gains in international 
organisation and in intervention in domestic economic affairs. For Hobson the War had 
created problems and exacerbated others, but it had also revealed the potential for cooperation 
in societies, the resultant increases in productivity and the benefits (on the economic side) of 
state organisation of the economy. He hoped that, should the correct policies be implemented, 
recovery after the war would be swift. This was not to be. But the economic and political 
catastrophe of the inter-w ar years was not primarily the result of the dislocation of the War. 
In terms of economic relations, both nationally and internationally, the War created few new 
special problems; rather, it had worsened some, while temporarily solving others, i.e., 
respectively, the rise of protection and the stimulation of aggregate demand. Hobson ascribed 
the maladies affecting the economies of the world not to the War but to the underlying 
structure of capitalist distribution.
Much of Hobson’s analysis during World War One bears a striking resemblance to his 
writing during the Boer War. This is because his arguments during the World War are 
premised on arguments developed during the earlier war. Hobson was particularly concerned 
with the economic costs of war. Indeed, the scale of the First World War contributed to the
For Hobson’s claims of surprise and his reduced faith in the rationality of humanity, see 
Problems o f  a New World, pt. 1, and Confessions, p. 96, 104.
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only new aspect of Hobson’s analysis compared to his examination of the Boer War, the long­
term economic consequences of war. He analysed the costs of war in terms of lost trade and 
the growth of protection. He scrutinised the financing of the War. Hobson noted that indirect 
taxation and borrowing were the favoured means of raising funds for the war effort. This 
allowed the war to be pursued with relatively little cost during the war, lengthening the 
conflict Hobson believed, because people did not feel the true cost of their actions and 
continued to support war.^^ Second, the method of financing the war meant that the 
working classes would pay for it. The wealthy who had made war-gains in terms of contracts 
and lending to government at high rates of interest escaped taxation that would reduce their 
benefits.^® In both cases Hobson argued that the underlying cause of war was the nature of 
capitalism and the economic relations of the Great Powers to each other and to the rest of the 
world, especially the backward peoples. He denied the simple explanations of inflamed 
nationalism, diplomatic failure or that the war was an unintended accident.
In both wars, Hobson criticised the reduction in civil liberties. Though some 
restrictions might be justified, he argued that wholesale suspension of democratic rights would 
depress rather than enhance the war e f f o r t . H e  attacked the propaganda of atrocities and 
the démonisation of the enemy as well as the increasing secrecy of government activities. 
Finally, his social psychology of the brutality and credulity of the mob mind is echoed from 
the Boer War to the First World War.^° He called for a negotiated peace and attacked those 
who looked for absolute victory over the enemy, calling them ‘Never Endians’.^^
Hobson’s repetition and refinement of his previous arguments demonstrates that he 
was not thrown off  balance by the First World War, though its scale and the intra-European 
factor made it considerably worse than the Boer War. The difference in the severity of the 
conflict and the opposition to Germany led Hobson to be distanced from some of his good 
friends during this period. Hobson’s anti-war stance was highly unpopular, even with many
Compare the analysis of imperialist finance in Imperialism^ pt. 1, ch. 7, with Labour and the 
Costs o f  War, p. 10, 16.
‘The Coming Taxation’; Taxation in the New State, pt. 2, ch. 2.
‘The War and Civil Liberties’; Forced Labour.
As in The Psychology o f  Jingoism  during the Boer War; in his satirical First World War book, 
1920: Dips Into the Near Future', and in his post-war assessment. Problems o f  a New World.
The War in South Africa, pt. 3, ch. 6. Cf. 1920: A Dip Into the Near Future.
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of his own circle, such as Hothouse and M u r r a y .H o b s o n ’s consistent opposition to war 
as a solution to conflict is a tribute to the continuity of his international theory and contrasts 
with the many of his friends who were transformed by the First World War from peace 
activists to supporters of the ‘War to end all wars’.
Concluding Remarks
A Sum m ary o f  the Thesis
This thesis has scrutinised J.A. Hobson’s approach to international relations. Part one 
sketched Hobson’s theoretical system. Hobson used an evolutionary theory of society in which 
surplus and organic were the central concepts. His methodology emphasised the importance 
of unity and rationality in human progress. Hobson’s intellectual and ideological influences 
were diverse and sometimes contradictory. He merged Ruskin’s humanism with John Stuart 
Mill’s utilitarianism, and the Herbert Spencer’s evolutionism with the idealism of the Oxford 
Hegelians. Hobson’s theoretical analysis of social, economic and political life was part of his 
re-articulation of the liberal tradition towards social reform and state intervention. Widening 
and socialising the concerns of classical political economy, Hobson posited ‘organised 
cooperation’ as productive o f ‘surplus’ value beyond individual contributions. He interpreted 
value as human (and social) welfare, the overall well-being of individuals and societies. 
Hobson’s theorisation of surplus created a concept with two faces, cooperative and 
unproductive; the source of human progress on the one hand, and the fundamental cause of 
conflict in society on the other. It was also a concept he used to critique current social, 
political and economic arrangements. In the capitalist system, powerful sectional interests 
exploit the weaker members of society and expropriate an ‘unproductive surplus’. Hobson’s 
theory of the economic malady of underconsumption was a facet of unproductive surplus. 
Hobson deviated from classical political economy in his emphasis on the cooperative aspects 
of industrial life, including his remedy for underconsumption through redistribution of 
income according to the maxim ‘from each according to his capacities, to each according to 
his needs’.
Chapter three examined Hobson’s approach to international relations in the context 
of his theoretical system. Hobson’s system lends itself to a study of international cooperation
Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, p. 168.
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and organization. Drawing on the concepts of surplus and organic, Hobson’s study of 
international relations is both holistic and dynamic, integrating political and economic issues 
in a vision of an international society. According to Hobson, international relations was just 
one of the many levels of social interaction, albeit in a sense the ‘highest’ and most 
encompassing, constituting the beginnings of a world society of all humanity. In his approach 
to international relations, Hobson implicitly adopted an evolutionary framework of four types 
of international system: Realism, Cobdenism, Imperialism and Constructive Internationalism. 
Linked by an evolutionary dynamic propelled by the creation of surplus value, these types of 
international system were stages in the increasing organization of international relations. 
Hobson analysed contemporary international relations through the first three types, 
particularly imperialism, as a primitive but developing social realm. Constructive 
internationalism, the extension and final realisation of the logic of the organic and surplus 
concepts in an international government, was, for Hobson, the ideal towards which the 
humanity was evolving, though the prospect sometimes seems closer than at others.
Part two analysed the theoretical issues underlying Hobson’s writings on international 
relations. Chapter four presented an alternative to the orthodox international relations 
interpretation of Hobson’s theory of imperialism. Hobson’s theory was defended against 
charges of economic determinism and second image reductionism. The theory of imperialism 
was Hobson’s political economy of modern world politics and was a bona fid e  international 
theory. Imperialism was the product of sectionalism in domestic society certainly, but was also 
sectionalism in the nascent international society. The international relations of imperialism 
consisted of great power rivalry, the coercive relations of the advanced and backward 
countries, and the global scope of underconsumption in the world capitalist system, none of 
which were reducible simply to domestic or economic variables. The theory of imperialism 
was a political theory rather than a scientific theory. It was Hobson’s expose of the sectional 
business interests in imperialism, of the ideology and psychology of imperialism and 
imperialists, as well as a demonstration that imperialism was an economic cost not a benefit 
to the nation and the world. Hobson bound up imperialism with protectionism, militarism and 
war into a social, political and economic system of exploitation and reaction, that has as its 
final peril the possibility of inter-imperialism, the collusion of the capitalists of the Western 
great powers in the domination of the rest of the world.
Chapter five traced Hobson’s defence of free trade and championing of institutional 
intervention in his economic internationalism. Hobson explained the growth of a world 
economy through improved communications and transportation that facilitated increased
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capital flows and international trade. He suggested that increasing economic and subsequently 
political, social and cultural integration would follow. While offering a qualified defence of 
free trade, Hobson believed that measures of international economic governance were 
required, though he was rarely explicit about necessary institutional arrangements. The 
apparent contradiction of free trade and international economic government was resolved 
within Hobson’s evolutionary framework: free trade was the minimum policy for international 
economic and social cooperation, while institutional reform was the organisational corrective 
to the failures of free trade, ensuring equity and welfare, in an increasingly organised world 
economy. The organic concept resolved another apparent contradiction, that between his 
support for the increasing globalisation of finance and his earlier condemnation of the 
cosmopolitan financiers and foreign investment in the theory of imperialism.
Chapter six assessed Hobson’s proposals for international government. His suggestions 
were greatly influenced by the experience of the Great War and the Bad Peace that followed 
it. Hobson’s proposals for an international government, including a centralised collective 
international force, are difficult to reconcile with his evolutionary ideas of an emerging world 
society. Hobson’s bold scheme for the establishment of an international government, including 
an executive council, as well as an international legislature, judiciary and secretariat, 
employed the rhetoric of his evolutionary approach to international relations to justify a 
revolutionary change in the international system. He also stressed the importance of 
democratic control of foreign policy, the need for arbitration as a means of peaceful 
settlement of international disputes and the imperative of satisfying the needs of national and 
world economic development. However, the central feature of his proposals was the 
centralisation of force as a remedy for war between states. The emphasis on peace and order 
over welfare are an anomaly in his theoretical system.
Chapter seven considered that Hobson could only be labelled an idealist with some 
qualifications. There are, in fact, three modes of idealism in Hobson’s proposals for a 
reformed international order: traditional idealism, Cobdenism and constructive
internationalism. These three modes were Hobson’s responses within his evolutionary 
framework to the changing international environment. His move away from la issez-fa ire  
towards some form of institutional solution in international relations makes for two different 
approaches, but Hobson’s concrete proposals for an international government are different 
again, being premised on the need for a centralised state to control international relations. We 
have just considered Hobson’s part in the liberal tradition of international theory.
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The Criticisms
The challenges to Hobson’s theories have been discussed throughout the thesis. Many of the 
fundamental criticisms of his approach to international relations are part of an attack on 
Hobson’s liberalism. The most common criticism of Hobson’s writing, however, is that his 
journalistic style deprives his argument or his presentation of evidence of academic rigour.^^ 
The criticism might be expected to be particularly strong in international relations, where 
Hobson had little expertise or experience and no scholarly training. This common charge falls 
when compared to the presentation, as in the previous pages, of Hobson’s theoretical system; 
rich in ambiguities and contradictions but also a coherent outlook, developed in the liberal 
tradition and modified by experience. This applies to his international theory as an integral 
part of his theoretical system. Hobson was not purely an opportunist in his writings, cobbling 
together any available theory or evidence. According to Hobson, each event and new piece 
of evidence was to be understood in terms of a philosophy of history stressing the unity of 
knowledge.
A further difficulty arises because Hobson wrote before and during the 
institutionalisation of academic specialisms, not only in international relations but also 
economics, politics, sociology and psychology. Though he wrote a lot on economic issues, 
Hobson’s work straddled academic disciplines. Being one of the early writers in these 
subsequently professionalised fields, Hobson has come to be considered an intellectual ‘jack 
of all trades, master of none’. His work has been evaluated by the academic disciplines to 
which he contributed but only in terms of each separate specialism, despite the anachronism 
this entails as it manufactures the fictions Hobson the economist, Hobson the sociologist, 
Hobson the critic of imperialism and even the historical Hobson. These disciplines, with 
economics the most strident, have tended to construe the history of ideas in their field as the 
progress towards the status of science now attained. His normative and evolutionary concerns 
and assumptions have been rejected by the professional scholars, seeking academic credibility, 
predominantly by demonstrating scientific d e t a c h m e n t . A n  ahistorical misconstruction 
marginalises Hobson as a sadly misinformed and misguided early writer: his work is like the
Michael Freeden, ‘Introduction’, to Freeden (ed.), J.A. Hobson: A Reader., p. 2.
Social Problem, ch. 20.
Hobson was critical of the attempt of social scientists to be detached. See Free Thought, p. 37.
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alchemy that gave way to modern science in Thomas K uhn’s account.^® This is as 
appropriate a criticism of international relations’ understanding of Hobson as it is of other 
academic disciplines. Hobson wrote as a generalist in the tradition of great thinkers and 
philosophers, and his generalism and wide vision should be embraced as an antidote to 
disciplinary parochialism. He provided a coherent world-view, a whole perspective of human 
life in society drawn from a view of human nature, evolution and the progress of civilisation.
Hobson’s analyses have in many instances been superseded with the passing of time. 
Events, such as World War Two, and developments, such as, say, computerisation, radically 
alter the social context and the nature of phenomena that Hobson was attempting to explain. 
Much of Hobson’s analysis of international economic relations has now been surpassed by 
more sophisticated theory. More accurate means of gathering and assessing data have been 
developed since Hobson’s time, frequently challenging the results Hobson advanced. Hobson’s 
theory of imperialism has been overtaken by changing world events and superseded by 
subsequent theory in the form of the Leninist explanation and more recently, dependency 
theory and world systems a n a ly s is .H o w e v e r ,  it is a lot to expect a theorist who died over 
fifty years ago, and who had concerns peculiar to his era, to appear contemporary in every 
respect. Claims to contemporary relevance can be deceptive. The appearance of contemporary 
relevance is commonly based on the repetition of banalities, such as the assertion that states 
will always conflict, the like of which Hobson avoided, preferring to try to explain the sources 
and the reason for the persistence of international conflict, both much more susceptible to 
change.
Another common criticism of liberal writing on international relations is the apparent 
reliance on the domestic analogy. The extrapolation from domestic institutions to proposals 
for solutions for international problems is a familiar element of liberal reformism in 
international theory. The domestic analogy is held by many, however, to be problematic, 
mainly because of the disanalogies between international relations and domestic society. 
Hidemi Suganami has identified two variants of the domestic analogy: the internationalist, 
where the analogy is between states in international society and persons in domestic society; 
and the cosmopolitan, where the analogy is drawn between a world society of all humanity
46 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions.
Two examples among neo-Marxist scholarship are Fred Halliday, ‘Vigilantism in International 
Relations’, and Giovanni Arrighi, ‘Concluding Remarks’, The Geometry o f  Imperialism.
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and domestic society/^
As we have seen, Hobson applied his theory of cooperative surplus to all organic forms 
from individuals to the society of all humankind, and his view of international relations was 
that it was an emerging global community based in the commercial intercourse of nations 
rather than states. This approach appears to be a form of the cosmopolitan domestic analogy. 
Hobson’s only use of the term domestic analogy accords with this interpretation. On the other 
hand, when Hobson discussed the relations of nations in an international organisation, he 
adopted the internationalist variant, drawing parallels between nations in international society 
and persons in domestic society. In particular, he adopted a rather crude example of the 
internationalist domestic analogy in his proposal for an international government.
Problems with the internationalist domestic analogy are the greater. Even if 
interdependence between states advances and an international society can be said to exist, the 
analogy between states and people will remain far from perfect. On the other, with the 
advance of interdependence and the growth of a world society, people might plausibly be 
expected to relate to the world authority as they do to the current nationally based authorities. 
The issue for the cosmopolitan analogy is the extent to which this can be said to be near to 
realisation.^^ Criticisms of the domestic analogy have been part of the founding of 
international relations as an academic discipline, justifying as it does the autonomy of 
international politics and law from domestic politics and law. Such criticisms have dismissed 
the notion that international relations can become more like domestic society because of the 
anarchical relations of sovereign states in international relations.
The criticisms of the domestic analogy have themselves been subjected to criticism 
lately. It is pointed out that both the domestic analogy and the critique of the analogy presume 
the association of hierarchy and order as the premise for society. Lacking hierarchical order, 
because of the establishment of such order within sovereign states, international relations is 
conceived by realists, as the perpetually anarchical, disordered realm. So-called idealists hope 
for the establishment of an international political community, but on the basis of hierarchy. 
The political possibilities are thus constrained within the hierarchy/anarchy, realism/idealism 
d i c h o t o m y .T h i s  poses a serious problem for international theory: any attempt at reform.
Hidemi Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals^ p. 35-7.
For an instance of the cosmopolitan domestic analogy, see Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory 
and International Relations.
50 R.K. Ashley, ‘The Powers of Anarchy’, pp. 1-23.
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or suggestion that reform is possible because international relations are becoming more like 
domestic society, are rendered taboo by accusations of domestic analogy. This censoring of 
progressive international theory conceives all truly political experience as domestic political 
experience; there is no such thing as an experience of international p o l i t ic s .H o b s o n  would 
certainly have denied this. His international government is a domestic, hierarchical 
government writ large, however. Only in the evolutionary framework of constructive 
internationalism, do we see the possibility of alternative political forms for global democracy.
Hobson wrote, I have argued, in the liberal tradition of international relations, despite 
the fact that he modified liberal internationalism extensively. The liberal tradition of which 
Hobson was a part has been charged with individualism, positivism, paternalism, modernism 
and rationalism. Some of these criticisms are more appropriate to Hobson than others. Hobson 
was, as Allett has pointed out, one of the least sociologically naive l i b e r a l s .H e  realised the 
impossibility of individualism as espoused in nineteenth century liberalism and believed that 
it was undesirable as an ideology for social reform.®^
While Hobson was a strident critic of the application of natural scientific methods to 
the social sciences, he was enough of a Comtean positivist to believe in the need for a single 
science of society. This science would have as its purpose the improvement of the human 
condition and would be established by unitary scientific criteria. This scientific reason was 
to be the guide of civilisation following the demise of God in the face of critical rationalism. 
Hobson’s Comtean positivism and his evolutionism were optimistic prejudices about the 
development of human civilisation and internationalism that have since been ruthlessly 
exposed both by subsequent theorists, such as Talcott Parsons in sociology and by the realists 
in international r e l a t io n s .B e fo r e  condemning Hobson as a positivist, however, we should 
be careful to distinguish three possible relationships between science and society that might 
be construed as positivism. The first is that all science should be based on the methodology
See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, ‘Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life’, p. 262.
John Allett, New Liberalism , p. 262.
Yet, there is a tension between Hobson’s advocacy of the importance of community and society 
and his maintenance of, and indeed increasing support for, the liberal tenet that human progress has 
to be judged in terms of the improvements for individuals. The basis for Hobson’s reforms were to 
this extent at least individualist; social reform was to improve the individual lot. Hobson’s positivism 
is of a different sort to the logical positivism commonly identified as a sin in recent international 
theory. This is most evident in his later work. See Wealth and L ife , ch. 2, esp. p. 22.
Talcott Parsons, The Structure o f  Social Action, pt. I.
257
of the natural sciences. The second is the notion of a single social science, a science of society, 
that will be a guide for individual and social life. The third form is the suggestion that the 
natural sciences have improved the material conditions of society, thus creating the basis for 
a freer, more spiritual existence. Hobson refused the first utterly. He believed in the benefits 
of the application of science and technology. But his positivism consists in his belief in a 
science of society as a method of social reform. Hobson’s positivism was not to advance a 
science of international relations, but to emphasise that similar rules apply to all forms of 
social organisation.
Hobson’s paternalism, on the other hand, is often quite patent. His condemnation of 
the behaviour of the British masses during the Boer War has been attacked by John Hall as 
smacking of e l i t i s m .H i s  attitude to the backward peoples, though encouraging, implicitly 
treats them as children. Significantly, Hobson never describes them as the backward nations 
because nationhood was an indication of civilisation. Hobson’s paternalism (unlike his anti­
semitism, which can be ascribed to the culture of the day) is not an anomaly in his writings 
but a function of his conception of the evolution of civilisation and internationalism. 
Internationalism is to be led by those who possess the correct knowledge as assessed by 
scientific reason.
Hobson was a passionate and committed modernist. The industrial revolution was the 
clearest material manifestation of the modern era. Despite his hesitations concerning the 
Ruskinian reservations about the effect on the humanity of workers of industrial routine, he 
celebrated mechanisation and rationalisation. These were processes that could be abused, for 
sure, but if used sensibly could free up leisure time and thus be harnessed to the improvement 
of human welfare. His approach to international relations exudes a faith in modernity in the 
shape of internationalism deriving from the effects of the industrial revolution on 
communications technology. His belief in modernity is most clear in his use of the term 
civilisation and his belief in human progress, both modernist concepts. Progress suggests that 
current industrial society is an improvement on previous forms of social organisation and ways 
of life. Culture and social, political and economic organisation considered pre-modern are
John Hall, Liberalism, pp. 94-5, citing R.W. Price, An Imperial War and the British Working 
Classes.
Hobson is close in terms of his paternalism to the elitism of J.S. Mill and the emphasis on 
experts of the Webbs. See H.B. Acton, ‘Introduction’, to J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism. On Liberty and 
Considerations on Representative Covernmeni, p. xiii-iv. B.L. Crowley, The Self. The Individual and 
the Community, chs. 4-5.
258
implicitly and sometimes explicitly denigrated in the discourse of progress. Despite Hobson’s 
connection of civilisation with internationalism and democracy, it remains a heady mixture 
of  a Western world-view, race and culture combined with a faith in the increasing 
rationalisation, that is. Westernisation, of the world. Even in his critical remarks on Western 
imperialism, Hobson argued that there was no return to isolation for the backward peoples (or 
for that matter for any nation, even the powerful United States). They had no choice but to 
participate in modern civilisation.
Hobson was a rationalist. Though he held the view that reason must include the 
passions, he believed that civilisation resided in the supremacy of reason over the passions. 
He believed in the constructive mission of rationality as well as its critical aspect in subjecting 
each tradition, custom and custom to the judgement of sceptical r e a s o n .H o b s o n  was 
convinced that rational methods of administering international relations could be drawn up 
to solve the problems of nations. A scheme was required, rather than the participation or 
discussion of each state’s representatives.^®
The experience of the twentieth century, the World Wars, the rise of fascist and 
communist ideologies and dictatorships, and the grand opposition of the Cold War has 
challenged liberal ideology and particularly the rationalist belief in progress towards 
democracy, peace and internationalism. Even the welfare state, which can be seen as a part 
o f  Hobson’s legacy for socio-economic policy, has recently been called into question. Hobson’s 
influence on domestic policy, however, has been much larger than in foreign and international 
policies. His internationalist ideas have remained quite distant, both in terms of their practical 
realisation and the premises upon which they rested.®® However, with the ending of the Cold 
War, the fall of communist regimes and the victory for the so-called Allies in the Gulf War, 
new possibilities for internationalism have opened up. With these changes, Hobson’s 
international theory potentially gains renewed relevance. His insights might be applied to the 
impending single market in Europe as well as the growth of regional trading blocs over the 
apparently moribund liberal trading order. Hobson’s critique of the ideology of imperialism 
can usefully be applied to the current fashion to set national goals of ‘competitiveness’ in the
‘The Task of Realism’, reprinted with alterations as ‘The Task of Reconstruction’ in The Crisis 
o f  Liberalism.
This is Michael Oakeshott’s complaint about the rationalism of proposals for international 
government. See his Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays^ p. 6.
Bernard Porter, ‘Hobson and Internationalism’, pp. 179-81.
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world economy. In this regard, current international theorists might gain from Hobson’s
criticisms of competition and the parallels between his critique of social Darwinism and the
currently fashionable discourse of international competitiveness. Lastly, there are some
similarities between the revived belief in civilisation and the advanced West in the talk of a
New World Order. Hobson’s critical assessment of the world order to be established by the
Great Powers after the First World War resound for the contemporary scene strikes a chord
today. Describing the origin of the League of Nations, Hobson remarked:
The project introduces itself under the title of world-order. Why should not the ruling 
classes of the most powerful Western Allies undertake in the name of pacific 
internationalism the political government and the economic exploitation of the weaker 
peoples and the less developed countries of the world? ... [The Allies] could police the 
world in the name of international order, and force their decisions in their 
international courts upon the smaller members of their League or upon unruly 
outsiders.
Hobson’s Contribution to International Theory
Hobson’s approach to international relations might have been flawed, but this should not 
distract us from the seriousness of his contribution to international theory. Conventional 
wisdom in international relations has, however, marginalised Hobson’s contribution to the 
theory of economic imperialism. The theory of theory is indeed an important element of 
Hobson’s contribution, but it has wider ramifications than as a simple explanation of war. 
Imperialism is the basis of the structuralist paradigm in international relations.®^ 
Furthermore, Hobson’s theory provided the historical interpretation of turn of the century 
international events upon which hegemonic stability theory rests.
The implications of Hobson’s central concepts, surplus and organic, for his study of 
international relations as a whole (rather than simply in the theory of imperialism) have been 
neglected. The theory of imperialism was not Hobson’s only contribution to international 
theory. He developed the theoretical orientation upon which the functionalist approach to 
international organisation is founded by applying his theory of cooperative surplus to 
observed changes in the organisational arrangements of international relations. Like the 
functionalists, Hobson was primarily interested in welfare as the basis of his international
Democracy After the War, pp. 191-2.
Michael Banks, ‘The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, p. 17-20. 
See chapter four.
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theory. War, militarism and imperialism are considered aspects of a pathological social and 
international system.
With his background in economics and the priority of economic issues in international 
affairs for much of the time he was writing, it is hardly surprising that Hobson focused on 
political economy in his discussions of international relations.®^ Rather more surprising it 
the fact that political economy all but disappeared from academic international relations after 
the Second World War. Political realism, the dominant school of international relations since 
then, emphasised political power as the determinant of state action and concentrated on the 
global geopolitical struggle of the Cold War. Realism maintained a narrow conception of 
power, conceiving economics and economic power as either irrelevant or as elements of 
national political and military p o w e r . I r o n i c a l l y ,  Hobson’s marginalisation as an 
international theorist also obscured his potential contribution to the political economy of 
international relations. Hobson offers a contribution to international political economy in his 
analysis of the development of the economic relations of nations and the interaction of 
international politics and international economics. His refusal to accept the separation of 
economics from politics also makes him an important figure in contemporary international 
political economy. The context of Hobson’s discussion can also inform an analysis of why 
international political economy should again become a major focus of study. International 
economic issues were significant policy issues in the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly, the rise of 
modern academic international political economy in the literature on interdependence and 
transnationalism in the 1970s was prompted by concerns over the economic dimensions of 
power regarding the Oil Price shock and the collapse of Bretton Woods.
The most significant aspect of Hobson’s contribution to international political economy 
and the functional approach to international organisation was the new theoretical orientation 
towards organisation and the interrelations of politics and economics. Hobson’s emphasis on 
the organic nature in social life creates a holistic approach to the study of international 
relations. Hobson discussed the international system or the world economy as a single, unified
This was the case for a number of other writers during the inter-war period in particular. I have 
examined the contribution of inter-war theorists to international political economy in my ‘"Not at all 
Profound"? Reassessing Inter-War International Theory’, paper presented at the Canadian Political 
Science Association Annual Meeting, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 2-4 June 1991.
For example, for the absence of economics in international relations, see Fred Northedge, The 
International Political System', Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, and Hans Morgenthau, Power 
Among Nations. For an earlier realist formulation of economics as a manifestation of national power, 
see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, ch. 8 (b).
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system, denying the possibility of separate analysis of parts of the system. The fundamental 
unit of Hobson’s is not the collectivity of states, nor the global market, but humanity as a 
whole as a social entity.
Hobson, the History o f  Ideas and International Relations
Hobson has been shown to be more than a theorist of imperialism. This study has 
demonstrated that Hobson’s writings on international relations ranged over a number of 
subjects. His writing is both a potential resource for current theorists of international 
relations, in the shape of the theory of cooperative surplus, and a lesson as to the development 
of the study of international relations, to which Hobson contributed significantly.
A study of Hobson’s ideas has also enabled us to map the development of liberal 
international theory from nineteenth century laissez faire  to the latest writings in academic 
international relations. This reintegrates liberal theory in international relations into the liberal 
tradition from which it has increasingly been isolated as it became an academically 
‘respectable’. More broadly, filling this gap in the history of liberal internationalism reveals 
a vital and developing tradition and also the political and ideological underpinnings of certain 
international theories.
There is, finally, a more general implication of this study, regarding the approach of 
the study and the character of thinker addressed in it. A study of Hobson’s international 
theory, one of the neglected international theorists, widens the usual interests of the history 
of international ideas. While Martin Wight has ascribed the poverty of the international theory 
to the nature of international theory as a theory merely of survival as opposed to political 
theory as a theory of the good life,®^ there is a modest growth in the history of ideas in 
international relations. Commonly, however, this identifies a number of great thinkers (by 
way usually of obiter dicta) as contributors to a tradition of thought on international relations, 
the oldest of which is realism, including the writings of Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli and 
Rousseau. In construing the history of international ideas this way, international relations 
misunderstands and neglects the contributions of these and many other thinkers, groups and 
movements, either by omitting them altogether or by placing them within the grand 
opposition of realism and idealism (or utopianism) in international relations. International
Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no international theory?’. It might also be because international 
relations has been par excellence a social science in behaviouralist terms or because of the discipline’s 
closeness to the centres of state policy making.
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relations has yet to move away from the Great Men approach to international theory. 
Furthermore, the understanding of Hobbes’ Leviathan, for example, as a contributor to a 
tradition of international theory distorts the context of his discussion, takes the text out of the 
context of his time and imagines that he is contributing to some timeless problematic of 
international relations.®®
This thesis, as an analysis of the writings of one under-researched writer, is potentially 
part of a much larger project to bring to the discipline of international relations a semblance 
of maturity as a political, economic and social study following its naive scientism since the 
Second World War. It does so by examining the work of J.A. Hobson, one of its neglected 
thinkers, his contribution to international theory and his part in the development of the study 
of international relations. Hobson repays this examination by illuminating some aspects of 
current international theory as well as being a significant figure in the liberal alternative to 
the realist tradition in international relations.
®® For a discussion of the theoretical issues in the history of political ideas, see Quentin Skinner, 
‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ and Bhikhu Parekh and R.N. Berki, ‘The History 
of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner’s Methodology’.
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